What if McClellan had beaten Lee in 1862?

[irishmick79]

It's interesting to look at how Lincoln and McClellan both conceptualized the war, and how to approach it. McClellan's decision making makes a lot more logical sense when you realize that he was fairly representative of a large wing of northerners who simply viewed the war aim as to demonstrate the superiority of northern arms, settle the sharpest disputes at the negotiating table while leaving the south largely intact, and letting national life return to something resembling normal. Lincoln, on the other hand, gradually came to view the war as an almost counter-revolutionary experience and nationalized political life on an unprecedented scale. It's hard to imagine things like the Wade-Morrill Land Grant act, the national income tax, or the National Banking act even being contemplated a year earlier.

If somebody had given McClellan a detailed and accurate assessment of the true state of affairs in the southern army, how would that have changed McClellan's strategic approach? Would he have even bothered with the Peninsula Campaign and driven straight at the southern army if he knew just how weak it was compared to his own? Even if he had accurate intelligence on the Army of Northern Virginia, was McClellan capable of delivering the killing blow?

And what would the political consequenses of a decisive victory by the Army of the Potomac be? McClellan was probably the most prominent reconciliation democrat in the country at the time, and would have certainly been a leading voice for the Union in any peace negotiations with South had he been victorious. With the radical republicans still being somewhat of an outlier in northern politics, would emancipation have stood a chance of becoming policy? Would reconciliation have been possible with peace democrats controlling the process, and if so what would it have looked like?

[Mr Bean]

If somebody had given McClellan a detailed and accurate assessment of the true state of affairs in the southern army, how would that have changed McClellan's strategic approach? Would he have even bothered with the Peninsula Campaign and driven straight at the southern army if he knew just how weak it was compared to his own? Even if he had accurate intelligence on the Army of Northern Virginia, was McClellan capable of delivering the killing blow?

At Antietam McClellan had an exact idea of Lee's displacements and numbers and was convinced that the reports were genuine. What you asked for what would happened in history.. Well we know this because of the capture of Lee's orders and McClellan still failed to act. As an organizer there were few who could beat McClellan, as a general however many could beat him and did. As a general he out numbered his foe on the field at least 2 to 1 in every engagement and sometimes 3 or 4 to 1 and lost every time all the while claiming his foe's outnumbered him. He at one point claimed Lee had 162,000 men to his 90,000 to Lincoln.

*I'll add that Lee secured local superiority often against McClellan and other northern generals because of his excellent grasp of the eb and flow of battle. But the fact remains the Army of the Potomac outnumbered Lee's at every single turn except in a very local sense from time to time.

And what would the political consequenses of a decisive victory by the Army of the Potomac be? McClellan was probably the most prominent reconciliation democrat in the country at the time, and would have certainly been a leading voice for the Union in any peace negotiations with South had he been victorious. With the radical republicans still being somewhat of an outlier in northern politics, would emancipation have stood a chance of becoming policy? Would reconciliation have been possible with peace democrats controlling the process, and if so what would it have looked like?

This second part I am not equipped to speculate on

[irishmick79]

If somebody had given McClellan a detailed and accurate assessment of the true state of affairs in the southern army, how would that have changed McClellan's strategic approach? Would he have even bothered with the Peninsula Campaign and driven straight at the southern army if he knew just how weak it was compared to his own? Even if he had accurate intelligence on the Army of Northern Virginia, was McClellan capable of delivering the killing blow?

At Antietam McClellan had an exact idea of Lee's displacements and numbers and was convinced that the reports were genuine. What you asked for what would happened in history.. Well we know this because of the capture of Lee's orders and McClellan still failed to act. As an organizer there were few who could beat McClellan, as a general however many could beat him and did. As a general he out numbered his foe on the field at least 2 to 1 in every engagement and sometimes 3 or 4 to 1 and lost every time all the while claiming his foe's outnumbered him. He at one point claimed Lee had 162,000 men to his 90,000 to Lincoln.

*I'll add that Lee secured local superiority often against McClellan and other northern generals because of his excellent grasp of the eb and flow of battle. But the fact remains the Army of the Potomac outnumbered Lee's at every single turn except in a very local sense from time to time.

Special Order 191 did not give any indication of Lee's numbers, merely outlining general movements of the Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan must have felt justified in his large estimates of enemy strength after realizing Lee was willing to split up his army like that. McClellan's maneuvering is fairly consistent with a conventional general who is operating under the assumption he is facing an army of superior numerical strength.

[TC Pilot]

Giving McClellan a full idea of the Confederate strategic situation doesn't guarantee victory. The closest thing he had to that was at Antietam, and all he did was hurl a fraction of the army at Lee piecemeal and let Lee escape back south without even bothering to so much as harass him. Besides, it's not as if the Union didn't put other generals far less afraid to commit to battle than McClellan into the field, only to be crushed again and again.

Assuming he actually does take Richmond, the war will likely end soon after; getting KOed in just one year will tend to do that. I doubt it'll be enough to propell McClellan or any other Democrat into the presidency in '64, since the victory can be spun as much Lincoln's as McClellan's.

[Sea Skimmer]

Special Order 191 did not give any indication of Lee's numbers, merely outlining general movements of the Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan must have felt justified in his large estimates of enemy strength after realizing Lee was willing to split up his army like that. McClellan's maneuvering is fairly consistent with a conventional general who is operating under the assumption he is facing an army of superior numerical strength.

McClellan's reports on the size of Lees Army all basically came from a single spy the name of whom I forget at the moment. He was very foolish to constantly accept this guys reports without anything to back them up. Common sense alone should have made him very skeptical of reports of the rebel army being so much larger when it was drawing from such a smaller population base.

[Lonestar]

McClellan's reports on the size of Lees Army all basically came from a single spy the name of whom I forget at the moment.

Pinkerton? IIRC at one point a CSA General just marched his brigade in a loop to make it appear as if there were many more men then there were.

[CarsonPalmer]

McClellan's reports on the size of Lees Army all basically came from a single spy the name of whom I forget at the moment.

Pinkerton? IIRC at one point a CSA General just marched his brigade in a loop to make it appear as if there were many more men then there were.

Yeah, Pinkerton. That was Magruder who marched his men in a loop at Yorktown, although that wasn't all that uncommon of a trick at different points in the war.

[irishmick79]

Special Order 191 did not give any indication of Lee's numbers, merely outlining general movements of the Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan must have felt justified in his large estimates of enemy strength after realizing Lee was willing to split up his army like that. McClellan's maneuvering is fairly consistent with a conventional general who is operating under the assumption he is facing an army of superior numerical strength.

McClellan's reports on the size of Lees Army all basically came from a single spy the name of whom I forget at the moment. He was very foolish to constantly accept this guys reports without anything to back them up. Common sense alone should have made him very skeptical of reports of the rebel army being so much larger when it was drawing from such a smaller population base.

How developed was that sense of mobilization logistics during the civil war? Could somebody in the military have reasonably been expected to know how to sit down and calculate just what kind of manpower would be available?

And wasn't Pinkerton fairly well regarded for his abilities as a detective at the time? I guess what would have given McClellan a reason to really be skeptical, since the high estimates seemed to help him buy time from congress to train his army, and gave him political room to pursue the cautious maneuvering he seemed to favor?

[irishmick79]

Giving McClellan a full idea of the Confederate strategic situation doesn't guarantee victory. The closest thing he had to that was at Antietam, and all he did was hurl a fraction of the army at Lee piecemeal and let Lee escape back south without even bothering to so much as harass him. Besides, it's not as if the Union didn't put other generals far less afraid to commit to battle than McClellan into the field, only to be crushed again and again.

Assuming he actually does take Richmond, the war will likely end soon after; getting KOed in just one year will tend to do that. I doubt it'll be enough to propell McClellan or any other Democrat into the presidency in '64, since the victory can be spun as much Lincoln's as McClellan's.

The second part is where I'm not so sure. Lincoln essentially got elected on an anti-slavery platform, and the anti-slavery position really didn't become a cornerstone of war policy until practically the end of the year. Until McClellan's failures on the Peninsula, Lincoln himself refused to consider emancipation even though the republican radicals were pushing him for harsher action against the south.

Politically speaking the country in 1862 still had hopes for some sort of reconciliation. And I think that any decisive Union victory in 1862, especially prior to July, would essentially hand war democrats like McClellan the political initiative to set priorities for any sort of negotiation or reconciliation effort with the south. The nation in 1862 was still largely not interested in emancipation and was hopeful for some sort of reconciliation. And given the serious insurgencies Lincoln was dealing with from within his own cabinet and from the republicans in the senate, it's unilkely that Lincoln could have counted on much support from them to promote a credible alternative to what McCellan might propose.

[TC Pilot]

The second part is where I'm not so sure. Lincoln essentially got elected on an anti-slavery platform, and the anti-slavery position really didn't become a cornerstone of war policy until practically the end of the year.

I'd like to know where you're getting the idea Lincoln only won because of anti-slavery. The Republicans' platform only mentioned blocking any further expansion of it into the territories. After the election, Lincoln himself repeatedly tried to emphasize to a hysterical South he wasn't going to take their slaves away.

Politically speaking the country in 1862 still had hopes for some sort of reconciliation. And I think that any decisive Union victory in 1862, especially prior to July, would essentially hand war democrats like McClellan the political initiative to set priorities for any sort of negotiation or reconciliation effort with the south. The nation in 1862 was still largely not interested in emancipation and was hopeful for some sort of reconciliation.

This is perfectly in line with what Lincoln himself seemed to support even as late as '65.

And given the serious insurgencies Lincoln was dealing with from within his own cabinet and from the republicans in the senate, it's unilkely that Lincoln could have counted on much support from them to promote a credible alternative to what McCellan might propose.

Why exactly would a Union victory in '62 make the Republicans any less capable of weathering the internal divisions within the party than in '60 or '64? Why would radical Republicans fight Lincoln any harder when, as you obliquely pointed out above, their main impetus would be cut out from under them by an early Union victory? Since when did McClellan suddenly become some dynamic force on the political arena and the Republicans incapable of any sort of flexibility?

What exactly is McClellan going to offer in terms of "reconciliation" (assuming it's even relevant two full years after the end of the war) and slavery that Lincoln didn't already advocate?

[irishmick79]

The second part is where I'm not so sure. Lincoln essentially got elected on an anti-slavery platform, and the anti-slavery position really didn't become a cornerstone of war policy until practically the end of the year.

I'd like to know where you're getting the idea Lincoln only won because of anti-slavery. The Republicans' platform only mentioned blocking any further expansion of it into the territories. After the election, Lincoln himself repeatedly tried to emphasize to a hysterical South he wasn't going to take their slaves away.

Anti-slavery wasn't the only reason he won, but it was the catalytic issue which motivated the Republicans who voted for him. The Republicans clearly had the strongest anti-slavery position on the 1860 ballot, and it clearly served as a unifying and motivating force for them, whereas the issue of slavery blew up the Democratic caucus. And Lincoln, unlike McClellan gradually shifted his position on abolition throughout 1862 in light of the Union defeats in the field and the growing storms of criticism from the republican radicals on his flank.

Politically speaking the country in 1862 still had hopes for some sort of reconciliation. And I think that any decisive Union victory in 1862, especially prior to July, would essentially hand war democrats like McClellan the political initiative to set priorities for any sort of negotiation or reconciliation effort with the south. The nation in 1862 was still largely not interested in emancipation and was hopeful for some sort of reconciliation.

This is perfectly in line with what Lincoln himself seemed to support even as late as '65.[/quote]

By embracing emancipation, didn't Lincoln in essence set the wheels of full abolition in motion? He had to have understood the ramifications of what he was doing, and what that meant for any sort of reconciliation with the south. Emancipation was a guantlet thrown down at the feet of the south, a clear message that the war was going to be a fight to the finish.

And given the serious insurgencies Lincoln was dealing with from within his own cabinet and from the republicans in the senate, it's unilkely that Lincoln could have counted on much support from them to promote a credible alternative to what McCellan might propose.

Why exactly would a Union victory in '62 make the Republicans any less capable of weathering the internal divisions within the party than in '60 or '64? Why would radical Republicans fight Lincoln any harder when, as you obliquely pointed out above, their main impetus would be cut out from under them by an early Union victory? Since when did McClellan suddenly become some dynamic force on the political arena and the Republicans incapable of any sort of flexibility?[/quote]

Because the radical wing of the party would still be outside the mainstream in 1862, especially earlier in the year. Interest in emancipation rapidly expanded in the north directly as a war aim to undercut the south. Earlier in the year that motivation towards emancipation wouldn't be there. The radical republicans might fight Lincoln harder to push for terms which the south couldn't accept, because if somebody like McClellan got elected in 1864 their window of opportunity would be closed. If they can't get Lincoln to embrace their efforts, they would probably ditch him for somebody like Fremont or Chase or some other abolitionist who would carry their banner without reservation.

And I think McClellan would be in a strong position politically if he had taken Richmond. Heck, if the country can elect somebody like Grant largely because of the Civil War, why not McClellan?

What exactly is McClellan going to offer in terms of "reconciliation" (assuming it's even relevant two full years after the end of the war) and slavery that Lincoln didn't already advocate?

For one, McClellan abhorred emancipation. He was for recognizing property rights of slave owners and did not support military arrests. He didn't support the territorial organization of states (namely, the creation of West Virginia). I think he would have been much, much more lenient on issues of slavery towards the south in a negotiated settlement than Lincoln would have been, although I admit that's based on speculation.

[TC Pilot]

Anti-slavery wasn't the only reason he won, but it was the catalytic issue which motivated the Republicans who voted for him. The Republicans clearly had the strongest anti-slavery position on the 1860 ballot, and it clearly served as a unifying and motivating force for them, whereas the issue of slavery blew up the Democratic caucus. And Lincoln, unlike McClellan gradually shifted his position on abolition throughout 1862 in light of the Union defeats in the field and the growing storms of criticism from the republican radicals on his flank.

I guess I keep running into this seeming contradiction in your point. So people voted for Lincoln because of anti-slavery in '60... but the North doesn't support anti-slavery policies?

By embracing emancipation, didn't Lincoln in essence set the wheels of full abolition in motion? He had to have understood the ramifications of what he was doing, and what that meant for any sort of reconciliation with the south. Emancipation was a guantlet thrown down at the feet of the south, a clear message that the war was going to be a fight to the finish.

Well, technically the Emancipation Proclamation (which came out after Antietam) didn't take effect until '63, and after Congress passed its own Confiscation Act. Of course, we're talking about a completely different situation in which the war's probably already over by the time the EP is penned.

Because the radical wing of the party would still be outside the mainstream in 1862, especially earlier in the year. Interest in emancipation rapidly expanded in the north directly as a war aim to undercut the south. Earlier in the year that motivation towards emancipation wouldn't be there. The radical republicans might fight Lincoln harder to push for terms which the south couldn't accept, because if somebody like McClellan got elected in 1864 their window of opportunity would be closed. If they can't get Lincoln to embrace their efforts, they would probably ditch him for somebody like Fremont or Chase or some other abolitionist who would carry their banner without reservation.

See, here's another seeming contradiction I keep picking up on. Radical republicans are a marginal, predominantly unpopular group, so they'll dump their moderate Presidential incumbent (who just won a civil war for them) in the face of a popular war general who would support even more conservative policies? Why are RR suddenly so stupid?

And I think McClellan would be in a strong position politically if he had taken Richmond. Heck, if the country can elect somebody like Grant largely because of the Civil War, why not McClellan?

They're totally different circumstances. Grant was regarded by most Northerners as the Union's savior and the inheritor of the fallen Lincoln's vision. This is not McClellan taking up the mantle of a fallen martyr after years of being 'hijacked' by a usurper, this is McClellan trying to boot Lincoln, a victorious one at that, out of office.

Besides, who would the South (assuming they can even vote at this point) favor?

For one, McClellan abhorred emancipation. He was for recognizing property rights of slave owners and did not support military arrests. He didn't support the territorial organization of states (namely, the creation of West Virginia). I think he would have been much, much more lenient on issues of slavery towards the south in a negotiated settlement than Lincoln would have been, although I admit that's based on speculation.

Granted. So why would RR be so keen to dump their moderate incumbent?

[irishmick79]

Anti-slavery wasn't the only reason he won, but it was the catalytic issue which motivated the Republicans who voted for him. The Republicans clearly had the strongest anti-slavery position on the 1860 ballot, and it clearly served as a unifying and motivating force for them, whereas the issue of slavery blew up the Democratic caucus. And Lincoln, unlike McClellan gradually shifted his position on abolition throughout 1862 in light of the Union defeats in the field and the growing storms of criticism from the republican radicals on his flank.

I guess I keep running into this seeming contradiction in your point. So people voted for Lincoln because of anti-slavery in '60... but the North doesn't support anti-slavery policies?

Ah, I see. My point is that northern support for anti-slavery policies was pretty soft, politically. Voters were willing to halt the spread of slavery into the territories, but when it came to emancipation of slaves in the south, there was much less support. So while Lincoln could find ample support to keep new slave states from being admitted or letting slavery continue in Missouri and Kansas, emancipation was a much tougher sell. As the country drifted towards the more radical position of emancipation over the course of 1862, so did Lincoln. Lincoln hedged his bets for much of the year, concerned with the impact of emancipation upon states like Kentucky and Missouri.

By embracing emancipation, didn't Lincoln in essence set the wheels of full abolition in motion? He had to have understood the ramifications of what he was doing, and what that meant for any sort of reconciliation with the south. Emancipation was a guantlet thrown down at the feet of the south, a clear message that the war was going to be a fight to the finish.

Well, technically the Emancipation Proclamation (which came out after Antietam) didn't take effect until '63, and after Congress passed its own Confiscation Act. Of course, we're talking about a completely different situation in which the war's probably already over by the time the EP is penned.

True. I'm wondering if the the EP would even get written if the Union is victorious earlier in the year. If the radicals in congress are taking the intiative on the abolitionist position, what political ground would Lincoln be able to stand on?

Because the radical wing of the party would still be outside the mainstream in 1862, especially earlier in the year. Interest in emancipation rapidly expanded in the north directly as a war aim to undercut the south. Earlier in the year that motivation towards emancipation wouldn't be there. The radical republicans might fight Lincoln harder to push for terms which the south couldn't accept, because if somebody like McClellan got elected in 1864 their window of opportunity would be closed. If they can't get Lincoln to embrace their efforts, they would probably ditch him for somebody like Fremont or Chase or some other abolitionist who would carry their banner without reservation.

See, here's another seeming contradiction I keep picking up on. Radical republicans are a marginal, predominantly unpopular group, so they'll dump their moderate Presidential incumbent (who just won a civil war for them) in the face of a popular war general who would support even more conservative policies? Why are RR suddenly so stupid?

The problem that Lincoln would be facing from the radicals is that without emancipation, he wouldn't have a position from which to co-opt them. And with the Peninsula Campaign at least, McClellan could certainly argue that the White House fought him on the plan, was overly concerned with the security of the capitol, and the victory should be considered his and his alone. And this is pretty much what McClellan argued IRL to shift blame for the campaign's failure to the White House.

And I think McClellan would be in a strong position politically if he had taken Richmond. Heck, if the country can elect somebody like Grant largely because of the Civil War, why not McClellan?

They're totally different circumstances. Grant was regarded by most Northerners as the Union's savior and the inheritor of the fallen Lincoln's vision. This is not McClellan taking up the mantle of a fallen martyr after years of being 'hijacked' by a usurper, this is McClellan trying to boot Lincoln, a victorious one at that, out of office.

Besides, who would the South (assuming they can even vote at this point) favor?

I imagine the South would favor someone like McClellan if they had a choice. Without the Southern Democrats actively manuevering to split the party in the hopes of triggering secession, the democrats might stand a chance of organizing themselves behind a victorious general like McClellan and position themselves as the party most serious about national reconcilation.

For one, McClellan abhorred emancipation. He was for recognizing property rights of slave owners and did not support military arrests. He didn't support the territorial organization of states (namely, the creation of West Virginia). I think he would have been much, much more lenient on issues of slavery towards the south in a negotiated settlement than Lincoln would have been, although I admit that's based on speculation.

Granted. So why would RR be so keen to dump their moderate incumbent?

I think a lot of them would be frustrated with Lincoln, if the Democrats are going with a candidate who's already going to be consiliatory towards the south, then they might say "see? we went with a moderate in 1860 and aren't getting anywhere on ending slavery. We need a real abolitionist if we want to be competitive." I'm not sure how Lincoln could effectively fight off the democrats andkeep the radicals from ditching him for a more pliant candidate.

[irishmick79]

As a further point, it occured to me that the radicals had quite a bit of animosity towards McClellan, and were pushing Lincoln for a change as early as December 1861. If McClellan actually did take Richmond and beat the rebels, I imagine that the radicals would blame Lincoln for essentially handing a major part of the national dialogue on slavery and reconciliation to their adversaries. They would certainly view McClellan as a political adversary, and would probably accuse Lincoln of selling them out for McClellan's benefit (fairly or not).

If anything, the radicals were relentless in pursuing their objective of abolition and I'm not sure that they could have held their noses long enough to continue supporting Lincoln in the event of an early union victory, unless Lincoln really embraced their agenda.

[TC Pilot]

Ah, I see. My point is that northern support for anti-slavery policies was pretty soft, politically. Voters were willing to halt the spread of slavery into the territories, but when it came to emancipation of slaves in the south, there was much less support. So while Lincoln could find ample support to keep new slave states from being admitted or letting slavery continue in Missouri and Kansas, emancipation was a much tougher sell. As the country drifted towards the more radical position of emancipation over the course of 1862, so did Lincoln. Lincoln hedged his bets for much of the year, concerned with the impact of emancipation upon states like Kentucky and Missouri.

It's been a few days, so please forgive me, but.... what's your point? Lincoln adapted to changing situations while McClellan doesn't? I don't see that as being bad for Lincoln.

True. I'm wondering if the the EP would even get written if the Union is victorious earlier in the year. If the radicals in congress are taking the intiative on the abolitionist position, what political ground would Lincoln be able to stand on?

Depends, I think, on when the Union wins. Richmond might very well have been taken before even Congress made a move if McClellan isn't dithering around Yorktown for a month.

The problem that Lincoln would be facing from the radicals is that without emancipation, he wouldn't have a position from which to co-opt them.

He co-opted them in '60. Why not now?

And this is pretty much what McClellan argued IRL to shift blame for the campaign's failure to the White House.

A good point.

I imagine the South would favor someone like McClellan if they had a choice. Without the Southern Democrats actively manuevering to split the party in the hopes of triggering secession, the democrats might stand a chance of organizing themselves behind a victorious general like McClellan and position themselves as the party most serious about national reconcilation.

This just strikes me as being... too convenient. So the North will accept him as the vanquisher of the South, and the South will vote for him...

I think a lot of them would be frustrated with Lincoln, if the Democrats are going with a candidate who's already going to be consiliatory towards the south, then they might say "see? we went with a moderate in 1860 and aren't getting anywhere on ending slavery. We need a real abolitionist if we want to be competitive." I'm not sure how Lincoln could effectively fight off the democrats andkeep the radicals from ditching him for a more pliant candidate.

You think they'd risk splitting the party because the Democrats are running a candidate whose policies they abhor more than their incumbent candidate?

Well, looking at your next post, that's more of a rhetorical question.

Edited to fix my quote-tag incompetence.