Did Hitler & The 3rd Reich Save Western Europe?

[Omeganian]

What do you exactly mean by reorganization? In his book about the Soviet Army, Suvorov gives examples of significant changes in the army's abilities within months - the Winter War was over a year in the past by then.

Rebuilding an army, changing its ToE (do you know what a ToE is?), changing the structure, balance and function of its units. Suggesting a task of that magnitude can be completed in a year simply shows you have no idea what is involved in running an Army, And Rezun's "examples" simply confirm that the reorganization was in progress. You need to read real books to give you at least a baseline of knowledge as to what is involved and what happened as a result.

A normal, constant process in any army, certainly in one that has increased fivefold over the last four years. So what?

A few years before that, the forces were not that close to the border. The bunkers weren't either. There was a wide security zone. No "relics" in sight. Where could one suddenly appear from?

Doctrine changed from a defense in depth to a hardshell perimeter defense in the 1930s, largely as a result of lessons from the Spanish Civil War that appeared to discredit blitzkrieg type theories. Then following lessons from 1939/40 (more specifically Poland/France) the Soviet Army realized the hardshell perimeter theory was seriously wrong and tried to shift to a defense in depth. Much as the Japanese shifted from a meet-them-at-the beach defense to defense in depth and then back to meet-them-at-the-beach

The defenses were being destroyed since autumn 1939. Especially after Meretskov was appointed as the Chief of the General Staff (and he just saw the effectiveness of Finnish defenses, so he knew what's a good defense)

I noticed some of his later books suffer from that. But Icebreaker was written at the same time as his serious books (partial publication - 1985). Time didn't pass.

Oh yes it did. Check your publication dates more carefully. Icebreaker fits neatly into the slide of Rezun's work from semi-serious accounts to sensationalized fiction.

I have in front of me the Wikipedia page, and a collection of interviews with Suvorov. According to them, the chronology is:

1981: Liberators (semi autobiographical, stories about the Soviet Army). Icebreaker, according to Suvorov, is largely finished, but work continues.

1982: Inside the Soviet Army (a serious book)

1984: Inside the Soviet Military Intelligence (a serious book)

1985: Aquarium (semi autobiographical, stories about his work as a spy). The newspaper "Russkaja Mysl" (Russian Thought) publishes pieces of the Icebreaker

1987: Inside Spetsnaz (a serious book).

1989: Icebreaker is published in German.

1992: Icebreaker is published in Russian.

The books you are talking about are most likely Cleansing (1998) and Suicide (2000).

Now, where's the gap?

But this game (well, there were two games, actually) didn't start from an enemy reaching a specific line. It started after the Soviets from that line threw the enemy back - and they certainly didn't throw it back without possessing the initiative.

Well, you missed the point there completely didn't you. The Soviet exercises in question started from exactly the same foundations as everybody elses when dealing with such situations. Your attempted implications simply do not hold water.

Point? The point is that the line which before the enemy's attack has been the state border, means absolutely nothing during the war. The logical place to start the game according to your logic is the farthest line the enemy has reached (the line was specified). Why wasn't it chosen?

Some years ago, there was an 18 series film about Suvorov and his theory. On the other side, Russian generals were speaking. There were no bad words about his quality of work; in fact it was said he was a good worker, due for a promotion. What's your source?

The man himself.

Let's look at another interview. Suvorov says that the immediate reason was: The head of their residency was replaced. An idiot was sent in his place. Suvorov was to pay the bill for his blunders. He refused, took his family, and fled. Your source?

There are plenty of resource rich places in Russia, and plenty of space. And Ural is in much less danger from bombers. So why concentrate all the industry on the border?

Because, if you look at a map of Russia, that's where most of the power generation, transport and communications facilities etc were. Also, incidentally, most of the centers of population - it's a bit pointless to build factories out in the pine forests where nobody lives. Having said that, the Russians were trying to disperse their industry - that's why there's a submarine building yard at Nizhky Novgorod. That sort of thing does not happen overnight.

85% of the ammo production near the borders? Those were all new facilities(their manufacturing power was about tenfold the 1939 ones). Where's the dispersal? Stalin built a new industry to replace it in less than two years - on Ural and in Siberia. You think he had problem relocating people there before the war, if needed?

And generals state they had plans. Plenty of very detailed plans. Which said absolutely nothing about actions in case of an enemy attack. The contingency lacked variety, it seems. General-Colonel Gor'kov (a prominent Suvorov opponent) claimed that was the plan which was used by the army. Later he claimed that the part about attack was removed from there, but that hardly leaves much of a plan.

That comment hardky makes any sense at all and what little coherent thought it does express is irrelevent to the substance of the argument.

The Soviet Generals had some detailed plans. They had no defense plans. And for areas beyond Kiev and Odessa, there could be no defense plans - since, according to a former chief of the General Staff, there were simply no up to date maps any further east.

An official directive to the Kiev district in June 13th stated that all the forces which are not close to the border are to be moved closer by the beginning of July.

Have you looked at a map recently? And do you know where Kiev is?

Kiev military district (at the time, Kiev special military district) included most of Ukraine. It had a common border with the Reich (and I gave a map showing that border). It was attacked at the first day of the war. Those are among the most basic facts where Soviet Military is concerned. You don't know that? And you criticize my knowledge?

But why demolish (at least in part) the bunkers on the old borders? No one seems to be in any hurry to destroy WWII bunkers even today.

To deny them to an enemy?

This was well before Germany attacked.

In a lot of cases to utilize the equipment therein elsewhere.

It was done before the decision was made to build bunkers on the new border. And the old bunkers were stripped much faster than the older ones were equipped.

Or simply to get rid of a nuisance. It really doesn't help a farmer plow his fields if there is a circular block of concrete in the middle.

Utilization of land, agriculture... That was hardly a factor in the Soviet Union.

Let's see. If your bunkers are meant to support an offensive, then:

1) Forces are to be gathered on the primary direction, and bunkers are to be built on the secondary positions.

2) Bunkers are not to be camouflaged; let the enemy think you are preparing for defense.

3) Don't make the fortified lines deep - that way, if you advance on a secondary direction, every bunker can support your forces.

4) Don't cover the bunkers with minefields and barbed wire - it's a hindrance to your own forces.

5) Don't waste too much concrete and steel - those are not long term fortifications.

Since each of those features can be implemented, and can be not implemented, that gives us 32 ways to build a pillbox. Germans, in preparation for an attack on the Soviets, used a particular one of those ways - one matching all five features. The Soviets, on their side, used the exact same way.

That is utter nonsense. It seems as if you are quoting something without understanding what you are reading.

It means that Germans built their bunkers in a particular way to better support their offensive. And the Soviets built their own bunker in the exact same manner.

According to Wikipedia "It is assumed that tactical advantage cannot be sustained for very long, so effective Airborne missions require the rapid advance of ground based troops in support." Not a primary source, of course, but do you have one that contradicts it? Now, the troops in question were constantly practicing in close proximity to the border (Why not close to Moscow, or Volga? Is Russia small?). After Germany attacked, the Soviets had to remove thousands of parachutes from the forest (without a command from very high up any commander would have been shot for sabotage if he left parachutes outside).

Of what possible relevence is that? It has no bearing on the subject at all. Irrelevent quotations prove nothing.

It means that forces which can be used for nothing but offense were gathered close to the border. What for?

Stalin received a small piece of Danube. Into this small piece, he moved about half the forces which were previously sufficient to defend the 2000+ km Dnieper. For defense? looks a bit too much.

Not really; depends on the threat profile.

It was the Danube Delta. According to Wikipedia, The Danube Delta is a low alluvial plain, mostly covered by wetlands and water. It consists of an intricate pattern of marshes, channels, streamlets and lakes. Marshes, water... chances of an enemy attack upon such terrain - very low and lower. Very low threat profile.

The river was so narrow there, that the larger ships were very difficult to rotate. Meaning, they were not supposed to go back (and what is the point of moving them there and building a base, if they are to be returned). The enemy threat was low there - so there was no point in them remaining. They couldn't move forward, either - except many people died digging that trench which could serve no purpose other than to give them that exact opportunity.

Again, so what?

Why were they moved there, then? Can you explain that?

If you think that something can reflect the army's purpose and training than its orders and actions... In this case, an order to seize Suvalki and Lublin in two days. Not a word about defense. And the matching action - or, at least, an attempt.

So they launched a counter-attack. Premature no doubt but that's the name of the game. Say again, so what?

If they were indeed as weak as everyone claims, why didn't they defend or retreat? Apparently, at this moment they believed they were strong enough to defeat Germany in a direct attack.

And yet Rzheshevsky claims he cannot present any documents against Suvorov's theory.

So you say. More likely, the thoery is so outlandish there is no point in discussing it.

In 1997, there was a videoconferencing between Suvorov and his opponents (plenty of historians with general and colonel ranks, carefully chosen). The result was edited (not a live broadcast) and shown by said opponents with the comment that "for certain reasons, the program was not a convincing disproof of the theory". Three years later, one of the people claimed that they have "outshouted, but not defeated him". Outshouted... not a credibility adding method.

Once again, if you believe the Soviet Union was on the verge of launching an attack in 1941, the onus is on you to prove it.

A theory must fit facts. Suvorov's theory fits certain facts (a few of them I mentioned). What is your theory, which fits said facts?

Anyone familiar with the Soviet movements in 1941 would note that the USSR was caught in deployment; ie. it was not in a position to either attack or defend, it's forces were only being deployed to pre-planned position.

Suvorov's point exactly - the army was being deployed, and caught with its pants down, in no position to neither defend nor attack. But it says little about the situation which could have been in a few weeks.

The Soviet doctrine also called to "defend on enemy land" in case of attack or even attack pre-emptively, so anyway what's the point in discussing the coulda-wouldas? When deployed, the USSR could've used it's forces for a preventive attack (with poor results, quite probably, for the factors mentioned many times).

Except that Stalin didn't believe Hitler would attack (there is a well known comment of his on one warning, ordering to shove the source of it where the sun doesn't shine). So, the forces were deployed for neither defense nor a preemptive attack.

However, it doesn't lend any credency to claims of a grand agression, because the political decisions just aren't there. An agression is an act of politics done by military means.

Stalin had a habit of making any decisions in a very narrow circle. Often - with no records kept. Like in mafia.

Rezun idiotically and frantically assumes that the prefix "A" in Soviet tanks means they are "highway" (from the word automobile), and that trackless tanks are some sort of uber weapons oа doom agression. Heh.

First, he doesn't insist upon the interpretation (however, there can be no argument about the BT meaning fast tank). Second, not automobile but highway. Third, he simply states that the tanks were hard to use upon Soviet terrain and roads. Fourth, this is but a minor point of his.

[K. A. Pital]

Anyone familiar with the Soviet movements in 1941 would note that the USSR was caught in deployment; ie. it was not in a position to either attack or defend, it's forces were only being deployed to pre-planned position.

Suvorov's point exactly - the army was being deployed, and caught with its pants down, in no position to neither defend nor attack.

No, Rezun's point was that the Army was DEPLOYED to attack.

Except that Stalin didn't believe Hitler would attack (there is a well known comment of his on one warning, ordering to shove the source of it where the sun doesn't shine).

Really? Perhaps Stalin did it because Stalin received 10 false dates and many false warnings? The Soviet command had no doubts Hitler would attack, they did not know WHEN. And if so, why did thу Soviet command issue orders to deploy 2 days before the German attack? You're contradicting reality.

Stalin had a habit of making any decisions in a very narrow circle. Often - with no records kept. Like in mafia.

That's strange - even such a small event as the Katyn POW execution was documented. I'm not sure you'll be able to prove this thesis. Stalinist USSR was a massive bureaucracy with papers on every corner.

First, he doesn't insist upon the interpretation (however, there can be no argument about the BT meaning fast tank). Second, not automobile but highway. Third, he simply states that the tanks were hard to use upon Soviet terrain and roads. Fourth, this is but a minor point of his.

Please, anyone who makes such an idiotic point deserves to be thrown out and his books burned. I'm dead serious. The T-34 and other tanks had the "A" index (it was common for Soviet tanks); so even half-serious, that claim's bullshit. And "hard to use on Soviet terrain"? Is he an idiot? The BTs made 600 km + marches over very rough terrain in the Far East for the Soviet-Japanese conflicts (where no roads were present, anyhow), and they were quite useful for off-road combat as is ANY tank (in fact, a tank should be able to pass over rough terrain to outflank enemies). Again, this is cursory knowledge.

So the claim is idiotic, yes. And Rezun's books consist 90% of such claims, or open falsehoods, misquotations, lies, or just plain bullshit sucked out of the ass.

Pardon me, but trying to say it's not so will force me to post a very huge tractate singling out every one of Rezun's dozens of falsehoods and errors.

[TC Pilot]

That's strange - even such a small event as the Katyn POW execution was documented. I'm not sure you'll be able to prove this thesis. Stalinist USSR was a massive bureaucracy with papers on every corner.

Aren't there a lot of documents, like lists of individuals to be purged, that Stalin personally combed through and signed? I seem to recall how Stalin had a tendency to involve himself in a lot of the minutiae of governance and administration.

[Omeganian]

Anyone familiar with the Soviet movements in 1941 would note that the USSR was caught in deployment; ie. it was not in a position to either attack or defend, it's forces were only being deployed to pre-planned position.

Suvorov's point exactly - the army was being deployed, and caught with its pants down, in no position to neither defend nor attack.

No, Rezun's point was that the Army was DEPLOYED to attack.

Where? He writes plenty about the Red Army still being in the trains when Germany attacked.

Except that Stalin didn't believe Hitler would attack (there is a well known comment of his on one warning, ordering to shove the source of it where the sun doesn't shine).

Really? Perhaps Stalin did it because Stalin received 10 false dates and many false warnings? The Soviet command had no doubts Hitler would attack, they did not know WHEN. And if so, why did thу Soviet command issue orders to deploy 2 days before the German attack? You're contradicting reality.

Many false dates while Germany was undecided about the date. By June the 17th there were no such contradictions.

Stalin had a habit of making any decisions in a very narrow circle. Often - with no records kept. Like in mafia.

That's strange - even such a small event as the Katyn POW execution was documented. I'm not sure you'll be able to prove this thesis. Stalinist USSR was a massive bureaucracy with papers on every corner.

And absolutely no documents on the important matter of removing Yezhov.

First, he doesn't insist upon the interpretation (however, there can be no argument about the BT meaning fast tank). Second, not automobile but highway. Third, he simply states that the tanks were hard to use upon Soviet terrain and roads. Fourth, this is but a minor point of his.

"hard to use on Soviet terrain"? Is he an idiot? The BTs made 600 km + marches over very rough terrain in the Far East for the Soviet-Japanese conflicts (where no roads were present, anyhow), and they were quite useful for off-road combat as is ANY tank (in fact, a tank should be able to pass over rough terrain to outflank enemies). Again, this is cursory knowledge.

There were no such distances on Khalkhin Gol (where Zhukov was displeased with the BT performance). In 1945, the older tanks remained near the border - for hindering the enemy. The newer tanks were the advancing ones.

[Stuart]

A normal, constant process in any army, certainly in one that has increased fivefold over the last four years.

Wrong. Armies do not reconstruct on the scale described as a normal constant process. Here, you are simply revealing your own lack of understanding of how armies work. Army reorganization is immensely disruptive and takes many years. Check, for example such things as the Pentomic Division and the ROAD reorganization.

The defenses were being destroyed since autumn 1939. Especially after Meretskov was appointed as the Chief of the General Staff (and he just saw the effectiveness of Finnish defenses, so he knew what's a good defense)

Which fits in beautifully with the realization that the Sapnish Civil War model was wrong and that defense in depth was the proper mode. And, by the way, there were no massive Finnish defenses, that's a Soviet propaganda line. The Finnish defenses were aptly described as "waterlogged holes containing one rifleman each" and the source for that is a guy called Mannerheim. There's a good possibility he knew what he was talking about.

I have in front of me the Wikipedia page, and a collection of interviews with Suvorov. According to them, the chronology is:

Chronology proves my point perfectly. However, Wikipedia is not an acceptable source for anything. Even less so when it quotes post-facto interviews.

Point? The point is that the line which before the enemy's attack has been the state border, means absolutely nothing during the war. The logical place to start the game according to your logic is the farthest line the enemy has reached (the line was specified). Why wasn't it chosen?

Try reading "The Road to Moscow" by Ericsson or any of the material by Glantz. These are reliable historians. Not con-men out to make a few bucks from the gullible. The reasoning behind the exercises and their formal is well-documented.

Let's look at another interview. Suvorov says that the immediate reason was: The head of their residency was replaced. An idiot was sent in his place. Suvorov was to pay the bill for his blunders. He refused, took his family, and fled. Your source?

Say again. The man himself. Read his books. He actually tells you that he was a failure and ran before his superiors relaized how much of one.

85% of the ammo production near the borders? Those were all new facilities(their manufacturing power was about tenfold the 1939 ones). Where's the dispersal? Stalin built a new industry to replace it in less than two years - on Ural and in Siberia. You think he had problem relocating people there before the war, if needed?

All of which confirms that, as I said, a dispersal program was in place, These things take time. Once again, you have just destroyed your own argument.

The Soviet Generals had some detailed plans. They had no defense plans. And for areas beyond Kiev and Odessa, there could be no defense plans - since, according to a former chief of the General Staff, there were simply no up to date maps any further east.

So what? All completely meaningless.

Kiev military district (at the time, Kiev special military district) included most of Ukraine. It had a common border with the Reich (and I gave a map showing that border). It was attacked at the first day of the war. Those are among the most basic facts where Soviet Military is concerned. You don't know that? And you criticize my knowledge?

I criticize your knowledge for the very simple reason that you obviously don't have any. As it happens I am very well aware of what and where the Kiev military district was. The point is that given the area in question, moving units around in it, particularly as part of a major shift in defensive strategy (a shift which is well-documented by real historians) doesn't have any of the significance you attach to it.

This was well before Germany attacked.

So what? Meaningless.

It was done before the decision was made to build bunkers on the new border. And the old bunkers were stripped much faster than the older ones were equipped.

So what? Meaningless.

Utilization of land, agriculture... That was hardly a factor in the Soviet Union.

A stupid, nonsensical remark. The Soviet Union might not have been a paragon of effciiency but clearing an obstruction froma field is well withing their capability.

It means that Germans built their bunkers in a particular way to better support their offensive. And the Soviets built their own bunker in the exact same manner.

Which is complete nonsense right from the start.

It means that forces which can be used for nothing but offense were gathered close to the border. What for?

To act as a mobile reserve perhaps which is how paratroop units mostly got used? The point is that the Soviets were trying to create a modern combined-arms army. Did that include an offensive element? Of course it did. That says absolutely nothing about whether Stalin was planning an attack in 1941. On the other hand his actual troop movements prove he was not. You lose.

It was the Danube Delta. According to Wikipedia, The Danube Delta is a low alluvial plain, mostly covered by wetlands and water. It consists of an intricate pattern of marshes, channels, streamlets and lakes. Marshes, water... chances of an enemy attack upon such terrain - very low and lower. Very low threat profile.

And ideal terrain for the use of waterborne forces should an attack develop. Once again, Wikipedia is not an acceptable source for anything. You get an automatic F for using it.

Why were they moved there, then? Can you explain that?

I don't have to. The onus is on you to prove your argument. One might argue for example that the dispositions are intended to provide support for flanking counter-offensives. But, I don't have to provide a justification, you have to justify your hypothesis.

If they were indeed as weak as everyone claims, why didn't they defend or retreat? Apparently, at this moment they believed they were strong enough to defeat Germany in a direct attack.

Actually the attacks mentioned were counter-attacks, in many cases aimed at breaking out of encirclements that were already beginning to form. Again, you need to read some real histories of this era. Try Road to Moscow by Ericsson or Stalingrad by Beevor.

In 1997, there was a videoconferencing between Suvorov and his opponents (plenty of historians with general and colonel ranks, carefully chosen). The result was edited (not a live broadcast) and shown by said opponents with the comment that "for certain reasons, the program was not a convincing disproof of the theory". Three years later, one of the people claimed that they have "outshouted, but not defeated him". Outshouted... not a credibility adding method.

So what? Television programs (especially ones related third hand by an extremely unreliable source) prove nothing. What counts are real histories, properly documented, by real historians.

A theory must fit facts. Suvorov's theory fits certain facts (a few of them I mentioned). What is your theory, which fits said facts?

That is utter and complete nonsense. A viable account of events has to be based on the information available, not just a few cherry-picked facts. Rezun makes his "argument" such as it is by ignoring all the facts that don't fit into his hyothesis.

Suvorov's point exactly - the army was being deployed, and caught with its pants down, in no position to neither defend nor attack. But it says little about the situation which could have been in a few weeks.

Once again you are obtusely missing the point. The Soviet Army was shifting from one doctrine (forward defense along a rigidly defined front) to another (defense in depth). That shift is well-documented. It is also well-diocumented that the Soviet Army was caught between the two. Certainly in a few weeks or months the Soviet Army would have been able to put up a better defense. That doesn't prove anything about whether Stalin intended to launch an offensive in 1941 or not.

Except that Stalin didn't believe Hitler would attack (there is a well known comment of his on one warning, ordering to shove the source of it where the sun doesn't shine). So, the forces were deployed for neither defense nor a preemptive attack.

Once again you have just destroyed your own argument.

Stalin had a habit of making any decisions in a very narrow circle. Often - with no records kept. Like in mafia.

Actually not so. The Russians were pretty good at documenting everything. They still are. Everything gets put into writing somewhere.

First, he doesn't insist upon the interpretation (however, there can be no argument about the BT meaning fast tank). Second, not automobile but highway. Third, he simply states that the tanks were hard to use upon Soviet terrain and roads. Fourth, this is but a minor point of his.

In which case, if he seriously says that, he is insane. I suggest you look at accounts of real technical experts like Zaloga on Russian tank design. Also at the real-world performance of Russian tanks.

Sorry, but you are still doing very badly. Let's put this simply. Your job here is to support the hypothesis proposed by Rezun (not Suvorov who is a pen-name without real existance.) It has been pointed out to you that the situation taken as a whole not only does not support his hypothesis, but is utterly contradictory to it. All you have managed to do is point to cherry-picked instances and chant "prove otherwise". That is not a valid argument. Partly because many of said instances are actually irrelevent to teh main argument and partly because they are shrounded in falsehood and inaccuracy. Also, its pretty obvious that, between posts, you are running off somewhere else (a website named after a weather phenomenom perhaps) and asking "what is the answer to this". Try thinking for yourself, its a pretty worthwhile exercise you know.

[Stuart]

But please, leave ol' Rezun out of it. He's nuts, and better left alone, much like David Irving and other infamous figures of pop-history revisionism.

I'd argue with you there tovarish. Rezun is nuts like a fox. He's actually a smart cookie who quickly worked out what books would sell best on a western market and guarantee him a luxurious lifestyle and then wrote books to match. His five favorite english words are "pay to the order of". Personally, i think he is sitting somewhere having a really good laugh at the expense of pep[le who take him seriously. I know there were a lot of red faces in the intelligence community when they realized how much he had taken them for a ride.

[Stuart]

Where? He writes plenty about the Red Army still being in the trains when Germany attacked.

Which fits in perfectly with what really happened - as part of the change in defensive strategy that is very well documented.

Many false dates while Germany was undecided about the date. By June the 17th there were no such contradictions.

So what? Yet another one of your irrelevent comments that simply does not bear on teh subject at issue.

And absolutely no documents on the important matter of removing Yezhov.

Wrong. Try doing some background reading. Petrov and jansen

There were no such distances on Khalkhin Gol (where Zhukov was displeased with the BT performance). In 1945, the older tanks remained near the border - for hindering the enemy. The newer tanks were the advancing ones.

Neither point is relevent to the argument in question. The first does not exclude tovarsh Stas's statement while the second is of no conceivable bearing on the issue. Zaloga confirm's Stas's comment and refutes Rezun's

[Thanas]

Anyone who thinks television programs prove anything, is an idiot and has never been to a real conference of historians. These are at least-day-long affairs, at the end of which a panel discussion will at least last over an hour. And that is on issues which are not hotly contested.

A television program, even a television discussion, is worthless. What counts are papers, books and reviews.

[K. A. Pital]

Where? He writes plenty about the Red Army still being in the trains when Germany attacked.

No; he actually postulates that BECAUSE the Red Army was deployed in an attacking stance (he never explains what that is really; when an army is deployed you can both attack and defend), it was badly damaged. Not because it was not yet deployed. A huge difference.

Many false dates while Germany was undecided about the date. By June the 17th there were no such contradictions.

By June 20 the USSR's command already started deploying the Army. However, they were mistaken about the speed of the German deployment (believing it would take them a few more weeks if not months), and therefore made a critical strategic error. None of which indicates anything that would somehow prove any of Rezun's postulates.

And absolutely no documents on the important matter of removing Yezhov.

Wrong (as Stuart and others noted already). Everything connected with Yezhov's demise (like that of the preceding chief, Yagoda, too) left a huge trail of paper documents, from reports to arrest orders (not just one, but many, since Yezhov's appointed men in the NKVD were likewise arrested while their former patron was in the process of "removal from power", so to say).

There were no such distances on Khalkhin Gol (where Zhukov was displeased with the BT performance). In 1945, the older tanks remained near the border - for hindering the enemy. The newer tanks were the advancing ones.

Wrong; on Khalkhin-Gol, the BT-armed units made 500 km marches. In 1945, according to tankists' memoirs, the BTs were actively utilized on cross-terrain. Moreover, the BTs were produced from 1931 onwards for use primarily on Soviet lands and in the Soviet sphere of influence (Mongolia). It's pathetically stupid to assume they were some sort of specific weapons; much like everything else in Rezun's books.

If you have something else to say, say it. So far, three wrong statements as an answer. That is not good.

That's strange - even such a small event as the Katyn POW execution was documented. I'm not sure you'll be able to prove this thesis. Stalinist USSR was a massive bureaucracy with papers on every corner.

Aren't there a lot of documents, like lists of individuals to be purged, that Stalin personally combed through and signed? I seem to recall how Stalin had a tendency to involve himself in a lot of the minutiae of governance and administration.

Yeah, there are; they often compose whole books of shootings, signed by Stalin personally. If Stalin was willing to intefere even in such NKVD minutiae as death sentences, he was quite clearly willing to interfere in matters of military planning. and even without Stalin, the paper trail of any such high administrative decision would be downright massive.

Either that, or someone doesn't understand how bureaucracy works.

[Thanas]

Yeah, there are; they often compose whole books of shootings, signed by Stalin personally. If Stalin was willing to intefere even in such NKVD minutiae as death sentences, he was quite clearly willing to interfere in matters of military planning. and even without Stalin, the paper trail of any such high administrative decision would be downright massive.

Either that, or someone doesn't understand how bureaucracy works.

No, I think "someone" does not understand the amount of planning involved in ordering and preparing for an attack. As a thought experiment, how about Omeganian writes how much paperwork is needed for a single division to prepare for an attack. Apparently he thinks it is as simple as "attack here", which works quite well in RTS games but not in RL.

[Stuart]

No, I think "someone" does not understand the amount of planning involved in ordering and preparing for an attack. As a thought experiment, how about Omeganian writes how much paperwork is needed for a single division to prepare for an attack. Apparently he thinks it is as simple as "attack here", which works quite well in RTS games but not in RL.

Also, he seems to have no appreciation of how long decisions take to implement. His comment that less than a year was long enough to totally reorganize the Soviet Army was very revealing. Another useful thought experiment would be for him to go through the steps required for such a reorganization and provide a time estimate for each one. He can follow that up by working out exactly what is involved in moving a division from one location to another and provide a dual estimate of how long it takes and how much paperwork is generated.

[PeZook]

To be honest, a lot of people don't, since most pop-history books simply gloss over the minutae (or criticize it harshly as unneeded bureaucracy). It doesn't take much thinking to figure out what a logistical challenge it has to be to move ten thousand people and their gear somewhere - a literate office worker should be able to do that thought excercise, for fuck's sake...but most people don't even do that.

Yet, for whatever reason, they insist on mouthing off on those topics and casually suggesting outrageous things.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

To be honest, a lot of people don't, since most pop-history books simply gloss over the minutae (or criticize it harshly as unneeded bureaucracy). It doesn't take much thinking to figure out what a logistical challenge it has to be to move ten thousand people and their gear somewhere - a literate office worker should be able to do that thought excercise, for fuck's sake...but most people don't even do that.

Yet, for whatever reason, they insist on mouthing off on those topics and casually suggesting outrageous things.

Most documentaries on History Channel are crap anyway, and sometimes one has to wonder if the programming editor is some Christian fundie what with all the doomsday shows and so forth.

And a lot of popular science books gloss over many details, but then most of the general public seem to like to read good stories rather than facts.

[Coyote]

You don't think so? I'd be interested in hearing more. May have to start a new subject.

For starters Coyote, you'd need to give an example of how they were tied before he could tell you why you are wrong. If it is the anti-semitisim, that wasn't continuous in Germany. Not to mention it happens every time someone trys to make a new religion based of Judaism and discovers that the Jews aren't converting to their new faith.

Oh, that. Yeah, I know. I should have said the argument could be made and the connection was threadbare; my point was more to show Omeganian that history does not start with "event X" (ie, the 1933 election or the 1939 invasion) but is built upon many, many, many preceding elements, and many of those elements will be related only very distantly. I was using an extremely far-reach example precisely because it was far-reaching.

It's hard to have a good discussion about, say, Hitler's motivations without some knowledge of Karl Lueger's Austria, and so on back. Elements from the Teutonic invasions into Lithuania can be brought in as part of that "expand to the east" manifest destiny mindset. Martin Luther was, IIRC, the one who used talk of "concentrating the Jews in camps", etc.

[Thanas]

It's hard to have a good discussion about, say, Hitler's motivations without some knowledge of Karl Lueger's Austria, and so on back. Elements from the Teutonic invasions into Lithuania can be brought in as part of that "expand to the east" manifest destiny mindset. Martin Luther was, IIRC, the one who used talk of "concentrating the Jews in camps", etc.

Yeah....I was right. This is idiotic. Expand to the east manifest destiny mindset my behind. The aims of the German state since Frederick the Great have been in keeping what has been Prussia. Bismarck expanded to the west and Germany has been western-oriented since it existed. Anybody who thinks the teutonic invasions even mattered to Prussia one bit has not dome much reading. Heck, before Hitler came along, nobody took this kind of stuff seriously. And even then, Hitler and his Ostpolitik were viewed in context of the treaty of Versailles, not some idiotic callback to something that happened over 600 years ago. The Teutonic order is a really bad example for Prussia because the Prussian state only came to be due to its dissolution.

And I the statement that tries to draw a line from Luther to concentration camps....wow. Just wow. If you weren't a respected poster I would think you are trolling because there is no way one can equate the two or that the two are even remotely related.

[Thanas]

Idiocy HoS'ed. Continue.

[Sea Skimmer]

Idiocy HoS'ed. Continue.

Nope, thread is still in history forum only. Might want to try that again.

[Thanas]

Idiocy HoS'ed. Continue.

Nope, thread is still in history forum only. Might want to try that again.

Idiocy got it's own thread in HoS.

[Omeganian]

A normal, constant process in any army, certainly in one that has increased fivefold over the last four years.

Wrong. Armies do not reconstruct on the scale described as a normal constant process. Here, you are simply revealing your own lack of understanding of how armies work. Army reorganization is immensely disruptive and takes many years. Check, for example such things as the Pentomic Division and the ROAD reorganization.

Stalin once ordered one of his plane designers to create a new plane in three months. When the designer objected that the Americans spend two years on that, Stalin merely asked "are you an American"?

The decisions are the ones that seem to take a lot of time, and Stalin isn't widely known to have wasted years on that. It certainly didn't take "many years" for the Soviet army to reorganize enough to kick the German asses from Moscow. Now, Suvorov never stated that the reorganization was to be complete. He stated that the first attack wave was to be complete - the rest were to be organized and mobilized under the cover of its attack. Judging by this page, you don't need 100% equipped units in order to attack, either.

The defenses were being destroyed since autumn 1939. Especially after Meretskov was appointed as the Chief of the General Staff (and he just saw the effectiveness of Finnish defenses, so he knew what's a good defense)

Which fits in beautifully with the realization that the Sapnish Civil War model was wrong and that defense in depth was the proper mode. And, by the way, there were no massive Finnish defenses, that's a Soviet propaganda line. The Finnish defenses were aptly described as "waterlogged holes containing one rifleman each" and the source for that is a guy called Mannerheim. There's a good possibility he knew what he was talking about.

You completely missed the point. I wasn't talking about the bunkers. I was talking about defense in depth. Minefields. Bridges and infrastructure set to blow. Mobile units harassing your forces. This is what Meretskov saw in Finland. This is what the Red Army saw in Poland. This was Stalin's Line. In both the Stalin Line and the Mannerheim Line the bunkers were largely behind that area (in Poland, I'm not sure there were bunkers at all). But bunkers were built point blank to the border in August 1940. And later. The greatest efforts were concentrated in the Baltic District (a secondary direction). The bunkers didn't cover the important bridges. And a few days before the German attack, the Soviets started cutting down their own barbed wire. Defense?

I have in front of me the Wikipedia page, and a collection of interviews with Suvorov. According to them, the chronology is:

Chronology proves my point perfectly. However, Wikipedia is not an acceptable source for anything. Even less so when it quotes post-facto interviews.

His opponents say exactly the same - first chapters in 1985. The book was written well before the more speculative ones. Yes, he has a non-academical style there, but that's how he writes. His supporters are writing academically. Oh, and I wasn't using Wikipedia for the interviews - I had a book in front of me.

Let's look at another interview. Suvorov says that the immediate reason was: The head of their residency was replaced. An idiot was sent in his place. Suvorov was to pay the bill for his blunders. He refused, took his family, and fled. Your source?

Say again. The man himself. Read his books. He actually tells you that he was a failure and ran before his superiors realized how much of one.

Are you talking about the Aquarium? Well, first of all, it cannot be used as a source for details (this is a semi autobiographical book which distorts them deliberately). Second, I read it and I don't see why his behavior there must be considered foolish. Is it idiocy - hesitating to harm a friend?

Kiev military district (at the time, Kiev special military district) included most of Ukraine. It had a common border with the Reich (and I gave a map showing that border). It was attacked at the first day of the war. Those are among the most basic facts where Soviet Military is concerned. You don't know that? And you criticize my knowledge?

I criticize your knowledge for the very simple reason that you obviously don't have any. As it happens I am very well aware of what and where the Kiev military district was. The point is that given the area in question, moving units around in it, particularly as part of a major shift in defensive strategy (a shift which is well-documented by real historians) doesn't have any of the significance you attach to it.

The order stated to move units closer to the border (along with all the fuel and ammo). And to leave the units already near the border there. You said that forces were withdrawn - what forces? Yes, Suvorov does mention such forces. Most of the border guard moved deeper into the country, leaving the border to the Red Army.

It was done before the decision was made to build bunkers on the new border. And the old bunkers were stripped much faster than the older ones were equipped.

So what? Meaningless.

This included special bunker equipment. Why remove it if it's of no use anywhere else?

It means that forces which can be used for nothing but offense were gathered close to the border. What for?

To act as a mobile reserve perhaps which is how paratroop units mostly got used? The point is that the Soviets were trying to create a modern combined-arms army. Did that include an offensive element? Of course it did. That says absolutely nothing about whether Stalin was planning an attack in 1941. On the other hand his actual troop movements prove he was not. You lose.

I don't know about the West, but the Soviet field manual at the time stated the parachute forces are used to disorganize the communications and rear, and aid the advancing forces in encircling the enemy. Certainly, there was no attempt to use them as you said when Hitler attacked - they were merely converted into infantry.

It was the Danube Delta. According to Wikipedia, The Danube Delta is a low alluvial plain, mostly covered by wetlands and water. It consists of an intricate pattern of marshes, channels, streamlets and lakes. Marshes, water... chances of an enemy attack upon such terrain - very low and lower. Very low threat profile.

And ideal terrain for the use of waterborne forces should an attack develop.

For use of a 50 meter long ship which can't even turn around in the narrower streams? Looks as appropriate there as a heavy tank in guerrilla forest warfare.

If they were indeed as weak as everyone claims, why didn't they defend or retreat? Apparently, at this moment they believed they were strong enough to defeat Germany in a direct attack.

Actually the attacks mentioned were counter-attacks, in many cases aimed at breaking out of encirclements that were already beginning to form. Again, you need to read some real histories of this era. Try Road to Moscow by Ericsson or Stalingrad by Beevor.

I looked in Beevor's book (the Russian translation). He makes no mention of either of the June 22nd offensive directives. The guy says that even 12 hours after the attack, Stalin didn't order action in return - while the first of those directives (limited offense) has the time of 7:15 am. Both he and Erickson seem to admire a bloodthirsty moron who insisted on converting tractors and trucks into tanks by putting armor and machine guns on them (neither vehicle could move after that) and building 50,000 tanks over the course of 1928 (the very beginning of the industrialization). Some sources you have...

In 1997, there was a videoconferencing between Suvorov and his opponents (plenty of historians with general and colonel ranks, carefully chosen). The result was edited (not a live broadcast) and shown by said opponents with the comment that "for certain reasons, the program was not a convincing disproof of the theory". Three years later, one of the people claimed that they have "outshouted, but not defeated him". Outshouted... not a credibility adding method.

So what? Television programs (especially ones related third hand by an extremely unreliable source) prove nothing. What counts are real histories, properly documented, by real historians.

Once again, you missed the point completely. You said that historians simply don't bother with Suvorov. Well, here is the proof - they do. They publish books and articles against him, too (Suvorov absolutely loves finding mistakes and outright lies in those books). But it never leads anywhere.

Suvorov's point exactly - the army was being deployed, and caught with its pants down, in no position to neither defend nor attack. But it says little about the situation which could have been in a few weeks.

Once again you are obtusely missing the point. The Soviet Army was shifting from one doctrine (forward defense along a rigidly defined front) to another (defense in depth). That shift is well-documented. It is also well-diocumented that the Soviet Army was caught between the two. Certainly in a few weeks or months the Soviet Army would have been able to put up a better defense. That doesn't prove anything about whether Stalin intended to launch an offensive in 1941 or not.

Or they would have put a better offense. The 28th rifle corps, for example, in June 21st just finished a tactical exercise of an offensive operation and had another planned for the next week.

Except that Stalin didn't believe Hitler would attack (there is a well known comment of his on one warning, ordering to shove the source of it where the sun doesn't shine). So, the forces were deployed for neither defense nor a preemptive attack.

Once again you have just destroyed your own argument.

Why? Stalin wanted to attack - without being afraid that Hitler will. The forces were deployed for attack - pure and simple.

Stalin had a habit of making any decisions in a very narrow circle. Often - with no records kept. Like in mafia.

Actually not so. The Russians were pretty good at documenting everything. They still are. Everything gets put into writing somewhere.

First of all, even what was put in writing, doesn't always survive - in 1991, over the course of just two days, 12 tons of 1941 papers were destroyed, and in 1941, when the Germans were near Moscow, the burning of documents caused panic among the general population.
Second, Mikoyan, Marshal Ustinov, Alexander Yakovlev - all state that the narrow circle conferences in Stalin's time had no stenographers present - nothing was put on paper (don't forget, many of the senior government members back then had a long experience of underground conspiracy). There is no document saying "Comrade Yezhov has become too influential and is dangerous, he must be removed" - there is simply evidence that his people are slowly replaced by Beria's men, until one day Yezhov disappears. Same with what Suvorov says - there are documents on the lower levels (historians still argue about whether the combat plans even reached district and army level), which merely say - move division here, produce such and such tech, put your forces through such and such drills, organize border defense until the main forces arrive... And there is naturally no order to attack until the day of attack.

First, he doesn't insist upon the interpretation (however, there can be no argument about the BT meaning fast tank). Second, not automobile but highway. Third, he simply states that the tanks were hard to use upon Soviet terrain and roads. Fourth, this is but a minor point of his.

In which case, if he seriously says that, he is insane. I suggest you look at accounts of real technical experts like Zaloga on Russian tank design. Also at the real-world performance of Russian tanks.

During the war in Japan, those tanks were around five years old - not much for a tank. They were in the second line, behind the T-34 - so they didn't even use the full potential of their speed on tracks. Yet still, their non-combat losses on rough terrain seem rather high. Definitely not their terrain, even more so for using their full speed. Building over seven thousands of them for use on Russian territory at the very least seems irrational.

[Simon_Jester]

Stalin once ordered one of his plane designers to create a new plane in three months. When the designer objected that the Americans spend two years on that, Stalin merely asked "are you an American"?

Did the plane fly? Did it fly well? Was it plagued by design flaws?

These are not irrelevant questions: things like mobilizing and organizing armies take time for a reason. Skimp on preparations and you hurt your own effectiveness. Skimp too much and you've grenaded yourself in the foot before you even start.

[K. A. Pital]

Stalin once ordered one of his plane designers to create a new plane in three months. When the designer objected that the Americans spend two years on that, Stalin merely asked "are you an American"?

Stalin also ordered the USSR to construct 4 battleships by the year 1940. We know how well that went, nes pa? Desire is one thing; reality another. Moreover, what's the source for that tale, eh?

It certainly didn't take "many years" for the Soviet army to reorganize enough to kick the German asses from Moscow.

It took two years to reorganize the mechanized units of 1941-type to Tank Armies of 1943 type. The battle of Moscow was fought by the RKKA not yet reogranized (and it was fought with far heavier losses than following battles w/ the reorganized Red Army, e.g. in 1943-1944). You only betray your ignorance here.

Now, Suvorov never stated that the reorganization was to be complete. He stated that the first attack wave was to be complete

This is meaningless. The units right near the border lacked supply motorization and fuel. They would hardly be able to advance anywhere. Even the "first wave" was not complete, since the First Strategic Echelon was still under complectation when the Germans struck. It was in no shape to either attack or defend, and the unit density was far too small for a frontal attack, which would've led to a disaster. The question is not that of 100% equipment as well, but also that of the TOE of a Soviet mechanized corps. It was woefully inadequate for an offensive mission, especially in artillery and artillery transports (trucks and tractors) - all in all, a unit quite unfit for long-distance offensives.

And a few days before the German attack, the Soviets started cutting down their own barbed wire. Defense?

Source? The USSR continued construction works on the fortifications for years and years.

Yes, he has a non-academical style there, but that's how he writes.

He misquotes and openly lies. That's not "non-academical style", idiot.

His supporters are writing academically.

Outside of Meltukhov, who is hardly pushing forward the same thesis as Rezun, he has no "academic" supporters to speak of.

The order stated to move units closer to the border (along with all the fuel and ammo). And to leave the units already near the border there. You said that forces were withdrawn - what forces? Yes, Suvorov does mention such forces. Most of the border guard moved deeper into the country, leaving the border to the Red Army.

This is strange, because a lot of the NKVD border guards were also moved to new posts along the border. It happened for the reason that the USSR massively increased the density of the border defences and lacked men to properly equip the entirety of proposed posts. Or that's what I recall. Please, do provide sources.

This included special bunker equipment. Why remove it if it's of no use anywhere else?

Sources? I mean, you keep talking about this and that. How do you know what was removed? What was left behind, and what was done faster? How do you know what was the state of the Stalin line? Sources, sources, sources.

I don't know about the West, but the Soviet field manual at the time stated the parachute forces are used to disorganize the communications and rear, and aid the advancing forces in encircling the enemy. Certainly, there was no attempt to use them as you said when Hitler attacked - they were merely converted into infantry.

Really? So paratroopers were not dropped in the German rear?

Once again, you missed the point completely. You said that historians simply don't bother with Suvorov. Well, here is the proof - they do.

They don't. There's not even any serious academic debate.

They publish books and articles against him, too

Like D.M. Glantz?

(Suvorov absolutely loves finding mistakes and outright lies in those books). But it never leads anywhere.

So, did Suvorov find outright lies and mistakes in D.M. Glantz' books?

Why? Stalin wanted to attack - without being afraiseed that Hitler will. The forces were deployed for attack - pure and simple.

Why? You can deploy forces and then attack or defend. Stalin didn't have to make a decision on either before the forces were deployed.

There is no document saying "Comrade Yezhov has become too influential and is dangerous, he must be removed" - there is simply evidence that his people are slowly replaced by Beria's men, until one day Yezhov disappears.

There's a report on Yezhov and there are reports of arrests of his appointed men. If that's not a paper trail, what is one?

Suvorov says - there are documents on the lower levels (historians still argue about whether the combat plans even reached district and army level), which merely say - move division here, produce such and such tech, put your forces through such and such drills, organize border defense until the main forces arrive... And there is naturally no order to attack until the day of attack.

Well you see, Omeganian, once you deploy forces you can either attack or defend. But not before that. However, if you have a grand plan to attack, you'll leave a huge paper trail. How? Let's look at Barbarossa. It was decided in 1940, a year prior to the attack. Not just the plan itself, but all the OKH diaries, Halder's diary and many, many other documents show the point of decision for an attack. So basically, you're saying that while Hitler decided firmly to attack in 1940, Stalin COULD have decided to attack in 1941 if he so wanted (and would've actually possibly saved many millions of people from extinction, if he pre-empted Hitler's attack with a sufficiently ready force). That's not the argument made by Rezun. That's the argument which can be technically defended. But not Rezun's argument, sorry.

During the war in Japan, those tanks were around five years old - not much for a tank. They were in the second line, behind the T-34 - so they didn't even use the full potential of their speed on tracks. Yet still, their non-combat losses on rough terrain seem rather high. Definitely not their terrain, even more so for using their full speed. Building over seven thousands of them for use on Russian territory at the very least seems irrational.

And yet, the USSR continously used them on Soviet territory or territory which was even worse developed, infrastructure wise, than the Soviet territory (you continously ignore the 500 km march at Khalkin-Gol, right?). Moreover, so what if they didn't use the full potential of their speed? Weapons don't always have to be used at full potentials.

In any case, I see you're up for a serious discussion. So let's get it going.

[Omeganian]

Stalin once ordered one of his plane designers to create a new plane in three months. When the designer objected that the Americans spend two years on that, Stalin merely asked "are you an American"?

Did the plane fly? Did it fly well? Was it plagued by design flaws?

These are not irrelevant questions: things like mobilizing and organizing armies take time for a reason. Skimp on preparations and you hurt your own effectiveness. Skimp too much and you've grenaded yourself in the foot before you even start.

Yak 1 (sorry, it was 8 months, according to the designer himself, but he finished even sooner, despite a month long mission in Germany). Good enough to make 8,700 of them.

[PeZook]

Yak 1 (sorry, it was 8 months, according to the designer himself, but he finished even sooner, despite a month long mission in Germany). Good enough to make 8,700 of them.

This is complete and utter bullshit. The formal specifications for that fighter were released on 29 July 1939, it was order into production in 19 February 1940 and then underwent nearly 20 000 design changes on the production line until it finaly became a worthwhile fighter in 1942. Its performance in 1941 was pretty poor because of the myriad technical issues plaguing it. In fact, it was such a crappy plane that parts were often non-interchangeable between aircraft because of loose tolerances during manufacturing, which massively complicated logistics. It was, so to speak, a production-run prototype, only pressed into manufacture because of time concerns.

[K. A. Pital]

Yak-1 was "good enough" to make in the thousands like many other pieces of Soviet equipment. The rush in Yak-1's development seriously hurt it's battle qualities, much like with other Soviet equipment made in large numbers (e.g. BT tanks, T-26, etc.)

And yet, Yak-1 is a fighter. The USSR was so eager to deploy fighters en masse, but why didn't it build hordes of strategic bombers or lots and lots of modern dive bombers, instead? Those are a more useful weapon for an offensive operation than thousands of small fighters.

I'm not sure anyhow, how the rapid construction of certain weapons constitutes any proof of your thesis.

EDIT: Yeah, I see Pezook dealt with it before me. Yak-1 was not a completely crappy plane, but it's deficiencies stemmed exactly from the time-pressed production launch (they were forced to launch it into serial run before the prototypes were properly tested, no wonder the deficiencies were staggering!). 7023 construction changes in 1941 alone! Heh.

[PeZook]

In fact, the development history of the Yak-1 completely destroys Omegamanian's point: its development cycle was on par with other fighters of the era, it's just that the steps were shuffled around, with most debugging being done in the factory during production rather than with prototype testing. Some processes just take a certain amount of time and you can't jump over the issues: just like with reorganizing an army, at a certain point you will have to do things which will take a fixed amount of time that's roughly the same everywhere, and no amount of corner-cutting will help you.