Jason L. Miles wrote:Yes, one of them does... Hence the "there seems to be some question of this."
Erm... from whom? Volokh Conspiracy (the legal blog that the second link derives from) posters broadly seem to be satisfied that Dormant Commerce Clause renders the boycott provisions unconstitutional. That you found a yahoo answers page in which one random person seems to claim otherwise doesn't create "some question of this" within the logical community (constitutional scholars). (There are also some non-lawyers on Volokh Conspiracy who seem to agree with you, but I haven't found a single lawyer since the first ~50 posts or so who thinks that it's up for debate). Moreover, you have still not addressed the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which are also obviously implicated here.
And you have yet to show me that you are smarter than every single lawyer in the California Bar. I notice that you have ignored my question of "Where are the lawsuits?" Private citizens don't have to wait for the federal government to sue, and in the Arizona case didn't.
They have to wait until they have
standing to sue. And moreover, "every single lawyer in the California Bar?" wtf are you even talking about? All the lawyers on the Volokh Conspiracy (including Volokh himself) seem to agree that Dormant Commerce Clause renders it unconstitutional. For instance:
MJW (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould wrote:“We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that by flatly prohibiting state purchases from repeat labor law violators Wisconsin ‘simply is not functioning as a private purchaser of services,’ 750 F.2d, at 614; for all practical purposes, Wisconsin’s debarment scheme is tantamount to regulation.” The Wisconsin law was, said the court, “a statute that can even plausibly be defended as a legitimate response to state procurement constraints or to local economic needs.”
This seems to me to suggest that the “market participant” exception would not shield the Arizona boycott from a dormant commerce clause challenge.
As I mentioned, the boycott does not (as far as I know) preempt any federal law. It does, however, violate the fundamental principal of federalism, since it is an attempt by the city of Los Angeles to impose its policies on Arizona.
He also cites Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, another case in which a state law preventing state funds from being used to purchase out-of-state goods and services was struck down as being unconstitutional for the very reason that a state or local government enacting a law for political reasons cannot shield itself using the market participant exception. There is good reason for this: such a state is not acting as a market participant.
MJW wrote:SCOTUS in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown wrote:We distinguished Gould in Boston Harbor, holding that the NLRA did not preclude a state agency supervising a construction project from requiring that contractors abide by a labor agreement. We explained that when a State acts as a “market participant with no interest in setting policy,” as opposed to a “regulator,” it does not offend the pre-emption principles of the NLRA. 507 U. S., at 229. In finding that the state agency had acted as a market participant, we stressed that the challenged action “was specifically tailored to one particular job,” and aimed “to ensure an efficient project that would be completed as quickly and effectively as possible at the lowest cost.” Id., at 232.
It is beyond dispute that California enacted AB 1889 in its capacity as a regulator rather than a market participant. AB 1889 is neither “specifically tailored to one particular job” nor a “legitimate response to state procurement constraints or to local economic needs.” Gould, 475 U. S., at 291. As the statute’s preamble candidly acknowledges, the legislative purpose is not the efficient procurement of goods and services, but the furtherance of a labor policy.
It is likewise beyond dispute that Los Angeles has no proprietary interest in refusing to purchase from Arizona, while continuing to purchase from the other 49 states. The only purpose is regulatory, and what it attempts to regulate are the policies of a separate sovereign state.
The boycott also violates the Equal Protection Clause. In HUGHES v. ALEXANDRIA SCRAP CORP., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), the court upheld a statute against an equal protection challenge, but only because the statute served a valid state purpose and the funding restrictions bore a rational relationship to that purpose. In the boycott law, there is no valid rational basis for denying the use of city funds to purchase products and services from Arizona.
I
bolded the bit at the end, too, to remind you that the constitutionality of the boycott provisions also depends on Equal Protection--something I pointed out in a very early post and to which you have never even attempted a response.
This guy has pretty much won the thread--none of the regular posters are arguing against him, anymore (although there are some stupid people who have rushed in for each side and who don't seem to be lawyers or regular posters). In contrast, the original Arizona law remains quite controversial, with lawyers coming down on each side of its constitutionality.
Jason L. Miles wrote:Are you seriously trying to tell me that even if every member of the bar in Los Angeles, Sacramento, and San Francisco is a part of the Vast Evil Liberal Conspiracy Against ArizonaTM, there isn't a single lawyer in either south Orange County, San Diego County, or the Inland Empire that has noticed this; or that if they have, the Orange County Register has decided not to report it. Or are you so deranged that you think that everyone in California is an Evil Liberal LoonieTM. If they were, there'd be a whole lot less gridlock in Sacramento.
I don't know what the fuck you're talking about, but Eugene Volokh lives in LA--he's a professor of Constitutional Law at UCLA School of Law. He agrees that the laws are unconstitutional. I'm sure that many of his other posters also live in California and are lawyers; so far as I can see, none of them seem to think that the issue is anything but settled law.
I never said they didn't, but I'm a little confused as to what you're arguing. I said lowest bidder laws might have been violated and that is a job for (at most) the CA Attorney General and you tried to bring the feds into it. If you are back on the constitutionality of the purchasing/contracting policies of the City of Los Angeles, rather than whether it violates the lowest bidder laws, a segue would be nice.
I, frankly, couldn't care less about lowest bidder laws. The argument should be the constitutionality of the laws involved; intrastate conflicts are basically irrelevant to the discussion so far as I'm concerned.
Andrew J. wrote:You talk of harm but then cite the number of laws violated, as if those were related. A little bit of highly diffuse economic damage is not as bad as the potential unfair harassment and imprisonment of countless of citizens, regardless of whether the former is more egregiously and obviously illegal than the latter.
I talk about the
constitutional provisions that have been blatantly and deliberately disregarded by the state and local governments involved. That's a much more serious problem than alleged "harassment and imprisonment of countless citizens" (which, btw, doesn't seem to be an issue in Rhode Island which has a functionally identical policy to Arizona's but without the guarantees of non-race-based enforcement). Indeed, it calls into question the entire structure and legitimacy of the government--Federal as well as state.