Marines Unveil EFV; Gates Takes Aim

[Cecelia5578]

Well in defense of the USCG, it always has had a strong homeland security related mission which is one of the reasons why it was rolled into the DHS. Although at times it is called upon by the USN to provide special services overseas.

The US National Guard and Air National Guard are a different matter entirely. They are set up to much along the lines of the US army and Air Force, which is a bit rediculous when you consider that there already exists a US Army and Air Force Reserve. I believe (correct me if I'm wrong) that Army Reserve is actually better equipped to provide for the National Guard's domestic role better than the National Guard is; i.e., the Reserve has more engineer, MP, and other necessary support units to respond to disasters, terrorism, etc. while the National Guard does not. Not to mention the stupidity of calling up and sending National Guard units overseas and not having them stateside to provide support when a disaster strikes.

People will of course argue about about the state militia and tradition, but I've always advocated restructuring the both Guards into something that works more along the lines of how the USCG operates.

I agree with you insofar as the Army NG has become merely another reserve force for the active duty Army, but when it comes to those stereotypical domestic tasks which its called up for, I really don't think the MOS of the soldiers is going to matter in most situations-what is needed is usually labor and stuff like helicopters, Humvees, etc. I have a hard time imagining my former USAR MI BN contributing much of anything to a domestic disaster other than bodies and labor, for example.

I'm sure someone here will know better than I, but sometime ago the Army decided to remove transfer most of its reserve component combat arms units and put them in the NG, while the USAR got the combat support and combat service support units (mostly). That may be a problem, though the way I see it, over the past decade both the USAR and ARNG have been called upon quite a bit, simply because of the need for troops regardless of MOS.

Another issue is that the National Guard does have a dual role-its not solely a state level organization, (hence NG personnel being subject to the Federal UCMJ even on weekend drills, I believe) so it does have to fit into the active duty puzzle somehow. There are state defense forces, organizations that are like the NG, except they can never be Federalized, and do a lot of stereotypical NG stuff. They seem to be small, chronically underfunded and understaffed (and most states don't even have them in the first place).

[Temujin]

While the reserve components are generally better suited, it would require the organization as a whole to be transformed. In other words they don't need to primarily be a combat organization. No armor, artillery or heavy arms outside Humvees, Strikers, and M113s armed with nothing larger then an M2 or a grenade launcher (especially if armed w/tear gas). No gunships, just transport and heavy lift cargo helicopters. Transfer that shit back to active duty and the reserves. Have a force that is properly trained and equipped to handle a variety of domestic situations.

Another issue is that the National Guard does have a dual role-its not solely a state level organization, (hence NG personnel being subject to the Federal UCMJ even on weekend drills, I believe) so it does have to fit into the active duty puzzle somehow. There are state defense forces, organizations that are like the NG, except they can never be Federalized, and do a lot of stereotypical NG stuff. They seem to be small, chronically underfunded and understaffed (and most states don't even have them in the first place).

My point is that it doesn't have to stay that way. Hell, the units shouldn't be state centric anyway, it should be an entirely Federal organization able to shift resources where needed as required. Of course the states rights advocates would scream bloody murder, but fuck them. Its that kind of ultra conservative traditionalist thinking that holds back any meaningful reform, military related or otherwise.

[CmdrWilkens]

So, when was the last time the Marines actually engaged in their specialized mission of landing on a heavily fortified enemy beach? The examples cited in the article are all from WW2 - and even then the biggest one (Normandy) was conducted by the Army and not the Marines.

If you haven't needed a capability in 70 years, maybe its time to finally admit that you do not need it.

They had landings planned but not executed during the First Gulf War and executed via helo instead of amphibian during Granada in 1983 but in both cases landing via amtrac was considered either viable or practicable and would have in the later case eased the strain on helo transport for the Rangers.

[Sea Skimmer]

A landing was certainly practical in 1991, but that would have required the USN being willing to risk several loaded amphibious ships within range and sight of Styx missiles while in small cleared lanes inside a minefield. Iraqi coastal defense missiles only fired once in the war, but the radars that controlled them came active all the time. That whole operation just really wasn't going to happen because of those factors alone. The minefields were annoying enough that it took two weeks just to clear small areas for the battleships to fire out of while steaming in circles.

EFV is supposed to solve that problem, but an amphibious ship sitting just barely over the horizon from land no longer looks like very good protection. Its just too easy for someone to operate a small slow hard to detect UAV with ~100km range for surveillance. All the mines on the beaches and inshore would have been another issue in 91, since we still have no effective standoff mine clearing system that will work in the tidal zone to this day. That's not an insoluble problem though, it just keeps going down dead ends.

[Littlefoot]

I've seen the early prototypes doing Gator Circles out in the jetty when I was in Schools Battalion back in '04. They were a hydrolics nightmare from what we heard, and the electrical system was a major drawback. But we were told that we would see them in service in '07. Looked forward to getting mine, but was disappointed as usual.

So, when was the last time the Marines actually engaged in their specialized mission of landing on a heavily fortified enemy beach? The examples cited in the article are all from WW2 - and even then the biggest one (Normandy) was conducted by the Army and not the Marines.

If you haven't needed a capability in 70 years, maybe its time to finally admit that you do not need it.

That would apply to the whole marine corps (well, most of it). Guess how likely it is that they will follow train of tought.

Well, yes, but I mean having them as a more distinct service that seems to think it is apart from the navy is what the issue is about. This could all be semantics, since we need a force of soldiers that need to be able to perform wet ops and guard naval bases, but whether the army simply extends itself for the navy, or the navy tries to copy the army, only for that copy to then try and become autonomous, is the problem. Or so I see it at least.

We are told straight up in boot camp that the only reason we aren't part of the Army is tradition. It helps with pounding in the mindset that we are elite, when generally we were just slightly better in terms of training and grossly inferior in terms of equipment.

As much as this is a waste of time couldn't they add a V shaped hull under a flat plate designed to help with hydrodynamics? The same goes for adding a slopped side screen to the side that can be deployed by something like hydraulic rams. You start to come ashore and you deploy the angled slats that deflect incoming projectiles.

Weight and complexity would likely be an issue.

In an AAVP7/A1 you have torsion tubes and a coolant system between the hull and the deck plates. With the EFV's ability to retract the tracks up into the hull I doubt there would be room to put much more in there.

[CmdrWilkens]

A landing was certainly practical in 1991, but that would have required the USN being willing to risk several loaded amphibious ships within range and sight of Styx missiles while in small cleared lanes inside a minefield. Iraqi coastal defense missiles only fired once in the war, but the radars that controlled them came active all the time. That whole operation just really wasn't going to happen because of those factors alone. The minefields were annoying enough that it took two weeks just to clear small areas for the battleships to fire out of while steaming in circles.

EFV is supposed to solve that problem, but an amphibious ship sitting just barely over the horizon from land no longer looks like very good protection. Its just too easy for someone to operate a small slow hard to detect UAV with ~100km range for surveillance. All the mines on the beaches and inshore would have been another issue in 91, since we still have no effective standoff mine clearing system that will work in the tidal zone to this day. That's not an insoluble problem though, it just keeps going down dead ends.

Though it might be noted that Iraq at the time represented about the peak of what we expected to ever be fighting in terms of an enemy. Given the size of its Army and its relative budget Iraq in 91 essentially represents what was then a worst case scenario for an amphibious landing (narrow corridor, heavy air defense network, and the slow speed of the existing amtrac fleet). I think a situation more analagous to Granada presents the chance for the EFV to do its job effectively and well, it represents and alternate approach method from the typical heloborne operations such as we engaged in during 83 (as well as both before and since) and means that nations either have to spend for both beach and air defense or eave themselves vulnerable. A fully integrated defensive network isn't cheap and there are an awful lot more Granada-type scenarios in the making.

That being said the problems are still there but waiting for all of them to be solved before adopting a piece of equipment is the kind of folly I'd like to avoid. The EFV is far, far, far, from perfect but it can perform its designated mission well and likely as not will end up being used as a Bradley-lite to augment the existing LAR units and/or Armored units in the Marine Corps. If only for that reason I think its worth buying since there is, right now, in the Marine TO&E nothing in between the LAV and the Abrams in terms of firepower and survivability.

[MKSheppard]

You're an idiot. He obviously meant 'we' as in the US Armed Forces and in the sense that 'we' landed in a predetermined fortified spot and suffered high casualties because of it and that 'we' as in the US Armed Forces can avoid that in the future with this vehicle.

You're an even more fucking retarded dipshit. Who the fuck is going to use the EFV? Certainly not the US Army. The US Army experimented with "Blow entire platoon up" capability in the late forties, and discarded that for more sensible squad sized vehicles.

It is obvious to anyone that isn't a fucking retard that he wasn't trying to take credit for the Normandy landing for the Marines.

You'd be surprised how many fucking morons the MARINES generate who think that they are God's gift to Amphibious Operations and Military Efficiency....nevermind that the US Army executed more Amphibious Operations under MacArthur in the PTO than the Marines ever did; and that the Marines have never really managed a complex program before -- all of their stuff was essentially basic designs, or refinements of existing designs. Nothing as bleeding edge as EFV or the Osprey....which is why they've fucked the procurement of both up by the numbers.

[Havok]

You're an idiot. He obviously meant 'we' as in the US Armed Forces and in the sense that 'we' landed in a predetermined fortified spot and suffered high casualties because of it and that 'we' as in the US Armed Forces can avoid that in the future with this vehicle.

You're an even more fucking retarded dipshit. Who the fuck is going to use the EFV? Certainly not the US Army. The US Army experimented with "Blow entire platoon up" capability in the late forties, and discarded that for more sensible squad sized vehicles.

It is obvious to anyone that isn't a fucking retard that he wasn't trying to take credit for the Normandy landing for the Marines.

You'd be surprised how many fucking morons the MARINES generate who think that they are God's gift to Amphibious Operations and Military Efficiency....nevermind that the US Army executed more Amphibious Operations under MacArthur in the PTO than the Marines ever did; and that the Marines have never really managed a complex program before -- all of their stuff was essentially basic designs, or refinements of existing designs. Nothing as bleeding edge as EFV or the Osprey....which is why they've fucked the procurement of both up by the numbers.

Who the fuck is going to use the EFV? Certainly not the US Army.

nevermind that the US Army executed more Amphibious Operations under MacArthur in the PTO than the Marines ever did

[MKSheppard]

What a brilliantly researched rapier wit.

Point 1. Between Leyte in October 1944 and the end of the Pacific war, MacArthur's Eighth Army made 52 amphibious landings. In one 44-day period there was a landing every day and a half.

Point 2. This is the US Army's Platoon Death Mobile

Everyone get out!

You all lined up? Good!.

The Army wisely did not chose to follow that line of development, and instead went for smaller squad sized vehicles that culiminated in the later M113 and then Bradley series. It's worth noting that in the present Iraq War; the worst casualty days have come when a Marine LVTP7 Amtrac gets hit by a mine or IED; killing most of the platoon inside.

So the EFV has no actual purpose other than to fill a narrowly defined US Marine Corps Specification -- and even then the specifications are pretty absurd and completely at odds with reality -- EFV shall drive for 400 miles inland after swimming 35+ miles in the water (when it is in the water, it will be putting out 3000 HP or so). And it will do all this on a single tank of gas.

[CmdrWilkens]

You're an idiot. He obviously meant 'we' as in the US Armed Forces and in the sense that 'we' landed in a predetermined fortified spot and suffered high casualties because of it and that 'we' as in the US Armed Forces can avoid that in the future with this vehicle.

You're an even more fucking retarded dipshit. Who the fuck is going to use the EFV? Certainly not the US Army. The US Army experimented with "Blow entire platoon up" capability in the late forties, and discarded that for more sensible squad sized vehicles.

You do realize the EFV is a squad sized vehicle right? Carrying capacity is 17 Marines and a standard rifle platoon is 13 (plus potential attachments). A Marine Rifle platoons is 39 which would require three EFVs unless the platoon is under-strength. The existing LVTPs are designed to carry 25 but that never happens in reality, you more often get 1 and maybe a half squads aboard (so say 20) which would allow a rifle platoon to maneuver within a 2 LVTP team...in other words you don't (and can't) stuff a rifle platoon aboard an LVTP (and you definitely can't stuff it aboard an EFV).

[Havok]

*I have a completely useless knowledge of military history*

And that all proves that this Marine Colonel was taking credit for an Army operation and not just using it as an example of the type of landing that this vehicle can help us avoid in the future how again?
Oh that's right, it doesn't. Thanks for your continued retardation.

[MKSheppard]

You do realize the EFV is a squad sized vehicle right?

My bad. I'm perpetually stuck on the mighty LVTP5; with a three man crew plus a mighty 34 man passenger capacity; though rated only to carry 20 in waterborne operations; and big enough to build literal sandbag forts on the roof...and of course, in the US Army; 'squad sized' has been six to seven men ever since they mass retired all the mechanized infantry battalions with M113s.

[Elfdart]

You'd be surprised how many fucking morons the MARINES generate who think that they are God's gift to Amphibious Operations and Military Efficiency....nevermind that the US Army executed more Amphibious Operations under MacArthur in the PTO than the Marines ever did;

Which is to be expected, considering the Army had 8 million men and the Marines had just under half a million. What is your point?

[Stark]

Is that relevant to relative experience levels? Clearly (at least in WW2) the army organisation had more experience in this field. There being less Marines is simply a possible explanation for why they were involved less, given casualities.

[Elfdart]

It's a difference of proportion. Marines were used mostly for amphibious attacks while the Army, being much larger, had other roles as well. Assuming that roughly 2 million soldiers served in the Pacific, that still leaves a 4:1 ratio of soldiers to Marines. So unless someone can show the Army carrying out more than four times as many amphibious assaults in that theater, Yellow Rain Man is talking out of his ass.

One more thing: The Marines had two advantages early in the war. First, they had a number of veterans left over from the Banana Wars, with experience in jungle fighting. Second, they were more ready to be deployed than the Army in the summer of 1942.

[Sea Skimmer]

Though it might be noted that Iraq at the time represented about the peak of what we expected to ever be fighting in terms of an enemy. Given the size of its Army and its relative budget Iraq in 91 essentially represents what was then a worst case scenario for an amphibious landing (narrow corridor, heavy air defense network, and the slow speed of the existing amtrac fleet). I think a situation more analagous to Granada presents the chance for the EFV to do its job effectively and well, it represents and alternate approach method from the typical heloborne operations such as we engaged in during 83 (as well as both before and since) and means that nations either have to spend for both beach and air defense or eave themselves vulnerable. A fully integrated defensive network isn't cheap and there are an awful lot more Granada-type scenarios in the making.

Well sure, it'd work great against Granada, but so would LAVs wading ashore from an LST. Granada didn't have anything like anti ship weapons at all except a small caliber artillery peices. So much of the rational for a over the horizon high speed amtrack assault is already lost.
One of the problumes with EFV is simply that the program is big but not big enough. Right now EFV is just an infantry carrier, and a command vehicle. In WW2 the amtracks had a large number of supporting variants, a trend which LVPT5 continued. LVPT7 at least has a recovery version, and a large rear ramp so different stuff could fit in it. LAV got all its special versions except the assault gun produced too.

EFV has that little tiny hatch squished between the giant water jets meanwhile, so I don't see much hope in bringing larger pieces of equipment and supplies ashore. So instead of a whole mechanized military crawling across the beach, its just infantry squads. That makes it very hard to see how the EFV force can sustain a fight for any real length of time. If the enemy is really weak sure, it will be fine, but at that point landing from actual WW2 amtracks would also work pretty well.
Other versions could be developed, but little hope exists of that happening now about two decades after the program began. I'm also not to sure you'd even have space for them on the ships, because Marine units have to haul around a full array of regular army junior ground war fighting kit like LAVs and M1 tanks on the same hulls.

An all EFV based armored force would be much more justifiable to me, tapering off the LAV series and reducing the number of M1s. Too much marine planning for the assault forces seems now to rely on offloading almost all fire support to increasingly few navy warships, and resupply to helicopters which already need to support the helicopter landed portion of the force.

That being said the problems are still there but waiting for all of them to be solved before adopting a piece of equipment is the kind of folly I'd like to avoid. The EFV is far, far, far, from perfect but it can perform its designated mission well and likely as not will end up being used as a Bradley-lite to augment the existing LAR units and/or Armored units in the Marine Corps. If only for that reason I think its worth buying since there is, right now, in the Marine TO&E nothing in between the LAV and the Abrams in terms of firepower and survivability.

The only reason I see to buy it is because without it we'd have to keep the LVPT7 around forever as our only piece of amphibious armor at all. Current upgraded LAV-25 models are too heavy to float as I recall.

[JointStrikeFighter]

Wouldn't it make more sense for the EFV NOT to be an infantry transport and be more of a light tank/assualt gun/LAV recon vehicle with most of the infantry being heli landed?

My understanding of the MOOORINE corp doctrine is that helicopter borne vertical envelopments are meant to hit the rear of beach defences to tie them up long enough for the armoured EFVs and a bunch more marines to come ashore who then hold the beachhead against counter-attack long enough for the unarmoured and giant pain in the ass to unload LCACs to bring ashore the real armoured elements? Largely analogous to army river crossing operations with the LCACs instead of bridging equipment.

[Sarevok]

You're an idiot. He obviously meant 'we' as in the US Armed Forces and in the sense that 'we' landed in a predetermined fortified spot and suffered high casualties because of it and that 'we' as in the US Armed Forces can avoid that in the future with this vehicle.

The US army is going to procure an armored vehicle deployed from an assault ship at sea ? A vehicle that is inferior on land to what the army already uses ? That does not compute.

[Shroom Man 777]

Man, it's hilarious. Maybe in the grim darkness of the far future, the Marines will want to buy amphibious vehicles to invade Waterworld to topple the dictatorship of al-Kevin Costner and freedomize the aquamen. Like, this is a million years in the future. But, like, Shep'll still be hollering about how the US Army did more amphibious operations in the Battle of Waterloo or how it was US Army General Rock Stronggo who amphibiously invaded Spain, and not the Marines, and how the US Army did more amphibious invasions than the USMC in the Spanish-American war or something. So what if the Army carried out the majority of amphibious operations when the USA invaded Australia three hundred years ago, mang? This is the 1980s, man, get on with the times!

[MKSheppard]

So what if the Army carried out the majority of amphibious operations when the USA invaded Australia three hundred years ago, mang? This is the 1980s, man, get on with the times!

MAN!

*1960s Graph*

I hate to tell you this but, the army is walking around with eight LSTs.

Though in true Army fashion, they're called Logistics Support Vessels (LSV)s to run silent and not attract attention.

Additionally, they have (according to 2004-05 Military balance) 34~ LCU-2000s, 11 LCU-1600s, and 73 LCM-8s.

Not to mention that US Army TACOM has actually owned and operated high speed catamarans for tests, the most recent being the TSV-1X and HSV-1X.

By contrast, the Navy (who supplies the landing craft for the USMC) has 72~ LCACs, 37 x LCU-1610s, 8 x LCVPs and 75 LCMs.

Also, the Army has 8 x T-AKRs and 4 T-AKs afloat as prepositioned ships; while the USMC has 16 T-AKs.

Not to mention the Army is (or was) looking into over the horizon amphibious assault from it's own ships. This occured after the USS Kitty Hawk was used as a staging base for US Army Special Forces attacking Afghanistan in 2001, and did it quite well.

Afloat Forward Staging Base

MANG!

[Shroom Man 777]

Well, they obviously need to trim some fat from one of those services (or both, or all) to get rid of the redundancies. Why does EVERYONE have to have amphibious craps? Isn't one service meant to do a specific XYZ-task, while another does an ABC-specialty? It'd defeat the purpose of having specialized services meant to do specific tasks when other services end up doing those tasks too.

[Knife]

Well, they obviously need to trim some fat from one of those services (or both, or all) to get rid of the redundancies. Why does EVERYONE have to have amphibious craps? Isn't one service meant to do a specific XYZ-task, while another does an ABC-specialty? It'd defeat the purpose of having specialized services meant to do specific tasks when other services end up doing those tasks too.

That is his point, I think. His blinding hatred of the USMC will lead him down the road of wanting to nix the Corps. but then again, you could say I have a bias for the Marines so...

[Shroom Man 777]

You must destroy each other.



This whole inter-service rivalry between the US military's branches is pretty ridiculous.

Also, why DOES Sheppy-pooh hate the Marines?

[MKSheppard]

His blinding hatred of the USMC will lead him down the road of wanting to nix the Corps. but then again, you could say I have a bias for the Marines so...

Actually, no -- I don't want to eliminate the corps. But they should be what they should be intended to be; the US Navy's Police Force who guard the Nukes onboard ships, with a limited filibustering capability to go ashore and beat up on third world countries to rescue Americans/Europeans in danger during a coup or whatever.

Basically, what they were in 1939; before they became a cancer demanding MORE MORE MORE of the US Navy's limited shipbuilding budget.

Building and staffing an Amphibious Assault Ship that approaches the size of an Essex WWII carrier isn't cheap. I'm sure the Navy would love it if all of those Big Deck Amphibious Assault Ships suddenly transmogrified into fixed-wing CVLs.

[Knife]

His blinding hatred of the USMC will lead him down the road of wanting to nix the Corps. but then again, you could say I have a bias for the Marines so...

Actually, no -- I don't want to eliminate the corps. But they should be what they should be intended to be; the US Navy's Police Force who guard the Nukes onboard ships, with a limited filibustering capability to go ashore and beat up on third world countries to rescue Americans/Europeans in danger during a coup or whatever.

We had nukes in 1775?



I would agree, though, that it would be nice if the Corps. wasn't used as the other Army. It would cut down on the head butting between the two.

Basically, what they were in 1939; before they became a cancer demanding MORE MORE MORE of the US Navy's limited shipbuilding budget.

Building and staffing an Amphibious Assault Ship that approaches the size of an Essex WWII carrier isn't cheap. I'm sure the Navy would love it if all of those Big Deck Amphibious Assault Ships suddenly transmogrified into fixed-wing CVLs.

Lol, they keep the Navy honest. Lets face it, all the fighter jocks in the Navy would have CVN swarms if they could, instead of a well diversified Navy with various capabilities like gator navy. I don't know about the Army dogs, but I always felt a little better knowing my CAS and CIFS was being delivered by someone who doesn't think he would be better off shooting down Russian MiGs and instead actually trains on and is tasked to ground support.

If anything, I'd nix more of the Army so foreign interventions in pointless wars would be harder and keep a strong Navy with power projection but little staying power with expeditionary Marine units. A small Army with NG reserve units available to call up if somebody decides to be stupid, is more than enough to defend the US with a strong Navy to project power. See, no problem and no head butting there.