Did Hitler & The 3rd Reich Save Western Europe?

[Omeganian]

I mean; was Bug a good defensive line there?

You don't cut your front short when you run out of river ; If anything, you concentrate more troops there to prevent a strategic encirclement.

After a few hundred km, there is no need to remain too close to the border. As for within the reach of artillery... not even if there is a river between you. That is, unless you fire first.

[Spoonist]

First of all, he is, not was. As for the salt - no doubt, but he does have a few good points. The maps do show some Soviet divisions rather close to the border.

After a few hundred km, there is no need to remain too close to the border. As for within the reach of artillery... not even if there is a river between you. That is, unless you fire first.

I'm unsure how to interpret your posts. You seem to disagree with an opinion that you then continue to defend.

So for the sake of clarity, Omeganian - are you saying that the positioning of USSR troops by that map is a hostile position before a potential attack? Or are you just saying that the positioning is a suspicious one?

I.E. do you or do you not think that they consitute a direct threat to their neighbors?

[Omeganian]

First of all, he is, not was. As for the salt - no doubt, but he does have a few good points. The maps do show some Soviet divisions rather close to the border.

After a few hundred km, there is no need to remain too close to the border. As for within the reach of artillery... not even if there is a river between you. That is, unless you fire first.

I'm unsure how to interpret your posts. You seem to disagree with an opinion that you then continue to defend.

So for the sake of clarity, Omeganian - are you saying that the positioning of USSR troops by that map is a hostile position before a potential attack? Or are you just saying that the positioning is a suspicious one?

I.E. do you or do you not think that they consitute a direct threat to their neighbors?

I believe the main idea.

[Spoonist]

I believe the main idea.

Again, that is not that clear. The main idea of what?
Why all of this evasiveness?

[Omeganian]

I believe the main idea.

Again, that is not that clear. The main idea of what?
Why all of this evasiveness?

Suvorov does exaggerate from time to time. But I do believe Stalin intended to attack.

[PeZook]

Suvorov does exaggerate from time to time. But I do believe Stalin intended to attack.

Then I guess he just plain forgot to order the Stavka to, you know, draw up some plans to this effect?

[Omeganian]

Suvorov does exaggerate from time to time. But I do believe Stalin intended to attack.

Then I guess he just plain forgot to order the Stavka to, you know, draw up some plans to this effect?

First, Stavka was only officially created after the invasion. Second, the HQ worked a lot in the first half of 1941 - but the results are not published. The exceptions are a few district level plans of border cover (not sure if it's the correct term in English; limited forces' defense until the main forces arrive) and an unsigned plan from 15 May 1941 (http://www.sovmusic.ru/text.php?fname=text5) - definitely not a defensive one.

[Thanas]

You do know that it is standard operating procedure for all militaries to have such plans ready? Their mere existence proves nothing. For example, Germany had a full range of color-coded plans available (which is why some campaigns are also called Fall Gelb and Fall Weiß).

Unless you have an order signed by Stalin to make preperations for an attack in 1941, you have no case.

[Stuart]

From what I've read about him he was an anti-soviet propagandist and so almost everything he had to say should be taken with a Polish salt mine while reading it.

I wouldn't put it quite like that. When Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun came over, he brought with him a lot of very valuable goodies. Where that could be compared with stuff we already knew, it turned out his material was accurate, The problem was that he then fell into the trap that all defectors fall into. He knew his continued prosperity and protection depended on him producing more and more goodies. After a while, his stock in trade ran out and he started to retell unsubstantiated stories he had heard from elsewhere and then what he guessed was happening based on his own knowledge finally ending up by simply inventing things. Since his first batches of goodies were accurate, it took some time before his later stuff was properly discredited.

When reading something from Rezun, ask two questions. How would a man in his position know this? And, When did he reveal this?

As for Stalin planning to attack in 1941? Not a chance. 1943, maybe, but 1941 is out.

[Ariphaos]

Actually, the problem is both simpler and more complex than that. During the 1930s, the Russians created an extermely modern and well-balanced army that had an excellent command structure. Stalin then effectively destroyed that Army in the Great Purges. What went to war in Finland was the derelict husk of that Army commanded by incompetent time-servers. Finland had nothing to do with the massive change in the Soviet Army that took place between 1937 and 1939. What it did do was catastrophically highlight the disastrous effects of that change. What the German assault in 1941 did was to reverse that change. It's not that common knowledge but there actually was a sort-of coup in Russia in October/November 1942. Zhukov and the other senior Russian generals went to Stalin and told him to his face that unless he allowed them to put the Army right and stopped interfering with the military command structure, they would walk off the job and Russia would lose the war. Stalin caved and from that point on, Unitary Command was restored. The Army that won the Second World War in 1943/44 was the Army Russia had in 1936 before it was emasculated in the Great Purge.

Had that Great Purge not happened, the army facing the Germans in 1941 would have been the 1936 Army but equipped with T34s and KV1s - in effect the Army Russia actually had in 1943/44. If the Winter War had actually happened, the Finns wouldn't be boasting about it today - or if they do, they'd be speaking in Russian while they did it. As Grazhdanin Stas has pointed out, logistic and industrial problems might well have meant that Army was not that effective outside Russia (although I believe he understates how effective it could have been) but inside Russia, the 1935/36 Army upgraded with 1942 equipment would have been a very hard nut for the German armies to chew upon. They'd have broken a lot of teeth trying.

Has there been any exploration of what would have happened if Stalin's paranoia really did exceed his sense and had Zhukov and co executed (or tried)?

[Omeganian]

You do know that it is standard operating procedure for all militaries to have such plans ready? Their mere existence proves nothing. For example, Germany had a full range of color-coded plans available (which is why some campaigns are also called Fall Gelb and Fall Weiß).

Unless you have an order signed by Stalin to make preperations for an attack in 1941, you have no case.

Signature means little - Stalin preferred not to leave traces (isn't that a Holocaust deniers' argument, too - that there is no signed order by Hitler?). And the argument works both ways - there is no defensive plan either (not even an unsigned one). But the Genshtab did work on something, and that something is hidden.

When Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun came over, he brought with him a lot of very valuable goodies. He knew his continued prosperity and protection depended on him producing more and more goodies.

What kind, exactly? What, did he expect that as soon as he reveals all he'll be removed from his teaching position and handed back to the Soviets? (besides, lots of people ran through the Berlin Wall while having nothing to offer to the West)

When reading something from Rezun, ask two questions. How would a man in his position know this? And, When did he reveal this?

He knows it by analyzing Soviet open writings - memoirs, newspapers, writings of Stalin and Lenin... As for when he revealed it - well, Suvorov says that he came to the West with the fully formed intention of writing it, just needed time to settle in, to get, read and organize the material.

As for Stalin planning to attack in 1941? Not a chance. 1943, maybe, but 1941 is out.

Why? What's the difference? Stalin had more manpower, more planes, more tanks - why not attack?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Signature means little - Stalin preferred not to leave traces (isn't that a Holocaust deniers' argument, too - that there is no signed order by Hitler?). And the argument works both ways - there is no defensive plan either (not even an unsigned one). But the Genshtab did work on something, and that something is hidden.

And regardless after all that babbling you have absolutely no case. Pure baseless speculation simply doesn't work.

What kind, exactly? What, did he expect that as soon as he reveals all he'll be removed from his teaching position and handed back to the Soviets? (besides, lots of people ran through the Berlin Wall while having nothing to offer to the West)

Don't be an idiot. Obviously they would pay him for everythin he said and wouldn't hand him back. And they were probably paying him by the loads and wanted that to continue.

He knows it by analyzing Soviet open writings - memoirs, newspapers, writings of Stalin and Lenin... As for when he revealed it - well, Suvorov says that he came to the West with the fully formed intention of writing it, just needed time to settle in, to get, read and organize the material.

You do realise that tonnes of material on the Soviet Union prior to 1991 was a load of rubbish because the Soviets were notorious for misinformation?

Why? What's the difference? Stalin had more manpower, more planes, more tanks - why not attack?

Because the Red Army just made lots of blundering mistakes in the Winter War with Finland, was still in the midst of restructuring etc. etc. etc. This was repeated throughout the thread and God knows if you even bothered to read it.

[Omeganian]

Signature means little - Stalin preferred not to leave traces (isn't that a Holocaust deniers' argument, too - that there is no signed order by Hitler?). And the argument works both ways - there is no defensive plan either (not even an unsigned one). But the Genshtab did work on something, and that something is hidden.

And regardless after all that babbling you have absolutely no case. Pure baseless speculation simply doesn't work.

Baseless? What about the May 15th 1941 plan? The forces positioning?

What kind, exactly? What, did he expect that as soon as he reveals all he'll be removed from his teaching position and handed back to the Soviets? (besides, lots of people ran through the Berlin Wall while having nothing to offer to the West)

Don't be an idiot. Obviously they would pay him for everythin he said and wouldn't hand him back. And they were probably paying him by the loads and wanted that to continue.

That's a motive to write interesting books. But how does that support the claim he's lying?

He knows it by analyzing Soviet open writings - memoirs, newspapers, writings of Stalin and Lenin... As for when he revealed it - well, Suvorov says that he came to the West with the fully formed intention of writing it, just needed time to settle in, to get, read and organize the material.

You do realise that tonnes of material on the Soviet Union prior to 1991 was a load of rubbish because the Soviets were notorious for misinformation?

Of course it is. Still, if everyone writes there were 5 prepared paratrooper corps (and more in the making), it can't just be ignored. The Soviets were not inclined to write anything that can be interpreted as a preparation of the USSR to attack. If anything of that kind does get through - well, what motive can exist to make it up?

Why? What's the difference? Stalin had more manpower, more planes, more tanks - why not attack?

Because the Red Army just made lots of blundering mistakes in the Winter War with Finland, was still in the midst of restructuring etc. etc. etc. This was repeated throughout the thread and God knows if you even bothered to read it.[/quote]

Those mistakes were over a year in the past (not "just"). And considerable improvements were noted by other countries before that war ended. Besides, what "restructuring" do you mean?

[Sea Skimmer]

Baseless? What about the May 15th 1941 plan? The forces positioning?

What about the construction of the Stalin and Molotov Lines? These were huge projects with a timeframe measured in years, work on which directly detracted from the USSR’s ability to build offensive things like improved communications near the boarder area.

Soviet deployments are nothing special, and just reflected a forward defense strategy anchored on the Molotov Line, with the Stalin Line on the 1939 boarder as fallback position. One might as well claim the ROK is about the invade North Korea because it keeps strong forces on the DMZ.

The Soviets had every reason to defend far forward; it let them defend the shortest line. The USSR gets wider the further east you go which means a more dispersed defense.

That's a motive to write interesting books. But how does that support the claim he's lying?

The fact that he is alone in making extraordinary claims? Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, not one book from one person. Meanwhile we very much do have extraordinary evidence of Soviet defensive preparations in the form of 136,000 civilian workers engaged on the Molotov Line project, supported by 201 army engineer battalions.

Why aren’t these troops building roads, railroads, airfields and supply dumps to support an attack? Maybe because no serious attack plan existed, if any at all?

Of course it is. Still, if everyone writes there were 5 prepared paratrooper corps (and more in the making), it can't just be ignored. The Soviets were not inclined to write anything that can be interpreted as a preparation of the USSR to attack. If anything of that kind does get through - well, what motive can exist to make it up?

Your asking what motive can exist to lie to make money in a capitalist society? Is that a joke? Everyone doesn’t write what you claim in any case, so you basically undo your own argument.

Those mistakes were over a year in the past (not "just"). And considerable improvements were noted by other countries before that war ended. Besides, what "restructuring" do you mean?

Of course the Soviets got better. Everyone stupid was just plain killed, they took a million casualties in that war. The Soviets also only won when the Finns literally ran out of artillery ammunition. You don’t replace losses like that overnight, and as Barabrossa blatantly proved the Soviet Army was a long way from reforming itself into something effective in the summer of 1941.

The reorganization underway was the formation of 21 new mechanized corps on the orders of Marshal of the Armored Forces Pavel Rotmistrov. He worked from 1939 onward to see the large mechanized units the USSR had disbanded several years earlier by collecting together all the independent tank battalions and regiments which had been scattered to the infantry. However the plan was only approved in mid 1940 and by June 1941 only a few of the corps even existed on paper let alone as actual organizations. This plan was additionally to be supported by construction of the ‘universal’ T-34 medium and KV-1 heavy tanks which would replace a large number of earlier types. In June 1941 only about 1,000 of these vehicles existed, against a requirement for over 16,000, plus 5,000 more new light tanks, which could not possibly have been produced before 1943.

Furthermore, if the USSR planned to attack then why did it continue to feed the Germans raw materials on credit until the very last minute before the German attack. Literally German troops crossed some bridges on the Bug River right after Russian trains rolled past carrying goods to Germany. It makes no sense to fatten up your enemy you plan to attack on credit. Your literally just giving him stuff to shoot at you with. No one would be stupid enough to do that, least of all a paranoid man like Stalin.

The only evidence of a Soviet attack plan is the words of one man we damn well know spins false stories; Stalin was to attack in 1941 is hardly his own obvious fraud. Meanwhile everything else is stacked in favor of a Soviet defense and a long planned Nazi attack.

[Omeganian]

BTW, Fingolfin_Noldor, in case you don't know, access to archives is restricted in Russia. And tons (literally) of documents have been destroyed. So, study based of documents is rather problematic.

[Thanas]

Listen Omeganian. Over here we have a standard of evidence. That means you either cite original documents supporting your viewpoint or serious historians arguing the same as you.

So either provide evidence for your claims or retract them. Your latest "argument", which was made while ignoring all other arguments, stated that the "archives are inaccessible", which pretty much translates to "I am not going to prove anything but the archives might support me". This is not acceptable. For one, it does not prove anything. The archives might just as well show that Stalin wanted to be a strong ally to Hitler.

So either put up or concede. No more evasion, no more hiding. Make a decent argument.

[Serafina]

I could be wrong, but weren't the archives regarding WWII opened after the decline of the Soviet Union?
So that statement of "they are closed!!1" propably shows only more ignorance.
Stas Bush, do you know anything about that? (clever abuse of autosearch ftw)

[Omeganian]

This is not acceptable. For one, it does not prove anything. The archives might just as well show that Stalin wanted to be a strong ally to Hitler.

So either put up or concede. No more evasion, no more hiding. Make a decent argument.

Currently, Suvorov has four books mainly concerned with that question, and one more is on its way (there are several books on other subjects which do mention that one, and at least three books of articles by his supporters, too). It's a bit difficult to find the main arguments. Here are a few...

In December 1940, there was a major gathering of the Soviet high commanders. The speeches were mostly about offense - and the main stated reason for the defense was to liberate forces from secondary combat lines to strike a strong offense. After that, a game was played out - Germany attacks, advances into the Soviet territory, then the Soviets drive it back and start to advance on its own territory... except that the advancement on the foreign territory is the only part which was actually played. The rest were ignored.

85% of the ammunition producing might of the Soviet Union was close enough to the borders for Nazis to capture - if defending, you build away from the borders. In spring 1941, when there was no storage space for all the produced ammo, an order came to bring all the ammo to the borders, and put it on the ground (till 1943?).

In May 15 1941, an offensive plan was written (though unsigned by Stalin). Two months before that, another plan was written, but it's not fully published. That is, none of the actual plan is.

Most of the forces were gathered near the border. some were actually between two rivers (Very bad for defense. Suvorov says he found 28 independent confirmations for their location). When Germany attacked, many units were simply blasted by artillery from behind the border.

The defensive lines were abandoned or dismantled outright. Another line was built slowly, on secondary directions, and in full view of the enemy (for show). Germans, on their side, did exactly the same, the remaining bunkers of both sides are indistinguishable.

A large number of airborne troops was created. 50,000 in the completed units (Suvorov provides the composition and the commanders' names), an equal number on its way. Airborne troops are not defensive forces. After Germany attacked, they were all remade into ordinary infantry.

A river flotilla was transferred into the delta of Danube. Not a logical place to expect an attacking enemy (swamps), but if you go upstream and blow up a few bridges through which oil went to Germany... It did start advancing when the war started, BTW. And many other forces did, too.

Another flotilla was moved into Pripyat. From there, a canal was dug to Bug. From there, the flotilla could move into Bug, and from there, eventually, to Berlin (the flotilla was recreated a few years later and did reach Berlin)

After the war started, two orders were issued the same day. Both ordered the Soviet forces to attack.

I could be wrong, but weren't the archives regarding WWII opened after the decline of the Soviet Union?
So that statement of "they are closed!!1" propably shows only more ignorance.
Stas Bush, do you know anything about that? (clever abuse of autosearch ftw)

They were partially accessible during the decline and fall. Now, they are sealed again. And literally tons of documents were burned at that time. Oleg Rzheshevsky, head of war history at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, even stated officially that documents concerning national and personal secrets will remain closed for centuries.

[Stuart]

Has there been any exploration of what would have happened if Stalin's paranoia really did exceed his sense and had Zhukov and co executed (or tried)?

Not to my knowledge; it could end up with repetitions in 1943 of what happened in 1941/42. Or, more likely given that Zhikov wasn't a dummy, there would have been a military coup and Stalin would have had an accient or died heroically or something. It's very hard to imagine the Marshals going to Stalin with an ultimatum like that and not having a Plan B.

What kind, exactly? What, did he expect that as soon as he reveals all he'll be removed from his teaching position and handed back to the Soviets? (besides, lots of people ran through the Berlin Wall while having nothing to offer to the West)

Don't be naive. Defectors got treated according to the value of the stuff they brought over with them and when they had been sucked dry they were given a false identity and more or less left to their own devices. The more valuable they'd been, the better the deal they got. Rezun started writing to earn the moneyhe needed to be comfortable in the West; then he found he had to keep writing to earn more money and make more outrageous claims. That's when he started making stuff up.

Why? What's the difference? Stalin had more manpower, more planes, more tanks - why not attack?

If you had studied this era in the depth you claim you would be well aware that the Soveit Army was in the middle of a massive reorganization intended to correct the deficiencies revealed by the Winter War and the false lessons from the Spanish Civil War. The Russian Army was in no position to go anywhere.

Baseless? What about the May 15th 1941 plan? The forces positioning?

That's tight, utterly baseless. The forces positioning was a relic of an at-the-border defense. As you would be aware if you had any level of knowledge of the events leading up to the German invasion.

That's a motive to write interesting books. But how does that support the claim he's lying?

Because it happens to be demonstrably accurate that Rezun's output became increasingly less accurate as time passed. We've already shown you why. We don't have to prove Rezun was lying, the onus is on you to substantiate his accounts.

In December 1940, there was a major gathering of the Soviet high commanders. The speeches were mostly about offense - and the main stated reason for the defense was to liberate forces from secondary combat lines to strike a strong offense. After that, a game was played out - Germany attacks, advances into the Soviet territory, then the Soviets drive it back and start to advance on its own territory... except that the advancement on the foreign territory is the only part which was actually played. The rest were ignored.

Standard procedure. There's no point in gaming out the initial stages because the initiative is entirely in the opposition hands. The planning and logistics side of things (which is why these games are really played) only cut in when the counter-offensive is started. So most such games start by assuming the enemy has reached a specific line and then taking it from there. This so-called argument proves nothing except the ignorance concerning standard exercise procedure on the part of those making it. And before you wave "suvorov says" again, just remember, the man defected because he was an abject failure at his job.

85% of the ammunition producing might of the Soviet Union was close enough to the borders for Nazis to capture - if defending, you build away from the borders. In spring 1941, when there was no storage space for all the produced ammo, an order came to bring all the ammo to the borders, and put it on the ground (till 1943?).

This is utter nonsense. Factories and industrial complexes are built to exploit the presence of raw materials. The positioning of Soviet industrial facilities were no different. Claiming there was a defense issue here is ridiculous. One might note that teh Ruhr is very close to the French Border, Silesia is across the Polish/German border and there are thousands of similar examples. One might also note that the largest hydro-electric facility in the USA is right on the Canadian-US border, So by your logic, the USA is planning to invade Canada?

In May 15 1941, an offensive plan was written (though unsigned by Stalin). Two months before that, another plan was written, but it's not fully published. That is, none of the actual plan is.

So what? There are plans to do everything; its part of the military function to make contingency plans. There was, for example, an Italian Navy plan to attack the east coast of the USA in the 1930s. Doesn't mean anything.

Most of the forces were gathered near the border. some were actually between two rivers (Very bad for defense. Suvorov says he found 28 independent confirmations for their location). When Germany attacked, many units were simply blasted by artillery from behind the border.

Again, so what? The original Soviet defensive plans were for a rigid defense of every inch of Soviet soil Of course that means having troops close to the border. They were in process of reorganizing to provide a defense in depth when all hell broke loose. You didn't know that Soviet units were actually repositioning deeper inside the USSR when the Germans invaded? Why does that not surprise me?

The defensive lines were abandoned or dismantled outright

Because of the shift from rigid border defense to mobile defense in depth.

Another line was built slowly, on secondary directions, and in full view of the enemy (for show). Germans, on their side, did exactly the same, the remaining bunkers of both sides are indistinguishable.

So are the ones in Southern England. Could it be because there are only limited ways to build a pillbox? Gee you think?

A large number of airborne troops was created. 50,000 in the completed units (Suvorov provides the composition and the commanders' names), an equal number on its way. Airborne troops are not defensive forces. After Germany attacked, they were all remade into ordinary infantry.

'

The Russians were building a modern, balanced, combined-arms army. Of course that included airborne troops. This argument proves nothing about Russian strategic plans.

A river flotilla was transferred into the delta of Danube. Not a logical place to expect an attacking enemy (swamps), but if you go upstream and blow up a few bridges through which oil went to Germany... It did start advancing when the war started, BTW. And many other forces did, too.

River gunboat forces have been statione don the Danube sinc ethe 18th Century. Or are you claiming that the Tsars anticipated the German invasion two hundred years before it happened. Another utterly meaningless argument taht proves nothing except the utter lack of historical knowledge of its proponents.

Another flotilla was moved into Pripyat. From there, a canal was dug to Bug. From there, the flotilla could move into Bug, and from there, eventually, to Berlin (the flotilla was recreated a few years later and did reach Berlin)

So what?

After the war started, two orders were issued the same day. Both ordered the Soviet forces to attack.

So what?

They were partially accessible during the decline and fall. Now, they are sealed again. And literally tons of documents were burned at that time. Oleg Rzheshevsky, head of war history at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, even stated officially that documents concerning national and personal secrets will remain closed for centuries.

First part is factually incorrect. Archives are opened on request for the purpose of genuine research. Beevor for example has regular access to Soviet records. This is common for most nations. In the UK documents dating from hundreds of years ago are still classified.

You are going to have to do a lot better than this. I would suggest you do some real background reading from scholastically-reliable sources before making a complete twonk of yourself. Rezun is an amusing read but no more authoritative than Sven Hassel

[JBG]

"Rezun is an amusing read but no more authoritative than Sven Hassel"

Ah, Hassel! Rolicking good reads for pimply pre-adolescents without a sold grounding in military history and technology. I was there once but have found reality to be so, so much more interesting.

Stuart you are being gentle. On home ground (HPCA) he would have had several new orifices carved for him by now by any number of members. Politely of course.

[Narkis]

In May 15 1941, an offensive plan was written (though unsigned by Stalin). Two months before that, another plan was written, but it's not fully published. That is, none of the actual plan is.

Every single country drafts all kinds of military plans, even if they don't intend to use them at the time. Not having a plan ready in case the unthinkable happens is far, far worse than having a useless one collecting dust in some drawer. To add to the examples posted by Stuart and others, the US wrote a plan to invade Canada in 1935 (War Plan Red). They even built some airfields close to the Canadian border to help the invasion. Does this mean that they seriously intended to conquer Canada?

[Omeganian]

Why? What's the difference? Stalin had more manpower, more planes, more tanks - why not attack?

If you had studied this era in the depth you claim you would be well aware that the Soveit Army was in the middle of a massive reorganization intended to correct the deficiencies revealed by the Winter War and the false lessons from the Spanish Civil War. The Russian Army was in no position to go anywhere.

What do you exactly mean by reorganization? In his book about the Soviet Army, Suvorov gives examples of significant changes in the army's abilities within months - the Winter War was over a year in the past by then.

Baseless? What about the May 15th 1941 plan? The forces positioning?

That's tight, utterly baseless. The forces positioning was a relic of an at-the-border defense. As you would be aware if you had any level of knowledge of the events leading up to the German invasion.

A few years before that, the forces were not that close to the border. The bunkers weren't either. There was a wide security zone. No "relics" in sight. Where could one suddenly appear from?

That's a motive to write interesting books. But how does that support the claim he's lying?

Because it happens to be demonstrably accurate that Rezun's output became increasingly less accurate as time passed. We've already shown you why. We don't have to prove Rezun was lying, the onus is on you to substantiate his accounts.

I noticed some of his later books suffer from that. But Icebreaker was written at the same time as his serious books (partial publication - 1985). Time didn't pass.

In December 1940, there was a major gathering of the Soviet high commanders. The speeches were mostly about offense - and the main stated reason for the defense was to liberate forces from secondary combat lines to strike a strong offense. After that, a game was played out - Germany attacks, advances into the Soviet territory, then the Soviets drive it back and start to advance on its own territory... except that the advancement on the foreign territory is the only part which was actually played. The rest were ignored.

Standard procedure. There's no point in gaming out the initial stages because the initiative is entirely in the opposition hands. The planning and logistics side of things (which is why these games are really played) only cut in when the counter-offensive is started. So most such games start by assuming the enemy has reached a specific line and then taking it from there. This so-called argument proves nothing except the ignorance concerning standard exercise procedure on the part of those making it.

But this game (well, there were two games, actually) didn't start from an enemy reaching a specific line. It started after the Soviets from that line threw the enemy back - and they certainly didn't throw it back without possessing the initiative.

And before you wave "suvorov says" again, just remember, the man defected because he was an abject failure at his job.

Some years ago, there was an 18 series film about Suvorov and his theory. On the other side, Russian generals were speaking. There were no bad words about his quality of work; in fact it was said he was a good worker, due for a promotion. What's your source?

85% of the ammunition producing might of the Soviet Union was close enough to the borders for Nazis to capture - if defending, you build away from the borders. In spring 1941, when there was no storage space for all the produced ammo, an order came to bring all the ammo to the borders, and put it on the ground (till 1943?).

This is utter nonsense. Factories and industrial complexes are built to exploit the presence of raw materials. The positioning of Soviet industrial facilities were no different. Claiming there was a defense issue here is ridiculous. One might note that teh Ruhr is very close to the French Border, Silesia is across the Polish/German border and there are thousands of similar examples. One might also note that the largest hydro-electric facility in the USA is right on the Canadian-US border, So by your logic, the USA is planning to invade Canada?

There are plenty of resource rich places in Russia, and plenty of space. And Ural is in much less danger from bombers. So why concentrate all the industry on the border? And as for USA building a power station a hundred kilometers away from Canada - In this case, it most likely means they are not expecting an attack from that direction. And besides, this is not an ammo facility. If you are fighting, you don't need to deliver full trains of electricity to your forces.

In May 15 1941, an offensive plan was written (though unsigned by Stalin). Two months before that, another plan was written, but it's not fully published. That is, none of the actual plan is.

So what? There are plans to do everything; its part of the military function to make contingency plans. There was, for example, an Italian Navy plan to attack the east coast of the USA in the 1930s. Doesn't mean anything.

And generals state they had plans. Plenty of very detailed plans. Which said absolutely nothing about actions in case of an enemy attack. The contingency lacked variety, it seems. General-Colonel Gor'kov (a prominent Suvorov opponent) claimed that was the plan which was used by the army. Later he claimed that the part about attack was removed from there, but that hardly leaves much of a plan.

Most of the forces were gathered near the border. some were actually between two rivers (Very bad for defense. Suvorov says he found 28 independent confirmations for their location). When Germany attacked, many units were simply blasted by artillery from behind the border.

Again, so what? The original Soviet defensive plans were for a rigid defense of every inch of Soviet soil Of course that means having troops close to the border. They were in process of reorganizing to provide a defense in depth when all hell broke loose. You didn't know that Soviet units were actually repositioning deeper inside the USSR when the Germans invaded? Why does that not surprise me?

An official directive to the Kiev district in June 13th stated that all the forces which are not close to the border are to be moved closer by the beginning of July.

The defensive lines were abandoned or dismantled outright

Because of the shift from rigid border defense to mobile defense in depth.

But why demolish (at least in part) the bunkers on the old borders? No one seems to be in any hurry to destroy WWII bunkers even today.

Another line was built slowly, on secondary directions, and in full view of the enemy (for show). Germans, on their side, did exactly the same, the remaining bunkers of both sides are indistinguishable.

So are the ones in Southern England. Could it be because there are only limited ways to build a pillbox? Gee you think?

Let's see. If your bunkers are meant to support an offensive, then:

1) Forces are to be gathered on the primary direction, and bunkers are to be built on the secondary positions.

2) Bunkers are not to be camouflaged; let the enemy think you are preparing for defense.

3) Don't make the fortified lines deep - that way, if you advance on a secondary direction, every bunker can support your forces.

4) Don't cover the bunkers with minefields and barbed wire - it's a hindrance to your own forces.

5) Don't waste too much concrete and steel - those are not long term fortifications.

Since each of those features can be implemented, and can be not implemented, that gives us 32 ways to build a pillbox. Germans, in preparation for an attack on the Soviets, used a particular one of those ways - one matching all five features. The Soviets, on their side, used the exact same way.

A large number of airborne troops was created. 50,000 in the completed units (Suvorov provides the composition and the commanders' names), an equal number on its way. Airborne troops are not defensive forces. After Germany attacked, they were all remade into ordinary infantry.

'

The Russians were building a modern, balanced, combined-arms army. Of course that included airborne troops. This argument proves nothing about Russian strategic plans.

According to Wikipedia "It is assumed that tactical advantage cannot be sustained for very long, so effective Airborne missions require the rapid advance of ground based troops in support." Not a primary source, of course, but do you have one that contradicts it? Now, the troops in question were constantly practicing in close proximity to the border (Why not close to Moscow, or Volga? Is Russia small?). After Germany attacked, the Soviets had to remove thousands of parachutes from the forest (without a command from very high up any commander would have been shot for sabotage if he left parachutes outside).

A river flotilla was transferred into the delta of Danube. Not a logical place to expect an attacking enemy (swamps), but if you go upstream and blow up a few bridges through which oil went to Germany... It did start advancing when the war started, BTW. And many other forces did, too.

River gunboat forces have been statione don the Danube sinc ethe 18th Century. Or are you claiming that the Tsars anticipated the German invasion two hundred years before it happened. Another utterly meaningless argument taht proves nothing except the utter lack of historical knowledge of its proponents.

Stalin received a small piece of Danube. Into this small piece, he moved about half the forces which were previously sufficient to defend the 2000+ km Dnieper. For defense? looks a bit too much.

Another flotilla was moved into Pripyat. From there, a canal was dug to Bug. From there, the flotilla could move into Bug, and from there, eventually, to Berlin (the flotilla was recreated a few years later and did reach Berlin)

So what?

The river was so narrow there, that the larger ships were very difficult to rotate. Meaning, they were not supposed to go back (and what is the point of moving them there and building a base, if they are to be returned). The enemy threat was low there - so there was no point in them remaining. They couldn't move forward, either - except many people died digging that trench which could serve no purpose other than to give them that exact opportunity.

After the war started, two orders were issued the same day. Both ordered the Soviet forces to attack.

So what?

If you think that something can reflect the army's purpose and training than its orders and actions... In this case, an order to seize Suvalki and Lublin in two days. Not a word about defense. And the matching action - or, at least, an attempt.

They were partially accessible during the decline and fall. Now, they are sealed again. And literally tons of documents were burned at that time. Oleg Rzheshevsky, head of war history at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, even stated officially that documents concerning national and personal secrets will remain closed for centuries.

First part is factually incorrect. Archives are opened on request for the purpose of genuine research. Beevor for example has regular access to Soviet records. This is common for most nations. In the UK documents dating from hundreds of years ago are still classified.

You are going to have to do a lot better than this. I would suggest you do some real background reading from scholastically-reliable sources before making a complete twonk of yourself. Rezun is an amusing read but no more authoritative than Sven Hassel[

And yet Rzheshevsky claims he cannot present any documents against Suvorov's theory.

[Samuel]

A few years before that, the forces were not that close to the border. The bunkers weren't either. There was a wide security zone. No "relics" in sight. Where could one suddenly appear from?

A few years before the USSR was bordered by Poland and the Baltic states not Nazi Germany which had a much large military.

There are plenty of resource rich places in Russia, and plenty of space. And Ural is in much less danger from bombers. So why concentrate all the industry on the border?

Because it requires electricity, people and machinary which were most plentiful in European Russia?

But why demolish (at least in part) the bunkers on the old borders? No one seems to be in any hurry to destroy WWII bunkers even today.

To deny their use to the enemy. That isn't a problem today.

2) Bunkers are not to be camouflaged; let the enemy think you are preparing for defense.

Instead making it easy for your enemy to find where they are and blast them to oblivion.

Since each of those features can be implemented, and can be not implemented, that gives us 32 ways to build a pillbox. Germans, in preparation for an attack on the Soviets, used a particular one of those ways - one matching all five features. The Soviets, on their side, used the exact same way.

Those also match "allocating resources towards other needs and putting the bare bones on defense".

(Why not close to Moscow, or Volga? Is Russia small?)

While don't know the details airborne units are constrained by where the airfields are, units they are going to be working with and terrain to practice in (you want it to be similar to what you expect them to fight in- so if you are defending western Russia, practice in Western Russia).

And yet Rzheshevsky claims he cannot present any documents against Suvorov's theory.

Why would Stalin write up plans detailing not attacking Germany? This is why we have the burden of proof- because you can't disprove these kinds of accusations.

[Stuart]

What do you exactly mean by reorganization? In his book about the Soviet Army, Suvorov gives examples of significant changes in the army's abilities within months - the Winter War was over a year in the past by then.

Rebuilding an army, changing its ToE (do you know what a ToE is?), changing the structure, balance and function of its units. Suggesting a task of that magnitude can be completed in a year simply shows you have no idea what is involved in running an Army, And Rezun's "examples" simply confirm that the reorganization was in progress. You need to read real books to give you at least a baseline of knowledge as to what is involved and what happened as a result.

A few years before that, the forces were not that close to the border. The bunkers weren't either. There was a wide security zone. No "relics" in sight. Where could one suddenly appear from?

Doctrine changed from a defense in depth to a hardshell perimeter defense in the 1930s, largely as a result of lessons from the Spanish Civil War that appeared to discredit blitzkrieg type theories. Then following lessons from 1939/40 (more specifically Poland/France) the Soviet Army realized the hardshell perimeter theory was seriously wrong and tried to shift to a defense in depth. Much as the Japanese shifted from a meet-them-at-the beach defense to defense in depth and then back to meet-them-at-the-beach

I noticed some of his later books suffer from that. But Icebreaker was written at the same time as his serious books (partial publication - 1985). Time didn't pass.

Oh yes it did. Check your publication dates more carefully. Icebreaker fits neatly into the slide of Rezun's work from semi-serious accounts to sensationalized fiction.

But this game (well, there were two games, actually) didn't start from an enemy reaching a specific line. It started after the Soviets from that line threw the enemy back - and they certainly didn't throw it back without possessing the initiative.

Well, you missed the point there completely didn't you. The Soviet exercises in question started from exactly the same foundations as everybody elses when dealing with such situations. Your attempted implications simply do not hold water.

Some years ago, there was an 18 series film about Suvorov and his theory. On the other side, Russian generals were speaking. There were no bad words about his quality of work; in fact it was said he was a good worker, due for a promotion. What's your source?

The man himself.

There are plenty of resource rich places in Russia, and plenty of space. And Ural is in much less danger from bombers. So why concentrate all the industry on the border?

Because, if you look at a map of Russia, that's where most of the power generation, transport and communications facilities etc were. Also, incidentally, most of the centers of population - it's a bit pointless to build factories out in the pine forests where nobody lives. Having said that, the Russians were trying to disperse their industry - that's why there's a submarine building yard at Nizhky Novgorod. That sort of thing does not happen overnight. For your theory to work, we would have to assume that the great plot to launch an offensive in 1941 started in 1780.

And as for USA building a power station a hundred kilometers away from Canada - In this case, it most likely means they are not expecting an attack from that direction.

Congratulations, you have just destroyed your entire argument.

And besides, this is not an ammo facility. If you are fighting, you don't need to deliver full trains of electricity to your forces.

You do realize that factories require immense amounts of electrical power.

And generals state they had plans. Plenty of very detailed plans. Which said absolutely nothing about actions in case of an enemy attack. The contingency lacked variety, it seems. General-Colonel Gor'kov (a prominent Suvorov opponent) claimed that was the plan which was used by the army. Later he claimed that the part about attack was removed from there, but that hardly leaves much of a plan.

That comment hardky makes any sense at all and what little coherent thought it does express is irrelevent to the substance of the argument.

An official directive to the Kiev district in June 13th stated that all the forces which are not close to the border are to be moved closer by the beginning of July.

Have you looked at a map recently? And do you know where Kiev is?

But why demolish (at least in part) the bunkers on the old borders? No one seems to be in any hurry to destroy WWII bunkers even today.

To deny them to an enemy? In a lot of cases to utilize the equipment therein elsewhere. Or simply to get rid of a nuisance. It really doesn't help a farmer plow his fields if there is a circular block of concrete in the middle.

Let's see. If your bunkers are meant to support an offensive, then:

1) Forces are to be gathered on the primary direction, and bunkers are to be built on the secondary positions.

2) Bunkers are not to be camouflaged; let the enemy think you are preparing for defense.

3) Don't make the fortified lines deep - that way, if you advance on a secondary direction, every bunker can support your forces.

4) Don't cover the bunkers with minefields and barbed wire - it's a hindrance to your own forces.

5) Don't waste too much concrete and steel - those are not long term fortifications.

Since each of those features can be implemented, and can be not implemented, that gives us 32 ways to build a pillbox. Germans, in preparation for an attack on the Soviets, used a particular one of those ways - one matching all five features. The Soviets, on their side, used the exact same way.

That is utter nonsense. It seems as if you are quoting something without understanding what you are reading.

According to Wikipedia "It is assumed that tactical advantage cannot be sustained for very long, so effective Airborne missions require the rapid advance of ground based troops in support." Not a primary source, of course, but do you have one that contradicts it? Now, the troops in question were constantly practicing in close proximity to the border (Why not close to Moscow, or Volga? Is Russia small?). After Germany attacked, the Soviets had to remove thousands of parachutes from the forest (without a command from very high up any commander would have been shot for sabotage if he left parachutes outside).

Of what possible relevence is that? It has no bearing on the subject at all. Irrelevent quotations prove nothing.

Stalin received a small piece of Danube. Into this small piece, he moved about half the forces which were previously sufficient to defend the 2000+ km Dnieper. For defense? looks a bit too much.

Not really; depends on the threat profile.

The river was so narrow there, that the larger ships were very difficult to rotate. Meaning, they were not supposed to go back (and what is the point of moving them there and building a base, if they are to be returned). The enemy threat was low there - so there was no point in them remaining. They couldn't move forward, either - except many people died digging that trench which could serve no purpose other than to give them that exact opportunity.

Again, so what?

If you think that something can reflect the army's purpose and training than its orders and actions... In this case, an order to seize Suvalki and Lublin in two days. Not a word about defense. And the matching action - or, at least, an attempt.

So they launched a counter-attack. Premature no doubt but that's the name of the game. Say again, so what?

And yet Rzheshevsky claims he cannot present any documents against Suvorov's theory.

So you say. More likely, the thoery is so outlandish there is no point in discussing it. I'll bet that Rzheshevsky is also unable to present any papers proving there was no invasion by green martians in 1941. Once again, if you believe the Soviet Union was on the verge of launching an attack in 1941, the onus is on you to prove it. Waving around one book by an author of highly questionable competence and known mendacity doesn't prove anything when compared to works by serious and reputable historians such as Beevor, Glantz, Salisbury and Ericsson that flatly contradict Rezun's claims.

You still have to do a lot better than this. For a start, try making sure that your argument is at least vaguely relevent to the point at issue. In multiple cases above, you fail to do this.

[K. A. Pital]

I could be wrong, but weren't the archives regarding WWII opened after the decline of the Soviet Union?
So that statement of "they are closed!!1" propably shows only more ignorance.
Stas Bush, do you know anything about that? (clever abuse of autosearch ftw)

They were partially accessible during the decline and fall. Now, they are sealed again. And literally tons of documents were burned at that time. Oleg Rzheshevsky, head of war history at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, even stated officially that documents concerning national and personal secrets will remain closed for centuries.

Purest idiocy - more and more docs get declassified each day since their term of secrecy expires, or new de-classification orders are issued (e.g. most Kursk, Mius, Rzhev archival works were made in post-2000 years, the bulk of info only ever growing now with more and more goodies coming to light). However, there's already a vast amount of documents opened which shows ALL the data about the pre-war USSR, it's armed forces, etc. to form a general picture.

Moreover, I'm not sure WHAT you're trying to say here. You want to make a point? Make it. As for Hitler and the Holocaust, you should tread carefully when using it as a comparison. Guess why? There are extermination orders for the Holocaust. Not the very top-level ones, but there are orders and internal documents relating to e.g. Op. Reinhardt, etc. Same as for Barbarossa.

That aside, the positioning of forces etc. is an irrelevant aspect anyway. The decision to go to a war is primarily a political one, and only thereafter a military one. It doesn't matter really what forces you have.

Anyone familiar with the Soviet movements in 1941 would note that the USSR was caught in deployment; ie. it was not in a position to either attack or defend, it's forces were only being deployed to pre-planned position.

The Soviet doctrine also called to "defend on enemy land" in case of attack or even attack pre-emptively, so anyway what's the point in discussing the coulda-wouldas? When deployed, the USSR could've used it's forces for a preventive attack (with poor results, quite probably, for the factors mentioned many times).

However, it doesn't lend any credency to claims of a grand agression, because the political decisions just aren't there. An agression is an act of politics done by military means.

P.S. And to make myself clear: the USSR was deploying it's forces in 1941 and could've used them for a preventive attack is not a statement which is even remotely similaк to the bullshit that are Rezun's books, which "infer" agression from "highway tanks". Yes, that's true - Rezun idiotically and frantically assumes that the prefix "A" in Soviet tanks means they are "highway" (from the word automobile), and that trackless tanks are some sort of uber weapons oа doom agression. Heh.

So please, do discuss the Soviet plans, the Soviet forces disposition, strategy and politics. But please, leave ol' Rezun out of it. He's nuts, and better left alone, much like David Irving and other infamous figures of pop-history revisionism.

However, if one wishes to discuss Rezun specifically... we could make a good laugh thread out of it. I'd split it when I reach Haikou. Zaijian.