Did Hitler & The 3rd Reich Save Western Europe?

[Omeganian]

Hey, Omeganian, how about actually answering the points?

1) The armed forces were in a process of reorganization. Low experience led the Soviet command to join up slow and weak tanks with modern tanks in single units (which obviously prohibits their separate use - so the situation of "T-26s staying in the rear while T-34s advance" would mean the mechanized corps would basically break in parts very quickly and thus lose controllability, which what often happened).

It wasn't "Low experience", it was "A moron named Zhukov in a very high position". Yes, Suvorov does talk about the problems with mechcorps, but the main problem he gives is size. Now, even with all the confusion caused by the attack, it took less than a month to realize the corps must be split up, and give the order.

Motorhour depletion plagued older tanks, while newer tanks had poor motorhour resource (40-70 motorhours), which made them so far unsuitable for long-term and long-range advances. By 1943, T-34 had a motorhour resource brought up to the 300-400 hour standard, which is a 6-7fold difference from the original V-2 resource. To ignore that this great increase in tank resource helped the Red Army in it's long-range offensive into Germany would be foolish.

Well, the main tank was supposed to be T-50. It had the V-4 engine. That was an upgraded version of V-3, with which a BT-5 managed to go 2600 km on various types of roads, and which had no problem working a 100 hours, under factory - proving ground tests.

3) The USSR erected defensive lines, which were quite costly and quite large, including major construction of fortifications. The Germans conducted no real fortification work on the same scale (stop nitpicking with individual examples!); individual reports on the construction of bunkers from the Soviet intelligence don't disprove this general fact (besides, the Germans engaged in strategic deception as well). How many tons of concrete did Germany allocate to the border in the East? How many bunkers did it built? Was the construction comparable to the Soviet effort on the Molotov Line? And if no, the answer is self-explanatory. We have German documents now. How many bunkers did Germany construct in the East?

Всего же на участке Клайпеда – Рачки, занимающем по фронту около 300 км, отмечено законченных или находящихся в последней стадии строительства 103 ДОТ, в действительности же их, видимо, больше.

На территории Генерал-Губернаторства.

На территории Генерал-Губернаторства к 1 марта 1941 г. отмечено следующее количество оконченных или находящихся в последней стадии строительства ДОТ (железобетонных и дерево-земляных):

в районе Остроленка – до 60

-"- Варшавы – до 140

-"- Демблин (участок Рыни, Куруа) – 83

-"- Аннополь – 7
Итого: ок. 290 ДОТ.

Подтверждаются сведения о создании на границе с СССР укрепленной линии и отдельных укрепленных районов. Все работы проводились под руководством известного строителя "линии Зигфрида" - инженера ТОДТ силами немецких рабочих и солдат.

By the beginning of March - 290 complete or near complete fortifications on the Polish border (possibly more), which is the direction of their main attack (and that's just what the Soviets saw). The reports are talking about a fortified line along the border. A well known Siegfried Line builder oversees the construction. Individual examples, eh? Why would I need a document about orders? I see the orders being followed.

Halder speaks about both "Tauschpanzer" (underwater fording tanks) and "Schwimmpanzer" (floating tanks). The translation was correct.

But "Tauschpanzer" seems to be translated as "amphibious tank". That is not a correct translation.

Besides, the Germans were not the only ones whose floating tanks had pontoons which could be taken off. The Japanese floating tanks likewise had drop-off pontoons. I'm sure you woudln't disagree they were floating tanks, right?

In Suicide, Suvorov refers to such tanks as floating "after a fashion". In "Rout", he said that such pontoons can be attached to anything, including a locomotive. I wouldn't disagree and wouldn't agree (definitions can be argued about up to complete pointlessness), but I'll point out that such an ability is useless for recon.

The movement of all these divisions has started.

It did not. Go on, prove it - "movement has started". You lie, much like Suvorov did. I only have contempt.

Look at the writings of any of Suvorov's opponents about the subject. They are saying that at least some divisions have started moving, and I gave documents confirming the movement of at least some divisions. They were all part of the same echelon. You are saying that part of the echelon was to move and another not? Well, that is a claim which must be supported by documents.

That is, enough was produced of just these two models to outweigh all the tanks Hitler threw against the USSR.

Really? 1400 Soviet tanks with 40-70 hours of resource, but excellent armour, outweigh 4000+ tanks and SPA of the Reich+satellites? *eyes with suspicion* You're even more delusional than I've thought.

We are talking about military production. Materials. That is, about the physical amount of the tech produced. We have around 70,000 tons as T-34 and KV. The heaviest German tank weighs about 20 tons, Hitler sent against USSR around 3500 tanks, many of which were below 20 tons - like I said, outweighed. By part of a less than two years' Soviet production.

Well, Suvorov did talk a bit about the neglection of said forces before the war, so it could mean nothing more than that.

In Rezun's theory, the Soviet aviation, including long-range aviation, was to play a critical role in striking against Germany.

Long range? Mainly for paratrooper dropping. As bombers - very little. A smaller part - for special ops.

Tell me now, by the way, why Rezun spends so much time describing the excellent characteristics of Il-2, when on 22.06.1941 the forces had about... zero ll-2s in service?

He says 249 were produced (and where does he spend "so much time"?). Not in service? Well, Suvorov's book "Inside the Soviet Army" does talk about the Soviet tendency not to put brand new tech in the first battle line. And the reasoning.

BTW, after these 50-70 hours, did the T-34 engines have to be replaced, or would some major overhaul have been enough?

Replaced. By the way, which Soviet tank in 1941 had 700 motorhours of resource? You said "300-700" - go on, prove it.[/quote]

Until major repairs:


1 Т-35 300
2 T-26 400
3 BT-7 600
4 BТ-2, BТ-5 450
5 Т-26 600
6 Т-27, Т-37, Т-38 800

Now, some of the models were produced up to 1940-1941, meaning at least some of the tanks had full resource or near so. And some tanks, some weeks before the attack, might have been scheduled for engine overhauls.

[Thanas]

Halder speaks about both "Tauschpanzer" (underwater fording tanks) and "Schwimmpanzer" (floating tanks). The translation was correct.

But "Tauschpanzer" seems to be translated as "amphibious tank". That is not a correct translation.

Tauschpanzer does not exist (it means bartering tank). What you are looking for is Tauchpanzer. And that means underwater fording tanks.

[Ziggy Stardust]

By the beginning of March - 290 complete or near complete fortifications on the Polish border (possibly more), which is the direction of their main attack (and that's just what the Soviets saw). The reports are talking about a fortified line along the border. A well known Siegfried Line builder oversees the construction. Individual examples, eh? Why would I need a document about orders? I see the orders being followed.

I will leave the other points for Stas, but this one just incited me so much I needed to respond. In order to prove the Germans were conducting large scale fortifications on the border with the Soviet Union, you need to provide more evidence then a single vague Soviet intelligence report. Where are the German orders? How much concrete was allocated? How many men? Honestly, it isn't even that hard to use Google, the lowest common denominator of research ...

During the construction of the Atlantic Wall in 1940 and 1941, the Nazis disassembled existing Polish fortifications and moved the materials to the French coast. Even when the Nazis were on the retreat from the Red army, Hitler refused to acknowledge the threat, and no earnest defensive preparations began until the Soviets reached the Vistula River (including Warsaw). Even then, they decided to fall back to and exand the Miedzyrzecz fortifications (Festungsfront Oder-Warthe Bogen) built during the 1930s on the border with Poland.

And besides, even if the Germans were building some bunkers in Poland ... so what? What about the rest of the border? Hungary, Rumania, East Prussia? When it comes right down to it, the Germans didn't start preparing large scale forticifications (the Panther-Wotan Line) until 1943, after the Battle of Kursk. Most of the German defenses were simple trenches with pillboxes and the like. The entire German strategy was offensive, not defensive. Here is a good website about German defensive strategies on the Eastern Front during World War II. Notice that most of the fortified elements were not used until after Barbarossa had already begun.

[K. A. Pital]

To add to Ziggy's point (no time right now for a comprehensive answer), the Molotov line had thousands of bunkers planned, and 880 built by 1941, with thousands more in 10-20% degrees of completion. *shrugs* Just think about it.

It wasn't "Low experience", it was "A moron named Zhukov in a very high position". Yes, Suvorov does talk about the problems with mechcorps, but the main problem he gives is size. Now, even with all the confusion caused by the attack, it took less than a month to realize the corps must be split up, and give the order.

Splitting the corps didn't suddenly make their remains survive the battles. If the unwieldy units will fail in the first attack, what then? *looks suspiciously* If they perish in battle, and the Germans launch a deep counteroffensive, how will it help?

If you don't know about the low experience of the Soviet Army, you need to read more about the RKKA before the war and in the immediate pre-war times. The RKKA had a problem of systemic, structural low experience and bad decisions from top to bottom. The early-war tactics were pretty bad, as well - which led to the debacle in Finland. But the problems in Finland were icing on the cake - the tip of the iceberg, so to say. In reality, the stuctural, organizational and doctrinal deficiencies of the RKKA ran deep, across the entire Army. The rapid rise in Army size after the onset of World War II only exacerbated the problem of poor training, low experience and deficient tactics and organization.

If Rezun thinks that size alone was a problem (and completely excludes the almost full motorhour depletion of entire divisions, like the example I gave from the 15th MC), that's all the more evidence that Rezun and historical science have nothing in common.

Well, the main tank was supposed to be T-50. It had the V-4 engine. That was an upgraded version of V-3, with which a BT-5 managed to go 2600 km on various types of roads, and which had no problem working a 100 hours, under factory - proving ground tests

Except the T-50 was accepted into production only in April 1941. Before it'd be provided in any significant quantities, a few month would have to pass, if not a full year. The V-4 had a nominal resource of 200-250 hours depending on the maturity of production. On-tank, it would've probably been slightly less, but that aside, what's that supposed to prove? The T-50 was supposed to be a successor to the T-26 in the pre-war doctrine of armed forces' evolution, but by 1941, the Army had no T-50s to speak of and a large share of the tank park was composed by T-26s, the resource of most of them depleted or close to that. The BT series' engines were very well worked-out, and thus their upgrade provided at least 200-250 motorhours (300 for some models), a relatively good result. However, with the introduction of the new V-2, which had on-stand (factory stand) resource of 100-150 hours and even poorer, 40-70 hr resource on-tank, the Soviet industry basically had to spend another 2 years to perfect the new engines. And indeed like I said, by 1943 the Soviet tank production made the V-2's resource rise to 300 hrs, which is what is necessary for good, reliable operation on a long logistical track. *shrugs* I'm not sure what's so hard to understand here.

By the beginning of March - 290 complete or near complete fortifications on the Polish border (possibly more), which is the direction of their main attack (and that's just what the Soviets saw). The reports are talking about a fortified line along the border. A well known Siegfried Line builder oversees the construction. Individual examples, eh? Why would I need a document about orders? I see the orders being followed.

That's pathetic. The Molotov line was to have 5807 fortified positions, of which 880 were fully completed by June 1941. 140 000 men were working daily on the construction of the Molotov line. For comparison, the Germans only started building an "Eastern Wall" (Ostwall) in 1943. They had planned 6000 fortifications (800 concrete bunkers). How much did they plan in 1941? How much of that were real bunkers and how much were mock-ups? Like Ziggy said, without German documentation the point stands - the German effort was a ruse. Their real dismantling of Polish and Czechoslovakian defence lines only underscores the point (defences which they tried to re-man and restore when there was a real Soviet offensive threat).

So you either continue to pretend, or start answering the point. The actually existing fortifications in the East are well-known and supported by German documents (e.g. Ostwal). Where are the German documents on massive construction in the East? There's none. The construction was weak and nothing more than a ruse.

But "Tauschpanzer" seems to be translated as "amphibious tank". That is not a correct translation.

No, it wasn't - Halder didn't even use the term "Tauchpanzer", BTW.

Испытание танков-амфибий [танки для передвижения под водой по дну] удовлетворяет.
Плавающие танки-амфибии производят очень хорошее впечатление

At no point this translation has any confusion - floating tanks (Schwimmpanzer II) and UW-tanks were clearly separated as submerging and floating tanks correspondingly.

I'll point out that such an ability is useless for recon

I'll point out that Soviet commanders, based on the experience of the Polish and Finnish campaign, considered the floating T-37 and T-38 as useless for recon duties.

The T-38 tanks were absolutely not adequate for the planned tasks of reconaissance. During the entire operation these machines were lagging behind T-26. Only the T-26 could be sent for reconaissance, which led to the separation of forces and lowering' of the brigades' combat potential

Indeed, the situation was so bad that during the Finnish campaign the T-37 and T-38 had only been used as stationary defence points around headquarters for internal guard purposes; their recon use had been abandoned for many reasons. Indeed, it's a sad situation - the USSR which had placed high hopes on the floating tanks was forced to abandon their use in favour of recon with ordinary medium tanks. The lone example of mass use of floating tanks only once, on the Svir' (despite having lots of other opportunities), and not in a recon duty, only underscores this point.

Look at the writings of any of Suvorov's opponents about the subject. They are saying that at least some divisions have started moving, and I gave documents confirming the movement of at least some divisions. They were all part of the same echelon. You are saying that part of the echelon was to move and another not? Well, that is a claim which must be supported by documents.

Well, "that claim" is supported by documents - some divisions simply did not move. They could not. Even some of the entire mechanized corps could not move - they were close to being not manned and not equipped at all, in essence being "paper units". The "echelon" had a depth of several hundreds of kilometers - like the special military districts which housed it. Many of the divisions were deployed in-depth as reserves, some were simply deployed on remote lines. Many were not in any shape to move neither in June, nor in July, being either too undercomplect or on peacetime TOEs. No one "gives an order to the entire echelon", Omeganian - there were orders to separate divisions and mechanized corps to move here and there. The echelon is not a military unit.

Moreover, many of these divisions were re-deployed in-depth, like I said. Some had special orders prohibiting their movement until three, sometimes five days have passed after official mobilization - and they were deployed so deep inside that they could only move by rail.

So yes, some divisions were ordered to move while others were re-deployed in depth or had no orders but to stay and wait. In fact, the distance between some divisions of a single corps could be as high as 50 kilometers in the pre-war haphazard deployment.

Hitler sent against USSR around 3500 tanks

Wrong. Germany planned a force of 4215 tanks and SPA, of them fully deployed 3 865 tanks and SPA by 22.06.1941. Axis satellites provided and deployed another 402 tanks. In total, thus, Axis sent against the USSR ~4600 tanks, of them 4200 fully deployed for immediate attack.

That minor nitpick aside, you're comparing tanks in tons? *smiles* What's better - a pair of 50-ton T-35s or five Pz.Kpfw. IIIs? By the number of machines produced, German production in 1940-1941 was comparable (on the order of scale) to the Soviet one. The USSR produced 2 793 tanks in 1940, 1 848 in first half of 1941. Germany (alone, excluding satellites, who also produced tanks) - 1 975 and 1 621 correspondingly. That is not a ten-fold diffrence in tank production, anyhow.

The heaviest German tanks weighed about 20 tons, and yet, they were pretty cool (at least, so thought the Soviets). The damaged Pz.Kpfw III captured in Poland by the USSR actually led the Soviet command to consider the T-26 obsolete when compared to the German tank, but I'm sure you know that already. And indeed, the bulk of Soviet tank park (BT series and T-26s) weighed below 20 tons (T-26s - close to 10 tons). By contrast, the Pz.Kpfw III and IV had similar weight - 20 tons.

Finally, returning to the point on military expenditure - how many capital ships, in thousands of tons, did Germany and the USSR construct in 1939-1941? How many submarines? Germany spent less on tanks, but quite probably more on it's naval arm, because it was already at war with Britain by 1941. In fact, Germany and the USSR had remarkably similar figures of war equipment production for 1940-first half of 1941. For a slightly smaller economy like the USSR that would mean a slightly greater percentage of military spending, but not a difference of several times, certainly. Germany produced more of some articles, whereas the USSR produced more of other articles. In general the spending was similar.

Long range? Mainly for paratrooper dropping. As bombers - very little. A smaller part - for special ops.

I thought a modern offensive requires long-range bombing. Paratrooper assaults require aerial support too; and of course, they require dropzone maps for airwings and airfleets that will do the dropping. *shrugs* In any case, the USSR found enough maps for it's aviation of it's own territory - the paratrooper drops under Orel, Vyazma, etc.

He says 249 were produced (and where does he spend "so much time"?). Not in service? Well, Suvorov's book "Inside the Soviet Army" does talk about the Soviet tendency not to put brand new tech in the first battle line. And the reasoning.

So the Il-2 is absolutely irrelevant for the operations in 1941.

Until major repairs:

1 Т-35 300
2 T-26 400
3 BT-7 600
4 BТ-2, BТ-5 450
5 Т-26 600
6 Т-27, Т-37, Т-38 800

Now, some of the models were produced up to 1940-1941, meaning at least some of the tanks had full resource or near so. And some tanks, some weeks before the attack, might have been scheduled for engine overhauls.

The USSR produced c.4600 tanks in 1940 and the first half of 1941. Of them 1400 were T-34s and KVs (extreme low resource by virtue of new, not worked-out engine), and about 3000 thus were tanks of older models, but with new engines. However, of less than 2000 could realistically had been deployed in 1941 in the border districts.

T-37A and T-38 were not produced in 1940-1941, thus no new Soviet tank had a resource of "800 hours".

I'm not sure the T-26 had a resource of 400 or 600 motorhours. That's plain wrong IIRC. The pre-1936 T-26s had a resource of 180 hours, later models - 250 hours.

The point aside, I smell errors, so would you kindly provide just what is your source of information about the tanks' resource?

FYI also: Soviet tanks of the 10td, for example, worked out 100 motorhours on the average during 22.06.1941-09.07.1941 (less than a month of combat). The front itself moved perhaps 100-50 km, but the tanks sometimes worked out ~3000 km of resource. In intensive combat, motorhour depletion occurs very rapidly because the tanks should always keep engines on. Each car and tank in the TD worked 12-13 hours a day. Just a tidbit so you'd know. Obviously average 100 hour work in such a short term means all T-34 and KVs require engine replacement, as well as all tanks with below 100 hours of resource. Just think about it.

[Omeganian]

To add to Ziggy's point (no time right now for a comprehensive answer), the Molotov line had thousands of bunkers planned, and 880 built by 1941, with thousands more in 10-20% degrees of completion. *shrugs* Just think about it.

Sources about the 10-20% complete bunkers? I only see such statistics about the areas in general. How are the percents calculated?

It wasn't "Low experience", it was "A moron named Zhukov in a very high position". Yes, Suvorov does talk about the problems with mechcorps, but the main problem he gives is size. Now, even with all the confusion caused by the attack, it took less than a month to realize the corps must be split up, and give the order.

Splitting the corps didn't suddenly make their remains survive the battles. If the unwieldy units will fail in the first attack, what then? *looks suspiciously* If they perish in battle, and the Germans launch a deep counteroffensive, how will it help?

Well, oil mining and production equipment is rather vulnerable (and the oil, naturally, is volatile), so even if they somehow managed to stop all those tanks, further operations would have had to be conducted without the Romanian oil (and, most likely, with much of the army's supplies lost due to bombings). That kinda rules out deep operations.

If you don't know about the low experience of the Soviet Army, you need to read more about the RKKA before the war and in the immediate pre-war times. The RKKA had a problem of systemic, structural low experience and bad decisions from top to bottom.

Some of that didn't change up until the victory, which came nonetheless. Some is often systematically exaggerated, like stating the paratrooper training was bad. Or the effects of the purge on the officers.

http://www.tuad.nsk.ru/~history/Author/ ... _Repr.html

If Rezun thinks that size alone was a problem

He talks about several problems. All of it comes down to the claim that the units could have been useful in the expected scenario of the war, but doomed to failure in any other.

Well, the main tank was supposed to be T-50. It had the V-4 engine. That was an upgraded version of V-3, with which a BT-5 managed to go 2600 km on various types of roads, and which had no problem working a 100 hours, under factory - proving ground tests

Except the T-50 was accepted into production only in April 1941. Before it'd be provided in any significant quantities, a few month would have to pass, if not a full year.

Production started in July, but then the problems with the factory itself started (and the light tank wasn't top priority). Within a year, the next model was in production already.

The V-4 had a nominal resource of 200-250 hours depending on the maturity of production. On-tank, it would've probably been slightly less, but that aside, what's that supposed to prove? The T-50 was supposed to be a successor to the T-26 in the pre-war doctrine of armed forces' evolution, but by 1941, the Army had no T-50s to speak of and a large share of the tank park was composed by T-26s, the resource of most of them depleted or close to that. The BT series' engines were very well worked-out, and thus their upgrade provided at least 200-250 motorhours (300 for some models), a relatively good result.

So, several thousand BT-5 and BT-7's move in. Successfully. Whatever breaks down is simply left behind.

However, with the introduction of the new V-2, which had on-stand (factory stand) resource of 100-150 hours and even poorer, 40-70 hr resource on-tank, the Soviet industry basically had to spend another 2 years to perfect the new engines.

Not many BT's had that engine.

By the beginning of March - 290 complete or near complete fortifications on the Polish border (possibly more), which is the direction of their main attack (and that's just what the Soviets saw). The reports are talking about a fortified line along the border. A well known Siegfried Line builder oversees the construction. Individual examples, eh? Why would I need a document about orders? I see the orders being followed.

That's pathetic.

Even with the slow building rate, I don't think the June numbers were the same.

The Molotov line was to have 5807 fortified positions, of which 880 were fully completed by June 1941.

15% complete in a year? Pathetic. Sounds like a ruse. The Soviets certainly weren't lagging like that in 1943. Besides, you include the entire western border of the USSR, while on the other side there is just statistics for Poland.

140 000 men were working daily on the construction of the Molotov line.

On the other side, just for auxiliary works (digging, mainly) 35 000 Jews were mobilized.

Like Ziggy said, without German documentation the point stands - the German effort was a ruse.

Do I argue? Of course it was a ruse.

Their real dismantling of Polish and Czechoslovakian defence lines only underscores the point (defences which they tried to re-man and restore when there was a real Soviet offensive threat).

Let's see what happens on the other side with the Stalin line (which, you claim, was within the area where the enemy could be expected to appear). Some bunkers are demolished. Some are buried, and had to be dug up after the Germans attacked. Some are neglected, with the metal parts being allowed to rust. The areas are patrolled by a few dozen crippled veterans. After the Germans attack, the locks have to be broken, because no one gave a damn beforehand about the keys. Doesn't seem to be a lot of difference in attitude.

So you either continue to pretend, or start answering the point. The actually existing fortifications in the East are well-known and supported by German documents (e.g. Ostwal). Where are the German documents on massive construction in the East? There's none. The construction was weak and nothing more than a ruse.

Didn't you say a few posts ago that the Germans did their best to destroy their documents? I do know that as early as July 1940:

По данным, полученным от закордонной агентуры из Гамбурга, Любека и Штеттина, в Мемель, Тильзит, Кенигсберг и Данциг усиленно завозятся строительные материалы – цемент и железо для строительства укреплений на границе с СССР. За последнее время число пароходов, занятых на этих перевозках, значительно возросло.

Строительные материалы предназначены для возведения укреплений, которые будут проходить вдоль советско-германской границы от Мемеля в Восточной Пруссии через Польшу до Словакии.

Укрепления будут построены по последнему слову техники с учетом военного опыта и по своей мощности якобы превзойдут существующую "Линию Зигфрида"

In other words, on paper - the most powerful defense line ever; just like the Molotov Line, on paper, had more fortifications than the Stalin line. De facto - well, both lines seem to be lacking. It can be argued whom Hitler intended to deceive when the building started - Britain, USSR or both...

Look at the writings of any of Suvorov's opponents about the subject. They are saying that at least some divisions have started moving, and I gave documents confirming the movement of at least some divisions. They were all part of the same echelon. You are saying that part of the echelon was to move and another not? Well, that is a claim which must be supported by documents.

Well, "that claim" is supported by documents - some divisions simply did not move. They could not. Even some of the entire mechanized corps could not move - they were close to being not manned and not equipped at all, in essence being "paper units".

During the war, some commanders were quite happy when receiving corps a hundred tanks apiece. Men - well, bringing them in isn't exactly the most time consuming part.

No one "gives an order to the entire echelon", Omeganian - there were orders to separate divisions and mechanized corps to move here and there. The echelon is not a military unit.

Of course not. But it can operate according to a single purpose.

Moreover, many of these divisions were re-deployed in-depth, like I said. Some had special orders prohibiting their movement until three, sometimes five days have passed after official mobilization - and they were deployed so deep inside that they could only move by rail.

You can't fight without reserves. Reserves are used when the time is right. And didn't Suvorov write something about striking first and concentrating later?

So yes, some divisions were ordered to move while others were re-deployed in depth or had no orders but to stay and wait. In fact, the distance between some divisions of a single corps could be as high as 50 kilometers in the pre-war haphazard deployment.

And a few weeks are not enough to go 50 km?

Hitler sent against USSR around 3500 tanks

Wrong. Germany planned a force of 4215 tanks and SPA, of them fully deployed 3 865 tanks and SPA by 22.06.1941.

I think there are still some arguments about the precise figures. At least, as late as 1996, a book claimed there were 3350 German tanks and SPA (numbers of each tank type are given). And there were around 230 command APC's based on Pz I.

Axis satellites provided and deployed another 402 tanks. In total, thus, Axis sent against the USSR ~4600 tanks, of them 4200 fully deployed for immediate attack.

Yeah, the Romanians had some 60 FT-17. Is that the measure of their "allies"?

That minor nitpick aside, you're comparing tanks in tons?

The production. And if you are talking about tons, you may notice that T-26 and BT are often compared to German tanks 1.5 - 2 times their weight.

By the number of machines produced, German production in 1940-1941 was comparable (on the order of scale) to the Soviet one.

And the Soviet Union wasn't officially at war yet.

The USSR produced 2 793 tanks in 1940, 1 848 in first half of 1941. Germany (alone, excluding satellites, who also produced tanks) - 1 975 and 1 621 correspondingly.

The Soviets were switching their factories to the production of newer tech - the production usually goes down in such cases.

That is not a ten-fold diffrence in tank production, anyhow.

Never said it was.

The heaviest German tanks weighed about 20 tons, and yet, they were pretty cool (at least, so thought the Soviets).

The damaged Pz.Kpfw III captured in Poland by the USSR actually led the Soviet command to consider the T-26 obsolete when compared to the German tank, but I'm sure you know that already.

The work on designing a new tank was going already. But it did give them a measure of the required standard - which they reached with a much smaller weight. So, who was cooler?

And indeed, the bulk of Soviet tank park (BT series and T-26s) weighed below 20 tons (T-26s - close to 10 tons). By contrast, the Pz.Kpfw III and IV had similar weight - 20 tons.

And those 20 ton tanks were about the same power category as the Soviet 10-tonners. At least, they are always compared to them.

Finally, returning to the point on military expenditure - how many capital ships, in thousands of tons, did Germany and the USSR construct in 1939-1941? How many submarines? Germany spent less on tanks, but quite probably more on it's naval arm, because it was already at war with Britain by 1941.

Well, the Soviet plan stated that in 1941, effectively one battleship and two battlecruisers are to be worked upon (BTW, there was an official order to scrap one battleship). Mostly, the ships seem to be for 1943. The naval program seemed to switch toward smaller ships - 4 light cruisers and 19 destroyers were to be started, as well as 40 subs.

http://bdsa.ru/index.php?option=com_con ... &Itemid=30

In fact, Germany and the USSR had remarkably similar figures of war equipment production for 1940-first half of 1941. For a slightly smaller economy like the USSR that would mean a slightly greater percentage of military spending, but not a difference of several times, certainly. Germany produced more of some articles, whereas the USSR produced more of other articles. In general the spending was similar.

In what ways was the economy smaller?

He says 249 were produced (and where does he spend "so much time"?). Not in service? Well, Suvorov's book "Inside the Soviet Army" does talk about the Soviet tendency not to put brand new tech in the first battle line. And the reasoning.

So the Il-2 is absolutely irrelevant for the operations in 1941.

Actually, around 100 were sent by the beginning of the war, and there was one regiment. 1500 - by the end of 1941 (despite the problems with industry). Of course, the losses were high.

http://www.airpages.ru/ru/il2_3.shtml

Until major repairs:

1 Т-35 300
2 T-26 400
3 BT-7 600
4 BТ-2, BТ-5 450
5 Т-26 600
6 Т-27, Т-37, Т-38 800

Now, some of the models were produced up to 1940-1941, meaning at least some of the tanks had full resource or near so. And some tanks, some weeks before the attack, might have been scheduled for engine overhauls.

The USSR produced c.4600 tanks in 1940 and the first half of 1941. Of them 1400 were T-34s and KVs (extreme low resource by virtue of new, not worked-out engine), and about 3000 thus were tanks of older models, but with new engines. However, of less than 2000 could realistically had been deployed in 1941 in the border districts.

1400 is just the number of T-34. The Number of KV was around 600. As for the engine - well, it's the light tank which goes in deep.

T-37A and T-38 were not produced in 1940-1941

And saw little use before that.

thus no new Soviet tank had a resource of "800 hours".

You give 200-300 as acceptable for a German tank before it needs its engine replaced. All Soviet older models seem to have 150-200 hours before medium repairs, which isn't such a small figure either.

I'm not sure the T-26 had a resource of 400 or 600 motorhours. That's plain wrong IIRC. The pre-1936 T-26s had a resource of 180 hours, later models - 250 hours.

The point aside, I smell errors, so would you kindly provide just what is your source of information about the tanks' resource?

Well, that's the figure until major repairs. The resource of the tank. Of course, the engine resource might be much smaller, since the engine can be replaced during the offensive without hindering it much, and, therefore, may not qualify as major repairs.

http://www.tuad.nsk.ru/~history/Author/ ... N/boe.html

FYI also: Soviet tanks of the 10td, for example, worked out 100 motorhours on the average during 22.06.1941-09.07.1941 (less than a month of combat). The front itself moved perhaps 100-50 km, but the tanks sometimes worked out ~3000 km of resource. In intensive combat, motorhour depletion occurs very rapidly because the tanks should always keep engines on. Each car and tank in the TD worked 12-13 hours a day. Just a tidbit so you'd know. Obviously average 100 hour work in such a short term means all T-34 and KVs require engine replacement, as well as all tanks with below 100 hours of resource. Just think about it.

That's not exactly the combat scenario they expected, you know - 100 km movement per 3000 km of resource. In a deep operation, a tank which has a 3000 km worth of resource is a force that can get quite far.

[Ziggy Stardust]

15% complete in a year? Pathetic. Sounds like a ruse. The Soviets certainly weren't lagging like that in 1943. Besides, you include the entire western border of the USSR, while on the other side there is just statistics for Poland.

I like how you completely ignored my post. There are statistics for the entire border on the Nazi side, you just refuse to do actually look them up. The fact is, the Germans did not start preparing large scale fortifications until 1943. There is no evidence to suggest that they were. In fact, they dismantled existing Polish fortifications to use on the Atlantic Wall.

On the other side, just for auxiliary works (digging, mainly) 35 000 Jews were mobilized.

Source?

Do I argue? Of course it was a ruse.

Seriously, what the hell are you trying to argue? In your past post, you said: By the beginning of March - 290 complete or near complete fortifications on the Polish border (possibly more), which is the direction of their main attack (and that's just what the Soviets saw). The reports are talking about a fortified line along the border. A well known Siegfried Line builder oversees the construction. Individual examples, eh? Why would I need a document about orders? I see the orders being followed.

You were arguing that the Nazis were preparing large-scale defences against a possible Soviet attack. When asked for evidence, you say ... it was a ruse? What the hell are you talking about?

Let's see what happens on the other side with the Stalin line (which, you claim, was within the area where the enemy could be expected to appear). Some bunkers are demolished. Some are buried, and had to be dug up after the Germans attacked. Some are neglected, with the metal parts being allowed to rust. The areas are patrolled by a few dozen crippled veterans. After the Germans attack, the locks have to be broken, because no one gave a damn beforehand about the keys. Doesn't seem to be a lot of difference in attitude.

The Stalin Line was abandoned IN FAVOR of the Molotov Line, which was FURTHER WEST. THe Germans abandoned and stripped fortifications along their border with Russia to use the materials in FRANCE.

In other words, on paper - the most powerful defense line ever; just like the Molotov Line, on paper, had more fortifications than the Stalin line.

Once again, you completely ignored my earlier post. Do you really not understand why that brief snipping from a Soviet report is NOT evidence of "the most powerful defense line ever" being built by the Germans? Please explain why the Germans would strip down existing fortifications for material to use on the mammoth construction projects on the Atlantic seacoast if they were in the process of building "the most powerful defense line ever" in Poland.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Personally, I think we are dealing with a recalcitrant intellectually dishonest prick who's desperate to feed his Russophobia because of some personal reasons he refuses to discuss. This discussion has gone on for pages to no end because he keeps babbling.

[Thanas]

Fin is correct. Omeganian has done nothing but stonewalling, "citing" secondary sources and persists in making claims that have been thoroughly debunked in this thread. Unless he comes up with actual evidence instead of some circumstantial BS anybody could dig up with a bit of googling about any army (heck, by his standards, NATO troop movements would be proof that they planned to attack the USSR), this thread will get locked very soon. Four pages of nothing but BS is enough, unless Stas enjoys this kind of "debate".

[Isolder74]

To quote myself,

It also doesn't prove anything in the case of a Naziless Germany that Stalin would be invading Europe.

Nothing that he has posted has done anything to show that there was a Soviet intent to try and take over the world, and while a fun part of the plot for a fun video game, it really nothing more the speculation at best and propaganda at worst.

[Omeganian]

15% complete in a year? Pathetic. Sounds like a ruse. The Soviets certainly weren't lagging like that in 1943. Besides, you include the entire western border of the USSR, while on the other side there is just statistics for Poland.

I like how you completely ignored my post. There are statistics for the entire border on the Nazi side, you just refuse to do actually look them up. The fact is, the Germans did not start preparing large scale fortifications until 1943. There is no evidence to suggest that they were. In fact, they dismantled existing Polish fortifications to use on the Atlantic Wall.

Since the Atlantic Wall wasn't being built at the time, I don't see how it relates to the matter at hand.

On the other side, just for auxiliary works (digging, mainly) 35 000 Jews were mobilized.

Source?

The same Soviet intel reports.

http://bdsa.ru/index.php?option=com_con ... ew&id=1849

Do I argue? Of course it was a ruse.

Seriously, what the hell are you trying to argue? In your past post, you said: By the beginning of March - 290 complete or near complete fortifications on the Polish border (possibly more), which is the direction of their main attack (and that's just what the Soviets saw). The reports are talking about a fortified line along the border. A well known Siegfried Line builder oversees the construction. Individual examples, eh? Why would I need a document about orders? I see the orders being followed.

You were arguing that the Nazis were preparing large-scale defences against a possible Soviet attack. When asked for evidence, you say ... it was a ruse? What the hell are you talking about?

They were not preparing large scale defenses. They were preparing something that looked like large scale defenses in order to deceive USSR, and to support their offensive. Suvorov argues that the so called Molotov Line served the same purpose, pointing out a few similarities.

Let's see what happens on the other side with the Stalin line (which, you claim, was within the area where the enemy could be expected to appear). Some bunkers are demolished. Some are buried, and had to be dug up after the Germans attacked. Some are neglected, with the metal parts being allowed to rust. The areas are patrolled by a few dozen crippled veterans. After the Germans attack, the locks have to be broken, because no one gave a damn beforehand about the keys. Doesn't seem to be a lot of difference in attitude.

The Stalin Line was abandoned IN FAVOR of the Molotov Line, which was FURTHER WEST.

It was abandoned before the Molotov Line building was completed (even before it started).

THe Germans abandoned and stripped fortifications along their border with Russia to use the materials in FRANCE.

In 1941, the reports were that materials, including intact smaller emplacements, are transferred from the Maginot line to the border with Russia.

In other words, on paper - the most powerful defense line ever; just like the Molotov Line, on paper, had more fortifications than the Stalin line.

Once again, you completely ignored my earlier post. Do you really not understand why that brief snipping from a Soviet report is NOT evidence of "the most powerful defense line ever" being built by the Germans?

It wasn't built. It mainly existed on paper.

Please explain why the Germans would strip down existing fortifications for material to use on the mammoth construction projects on the Atlantic seacoast if they were in the process of building "the most powerful defense line ever" in Poland.

Of course, by the time they started building the Atlantic Wall, the fortifications on the Soviet border were completely abandoned. And they were stripped down for the Atlantic Wall.

[K. A. Pital]

Let's not get carried away with snippets here, Omeganian - I'll try to condense this "debate" into larger points.

Molotov line (and defence lines in general)
Zhukov's memoirs detail that 2500 concrete fortifications were already constructed by June 1941, around a thousand armed with artillery and the rest were pillboxes with machine-guns. There were from 100 to 300 fortifications constructed for any given fortified region (FR) - quite obviously, those which were in the process of construction were in the beginning stage. The percents are naturally what is to be expected of the pillbox or bunker that was just begun.

I'm not sure you understand the scope of construction. The Molotov line not only had more fortifications than the Stalin line, it also had deeper and better fortifications planned. In number, these fortifications were similar to the Maginot line, but obviously had lower densities. As I'm sure you understand, building a large defence line of that scale is very expensive. In peacetime, the construction of such a line could take years and it could still be far from prime condition (the Stalin line is a good example). In 1940, the USSR was not under a threat of invasion (Hitler was busy in France) and still the construction of thousands of pillboxes and bunkers in just one year is ample evidence that the construction was massive. Aside from the construction on the Molotov line, the Soviet government also ordered a modernization of the old border defence lines (with deadlines for October, whereas the new border line had priority in construction materials).

As for "demolitions" and "burials" of fortifications on the Stalin line, that is another urban myth perpetrated by some wishful thinking in memoirs and lame excuses. There's no documental proof of widespread demolitions on the old border fortifications (and in fact, were you to read Zhukov, whose memoirs you seem to bring up fondly, he explains that "demolitions" were a tall tale - even if there were any, they were only done for those pillboxes which fell into unacceptable state and could not be modernized according to the 1941 programme). There's documental proof that the Stalin line was to undergo modernization; there's also proof that even in peacetime, the USSR never managed to fully man this enormous line (it was hard without mobilizing, as one can obviously understand, and there's documental evidence of guns being relocated from the Stalin line to the Molotov line (another proof that the new line was far from "a ruse", as if it wasn't clear enough already).

The claim that Germans destroyed their 1941 documents on construction of fortifications is idiotic - they didn't manage to destroy incriminating genocide orders like Hoepner's, Reichenau's, even failed to destroy all the SS murder reports (despite trying hard), but for some reason destroyed all the documents that detail their border fortification construction (something that would've actually spoken in their favour on Nuremberg)? Your argument seems to rest on the assumption that border fortification documents had a higher priority of destruction than Nazi genocide plans. You don't find that preposterous?

If you have primary documental proof of construction of large-scale concrete fortifications with artillery positions (from the Germans, obviously, I'm all ears. There are reports on the defence lines in 1939, 1940 and 1941 on the Soviet side. Just show something from the Germans. The KTB and Halder's diaries are all there - look, perhaps there's something?

German oil supplies and deep operations.
Once again you obviously ignore the fact that Germans utilized (de-facto, not in some sort of imaginary fantasy) a system of rationing and increasing domestic production to cope with oil shortages. Their logistical track which went deep into Russia made operations in 1942 far harder than the initial attacks of Barbarossa, which were made relying on a short track of supply as well. And even if (quite obviously) a Soviet preventive attack completely spoils up Barbarossa, the Germans still have their mobilized units and Army ready for action. Quite obviously, going to Moscow in a few months is out of the question.

And I've already said that such a situation is preferrable to IRL. However, that doesn't mean the USSR gets some sort of magical pass to German territories, or doesn't make it possible for the Germans to inflict severe defeats on the RKKA.

RKKA low experience and lacking tactics
Some things, like on-factory training of tankists (that the Germans utilized before the USSR finally switched to that system) are not "exaggerated", they're a matter of fact. Or the tactics of tank ambushes, which the USSR only mastered in 1942 onwards. Tank and infantry attack tactics changed significantly from 1941 to 1943. The pre-war concepts of warfare were often very simplistic or simply wrong when it came to actual combat.

The idea that RKKA units could've been efficiently used in one way, but not in another is simply idiotic. If the RKKA was mobilized at the time the Wehrmacht attacked, it would be able to defend and attack equally good, as it's TOE permitted, of course. In fact, trying to grind 300 kms to the old Soviet border against a mobilized RKKA would be extremely hard for the Germans. However, what they attacked was an Army not in shape for either defending or attacking.

4) Attacking only with BT tanks and "leaving everything else to rot" and "striking first, concentrating later"
That idea is outright idiotic - units had a mix-tank composition, if they broke down, they'd fall apart. If they lost a large fraction of their tanks, they'd become inadequate to the command tasks (if a tank division "left behind" most of it's tank except for say those 50 or so which had new engines?), and thus completely unusable. The Soviet commanders didn't have such idiotic plans. If we were to look at the real situation in Soviet armed forces, we'd have to pay attention to a shitload of details. Most importantly of course the inadequate concentration on the border, which cannot change in June or July, and that some units only had re-equipment plans set for September of 1941.

Striking without concentration is impossible, because you need to achieve a greater density of men per kilometer of offensive breadth than your opponent has. The Germans concentrated everything on the border and achieved a density of around 1-1,5 km per division. That is a very dense offensive. On the other hand, Soviet units were spread out in such a fashion that in some places a division had to defend from 30 to 150 km. That is obviously too thinly spread even for defence; trying to attack with such a density is impossible. So the movement of rear units of the FSE and their concentration is of critical importance. And if those rear units had orders to wait until a precise moment, then it obviously follows until this very moment no offensive is possible. Remember, we're speaking about the divisions in the border military districts, not about those in the so-called 2nd strategic echelon which are deep reserves and indeed would take weeks to move.

The units were supposed to act according to plans, not wishful thinking. The plans are in fact published. I'm not sure what else is not clear here.

Light tanks were not supposed to "go in deep" (usually the heavy tank is the tank of breakthrough, "breakthrough tank" is actually a military term that got incorporated in the Russian lexicon relating to the heavy tanks designed for breaking through enemy defences). They were supposed to be used in auxiliary duties - recon, rear mop-ups, infantry support, etc. In fact, Germans were so unimpressed with Soviet light tanks that did exactly that - relegated them to rear units and compared their usefulness to the duties that were fulfilled by FT-17s. Read more on that below.

5) German and Axis tank strength, tank production
I'm not sure why you need to refer to some "1996 books" when reports on German tanks prepared for invasion are well-known, as well as those on their allies. And 60 FT-17s were not all there was from the Axis, quite obviously - 400 tanks is not 60. There were 60 Italian tanks with 37, 47mm weapons, 100+ Hungarian new production (1939-) light tanks, Finns had trophy T-26s, some armed with flamethrowers, Slovakian LT.vz-38s, etc.

The comparison of 8-10 ton Soviet tanks like BT and T-26 to the 20-ton Pz.Kpfw's III and IV is obviously misguided, as you may notice yourself. Not only is the weight class different, the tanks had different equipment (Germans were superior in that regard). Moreover, a German report on trophy Soviet tanks, of which Germany captured many, notes that older types like T-26 and BT are poorly thought of by the German Army and not recommended for frontline use. At the same time, they were the bulk of Soviet tank forces.

The danger of comparing tanks in tons ignores the issues of organization and poor fighting, as well as the problem that a heavy tank can be a poor fighter in some situations. For example, the T-100 and SMK probably weighed more than the entire tank park of the Finnish unit which they were fighting against (maybe the Finns opposing them had no tanks at all). And yet, T-100 and SMK, both superheavy tanks, were completely disastrous in use. That is a small example which shows that tons of weight are not the best way of comparison.

The USSR produced tanks in 1939-1940 when it was, in fact, at war - in 1940 the USSR was at war with Finland (and in fact wasted a lot of T-26 motorhours because it had to transport the tanks with running engines on railroad during winter...). You said that the production was "falling" because the USSR was switching to newer tech, but in fact production in the USSR fell significantly in 1937, without any war, without switches to "new tech" - from ca. 4000 tanks and tankettes a year to a mere 1500. At the same time, during 1939, the Japanese make a decision to ramp production from 500 tanks a year to 1200 tanks a year, and Germany ramps up production from 700-800 per year to 1500 a year in 1940. Britain ramps production from 900 to 1400 per year in 1939-1940. So the production in the USSR keeps increasing - in fact from 1937 it rose from 1500 to 2000+, despite introduction of new tank types and abandonment of some old types (T-37A, T-38). Therefore, your logic's not correct, and the tank production of the USSR followed another pattern.

The USSR did not reach a "required standard" with a smaller weight - it's 8 and 10 ton tanks were not comparable to the German 20-tonners, which led to the following review by German generals when talking about Soviet trophies:

[...] Most types of captured Russian tanks that we inspected on the poligon are morally obsolete and substantially inferior to all armoured cars of the Wehrmacht. Maximum armour of Soviet light tanks is 16-22 mm, which is not sufficient. The armament - Erhard 45-mm gun - does not meet the OKH (Oberkommando Heer ~SB) requirements neither for armour-piercing (can pierce the armour of most our tanks only up to 300m)), nor for explosive power.
Optics are very inconveniently placed and have very bad glasses - foggy and a small viewing angle. [....]
The mechanisms of Russian tanks work with a lot of stress and have an increased deterioration (wear) and overconsumption of fuel. [...]
All engines of inspected tanks require significant repairs in factory workshops. Only aviation gasoline can be used for Russian tanks' fuel, which is absolutely intolerable in the light of their consumption. All attempts to use our gasoline in Russian tanks have failed. [...]
The controls of Russian tanks are obsolete. [...] The driver experiences substantial fatigue even on march.
Captured tanks can only find limited use serving the rear units instead of the Renault-17 tanks that are used now, only in case their mechanisms are in a good stance and require no factory repairs [...]

So if someone compares these tanks with German 20-tonners, perhaps he should think why the Soviet command thought the BT and T-26 to be inadequate tanks compared to the Pz.III they captured in Poland, and why the German command thought so poorly of captured Soviet tanks.

The motorhour resource of new German 20-tonners (and most German 20-tonners were new construction, thus having a full resource or close to that) was 300-400 hours (Maybach HL120 TRM, likewise the most common engine for new 20-tonners). That's engine resource alone. And engine replacements are not that easy - until 1942, the Soviet tank repair practice was likewise poor. Tanks were left to wait for engineers or to be taken to a factory when breaking down or experiencing resource fatigue. Later in the war this was found unacceptable and the USSR started the "factory training", but the pre-war doctrine was utterly bad here.

German naval construction

The Kriegsmarine constructed from 1930 to 1942 the following ships - 2x42000 ton battleships, 2x35000 ton battleships, 3x12000 ton and 3x14000 ton heavy cruisers, 1x8000 ton light cruiser, 21x3500 ton destroyers, and submarines, finally. The USSR during 1930-1941 concentrated on light cruisers and destroyer leaders - it failed to build enough modern destroyers, built zero battleships as a matter of fact, and all in all during 1930-1941 the USSR produced far fewer military tonnage than Germany (if we take all the Anti-Comintern nations - Italy, Japan and Germany together - the Soviet naval effort prior to the 1939 program will be a complete joke). Quite obviously, this has to be taken into account when measuring expenditures - the USSR spent more on it's land forces, while Germany and Japan concentrated on naval building. So while the expenditures can be similar, they can be oriented to diffrent areas of military construction.

The order to scrap Soviet Belorussia in 1940 came hardly because the USSR didn't need that battleship... the production was screwed up, the steel plates and rivets were messed up during production beyond repair and the ship was better scrapped for the remaining three ships (remember what I told you about messing up the armour).

In what ways was the Soviet economy smaller than that of the Reich?

Short answer - in all ways except oil:

Main Industrial Output Gauges:

1940, Coal:
Germany [pre-war borders] 233,7 million ton
Annexed Reich regions 34,0 million ton
European Axis (Nazi satellites and occupied nations) 96,9 million ton
Total for the European Axis, including imports 364,6 million ton

USSR 165 million ton

Reich [Germany+Austria] to USSR ratio, coal production, 1940: 1,62
European Axis to USSR ratio, coal production, 1940: 2,21

1941, Coal:
Germany [pre-war borders] 239,5 million ton
Annexed Reich regions 76,0 million ton
European Axis (Nazi satellites and occupied nations) 87,3 million ton
Total for the European Axis, including imports 404,3 million ton

USSR 151,4 million ton

Reich [Germany+Austria] to USSR ratio, coal production, 1940: 2,08
European Axis to USSR ratio, coal production, 1940: 2,67

(Addendum - in 1942 coal production in the USSR: 75,5 million ton)

Steel, 1940
Reich alone [Germany+Austria]: 31,8 million tons
USSR: 18,3 million tons

(in 1941-1942 production in the USSR plummeted to 8,5 million tons and steadily was around 8-11 million tons during following years, and until the very end of the war, the USSR did not overcome the Reich in steel production)

Electricity, 1940
Reich [Germany+Austria], 77 billion kwt-h
USSR: 48,3 billion kwt-h

In 1942, the USSR made 29,1 billion kwt-h, in 1942 - 32,3 billion, and in 1944 - 39 billion. Meanwhile Germany in pre-war borders produced 46,5 billion in 1942, 47,4 billion in 1943 and 49 billion in 1944 (approximately) before collapsing in late 1944-1945.

Pig Iron, 1941
Germany: 37,9 million ton
USSR: 14,9 million ton

Oil, 1940
USSR: 31 million ton (1941: 33 million)
Germany [w/imports and captured holds]: ~19,5 million ton

At the same time, the USSR had not only the Reich to worry about. In the period 1930-1938, for example (when the USSR was even more underdeveloped), it could've been attacked by Britain, Germany and Poland together, and Japan. The latter in fact had border clashes with the USSR. For a smaller economy like the Soviet one, the defence burden similar to that of the German or Japanese one was harder to bear. The USSR then concentrated on tanks and planes in the 1930-1941 period, necessary for a multitude of various possible land wars and defence of it's large territory.

[Thanas]

Stas, a question - if the Soviets had attacked earlier, wouldn't that have been more catastrophic than the opposite? Because it reads to me as if the units would attack undermanned and with obsolete equipment, while also having a large logistic train. In that case, wouldn't a counterattack have a far easier time encircling the soviets, who also have far longer to retreat before reaching secondary lines of defence? In short, isn't attacking just throwing away units for little gain, aka WWI?

[K. A. Pital]

Stas, a question - if the Soviets had attacked earlier, wouldn't that have been more catastrophic than the opposite? Because it reads to me as if the units would attack undermanned and with obsolete equipment, while also having a large logistic train. In that case, wouldn't a counterattack have a far easier time encircling the soviets, who also have far longer to retreat before reaching secondary lines of defence? In short, isn't attacking just throwing away units for little gain, aka WWI?

Of course, if the USSR "attacked" with the undeployed units it had during mid-1941, that might've been the single most disastrous attack in history of mankind - the densities of Soviet forces were so weak that dozens of men would be attacking hundreds on a very long territory. Quite obviously, this attack wouldn't go anywhere.

What I spoke about, however, is a pre-emptive attack by a fully deployed RKKA against a deployed Wehrmacht (there's no better option - the "RKKA attacks undeployed Wehrmacht" is infeasible, the Germans deployed units faster and their transport capacity was greater), or vice-versa, the attack of a deployed Wehrmacht against a deployed RKKA later in 1941. That is if the USSR's command had been smarter about it's train logistics, if it has been more willing to concentrate forces faster, and basically deploy the Army by mid-1941, concentrating forces at least to the densities the Germans had (1-3 km per division), then it would've been a fight of equals, more or less.

Not a fist punching through thin paper sheets, which is what happens when a mobilized and concentrated Army attacks a dispersed, undeployed one. But more like two equally massive boxer fists hitting each other. In essence, something a-la Kursk, but larger. Colossal battle of two very tightly concentrated Armies. And in that battle, which could rage for days if not months, the victor would be hard to determine. It wouldn't be a cakewalk for either Army.

This is not a "what if the USSR attacked earlier IRL" - it couldn't have happened, Soviet army was undeployed. It's a "what if Hitler for some attacked later, when the USSR's forces were already deployed". Whoever attacked when both armies would be deployed and concentrated, the outcome would be the same - a modern Verdun of sorts, a magnified picture of Kursk. Days and months of digging through the enemies' tightly packed formations.

As for Rezun, he's full of falsehoods on everything top to bottom (I'm kindly making a list of them right now for Omeganian, since he asked for one; I don't believe Omeganian's version of events is based on Rezun, anyway, and he seems to understand the arguments which are based on facts, like the motorhour depletion of Soviet tanks due to many pre-1936 and pre-1938 tanks in the park).

[Thanas]

What I spoke about, however, is a pre-emptive attack by a fully deployed RKKA against a deployed Wehrmacht (there's no better option - the "RKKA attacks undeployed Wehrmacht" is infeasible, the Germans deployed units faster and their transport capacity was greater), or vice-versa, the attack of a deployed Wehrmacht against a deployed RKKA later in 1941. That is if the USSR's command had been smarter about it's train logistics, if it has been more willing to concentrate forces faster, and basically deploy the Army by mid-1941, concentrating forces at least to the densities the Germans had (1-3 km per division), then it would've been a fight of equals, more or less.

Not a fist punching through thin paper sheets, which is what happens when a mobilized and concentrated Army attacks a dispersed, undeployed one. But more like two equally massive boxer fists hitting each other. In essence, something a-la Kursk, but larger. Colossal battle of two very tightly concentrated Armies. And in that battle, which could rage for days if not months, the victor would be hard to determine. It wouldn't be a cakewalk for either Army.

This is not a "what if the USSR attacked earlier IRL" - it couldn't have happened, Soviet army was undeployed. It's a "what if Hitler for some attacked later, when the USSR's forces were already deployed". Whoever attacked when both armies would be deployed and concentrated, the outcome would be the same - a modern Verdun of sorts, a magnified picture of Kursk. Days and months of digging through the enemies' tightly packed formations.

In other words, purely a thought exercise, because as soon as the Germans would notice the Soviet buildup, they'd try and accelerate as well. So in other words, this needs a Soviet mobilization while the battle of France is still raging in order to get the same amount of troops in positions - and to stock up supplies etc. The Germans sure as heck would not slow down their invasion attempt.

Or am I missing something here?

[K. A. Pital]

In other words, purely a thought exercise, because as soon as the Germans would notice the Soviet buildup, they'd try and accelerate as well. So in other words, this needs a Soviet mobilization while the battle of France is still raging in order to get the same amount of troops in positions - and to stock up supplies etc. The Germans sure as heck would not slow down their invasion attempt.

Yeah, a thought exercise, mostly. This requires the Germans to be dumber and Soviet commanders to be smarter. One thing that makes it somewhat important is the critical dependency of deployment on command decisions and resolutions. If the USSR made a firm resolution to initiate concentration somewhere before June 1941, it could've accumulated forces faster than it did in reality and deploy them more closely by May-June. This could've caused a pre-term German attack, since they were already doing deep aerial recon penetrating to 300 and beyond (sic!) kilometers since 1940 into Soviet airspace, but maybe it'd be worth the risk. We're entering a territory of unknowns here, where both armies would have a state of deployment not easily quantifiable.

See, the German tactic of deceivment had it's own tolls. For example, the transfer of tank units to the East was only severely intensified in the last months of preparations. A premature attack by infantry formations, without the tightly clustered, mechanized "fist" of the Panzertruppe fully ready for battle - perhaps that wouldn't change the overall German superiority in the initial battles, but later on it might cause the advance to stop in it's tracks.

But yeah, the main fact is that the USSR is in a race against time which it basically can't win - the railway capacity of the Reich and it's shorter logistic track, smaller territories, faster trains, etc. - all traits of a more powerful industrial economy - make it so that the Reich always deploys forces faster. Natural advantages, so to say. Thus the most optimistic scenario is that both deploy at the same time with a very small gap (a day or two), and relatively deployed armies hit each other. Requires blunders on part of the Germans and other decisions on part of the Soviets, more daring and bold ones (not fearing to provoke the enemy by concentration, for example). *shakes head* Such a turn of events is plausible, but obviously not too probable.

[Elfdart]

The claim that Germans destroyed their 1941 documents on construction of fortifications is idiotic - they didn't manage to destroy incriminating genocide orders like Hoepner's, Reichenau's, even failed to destroy all the SS murder reports (despite trying hard), but for some reason destroyed all the documents that detail their border fortification construction (something that would've actually spoken in their favour on Nuremberg)? Your argument seems to rest on the assumption that border fortification documents had a higher priority of destruction than Nazi genocide plans. You don't find that preposterous?

In Simpson's Blowback it was pointed out that in spite of a year or more of deliberate efforts to destroy incriminating documents, the War Crimes Tribunal had literally trains full of Nazi documents to work with. This was the result of Germany's almost anal-retentive obsession with keeping records. IIRC, the thing that stood out was that while the US government (including the military) kept everything in triplicate, the Nazis kept up to fifteen copies of official papers.

[Thanas]

In other words, purely a thought exercise, because as soon as the Germans would notice the Soviet buildup, they'd try and accelerate as well. So in other words, this needs a Soviet mobilization while the battle of France is still raging in order to get the same amount of troops in positions - and to stock up supplies etc. The Germans sure as heck would not slow down their invasion attempt.

Yeah, a thought exercise, mostly. This requires the Germans to be dumber and Soviet commanders to be smarter. One thing that makes it somewhat important is the critical dependency of deployment on command decisions and resolutions. If the USSR made a firm resolution to initiate concentration somewhere before June 1941, it could've accumulated forces faster than it did in reality and deploy them more closely by May-June. This could've caused a pre-term German attack, since they were already doing deep aerial recon penetrating to 300 and beyond (sic!) kilometers since 1940 into Soviet airspace, but maybe it'd be worth the risk. We're entering a territory of unknowns here, where both armies would have a state of deployment not easily quantifiable.

See, the German tactic of deceivment had it's own tolls. For example, the transfer of tank units to the East was only severely intensified in the last months of preparations. A premature attack by infantry formations, without the tightly clustered, mechanized "fist" of the Panzertruppe fully ready for battle - perhaps that wouldn't change the overall German superiority in the initial battles, but later on it might cause the advance to stop in it's tracks.

But yeah, the main fact is that the USSR is in a race against time which it basically can't win - the railway capacity of the Reich and it's shorter logistic track, smaller territories, faster trains, etc. - all traits of a more powerful industrial economy - make it so that the Reich always deploys forces faster. Natural advantages, so to say. Thus the most optimistic scenario is that both deploy at the same time with a very small gap (a day or two), and relatively deployed armies hit each other. Requires blunders on part of the Germans and other decisions on part of the Soviets, more daring and bold ones (not fearing to provoke the enemy by concentration, for example). *shakes head* Such a turn of events is plausible, but obviously not too probable.

Indeed, though I wouldn't want to count on the Germans making such mistakes, because this is pre-Hitler getting his fits and starting sacking Generals in order to replace them with cronies.

[K. A. Pital]

Rezun's writings, part 1: "BT tanks", from "Icebreaker", Chapter 3 "What communists need weapons for"

In the year 1933 the German colonel Heinz Guderian visited the Soviet train-building plant in Kharkov. Guderian says that beside trains, the factory produced a byproduct – tanks. The volume of tanks produced – 22 daily.
To estimate the BYPRODUCT of ONE Soviet factory in PEACETIME, you only have to remember that in 1933 Germany produced no tanks. In 1939 Hitler begun the war having 3195 tanks, i.e. less than the Kharkov train factory could build in half a year working in peacetime mode.

This statement contains many falsehoods. Heinz Guderian did not visit the Kharkov plant in 1933.

In 1933 I knew the Russians’ only tank plant produced 22 “Russian Christie” type tanks a day

Heinz Guderian did not know how much the plant produced in peacetime (or the Soviet intelligence was really stellar, heh – note the other wrong in Guderian’s statement, “the Russians’ only tank plant”). In reality the Kharkov plant had a target goal of 50 BTs for 1931 (only 3 built in reality), target goal for 1932 was 600 tanks, but it was failed and only 396 machines were accepted by the quality inspection. In total during 1932-1933 the USSR produced 610 BT-2 tanks, of which 350 had no guns. The 200+ guns made for the BT-2 tanks were of very low quality, since they were hand-made, without a process for serial production on the factory. As one can see, that’s at best one tank a day for 1932-1933. In essence, Rezun inflated the real number 22 times, using one unproven, unchecked and obviously erroneous statement from Guderian.

Christie’s achievements were not valued by any nation except the Soviet designers. The American tank was shipped to the USSR on false documents, in which it was listed as a tractor

Another falsehood. The Christie tank was officially licensed by the USSR as a tank, for a term of production of 20 years, even with a clause obliging Christie to inform of any modernizations to his M.1931 tank – it was the M.1932 which was covertly bought. The Christie tank was well-received in many nations. Poland made it’s 10TP on the base of Christie tank, Britain – a series of tanks A13 Mk.III Crusader, A27L Centaur, A27M Cromwell.

First BTs had a speed of 100 kph. After 60 years, every tanksman would be envious of such speed

False. First BTs - BT-2 (1931) and BT-5 (1933) - had a top speed of 52 kph tracked and 72 kph on wheels. Modern T-80s have a speed of 70 kph on-track, and all other modern tanks have similar speeds.

Soviet sources give a number of 86 kph, sometimes 70. The explanation is simple – on Soviet roads they had to put a power limiter on engines which were too powerful.

In fact 86 kph is the top speed of BT-7 on wheels, other models had a top speed of 72 kph on wheels. No power limiters were installed on BT-7 tanks or other BT tanks. Another falsehood.

In 1936 serial BT tanks forced deep rivers underwater

This statement is flat out wrong – 15 modified for underwater cross BTs crossed the river. “Serial” BT tanks were incapable of crossing rivers underwater. Sadly, the idea with underwater crossing did not receive a strong support in the USSR, and thus it was limited to experimental modifications. Unlike the aforementioned Germans, who made many UW complects for their medium tanks.

In 1938 diesels were started to be installed on BT tanks. The rest of the world will start doing that in 10-20 years

Double falsehood. First diesel BTs were made in 1939; the rest of the world produced diesel tanks – pre-war tanks in Italy, Japan, USA, during wartime the USA made diesel Shermans.

Saying so much good about the numbers and quality of Soviet tanks, truth be told, we must note a minor deficiency: these tanks were IMPOSSIBLE TO USE ON SOVIET TERRITORY.

Rezun’s falsehood again. When the USSR bought Christie tanks, the letter-recommendation from Khalepsky to Ginzburg said this:

Com. Voroshilov, com. Heidemann and com. Tukhachevsky agree that using Franco-English aid the Poles can build more than 300 light 6-ton tanks until the end of this year and up to 100 medium tanks, Christie type… Next year they can double this number… This can give them large advantages from an armored warfare point of view, which they will surely use, [for] Christie type tanks… are best suited for maneuver combat on the territory of the USSR.

Practical use:

Upon the end of hostilities the brigade executed a march, mostly on wheels, to the permanent dislocation… In total during four 24-hour marches (from 12 until 15 October 1939) we passed 630 km of roads… The average tank haul on one full gas tank with highest grade of fuel was… for BT-5 tanks – up to 130 km, for BT-7 tanks – up to 305 km

This march was executed upon returning from Khalkin-Gol. As evident, the Soviet command planned for a highly mobile tank that could move on Soviet territory, in the rear, on wheels (in fact, wheeled movement was only reserved for rear marches, but we’ll touch that now).

Zhukov used BTs in Mongolia, but only on tracks and was disappointed: tracks often went off outside roads, wheel pressure made tanks fall into the mud outside roads and even on roads

The use of them outside roads and only on tracks is an obvious lie, as evident from the above report. The other part, that Zhukov wrote anything bad about their wheels, tracks or tanks sticking in the mud on Soviet roads, is also a falsehood. Zhukov only criticized the BTs on grounds of… wait for it! – flammability, weak armor and gasoline engines. He praises them as “fast and maneuverable tanks”. That’s a quote from chapter 6 of Zhukov’s memoirs.

In fact, this report is but one. There's a multitude of Soviet reports on the use of BTs in the Far East, Mongolia, Trans-Baikal region and other conflict hotspots and regions close to that. Meanwhile, the European part of the USSR had much better roads.

On the question what’s most important for BT tanks, wheels or tracks, Soviet handbooks of the time give a clear answer: wheels

False. The BT-5 and BT-2 handbook says in fact the following:

...crawling on tracks is the main type for moving both on march and in combat… The wheels are preferable for large-distance marches inside the rear of your own forces to conserve the track chain resource… Entering combat on wheels is not recommended and may only be viewed as a self-defense measure for protecting tank columns on march...

In fact, all wheeled tanks from Poland to Sweden were made with one simple idea in mind – easy rear movements. These tanks were perfectly capable of rolling on “Soviet” roads, and the main task was to conserve track resources. When tracks were improved and their resource rose to such that wheeled tanks were no longer needed, wheeled tank went the way of the dodo. More below.

A-20

Rezun calls it the “highway tank” and says it was a further development of BT wheeled tank ideology. In reality, the “A” index meant experimental machines, A-20 was a single experimental tank later developed into an all-tracked A-34 (that’s the T-34). In 1940, the USSR fully switches production to tracked-only tanks because track resource has greatly increased. A-20 is never serially produced; the production of all BT modifications, including the most modern ones, is fully halted in 1940.

There was more made of them (BT tanks - SB) than ALL types of tanks in ALL nations of the world on 1st September 1939

False. Even a single old tank - the T-26 - was produced in greater numbers (BTs - c.8000, T-26 - c.11000). Germany, France, Britain, Poland and European Axis obviously had more tanks produced than the BTs on 1st September 1939. In fact, Germany + France alone made more tanks "of ALL types" than the BT.

This is just one chapter and one topic. With so many falsehoods investigated by a single fact-check, does it make any sense to continue?

Finally, all the ideas that Rezun deducts from his lies (BTs designed for use on foreign territory - false, wheeled tanks being the key to Soviet military doctrine - false, as evident by A-20 cancellation and stopping the production of all, even the most modern, wheeled tanks, BTs fighting on roads - false, only the USSR using wheeled tanks - false) make the whole chapter wrong.

[Serafina]

Sorry, but how can anyone take someone seriously who makes a statement like this:

Saying so much good about the numbers and quality of Soviet tanks, truth be told, we must note a minor deficiency: these tanks were IMPOSSIBLE TO USE ON SOVIET TERRITORY.

That's...that's just utterly moronic. Both the germans and the soviets used tanks extensively on soviet territory - deep inside it, in fact.
While it is true that it was difficult to do so in large areas during a couple of months (due to mud), that absolutely justify any statement like this.

Honestly, that statement alone shows how friggin clueless that guy must be - or he's just a liar.

[Stuart]

Honestly, that statement alone shows how friggin clueless that guy must be - or he's just a liar.

He's not clueless, he's a very sharp cookie. He's identified a particular market niche to which he can sell a lot of books and make a lot of money. So, he writes books specifically to address that market niche and fills them with utter garbage. He knows perfectly well that his "historical books" like Iceberg are trash but why should he care? He's probably having a good quiet laugh when he sees people trying to defend material that he knows perfectly well is utter nonsense. In fact, he probably has a little game going, seeing how much outrageous nonsense he can supply to people like Omeganian before they realize they are being had.

I wouldn't describe him as either an idiot or a liar; in my opinion he's a classic hoaxster. He's playing gullible idiots for all he can get from them.

[Marcus Aurelius]

I wouldn't describe him as either an idiot or a liar; in my opinion he's a classic hoaxster. He's playing gullible idiots for all he can get from them.

I agree that he's not a idiot, but he is still a liar, because he writes things he almost certainly knows to be untrue. Whatever his motives are does not change that knowingly spreading false information is lying, and someone who lies for personal gain or satisfaction is a liar.

[Omeganian]

Molotov line (and defence lines in general)
Zhukov's memoirs detail that 2500 concrete fortifications were already constructed by June 1941, around a thousand armed with artillery and the rest were pillboxes with machine-guns. There were from 100 to 300 fortifications constructed for any given fortified region (FR) - quite obviously, those which were in the process of construction were in the beginning stage. The percents are naturally what is to be expected of the pillbox or bunker that was just begun.

Well, the built part of statistics gives 128 as a maximum for an area. As for 2500... Well, Zhukov says nowhere it's the figure for the western borders, for the Molotov line. These figures are completely different. It seems more likely that the 2 500 is the figure is for the entire Soviet border. Out of these, a little over one third (if the 2 500 are in the built section), or less than a quarter (if they were in the operable section, since they were armed) belonged to the Molotov line. This proves that the Molotov line wasn't exactly considered top priority, but little else.

I'm not sure you understand the scope of construction. The Molotov line not only had more fortifications than the Stalin line, it also had deeper and better fortifications planned.

Source?

In number, these fortifications were similar to the Maginot line, but obviously had lower densities. As I'm sure you understand, building a large defence line of that scale is very expensive. In peacetime, the construction of such a line could take years and it could still be far from prime condition (the Stalin line is a good example).

Why should I take the Stalin line as an example? Why not Kursk, where a rather powerful defense was constructed without much delay?

In 1940, the USSR was not under a threat of invasion (Hitler was busy in France) and still the construction of thousands of pillboxes and bunkers in just one year is ample evidence that the construction was massive.

Well, the order for the Molotov Line building came the day after the Battle for France ended. As for thousands - see above.

As for "demolitions" and "burials" of fortifications on the Stalin line, that is another urban myth perpetrated by some wishful thinking in memoirs and lame excuses. There's no documental proof of widespread demolitions on the old border fortifications (and in fact, were you to read Zhukov, whose memoirs you seem to bring up fondly, he explains that "demolitions" were a tall tale - even if there were any, they were only done for those pillboxes which fell into unacceptable state and could not be modernized according to the 1941 programme). There's documental proof that the Stalin line was to undergo modernization; there's also proof that even in peacetime, the USSR never managed to fully man this enormous line (it was hard without mobilizing, as one can obviously understand,

Завтра выезжаю в Новоград-Волынский и Могилев-Подольский укрепленные районы. Кто их знает, в каком они состоянии. Я знаком ведь с ними пока по донесениям и отчетам. Впрочем, знакомство теперь излишне. Пришла директива срочно законсервировать все старые УРы, вывести на Сан воинские части, а охрану сооружений возложить на вольнонаемных вооруженных сторожей.

Мне кажется это какой-то бессмыслицей. Сколько сил и энергии вложено, чтобы возвести эти железобетонные доты, вооружить и оснастить их оборудованием. А прекрасные километровые подземные инженерные сооружения «Серебрия», «Гульские мины» — неужели и их забросить, засыпав землей? Немцы уже забрались на Балканы. Они вовсю орудуют в Румынии. Возможно, их наблюдатели, облачившись в легкие весенние плащи, ходят теперь по песчаному берегу Днестра и высматривают удобные места для переправ...

Днем мы с военинженером 3 ранга Евгением Ангеловичем проверяли Киевский УР. Я просто влюблен в Женю. Он еще очень молод, почти юноша, но уже хороший инженер-механик и прекрасной души человек. Его [36] жену тоже зовут Женей. Я с ней не знаком. Даже не видел, но узнал ее имя из телефонных разговоров. Часто задерживаясь по вечерам на службе, Женя всегда звонит ей домой, называя ласково Жён. «Они, должно быть, счастливы, — думаю я. — А вот Паша Аралов, мой однокашник, так ведь и не сумел устроить своей жизни. Значит, верно, что «не каждому дано яблоко».

Мы с Ангеловичем объезжаем все сооружения верхом на лошадях: другой вид транспорта в эту распутицу только помеха. Женя проверяет фильтровентиляцию, водоснабжение и силовое оборудование, я — все остальное.

Радости мало. Дворики залиты водой, она проникла и в сооружения. Маскировочные каркасы совсем провалились и требуют срочной замены, пулеметные столики заржавели, насосы «Красный факел» не работают, как и вентиляторы. За весь день нигде не встречаем сторожевых дозоров. Да и где встретить, если их всего 20 человек на весь УР, и те в большинстве старики, инвалиды.

...

— Не думаю, что это из-за отсутствия средств отказываются от сохранения старых УРов, — говорю я. — Видимо, считают, что они теперь уже не нужны.

С первых дней войны принимались меры по приведению Новоград-Волынского УРа в боевую готовность: откапывались засыпанные землей доты, занимали гарнизоны, устанавливалось табельное вооружение и подвозились боеприпасы. Однако полностью завершить эту работу к началу боев не удалось. В частности, передовой узел обороны в районе Красиловка, Дедовичи, Ярунь (16—20 км зап. Новограда-Волынского) из-за нехватки табельного вооружения и штатных подразделений УРа был занят стрелковыми батальонами 206-й стрелковой дивизии.

there's documental evidence of guns being relocated from the Stalin line to the Molotov line (another proof that the new line was far from "a ruse", as if it wasn't clear enough already).

If they are meant to support an offensive and cover secondary directions, then of course they need some armament.

If you have primary documental proof of construction of large-scale concrete fortifications with artillery positions (from the Germans, obviously, I'm all ears. There are reports on the defence lines in 1939, 1940 and 1941 on the Soviet side. Just show something from the Germans. The KTB and Halder's diaries are all there - look, perhaps there's something?

Looking in Halder's diary, electronic version... searching for "fortification"...

Вюстефельд: Строительство противотанкового рва под руководством органов СС на русской границе{111}. Укрепления в Восточной Пруссии. Где надлежит их создавать — вдоль пограничной реки или западнее?

19.00 — Вюстефельд: План строительства будущих сухопутных укреплений. Просьба управления общих дел о представлении сведений об этих укреплениях отклонена.

Укрепления на Востоке: Разрешение вопросов, поставленных командованием 1-го военного округа, и оборудование германской границы в соответствии с идеей активной обороны.

Кребер (из отдела строительства сухопутных укреплений) доложил о создании предмостных укреплений на Нареве.

Вюстефельд:

а. По вопросу строительства укрепления на Востоке (запросы командования группы армий «Б» относительно конечных и промежуточных целей).

Улекс: О строительстве сухопутных укреплений:

а. Он имеет в своем распоряжении 28 тыс. рабочих. Караульные батальоны (из расформированных дивизий) и саперы тоже работают. Кроме того, 50 батальонов имперской службы трудовой повинности.

б. Предмостные укрепления на р. Нарев. Там есть только охранение.

в. Сплошная полоса заграждений проходит по линии: Остроленка, р. Марев, р. Писа, Сувалки. «Отсечная» позиция — по р. Неман; следовательно, это не передовая позиция в районе Сувалки.

г. 120 дотов готово. В подавляющем большинстве доты с трех — и шестиамбразурными башнями и казематами. Внутреннее оборудование отсутствует, вооружение также.

д. Отчет о строительстве дорог, войсковых лагерей и пограничных укреплений на Востоке.

д. План строительства сухопутных укреплений на Востоке на 1941 год. Задачи, определенные на 1940 год, не смогут быть выполнены. Запрос относительно задач на 1941 год, Ответ: В Восточной Пруссии — долговременные оборонительные сооружения облегченного типа, на остальных участках — укрепления полевого типа.

на Востоке: расквартирование войск, дорожное строительство, строительство укреплений.

Восток: Строительство укреплений вслед за строительством дорог.

Распределение транспортных средств:
...

Высвободить из различных мест (со строительства укреплений на Востоке, с очистки дорог от снега на Юго-Востоке) — 2040 тонн.

German oil supplies and deep operations.
Once again you obviously ignore the fact that Germans utilized (de-facto, not in some sort of imaginary fantasy) a system of rationing and increasing domestic production to cope with oil shortages. Their logistical track which went deep into Russia made operations in 1942 far harder than the initial attacks of Barbarossa, which were made relying on a short track of supply as well.

I am not ignoring it. I merely refuse to believe in the omnipotence of said system. You said it could have saved them if they shortened their logistical train - here, you are talking about lengthening it.

And even if (quite obviously) a Soviet preventive attack completely spoils up Barbarossa, the Germans still have their mobilized units and Army ready for action. Quite obviously, going to Moscow in a few months is out of the question.

And with the Soviet bomber attacks, they may also have some logistical problems.

And I've already said that such a situation is preferrable to IRL. However, that doesn't mean the USSR gets some sort of magical pass to German territories, or doesn't make it possible for the Germans to inflict severe defeats on the RKKA.

At the very least, it means that the Soviets have a certain chance to cut out 2-3 years of the real life war (from their border and back), and finish the elimination of Germany before the Allies can land any sizable force.

RKKA low experience and lacking tactics
Some things, like on-factory training of tankists (that the Germans utilized before the USSR finally switched to that system) are not "exaggerated", they're a matter of fact. Or the tactics of tank ambushes, which the USSR only mastered in 1942 onwards.

Why would you need tank ambushes in a sudden attack?

The idea that RKKA units could've been efficiently used in one way, but not in another is simply idiotic.

Why? If a sudden air attack ensures air superiority (as it is in a sudden attack), you don't need a lot of AA guns. But in defense, such shortage becomes a big problem

4) Attacking only with BT tanks and "leaving everything else to rot" and "striking first, concentrating later"
That idea is outright idiotic - units had a mix-tank composition, if they broke down, they'd fall apart. If they lost a large fraction of their tanks, they'd become inadequate to the command tasks (if a tank division "left behind" most of it's tank except for say those 50 or so which had new engines?), and thus completely unusable.

Halder constantly complained in 1941 that the the tank divisions lost 50% or more of their tanks - and advanced.

some units only had re-equipment plans set for September of 1941.

You do realize that such plans wouldn't have been worth much once the war would have started? Suvorov constantly states that not only the enemy, the Soviet forces were deceived as well.

Striking without concentration is impossible, because you need to achieve a greater density of men per kilometer of offensive breadth than your opponent has. The Germans concentrated everything on the border and achieved a density of around 1-1,5 km per division. That is a very dense offensive. On the other hand, Soviet units were spread out in such a fashion that in some places a division had to defend from 30 to 150 km.

The German divisions on the secondary directions were also spread rather thin. Don't forget, according to Suvorov, the main attack was to be to the south, since a deployment to the north "ran a risk of prolonged battle". And there, the Germans had somewhat less forces.

Light tanks were not supposed to "go in deep" (usually the heavy tank is the tank of breakthrough, "breakthrough tank" is actually a military term that got incorporated in the Russian lexicon relating to the heavy tanks designed for breaking through enemy defences).

"Breathrough tank" and "breakthrough development tank" are different things. KV is the first, BT is the second. One makes a breach, the other goes in.

I'm not sure why you need to refer to some "1996 books" when reports on German tanks prepared for invasion are well-known, as well as those on their allies.

Huderian gives the figure of 3200 - without Pz-I.

And 60 FT-17s were not all there was from the Axis, quite obviously - 400 tanks is not 60. There were 60 Italian tanks with 37, 47mm weapons, 100+ Hungarian new production (1939-) light tanks, Finns had trophy T-26s, some armed with flamethrowers, Slovakian LT.vz-38s, etc.

The Italian medium tanks look quite comparable in their characteristics to the light T-26 (which they outweighed considerably). The Finns didn't attack the Soviets right away. As for the Slovakian tanks, they were mostly part of the German forces (149 Pz-35 and 623 Pz-38).

The comparison of 8-10 ton Soviet tanks like BT and T-26 to the 20-ton Pz.Kpfw's III and IV is obviously misguided, as you may notice yourself.

Indeed. But it's often done. The armament, at least, looks comparable (Pz III had a 37 mm gun, which was later replaced with a 50 mm, the process still being incomplete by June 1941, Pz IV had a snub nosed 75 mm not meant for tank combat). The engine is weaker on the T-26 - but it was an infantry support tank, after all, no need for top speed. The armor is somewhat weaker.

The USSR produced tanks in 1939-1940 when it was, in fact, at war - in 1940 the USSR was at war with Finland (and in fact wasted a lot of T-26 motorhours because it had to transport the tanks with running engines on railroad during winter...).

Except that the official Soviet historiography usually stated that the war only started for USSR in 1941.

The USSR did not reach a "required standard" with a smaller weight

I was talking about T-50. Was it inferior to Pz-III?

Most types of captured Russian tanks that we inspected on the poligon are morally obsolete and substantially inferior to all armoured cars of the Wehrmacht.

Inferior to the MG-equipped Pz-I? Damn, what was the guy smoking?

Maximum armour of Soviet light tanks is 16-22 mm, which is not sufficient.

25 mm on the turret. A few dozen were even equipped with additional 50 mm layers. The German 30 mm, while somewhat stronger, isn't quite shell proof either.

The armament - Erhard 45-mm gun - does not meet the OKH (Oberkommando Heer ~SB) requirements neither for armour-piercing (can pierce the armour of most our tanks only up to 300m)), nor for explosive power.

And their 20 mm on Pz II met said requirements?

All engines of inspected tanks require significant repairs in factory workshops.

They could either capture destroyed tanks, or tanks which broke down. In the first case, there is little to inspect, in the second, of course the engine is run down.

Only aviation gasoline can be used for Russian tanks' fuel, which is absolutely intolerable in the light of their consumption. All attempts to use our gasoline in Russian tanks have failed.

That's a German problem, but hardly a problem for the Soviets.

Hmmm... sounds like hypocrisy. Where's that from?

So if someone compares these tanks with German 20-tonners, perhaps he should think why the Soviet command thought the BT and T-26 to be inadequate tanks compared to the Pz.III they captured in Poland, and why the German command thought so poorly of captured Soviet tanks.

Said comparison usually has the purpose of proving the inferiority of the Soviet tanks.

engine replacements are not that easy - until 1942, the Soviet tank repair practice was likewise poor. Tanks were left to wait for engineers or to be taken to a factory when breaking down or experiencing resource fatigue. Later in the war this was found unacceptable and the USSR started the "factory training", but the pre-war doctrine was utterly bad here.

Even if so, it merely means that the Soviets would have simply had to replace their losses quickly. But with intact industry, it doesn't seem that far fetched of an idea.

At the same time, the USSR had not only the Reich to worry about. In the period 1930-1938, for example (when the USSR was even more underdeveloped), it could've been attacked by Britain, Germany and Poland together, and Japan.

Four countries, two of them are naval powers... sounds like a situation which requires a large navy. Any data about the appropriate navy building program?

For a smaller economy like the Soviet one, the defence burden similar to that of the German or Japanese one was harder to bear. The USSR then concentrated on tanks and planes in the 1930-1941 period, necessary for a multitude of various possible land wars and defence of it's large territory.

And on large scale deep defenses (not just concrete - partisans, bridges with explosives...).

Stas, a question - if the Soviets had attacked earlier, wouldn't that have been more catastrophic than the opposite? Because it reads to me as if the units would attack undermanned and with obsolete equipment, while also having a large logistic train. In that case, wouldn't a counterattack have a far easier time encircling the soviets, who also have far longer to retreat before reaching secondary lines of defence? In short, isn't attacking just throwing away units for little gain, aka WWI?

Which is probably why Suvorov doesn't talk in his book (at the end) about the proposed scenario of the Soviets attacking earlier, but about a scenario of Hitler hesitating and delaying Barbarossa by another month or so.

Christie’s achievements were not valued by any nation except the Soviet designers. The American tank was shipped to the USSR on false documents, in which it was listed as a tractor

Another falsehood. The Christie tank was officially licensed by the USSR as a tank, for a term of production of 20 years, even with a clause obliging Christie to inform of any modernizations to his M.1931 tank – it was the M.1932 which was covertly bought.

According to Zaloga's book, "the two M1930 arrived in USSR early in 1931 having been shipped from the USA under the guise of agricultural tractors" (they left USA in 1930). Suvorov states in a later book that it was simply a fig leaf - an attempt by both countries to hide that they are trading. And he states that the Aberdeen Proving Ground still has the original documents. If there is a mistake, everyone made it back then.

In 1936 serial BT tanks forced deep rivers underwater

This statement is flat out wrong – 15 modified for underwater cross BTs crossed the river. “Serial” BT tanks were incapable of crossing rivers underwater. Sadly, the idea with underwater crossing did not receive a strong support in the USSR, and thus it was limited to experimental modifications. Unlike the aforementioned Germans, who made many UW complects for their medium tanks.

And other serial tanks couldn't be modified accordingly? I believe a lot of the serial German tanks were not fitted with snorkels, and Halder even stated you need three months of work for large scale modifications of such type.

In 1938 diesels were started to be installed on BT tanks. The rest of the world will start doing that in 10-20 years

Double falsehood. First diesel BTs were made in 1939; the rest of the world produced diesel tanks – pre-war tanks in Italy, Japan, USA, during wartime the USA made diesel Shermans.

Later, Suvorov specifies that he is only talking about specialized tank diesels, and not car diesels fitted into a tank.

Zhukov used BTs in Mongolia, but only on tracks and was disappointed: tracks often went off outside roads, wheel pressure made tanks fall into the mud outside roads and even on roads

The use of them outside roads and only on tracks is an obvious lie, as evident from the above report. The other part, that Zhukov wrote anything bad about their wheels, tracks or tanks sticking in the mud on Soviet roads, is also a falsehood.

And Zhukov had no statements outside of his memoirs?

False. Even a single old tank - the T-26 - was produced in greater numbers (BTs - c.8000, T-26 - c.11000). Germany, France, Britain, Poland and European Axis obviously had more tanks produced than the BTs on 1st September 1939. In fact, Germany + France alone made more tanks "of ALL types" than the BT.

Suvorov admits his mistake about the BT vs T-26 numbers. Claims that he had no access to precise numbers, and indirect methods gave a somewhat incorrect figure.

This is just one chapter and one topic. With so many falsehoods investigated by a single fact-check, does it make any sense to continue?

It was written in the 80-s, when accurate research was problematic.

[K. A. Pital]

Hmm... first of all, this discussion certainly got more interesting.

Well, the built part of statistics gives 128 as a maximum for an area. As for 2500... Well, Zhukov says nowhere it's the figure for the western borders, for the Molotov line. These figures are completely different. It seems more likely that the 2 500 is the figure is for the entire Soviet border. Out of these, a little over one third (if the 2 500 are in the built section), or less than a quarter (if they were in the operable section, since they were armed) belonged to the Molotov line. This proves that the Molotov line wasn't exactly considered top priority, but little else.

Actually, that's the table I was speaking about when talking about documentary evidence. It provides the numbers of pillboxes in construction, the numbers of hardpoints built, et cetera. Zhukov indeed talks about the overall construction, not about the new border fortifications in particular. I've already mentioned the 880 number, right? Now, there were ~4900 pillboxes in progress, much like I said. If you can provide similar documents for the Germans, do so.

As to the quality of Molotov line fortifications - their depth was constantly rising. When Stalin line FRs mostly had a depth of 1-5 km, new FRs were projected with greater depth (sometimes up to 15 km), 5 km being the lowest FR depth. A typical MG pillbox of the old line had wall thickness 1,2m, internal floors and walls ~100 cm. By contrast, new border line pillboxes had a target wall thickness of 1,5-1,8m, internal floors and walls - ~2,5 m.

As for why I bring up the Stalin and Maginot lines for example - pretty obvious. They were (1) long-term, (2) very large, (3) peacetime construction. In essence, the Molotov line fully corresponded to what could be expected of a large peacetime defence line construction, and even exceeded some expectations. Kursk is an example of fully mobilized nation building haphazard defences (in early 1943, Soviet military expenditure rose to 60% of GDP). By the way also, Rezun says there were no "powerful defences" - no fixed fortifications, large fortifications at Kursk:

There were no pillboxes, concrete tetrahedrons or granite obstacles on the Kursk salient

Who am I to believe - you or Rezun? Besides, like I said - there were thousands of pillboxes being constructed - not just planned, but actually in the process of construction. According to internal Soviet reports. So where's anything proving the opposite? Besides, Khrenov argued for a limited effort on the Molotov line (simple field fortifications a-la Kursk, nothing long-term, permanent or very large). Stalin rejected that in favour of full-scale construction.

Construction of defence lines during Kursk and Stalingrad battle was limited to fast field defence and agile defence (use of tanks as defence weapons, for example). Around 200 pillboxes were constructed in Stalingrad. In Kursk, I'm not sure howmany. Perhaps none. Most of the sources speak about mass construction of trenches, etc[. but none about construction of long-term concrete pillboxes and artillery positions. Please be so kind as to explain yourself.

[snip quotes about conservation of fortified regions]

As I'm sure you know, the conservation of old fortifications is a well-known fact and perfectly sound measures when you have a limited amount of manpower and resource to man a line. However, where is the documental evidence of demolitions? How many pillboxes were demolished? We know that most old border fortifications were in fact maintained and slated for modernization; while older ones (never perfectly manned, fully equipped or constructed). The worst parts of the Stalin line, which already fell into disrepair by 1938 due to poor maintenance, were being considered for abandonment even prior to 1940. Moving guns to concrete fortifications in fortified regions makes little sense if you're badly lacking mobile artillery to support your offensive.

Looking in Halder's diary, electronic version... searching for "fortification"...

So - anti-tank ditch, 120 pillboxes without armament, "active defence".

Ответ: В Восточной Пруссии — долговременные оборонительные сооружения облегченного типа, на остальных участках — укрепления полевого типа.

So - "light" long-term fortifications in Eastern Prussia, "field fortifications" (no permanent fortification lines) in other regions. In essence, a defence that can only work with a fully mobilized Army defending it. No long-term static defences. Just like I said. What was the plan for 1940 and 1941? How many concrete pillboxes? How many were in construction, how many were finished by 1941? From what I see, that defence "line" is not a line at all, merely field defences a-la Kursk, etc.

You said it could have saved them if they shortened their logistical train - here, you are talking about lengthening it.

Hmm. I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. The German logistical track will be shortened if the USSR attacks. It's lengthened if Germany attacks the USSR and penetrates deep.

At the very least, it means that the Soviets have a certain chance to cut out 2-3 years of the real life war (from their border and back), and finish the elimination of Germany before the Allies can land any sizable force.

Perhaps, as an optimistic scenario. There's a number of pessimistic scenarios as well. One - 4-5 years of positional warfare. Two - Germany and Britain make an anti-Soviet pact and the whole war changes to unimaginable scenarios. That's why I despise alt-history for the most part - even very small changes will lead to long-term, varying effects impossible to predict. So basically, you're making an unproven assertion about very long-term effects of a major change to history. That's called "wishful thinking".

Why would you need tank ambushes in a sudden attack?

Because you ... ambush enemy tanks to defeat them? That's a stupid question. In both attack and defence both sides rely heavily on intelligence, ambushes, artillery support and all other common elements of warfare. German tactics were well-honed. The Soviet ones... often lacking.

And with the Soviet bomber attacks, they may also have some logistical problems. ... Why? If a sudden air attack ensures air superiority (as it is in a sudden attack), you don't need a lot of AA guns. But in defense, such shortage becomes a big problem

As for "Soviet bomber attacks", which bombers attacking from which airfields and which air armies would conduct such a raid? How many raids per day, per hour? Could the poorly experienced Soviet pilots keep up with the necessary rate? *shakes head* Especially with the high readiness, superior skill and superior tech edge of the Luftwaffe? Yes, the attack could spoil German cards, but you're attacking an army of high readiness. Most of the Soviet AF in reality died in battles over the USSR (in the sky), only 20-25% were destroyed on the airfield. 75% of Soviet AF was composed from obsolete craft which could barely catch up with German bombers. The air battles will be brutal, and it's not a given the USSR will get the necessary advantage at all. That's what I'm trying to explain - that a more favourable scenario of war onset doesn't mean insta-wins or doesn't relieve the necessity of following the tactics that the USSR employed later in the war.

Halder constantly complained in 1941 that the the tank divisions lost 50% or more of their tanks - and advanced.

Pardon me, but Halder didn't "constantly complain" about that. He merely noted the progression of losses in initial tank strength in his diary. Germany lost a half of the pre-war tank number slated for the invasion (~2000) till November 1941. Bule constantly noted that tank losses reach 50% during later months of 1941. In July, i.e. during the initial battles, the tank losses were (according to Bule's report, once again) "on an acceptable level", "not exceeding 20%".

You do realize that such plans wouldn't have been worth much once the war would have started? Suvorov constantly states that not only the enemy, the Soviet forces were deceived as well. ... The German divisions on the secondary directions were also spread rather thin. Don't forget, according to Suvorov, the main attack was to be to the south, since a deployment to the north "ran a risk of prolonged battle". And there, the Germans had somewhat less forces.

That's bullshit. No one deceived the Germans or the Soviets. The forces received plans which were sound (from what the pre-war doctrine said). They acted according to what they knew, learned and received as plan. What was the concentration of Soviet forces on the Southern direction, anyhow? What was the density? Worse yet, densities in the South were worse than those in the North. In KOVO, 5 rifle divisions covered 170 kilometers (5th Army), 140 km were covered by 3 RDs (6th Army), 130 km by 3 RDs (26th Army). All densities higher than 30 km per division. On the border with Romania, 650 km of front were covered by 7 RDs and two cavalry divisions, with a few RDs and two "non-movable" MCs in reserve. In any case a density ~50 km per division or greater. Not good, absolutely intolerable for attack. The density had to be multiplied tenfold or twenty times. No easy task, and plus up the re-equipment as well.

Besides, if the USSR was concentrating for a South attack, why the borderline in KOVO and OdVO had a 6,5:1 German numerical superiority? This signifies that even KOVO and OdVO forces were not deployed and not dense enough to attack neither immediately, nor in the nearest future. KOVO and OdVO did not finish deployment. In the North, the situation was a bit better, you know. Only a 4:1 to superiority.

"Breathrough tank" and "breakthrough development tank" are different things. KV is the first, BT is the second. One makes a breach, the other goes in.

What is the T-34, then? And yes, I'm fully aware that BTs are breakthrough development tanks - how is that relevant to my point, that breaching German defences (especially if their more serious ones were to be concentrated in East Prussia) without breakthrough tanks is not a sound plan?

Huderian gives the figure of 3200 - without Pz-I. ... The Italian medium tanks look quite comparable in their characteristics to the light T-26 (which they outweighed considerably). The Finns didn't attack the Soviets right away. As for the Slovakian tanks, they were mostly part of the German forces (149 Pz-35 and 623 Pz-38).

Nothing you've said here contradicts what I said. Guderian's figure might be a little off-base, but not far from it (3865-~500, because of the difficulties of calculating the number of Pz.Kpfw I that were actually battle-ready), it is about 3200. I'm not sure what is your point, though? The German tanks were concentrated for a strike. The Soviet tanks were dispersed, mixed capable tanks with those that exhausted resouce and needed maintenance. Thus even the capable tanks suffered because they were included in units together with tanks that were not ready. In essence, Germany concentrated over 2000 twenty-tonners in fully complect and ready units.

Indeed. But it's often done. The armament, at least, looks comparable (Pz III had a 37 mm gun, which was later replaced with a 50 mm, the process still being incomplete by June 1941, Pz IV had a snub nosed 75 mm not meant for tank combat). The engine is weaker on the T-26 - but it was an infantry support tank, after all, no need for top speed. The armor is somewhat weaker.

Things like crew comfort, optics and targeting (especially poor on BTs when compared to German tanks), communication, comparable armour and comparable armament gave a slight edge for the Germans in almost everything. This is why the Soviet command evaluated the caputured PzKpfw III so highly, not because it was some sort of wonder weapon, but because it was in many ways superior to the Soviet tanks. Track resource, of course, also figures. German and American machine tooling was superior to the Soviet one, which was just being created at the time. For example, American tracks for the Christie tank didn't break down after full test runs of several thousands of kilometers, percentage of track breakdowns in German tanks was likewise low. Soviet tracks on the first BTs broke prematurely - poor steel and poor production practices of a newly industrializing economy.

For example, trophy PzKpfw IIIs in the USSR often were used as command machines due to excellent optics and good communications. The RKKA had units operating the PzKpfw III, and documents issued to that effect; it was the most common German trophy tank to use in the first part of the war.

Early PzKpfw IIIs armed with Pzgr.40, for example, had an edge over the Soviet BTs, despite the latter having "apparently" better armament - a 45-mm gun versus a 37-mm one. Problem is, German 3.7cm KwK 36 L/45 showed superior initial speed and penetration versus the Soviet 45-mm 20K and 20Km (1932, 1934). 1017 m/s intial speed and 64mm penetration at 60deg, 100m distance for the 3,7 cm KwK 36 L/45. The Soviet 45-mm 20K and 20Km, a weapon of larger caliber, had a penetration of 43mm at 60deg, 100m distance and an intial speed of 757m/s. So, a German 37mm gun with Pzgr.40 offers a 34% greater speed, and 48% greater penetration capability. A German 37mm gun with Pzgr.39 offered similar performance to the BT gun. So the PzKpfw III outperformed both the T-26 and the BT, and was better armoured, too. For example, the PzKpfwIII had 30 mm armour in front and at sides, 20 mm at the rear. The BT-5 had 13 mm front, 13 mm side and 10 mm at the rear. The Pz.KpfwIII could kill the BT-5 from 1500 m away with certainity using the Pzgr.39. The BT-5 had to fire from 1000 m or less to get a certain kill; and obviously the probability of a kill decreased.

Even the BT-7 did not reach the armour thickness of the PzKpfwIII, achieving a top front armour of 22mm. In essence, the Pz.Kpfw.III remained about 33% better armoured than the BT of the latest modification, which had 22mm front and 19mm side armour. Certainly, comparing Soviet 10-tonners to German 20-tonners would not be favourable to the former. 20-tonners also had a crew of 5, easing operations. Soviet 10-tonners had a crew of 3.

As for the T-50, it was already a 14-tonner, not a 10-tonner. And yes, it was better than early Pz.Kpfw.IIIs, but was it better than the later models with 50-mm KwK, starting 1940 onwards? No. It would have better armour, but obviously inferior armament. Ergo, the Soviet command concentrated on the T-34; that was a wise decision, because by 1943 problems with penetrating German armour with either German 37mm or it's equivalent the Soviet 45-mm were growing too large to ignore. The T-34 offered a continous edge in firepower even if lacking in other chars.

Except that the official Soviet historiography usually stated that the war only started for USSR in 1941.

Who gives a fucking crap about the "official Soviet historiography" and it's will to rapproach the matter with Finland as if it never existed? *eyes suspiciously* I'm not sure you do. You surely know that the USSR didn't consider it's border conflicts wars, but they did require large operations of forces. The Finnish and Polish campaigns in particular, for the forces located in the West.

Inferior to the MG-equipped Pz-I? Damn, what was the guy smoking? ... 25 mm on the turret. A few dozen were even equipped with additional 50 mm layers. The German 30 mm, while somewhat stronger, isn't quite shell proof either. ... And their 20 mm on Pz II met said requirements? ... They could either capture destroyed tanks, or tanks which broke down. In the first case, there is little to inspect, in the second, of course the engine is run down.

The generals gave an all-around characteristic. The very light Soviet tanks like the T-37A, T-38 would obviously be inferior to the very light German machines (Pz.I and II); light Soviet tanks were inferior to German 20-tonners. The bad optics and comms problem persisted even in the very pinnacle of Soviet armour, T-34 and KV. The sad situation was that the German 30mm was not only stronger plate-wise, but that many BTs had pitful armour. Only the 4000-odd BT-7s and BT-7Ms had adequate armour (with side screens for 15+4 mm and 22 mm frontal armour), and even that was inferior to the German Pz.IIIs of EARLY build. Worse yet, the Pz.II had armour comparable to early BT models. Case in point - the Pz.II Ausf. C (1000 constructed, 1938-1940) had a frontal armour of 29-35 mm. That's a German 10-tonner. In frontal combat, the Pz.Kpfw.II could kill the BT-5, for example, from c.500 m with any munition (older BTs with vertical armour from an even greater distance, since that's penetration for 60 deg sloped), and likewise with a side hit as well. And obviously the Pz.IIs no longer met OKH demands - that's why Pz.IIIs and IVs were in production. Just like the BTs no longer met Soviet demands, and were stopped being made in 1940. Germans often captured intact tanks, in fact - those that were in warehouses or storages - just because they were waiting for repairs.

As for aviation gasoline, "not a problem"? Let me remind you - the Soviet Union had a problem with high-grade fuel production. Zhukov was extremely dissappointed with the gasoline engine requirements, high fuel consumption, etc. That is why BTs also started using diesels. This is why Soviet production shifted to diesels - a very good idea. That report is done by Boule and Thomas on 11th September, 1941, during a council on the use of trophy tanks (which the Germans captured in substantial numbers by that time).

In Halder's KTB you can also find stats on the use of Soviet trophy tanks in the Wehrmacht:

а) Сведения об использовании трофейных танков на фронте по состоянию на 9.10. 1941 года. В России: группа армий <Юг> - 16 танков (в октябре туда будет передано еще 5 танков); группа армий <Центр> - 42 танка (в октябре и ноябре будет направлено на фронт еще 20 танков); группа армий <Север> - 23 танка (в октябре будет направлено на фронт еще 5 танков). Когда закончится перевооружение 100-й и 101-й бригад, для использования в тыловых районах будет выделено еще 548 танков. На Крите: кроме танковой роты, имеющей на вооружении немецкие танки, 17 трофейных танков. В Сербии: 184 танка. К декабрю намечено перебросить в Сербию еще 194 танка. Во Франции: 140 танков, использующихся для береговой обороны и поддержания порядка внутри страны. В Норвегии - 100 танков.

Out of the thousands of trophy tanks captured, the Germans selected only less than a hundred for frontline use in Russia, but slated around a full 1000 of Soviet trophy tanks for rear and police duties in occupied territories.

Even if so, it merely means that the Soviets would have simply had to replace their losses quickly. But with intact industry, it doesn't seem that far fetched of an idea.

Perhaps so; but like I said, projecting for very long-term consequences is kinda hard. For example, a failure in deep penetration might cause the Germans to turn to strategic bombing as a solution; something they didn't do because of their successes with tactical bombing alone. Germany might turn it into a positional bloodbath, and finally, draw the support of other powers into that war, which will mean very bad consequences for the Soviet Union.

Four countries, two of them are naval powers... sounds like a situation which requires a large navy. Any data about the appropriate navy building program?

Heh. Poland, Germany and Japan threatened the USSR directly from land. So land forces got priority. But the USSR did start a naval buildup; several attempts. All failed - poor condition of industry in the early 1930s, lacking quality of metal and especially engines, etc. No cooperation with major powers on naval buildup, which Tsarist Russia used; the common problem of ordering engines abroad was hard to solve. Making 305-mm and other large-caliber weapons posed a problem for the USSR; it used barrels inherited from Tsarist Russia due to poor metallurgy in the 1930s. I thought it was all common knowledge; perhaps not.

And on large scale deep defenses (not just concrete - partisans, bridges with explosives...).

Verily so. The USSR constructed a large line in the West and some fortifications in the East against a Japanese agression. However, that was spread out in time. Foregoing naval buildup (especially with constant factory failures to produce necessary grade materials), the USSR concentrated on tanks and planes. And achieved a success in mass-producing them. That is all. Areas other than the Army - airforce, for example, and the navy, were in neglect. The Army got the best end of the stick. Airforce came second and Navy came third.

According to Zaloga's book, "the two M1930 arrived in USSR early in 1931 having been shipped from the USA under the guise of agricultural tractors" (they left USA in 1930). Suvorov states in a later book that it was simply a fig leaf - an attempt by both countries to hide that they are trading. And he states that the Aberdeen Proving Ground still has the original documents. If there is a mistake, everyone made it back then.

Yes, it's a mistake. I'm not sure why one should then rely on an obsolete and inaccurate book in anything, because other statements have a similar proportion of falsehoods in them.

And other serial tanks couldn't be modified accordingly? I believe a lot of the serial German tanks were not fitted with snorkels, and Halder even stated you need three months of work for large scale modifications of such type.

They could, but they - sadly - didn't. *shrugs* I wish they did. Germans made a lot of snorkeling efforts on the later modifications of their tanks. Certainly a series 168 medium machines fully modified for UW assault plus several hundred snorkels are a greater effort than the 15 prototypes barely ever used.

And Zhukov had no statements outside of his memoirs?

None that would support Rezun's writings, sadly. If you know something I don't, please show.

Suvorov admits his mistake about the BT vs T-26 numbers. Claims that he had no access to precise numbers, and indirect methods gave a somewhat incorrect figure.

Why bother with his books, then? Not only the T-26, but obviously the combined numbers of tanks of potential Soviet enemies by 1939 far outstripped the number of BTs (though not the number of all Soviet tanks).

It was written in the 80-s, when accurate research was problematic.

Then there's no point. False theories about "super BTs" which were "unusuable" on Soviet territory do not warrant a mention? Neither do stupid theories about the production of "150 000 Su-2s" (also not supported by any evidence), and the like which are contained in Rezun's books.

You tacitly ignored falsehoods about the BT speed, production rate, combat on wheels and use on Soviet territory, right? Obviously you agree I'm right, but then WHY mention Rezun at all? A far more sound explanation of how the USSR might have acted to preventively strike Germany is done by other authors (e.g. Meltukhov), and using documents to boot.

A realistic Soviet preventive strike or counter-strike after fending off German attack with deployed Army is an interesting subject which I'm ready to talk about. Rezun is a pop-sci trash writer whose writings are simply not relevant to historical science - part of them are obsolete, some wrong obviously (Rezun couldn't have not known that BTs were efficiently used on Soviet territory, and ordered to serve there, as well as that Christie tanks and wheeled tanks in general were used by other nations).

I'm tired of discussing Rezun's bullshit and silly exaggerations made on the basis of false claims. I'm ready to discuss real history.

[Ziggy Stardust]

So, Omeganian, do you concede your earlier point about the Germans building fortifications on the border? I notice you stopped bothering to argue that, and are instead changing tack to mumble vaguely about the extent of Soviet fortifications.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Construction of defence lines during Kursk and Stalingrad battle was limited to fast field defence and agile defence (use of tanks as defence weapons, for example). Around 200 pillboxes were constructed in Stalingrad. In Kursk, I'm not sure howmany. Perhaps none. Most of the sources speak about mass construction of trenches, etc[. but none about construction of long-term concrete pillboxes and artillery positions. Please be so kind as to explain yourself.

I have never read anything about Kursk having fixed concrete fortifications. The defenses were based on very deep field fortifications with mine fields and ample artillery support, both direct and indirect. If there were concrete fortifications, the numbers must have been insignificant.

Early PzKpfw IIIs armed with Pzgr.40, for example, had an edge over the Soviet BTs, despite the latter having "apparently" better armament - a 45-mm gun versus a 37-mm one. Problem is, German 3.7cm KwK 36 L/45 showed superior initial speed and penetration versus the Soviet 45-mm 20K and 20Km (1932, 1934). 1017 m/s intial speed and 64mm penetration at 60deg, 100m distance for the 3,7 cm KwK 36 L/45. The Soviet 45-mm 20K and 20Km, a weapon of larger caliber, had a penetration of 43mm at 60deg, 100m distance and an intial speed of 757m/s.

It's called "muzzle velocity" in English... Just some notes: the 37 mm Pzgr.40 was quite a short range ammunition. At 500 meters its penetration was about the same as Pzgr.39 and declined rapidly after that. This was of course typical for APCR (HVAP) type shells and especially for small calibers.

The Soviet 45 mm armor piercing ammunition seems to have been fairly low quality in the late 1930s and up to 1941, but it apparently improved later at least somewhat. Test made with later ammunition gave higher figures, although without knowing the plate quality it is difficult to evaluate their significance. Noticeably the Finnish copy of the BR-240SP projectile achieved about 25% better penetration than the above quoted number: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/AT_GUNS2.htm go to "Finnish live fire testing year 1943 ("45 psa - Vj4", Finnish AP-T, 760 m/sec)", but unfortunately the armor plate quality is unknown. In any case, the Finnish Army considered the Soviet 45 mm gun to be better than the German 37 mm L/45 gun with "conventional" (no APCR or HEAT) ammunition.

As for the T-50, it was already a 14-tonner, not a 10-tonner. And yes, it was better than early Pz.Kpfw.IIIs, but was it better than the later models with 50-mm KwK, starting 1940 onwards? No. It would have better armour, but obviously inferior armament. Ergo, the Soviet command concentrated on the T-34; that was a wise decision, because by 1943 problems with penetrating German armour with either German 37mm or it's equivalent the Soviet 45-mm were growing too large to ignore.

Actually they were too large to ignore even in 1942, when the Germans deployed the up-armored Panzer III models (J and up). That was one of the reasons for the introduction of the longer barreled M1942 version of the 45 mm gun, which however was not used in tanks, because apparently the longer recoil made it impossible to shoehorn it into the tiny turret of the T-70. It probably would have fitted in the T-50 turret, if it had still been in production, but in general I agree that the T-50 was undergunned. Perhaps if they could have somehow fitted the 57 mm ZiS-2 in its turret, but that does not seem feasible either.

The T-34 offered a continous edge in firepower even if lacking in other chars.

Well, not really. By 1943 the 76 mm gun was already showing its age, since the new Panzer IV models with the long 75 mm gun (model F2 onwards) could kill the T-34-76 at a much greater range than the T-34 could hope to destroy them over the frontal aspect.

The generals gave an all-around characteristic. The very light Soviet tanks like the T-37A, T-38 would obviously be inferior to the very light German machines (Pz.I and II); light Soviet tanks were inferior to German 20-tonners.

The T-37A and T-38 were reconnaissance vehicles, whereas the Pz I and II were training vehicles, which were used until medium tanks could be procured. The difference is significant, since the German light tanks were still designed for actual combat, whereas the T-37A and T-38 had only defensive armament for situations were combat was unavoidable, and no radios. Perhaps a more fitting comparison the German light tanks would be the T-40 and the up-armored T-40S (a.k.a. T-30), which were not that bad, although they were still reconnaissance tanks like their predecessors.