Skepticism

[Bakustra]

Thank you for calmly pointing me towards an explication of your belief system, instead of attacking my person rather than my points.

I see that my comments still smart. Ironic, I believe, wouldn't you say, Formless?

To be honest, I have no idea what either of you are trying to say here. Which one of us are you referring to? (note: the question is directed at Aranfan)

He's saying how calm and uninsulting you are, and contrasting that, with, well, me. I find that ironic given some of the spats we've had in the past.

I see that my comments still smart. Ironic, I believe, wouldn't you say, Formless?

To be honest, I have no idea what either of you are trying to say here. Which one of us are you referring to? (note: the question is directed at Aranfan)

My grasp of the language does not have an impact on the points I put up.

I'm not saying it does, I'm simply curious, because your responses are so strange that I cannot help but assume that there is some difficulty of communication between us. Your grasp of the language has an impact insofar as several of your posts confuse moral and less immoral, which would be a hindrance to any conversation or discussion.

[Bakustra]

But let me introduce another scenario. Let us say that you are starving to death, and on your last legs. You see in front of you a grocer's stall, and you have an opportunity to take a loaf of bread without anybody seeing. Doing so will allow you to live. What would you do? Which is the more moral path, or is there no moral path?

I will amorally take the bread. Because if I'm starving to death then I'm too hungry care about morality or legality or anything else. The philosophers can argue about the morality of my thievery, I'm too busy filling my empty stomach.

Thank you for answering one half of the question. Where is the other half? For that matter, just what form of morality do you abide by? You're not a deontologist, nor do you follow virtue ethics by this reply, and you specifically objected to utilitarianism earlier. What is your moral code? Do you simply not have a formal one?

[Aranfan]

Stirner has had the largest effect on my moral code. I suppose you could call me a subjectivist, in that I assign my own temporary and contingent valuations to things and acknowledge that my valuations are not necessarily applicable from a perspective other than my own.

The thing about Solipsism is that if you accept the Cartesian Methodological Doubt and accept Cogito Ergo Sum, then Solipsism is the only sound position given those bases. If Descartes had said "I see therefore I am" Solipsism would be avoided. Because as Hegel repeatedly pointed out, to be a perceiver there must be an object to be perceived. I do not base my proof of myself on thinking, but rather on perceiving, and thence get out of the solipsist trap.

[Formless]

To be honest, I have no idea what either of you are trying to say here. Which one of us are you referring to? (note: the question is directed at Aranfan)

My grasp of the language does not have an impact on the points I put up.

Ah. So you were addressing Bakustra. That is good to know. Although, if you genuinely have issues understanding English because, say, its a second language for you, that's perfectly understandable. I don't believe Bakustra meant to be insulting when he asked that question.

He's saying how calm and uninsulting you are, and contrasting that, with, well, me. I find that ironic given some of the spats we've had in the past.

Yes, I figured that out. Though, and this is my own opinion, I think part of that is that I actually insult people usually to make the argument more impersonal. I've gone from red hot to frigid in mid debate before, because I'm not doing it out of irritation with the person so much as the stuff they say. If they say something less stupid or indicate genuine ignorance, I cool off pretty quickly. At least, I strive to. You on the other hand seem to do the opposite (I.E. tailoring your mockery to suit the person you're talking to) and seem to assume that's what others are trying to do as well. Put anti-matter next to matter and see what happens. Same with us.

There are exceptions to these patterns, of course. I never claimed to be perfect (though it was pretty fun that time we had black supremacists invade the forum).

[Aranfan]

I'm a native English speaker who only speaks English. So my grasp of the language isn't that good.

[Bakustra]

Stirner has had the largest effect on my moral code. I suppose you could call me a subjectivist, in that I assign my own temporary and contingent valuations to things and acknowledge that my valuations are not necessarily applicable from a perspective other than my own.

The thing about Solipsism is that if you accept the Cartesian Methodological Doubt and accept Cogito Ergo Sum, then Solipsism is the only sound position given those bases. If Descartes had said "I see therefore I am" Solipsism would be avoided. Because as Hegel repeatedly pointed out, to be a perceiver there must be an object to be perceived. I do not base my proof of myself on thinking, but rather on perceiving, and thence get out of the solipsist trap.

I am not sure why your moral code would fail then in the case of stealing to feed oneself. My understanding of Stirner is that such an action is perfectly moral from his perspective.

How does that align with your arguments earlier in the thread, in which you essentially invoked Descartes' evil genius to provide an equivalency of mysticism and rationality?

To be honest, I have no idea what either of you are trying to say here. Which one of us are you referring to? (note: the question is directed at Aranfan)

My grasp of the language does not have an impact on the points I put up.

Ah. So you were addressing Bakustra. That is good to know. Although, if you genuinely have issues understanding English because, say, its a second language for you, that's perfectly understandable. I don't believe Bakustra meant to be insulting when he asked that question.

He's saying how calm and uninsulting you are, and contrasting that, with, well, me. I find that ironic given some of the spats we've had in the past.

Yes, I figured that out. Though, and this is my own opinion, I think part of that is that I actually insult people usually to make the argument more impersonal. I've gone from red hot to frigid in mid debate before, because I'm not doing it out of irritation with the person so much as the stuff they say. If they say something less stupid or indicate genuine ignorance, I cool off pretty quickly. At least, I strive to. You on the other hand seem to do the opposite (I.E. tailoring your mockery to suit the person you're talking to) and seem to assume that's what others are trying to do as well. Put anti-matter next to matter and see what happens. Same with us.

There are exceptions to these patterns, of course. I never claimed to be perfect (though it was pretty fun that time we had black supremacists invade the forum).

Hey, I'm perfectly fine with that! And I'll take that into account in the future, methinks.

I'm a native English speaker who only speaks English. So my grasp of the language isn't that good.

I'm genuinely curious. So why the confusion over "less immoral" and "moral"?

[Aranfan]

Stirner has had the largest effect on my moral code. I suppose you could call me a subjectivist, in that I assign my own temporary and contingent valuations to things and acknowledge that my valuations are not necessarily applicable from a perspective other than my own.

The thing about Solipsism is that if you accept the Cartesian Methodological Doubt and accept Cogito Ergo Sum, then Solipsism is the only sound position given those bases. If Descartes had said "I see therefore I am" Solipsism would be avoided. Because as Hegel repeatedly pointed out, to be a perceiver there must be an object to be perceived. I do not base my proof of myself on thinking, but rather on perceiving, and thence get out of the solipsist trap.

I am not sure why your moral code would fail then in the case of stealing to feed oneself. My understanding of Stirner is that such an action is perfectly moral from his perspective.

How does that align with your arguments earlier in the thread, in which you essentially invoked Descartes' evil genius to provide an equivalency of mysticism and rationality?

My understanding was that Stirner viewed morality as a heuristic that should be discarded as soon as it ceased to be useful.

Because the mysticism of the evil genius and the rationality of the objective world both rest on the subjective valuations of the mystic and the rationalist. The mystic has been presented with convincing evidence of their viewpoint, likewise with the rationalist. Empiricism is the most useful method I've yet encountered for explaining my perceptions, and in so far as that goes I side with the rationalist. But I view dimly a-prioristic fantasy-lands with at best tenuous connections with my perceptions, such as Austrian Economics or Euclidean Geometry (when treated as anything other than a useful approximation).

I'm a native English speaker who only speaks English. So my grasp of the language isn't that good.

I'm genuinely curious. So why the confusion over "less immoral" and "moral"?

Too many arguments about FDR being immoral for not stopping Stalin, which tend to spiral into arguments about which of Hitler or Stalin should get the "most evil" award. Good and Evil are a duality, its a matter of degree. That which is not good is evil and that which is not evil is good. Arguments happen about where the line is drawn.

[Bakustra]

Stirner has had the largest effect on my moral code. I suppose you could call me a subjectivist, in that I assign my own temporary and contingent valuations to things and acknowledge that my valuations are not necessarily applicable from a perspective other than my own.

The thing about Solipsism is that if you accept the Cartesian Methodological Doubt and accept Cogito Ergo Sum, then Solipsism is the only sound position given those bases. If Descartes had said "I see therefore I am" Solipsism would be avoided. Because as Hegel repeatedly pointed out, to be a perceiver there must be an object to be perceived. I do not base my proof of myself on thinking, but rather on perceiving, and thence get out of the solipsist trap.

I am not sure why your moral code would fail then in the case of stealing to feed oneself. My understanding of Stirner is that such an action is perfectly moral from his perspective.

How does that align with your arguments earlier in the thread, in which you essentially invoked Descartes' evil genius to provide an equivalency of mysticism and rationality?

My understanding was that Stirner viewed morality as a heuristic that should be discarded as soon as it ceased to be useful.

Because the mysticism of the evil genius and the rationality of the objective world both rest on the subjective valuations of the mystic and the rationalist. The mystic has been presented with convincing evidence of their viewpoint, likewise with the rationalist. Empiricism is the most useful method I've yet encountered for explaining my perceptions, and in so far as that goes I side with the rationalist. But I view dimly a-prioristic fantasy-lands with at best tenuous connections with my perceptions, such as Austrian Economics or Euclidean Geometry (when treated as anything other than a useful approximation).

My understanding of Stirner is that morals are defined totally by the individual. So that while you could discard morals, there is no reason to, as you may redefine them freely at any time. Of course, this is purely a semantical matter.


I see that we return once again to the beginning of the thread. However, I'm not sure what the difference is between "I think" and "I perceive" if one invokes the genius.

I'm a native English speaker who only speaks English. So my grasp of the language isn't that good.

I'm genuinely curious. So why the confusion over "less immoral" and "moral"?

Too many arguments about FDR being immoral for not stopping Stalin, which tend to spiral into arguments about which of Hitler or Stalin should get the "most evil" award. Good and Evil are a duality, its a matter of degree. That which is not good is evil and that which is not evil is good. Arguments happen about where the line is drawn.

A quick question. Is walking a moral or immoral action? This sounds irreverent, but frankly dismissing neutrality in a moral system so hastily sounds worrisome to me. This is also why I classified your position as a naive absolutism earlier. Is there a moral distinction between killing and stealing, under your system of duality? I am afraid that I cannot see where one would fit.

[Aranfan]

My understanding of Stirner is that morals are defined totally by the individual. So that while you could discard morals, there is no reason to, as you may redefine them freely at any time. Of course, this is purely a semantical matter.


I see that we return once again to the beginning of the thread. However, I'm not sure what the difference is between "I think" and "I perceive" if one invokes the genius.

I'll address the semantical issue below.

The difference between "I think" and "I perceive" lies in what is real. If my proof of myself rests on my thinking, then only my thoughts are given reality by my own existence. Anything I perceive that isn't my own thought cannot be trusted as really being there. Whereas with a proof based on perception, anything I perceive gains reality my perceiving them. Be I a brain in a vat, in a dreamscape, in an objective factual world, or lost in the illusions of an omnipotent daemon, what I perceive can be trusted as really there. If it wasn't, then I wouldn't be able to prove myself by perceiving it, but I have, so it is.

A quick question. Is walking a moral or immoral action? This sounds irreverent, but frankly dismissing neutrality in a moral system so hastily sounds worrisome to me. This is also why I classified your position as a naive absolutism earlier. Is there a moral distinction between killing and stealing, under your system of duality? I am afraid that I cannot see where one would fit.

Walking is an amoral action, it is neither good nor bad, it can have good effects and bad effects. Yet morality is a categorization, something either is in the "moral" category, or it is not and therefore is in the "immoral" category. Bad is not good, walking is not good, therefore walking is bad. Yet good is not bad, walking is not bad, therefore walking is good. The system threatens to fall apart and the category of "amoral" is applied as duct tape to patch the system.

My method is different. I place every action first into the amoral box, and then freely move the actions into the moral or immoral boxes according to such criteria and information as I decide. At any time I can shift the actions in a box to either of the other boxes, should I revise my information or change my criteria.

If this is a "system of morality" to you, then feel free to call it that, I'm a nominalist and won't object to how you label your things. I however, do not label such an arrangement as a "system of morality", as I view systems as rigid and universally applicable and instead call it a heuristic, and would ask you not to put your labels on my stuff.

[Bakustra]

My understanding of Stirner is that morals are defined totally by the individual. So that while you could discard morals, there is no reason to, as you may redefine them freely at any time. Of course, this is purely a semantical matter.


I see that we return once again to the beginning of the thread. However, I'm not sure what the difference is between "I think" and "I perceive" if one invokes the genius.

I'll address the semantical issue below.

The difference between "I think" and "I perceive" lies in what is real. If my proof of myself rests on my thinking, then only my thoughts are given reality by my own existence. Anything I perceive that isn't my own thought cannot be trusted as really being there. Whereas with a proof based on perception, anything I perceive gains reality my perceiving them. Be I a brain in a vat, in a dreamscape, in an objective factual world, or lost in the illusions of an omnipotent daemon, what I perceive can be trusted as really there. If it wasn't, then I wouldn't be able to prove myself by perceiving it, but I have, so it is.

But in your earlier posts, you posited that questions of results are irrelevant to attacking an equivalency of mysticism and rationality, because they depend on said sense-perception. If this is because the perception is personal, then how are we having this conversation? If we compare perceptions of the world, that is no use, because my statements are still filtered through your perception. This is still first cousins to solipsism because it lacks a real framework for comparison, as you have outlined it.

A quick question. Is walking a moral or immoral action? This sounds irreverent, but frankly dismissing neutrality in a moral system so hastily sounds worrisome to me. This is also why I classified your position as a naive absolutism earlier. Is there a moral distinction between killing and stealing, under your system of duality? I am afraid that I cannot see where one would fit.

Walking is an amoral action, it is neither good nor bad, it can have good effects and bad effects. Yet morality is a categorization, something either is in the "moral" category, or it is not and therefore is in the "immoral" category. Bad is not good, walking is not good, therefore walking is bad. Yet good is not bad, walking is not bad, therefore walking is good. The system threatens to fall apart and the category of "amoral" is applied as duct tape to patch the system.

My method is different. I place every action first into the amoral box, and then freely move the actions into the moral or immoral boxes according to such criteria and information as I decide. At any time I can shift the actions in a box to either of the other boxes, should I revise my information or change my criteria.

If this is a "system of morality" to you, then feel free to call it that, I'm a nominalist and won't object to how you label your things. I however, do not label such an arrangement as a "system of morality", as I view systems as rigid and universally applicable and instead call it a heuristic, and would ask you not to put your labels on my stuff.

Why is it a patch? The concept of neutrality or "amorality" is a part of many people's beliefs on morality from the beginning, and so it is not necessarily a patch. But what of the second question I asked? Is there a means you have of ranking decisions within morality or immorality? I would suggest that this is a system of morality in that it is your expression of your moral beliefs. But you argue that a system must be rigid, so I accept that we are at a definition impasse.

[Aranfan]

My understanding of Stirner is that morals are defined totally by the individual. So that while you could discard morals, there is no reason to, as you may redefine them freely at any time. Of course, this is purely a semantical matter.


I see that we return once again to the beginning of the thread. However, I'm not sure what the difference is between "I think" and "I perceive" if one invokes the genius.

I'll address the semantical issue below.

The difference between "I think" and "I perceive" lies in what is real. If my proof of myself rests on my thinking, then only my thoughts are given reality by my own existence. Anything I perceive that isn't my own thought cannot be trusted as really being there. Whereas with a proof based on perception, anything I perceive gains reality my perceiving them. Be I a brain in a vat, in a dreamscape, in an objective factual world, or lost in the illusions of an omnipotent daemon, what I perceive can be trusted as really there. If it wasn't, then I wouldn't be able to prove myself by perceiving it, but I have, so it is.

But in your earlier posts, you posited that questions of results are irrelevant to attacking an equivalency of mysticism and rationality, because they depend on said sense-perception. If this is because the perception is personal, then how are we having this conversation? If we compare perceptions of the world, that is no use, because my statements are still filtered through your perception. This is still first cousins to solipsism because it lacks a real framework for comparison, as you have outlined it.

To me, you and I seem to be having a conversation. This is true if you are actually there or a figment of my or god's imagination. Mysticism and Rationality both make claims about what is behind the appearance, yet as a subjective being I cannot get behind the appearance. Is an omnipotent demon screwing with me or am I in an objective factual world? The data to make that decision is outside my light cone, so to speak. I can no more doubt my perception of our having a conversation as I can doubt my perception of hearing the music I'm listening to right now.

This is what kills intersubjective agreement as an indicator for objective reality. They might all be wrong! It might be that this is just an illusion and I won't really fall to the ground if I jump out a window. But even so, if I jump out that illusionary window and illusionarilly fall to the illusionary ground, I will still be in a great deal of illusionary pain. Illusionary or not, that perception is something I would rather avoid. At the same time, if the intersubjective agreement is that chocolate rations have been increased from 30g to 20g, I can't agree.

Gotta go now.

A quick question. Is walking a moral or immoral action? This sounds irreverent, but frankly dismissing neutrality in a moral system so hastily sounds worrisome to me. This is also why I classified your position as a naive absolutism earlier. Is there a moral distinction between killing and stealing, under your system of duality? I am afraid that I cannot see where one would fit.

Walking is an amoral action, it is neither good nor bad, it can have good effects and bad effects. Yet morality is a categorization, something either is in the "moral" category, or it is not and therefore is in the "immoral" category. Bad is not good, walking is not good, therefore walking is bad. Yet good is not bad, walking is not bad, therefore walking is good. The system threatens to fall apart and the category of "amoral" is applied as duct tape to patch the system.

My method is different. I place every action first into the amoral box, and then freely move the actions into the moral or immoral boxes according to such criteria and information as I decide. At any time I can shift the actions in a box to either of the other boxes, should I revise my information or change my criteria.

If this is a "system of morality" to you, then feel free to call it that, I'm a nominalist and won't object to how you label your things. I however, do not label such an arrangement as a "system of morality", as I view systems as rigid and universally applicable and instead call it a heuristic, and would ask you not to put your labels on my stuff.

Why is it a patch? The concept of neutrality or "amorality" is a part of many people's beliefs on morality from the beginning, and so it is not necessarily a patch. But what of the second question I asked? Is there a means you have of ranking decisions within morality or immorality? I would suggest that this is a system of morality in that it is your expression of your moral beliefs. But you argue that a system must be rigid, so I accept that we are at a definition impasse.

I came to the conclusion that degrees of immorality and degrees of morality failed to capture what is commonly meant by "Morality" as a system because of those discussions about Hitler vs Stalin. The people who said Stalin was worse were called Nazi's for agreeing with Hitler's valuation of Stalin as bad, and the people who said Hitler was worse were accused of legitimizing the Holodomor.

[Bakustra]

But in your earlier posts, you posited that questions of results are irrelevant to attacking an equivalency of mysticism and rationality, because they depend on said sense-perception. If this is because the perception is personal, then how are we having this conversation? If we compare perceptions of the world, that is no use, because my statements are still filtered through your perception. This is still first cousins to solipsism because it lacks a real framework for comparison, as you have outlined it.

To me, you and I seem to be having a conversation. This is true if you are actually there or a figment of my or god's imagination. Mysticism and Rationality both make claims about what is behind the appearance, yet as a subjective being I cannot get behind the appearance. Is an omnipotent demon screwing with me or am I in an objective factual world? The data to make that decision is outside my light cone, so to speak. I can no more doubt my perception of our having a conversation as I can doubt my perception of hearing the music I'm listening to right now.

This is what kills intersubjective agreement as an indicator for objective reality. They might all be wrong! It might be that this is just an illusion and I won't really fall to the ground if I jump out a window. But even so, if I jump out that illusionary window and illusionarilly fall to the illusionary ground, I will still be in a great deal of illusionary pain. Illusionary or not, that perception is something I would rather avoid. At the same time, if the intersubjective agreement is that chocolate rations have been increased from 30g to 20g, I can't agree.

Gotta go now.

If there is no framework for comparison, then why bother? If you accept the reality, then why dismiss the arguments based on the benefits of rationality? Please clarify.

Why is it a patch? The concept of neutrality or "amorality" is a part of many people's beliefs on morality from the beginning, and so it is not necessarily a patch. But what of the second question I asked? Is there a means you have of ranking decisions within morality or immorality? I would suggest that this is a system of morality in that it is your expression of your moral beliefs. But you argue that a system must be rigid, so I accept that we are at a definition impasse.

I came to the conclusion that degrees of immorality and degrees of morality failed to capture what is commonly meant by "Morality" as a system because of those discussions about Hitler vs Stalin. The people who said Stalin was worse were called Nazi's for agreeing with Hitler's valuation of Stalin as bad, and the people who said Hitler was worse were accused of legitimizing the Holodomor.

What about the question that I asked? Is murder worse, better, or the same as stealing? For that matter, how does that fit in with the individualism of the rest of your philosophy?

[Aranfan]

If there is no framework for comparison, then why bother? If you accept the reality, then why dismiss the arguments based on the benefits of rationality? Please clarify.

I dismiss the arguments because every rationalist I've met claims to KNOW that we live in a world of objective factuality. Not that it is more useful to act as if we do, but that we do and that there is no way we don't. Of course, they always fall back on "its more useful" after a skeptic comes in and enquirers as to how they know this. If from the beginning they said, "this is the most useful way to proceed, so I'll proceed this way until I find a way I consider more useful", then I would have no problem with them, but instead they say that their way is THE ONE TRUE WAY, and that anyone who doesn't agree with them is a liar or a fool.

If it benefits me more to be irrational in a certain instance than to be rational, then I shall be irrational, simply because if my grounds for using reason was utility then dis-utility is grounds for dropping it.

What about the question that I asked? Is murder worse, better, or the same as stealing? For that matter, how does that fit in with the individualism of the rest of your philosophy?

Killing can be considered a subset of stealing. If it brings you enjoyment to kill a person, then try to kill them. If it brings you enjoyment to stop a murder from occurring, then do your damnedest to stop the murder. If seeing children happy brings you enjoyment, then encourage their happiness. If seeing children cry floats your boat then steal their candy or burn their house down. If such actions are reprehensible to you, then don't, and intervene to stop them from happening when you can. Force and guile are simply different aspects of might, which determines outcome, and whatever the outcome, serves you right. The line between foolhardy and heroism, as with Treason and Patriotism, is the line between failure and success.

[Bakustra]

If there is no framework for comparison, then why bother? If you accept the reality, then why dismiss the arguments based on the benefits of rationality? Please clarify.

I dismiss the arguments because every rationalist I've met claims to KNOW that we live in a world of objective factuality. Not that it is more useful to act as if we do, but that we do and that there is no way we don't. Of course, they always fall back on "its more useful" after a skeptic comes in and enquirers as to how they know this. If from the beginning they said, "this is the most useful way to proceed, so I'll proceed this way until I find a way I consider more useful", then I would have no problem with them, but instead they say that their way is THE ONE TRUE WAY, and that anyone who doesn't agree with them is a liar or a fool.

If it benefits me more to be irrational in a certain instance than to be rational, then I shall be irrational, simply because if my grounds for using reason was utility then dis-utility is grounds for dropping it.

The word objective is meaningless if you are right, so does it really matter? But let's step back. The response to you was that within a given framework, rationality is more valuable. So people did not declare anything of the sort. But instead you provided a canned response based upon your previous experiences. This is frankly, insulting. I gave effort to answer you, but you did not give the answer back. Granted, you probably will make some comeback about the subjectivity of feeling. Oh well. But I feel that this is approaching the point of fundamental incompatibility, since I have the urge to start talking about society and you follow good ol' Stirner.

What about the question that I asked? Is murder worse, better, or the same as stealing? For that matter, how does that fit in with the individualism of the rest of your philosophy?

Killing can be considered a subset of stealing. If it brings you enjoyment to kill a person, then try to kill them. If it brings you enjoyment to stop a murder from occurring, then do your damnedest to stop the murder. If seeing children happy brings you enjoyment, then encourage their happiness. If seeing children cry floats your boat then steal their candy or burn their house down. If such actions are reprehensible to you, then don't, and intervene to stop them from happening when you can. Force and guile are simply different aspects of might, which determines outcome, and whatever the outcome, serves you right. The line between foolhardy and heroism, as with Treason and Patriotism, is the line between failure and success.

Thank you for not answering my question.

[Aranfan]

If there is no framework for comparison, then why bother? If you accept the reality, then why dismiss the arguments based on the benefits of rationality? Please clarify.

I dismiss the arguments because every rationalist I've met claims to KNOW that we live in a world of objective factuality. Not that it is more useful to act as if we do, but that we do and that there is no way we don't. Of course, they always fall back on "its more useful" after a skeptic comes in and enquirers as to how they know this. If from the beginning they said, "this is the most useful way to proceed, so I'll proceed this way until I find a way I consider more useful", then I would have no problem with them, but instead they say that their way is THE ONE TRUE WAY, and that anyone who doesn't agree with them is a liar or a fool.

If it benefits me more to be irrational in a certain instance than to be rational, then I shall be irrational, simply because if my grounds for using reason was utility then dis-utility is grounds for dropping it.

The word objective is meaningless if you are right, so does it really matter? But let's step back. The response to you was that within a given framework, rationality is more valuable. So people did not declare anything of the sort. But instead you provided a canned response based upon your previous experiences. This is frankly, insulting. I gave effort to answer you, but you did not give the answer back. Granted, you probably will make some comeback about the subjectivity of feeling. Oh well. But I feel that this is approaching the point of fundamental incompatibility, since I have the urge to start talking about society and you follow good ol' Stirner.

My apologies if you weren't claiming to know the one true way, but instead that your way was merely the most useful yet developed. I shouldn't have stereotyped you. As to society, I shall support society in so far as it benefits me, and it benefits me quite a lot. I simply will not put it above myself. I will not deprive myself of the ability to gain by empathizing with a happy couple, but neither will I hesitate to go against them if their happiness comes from my harm.

What about the question that I asked? Is murder worse, better, or the same as stealing? For that matter, how does that fit in with the individualism of the rest of your philosophy?

Killing can be considered a subset of stealing. If it brings you enjoyment to kill a person, then try to kill them. If it brings you enjoyment to stop a murder from occurring, then do your damnedest to stop the murder. If seeing children happy brings you enjoyment, then encourage their happiness. If seeing children cry floats your boat then steal their candy or burn their house down. If such actions are reprehensible to you, then don't, and intervene to stop them from happening when you can. Force and guile are simply different aspects of might, which determines outcome, and whatever the outcome, serves you right. The line between foolhardy and heroism, as with Treason and Patriotism, is the line between failure and success.

Thank you for not answering my question.

How did I not answer your question? Killing and stealing are different to me if I decide to evaluate them as different. If I decide to evaluate them as the same then they are to me. Do you see now why I don't call this a "system"?

[Aranfan]

If you want me to decide which is worse, give me a scenario.

[Simon_Jester]

I propose a simplistic example, in an attempt to avoid sophistry:

Which is worse, Aranfan, you poking me in the eye with a stick, or you poking me in both eyes with a forked stick? Is either act worse than the other?

If one act is worse than the other, we are forced to conclude that there are degrees of wrongness, which greatly undermines any claim that a moral system must be rigid. At the low end, wrongness will be so faint as to be indistinguishable from background noise. At the high end, acts of extreme wrongness will be so horrid that they make mere "ordinary" wrongness look right by comparison.

If neither act is worse than the other, we wind up with an absurd description of wrongness as soon as even the slightest amount of accounting is brought into play. If one eye-poke equals two eye-pokes, then one eye-poke can trivially be shown to equal a hundred, or a thousand, or a million. Or, arguably, zero.

And, as Bakustra points out, whichever answer you give, how does that answer fit with the idea that morality is a custom-tailored thing that every person should alter to suit their preferences?

[Aranfan]

I propose a simplistic example, in an attempt to avoid sophistry:

Which is worse, Aranfan, you poking me in the eye with a stick, or you poking me in both eyes with a forked stick? Is either act worse than the other?

If one act is worse than the other, we are forced to conclude that there are degrees of wrongness, which greatly undermines any claim that a moral system must be rigid. At the low end, wrongness will be so faint as to be indistinguishable from background noise. At the high end, acts of extreme wrongness will be so horrid that they make mere "ordinary" wrongness look right by comparison.

If neither act is worse than the other, we wind up with an absurd description of wrongness as soon as even the slightest amount of accounting is brought into play. If one eye-poke equals two eye-pokes, then one eye-poke can trivially be shown to equal a hundred, or a thousand, or a million. Or, arguably, zero.

And, as Bakustra points out, whichever answer you give, how does that answer fit with the idea that morality is a custom-tailored thing that every person should alter to suit their preferences?

I don't have enough information to make an evaluation. Are you trying to kill me or are you an innocent bystander? Are your eyes closed or open? Did you ask me to or am I coercing you? Does poking you in the eyes make the children watching squeal with glee, or does it make them recoil with horror? Is there a policeman watching that will haul me off to jail? Do I get paid for poking you in the eye? I need context, my answers will be different depending on how the circumstances fall.

[Serafina]

Just to point it out:
Since you are listing so many qualifiers, you are clearly demonstrating that there ARE degrees of wrongness. Else, you would not have to ask for all these qualifiiers - if every act was equal (as required for a rigid moral system) then it would not matter if any of these apply.

Hence, you actually already answered the question: One such act can be worse than the other, depending on various things such as intent, effect and various others.

[Spoonist]

If it brings you enjoyment to kill a person, then try to kill them. If it brings you enjoyment to stop a murder from occurring, then do your damnedest to stop the murder.

Pathetic.

Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law

[Aranfan]

Pathetic.

How so?

Just to point it out:
Since you are listing so many qualifiers, you are clearly demonstrating that there ARE degrees of wrongness. Else, you would not have to ask for all these qualifiiers - if every act was equal (as required for a rigid moral system) then it would not matter if any of these apply.

Hence, you actually already answered the question: One such act can be worse than the other, depending on various things such as intent, effect and various others.

Hence why I describe it as a heuristic instead of a system. Also, if people disagree with my valuations, that's fine, but I sill evaluate them in such a way. If you were to ask me if it was wrong to jump off a cliff, I would ask if you wanted to die. If you said you did, then there would be nothing wrong about jumping, if you don't want to die then jumping off a cliff would likely be a bad idea (provided you aren't running away from a dude who will kill you).

[Simon_Jester]

Hence why I describe it as a heuristic instead of a system. Also, if people disagree with my valuations, that's fine, but I sill evaluate them in such a way. If you were to ask me if it was wrong to jump off a cliff, I would ask if you wanted to die. If you said you did, then there would be nothing wrong about jumping, if you don't want to die then jumping off a cliff would likely be a bad idea (provided you aren't running away from a dude who will kill you).

What if I ask you whether it's wrong for me to push a third party off a cliff?

Then you are faced with having to ask me "Do you want them to die?" and if the answer is "yes," saying that it's OK for me to push them off a cliff. But you are also faced with having to ask the third party "Do you want to die?" and if their answer is "no," saying it is NOT OK for me to push them off a cliff.

Thus your argument would seem contradict itself, saying that it is both wrong and not-wrong to push the person off the cliff.

I really don't think you've thought this through.

On top of that, you're ignoring the problem of error-checking in your own personal private "I do what I feel like I ought to do" moral code. Your rules for doing what you think should be done aren't going to be perfect; sometimes you will inevitably follow your rules and wind up harming your own interests anyway. If there's no point of intersection between different individuals' own private moral codes, who's going to talk you out of doing things that even you will regret doing once you discover the effects of your own privately generated rules?

[Aranfan]

Hence why I describe it as a heuristic instead of a system. Also, if people disagree with my valuations, that's fine, but I sill evaluate them in such a way. If you were to ask me if it was wrong to jump off a cliff, I would ask if you wanted to die. If you said you did, then there would be nothing wrong about jumping, if you don't want to die then jumping off a cliff would likely be a bad idea (provided you aren't running away from a dude who will kill you).

What if I ask you whether it's wrong for me to push a third party off a cliff?

Then you are faced with having to ask me "Do you want them to die?" and if the answer is "yes," saying that it's OK for me to push them off a cliff. But you are also faced with having to ask the third party "Do you want to die?" and if their answer is "no," saying it is NOT OK for me to push them off a cliff.

Thus your argument would seem contradict itself, saying that it is both wrong and not-wrong to push the person off the cliff.

I really don't think you've thought this through.

On top of that, you're ignoring the problem of error-checking in your own personal private "I do what I feel like I ought to do" moral code. Your rules for doing what you think should be done aren't going to be perfect; sometimes you will inevitably follow your rules and wind up harming your own interests anyway. If there's no point of intersection between different individuals' own private moral codes, who's going to talk you out of doing things that even you will regret doing once you discover the effects of your own privately generated rules?

I would personally evaluate the pusher in the wrong in the case you outline here. Because I personally don't like coercion and the pusher seems to be coercing. The pushee will likely agree with me, and the pusher will likely disagree, but that's fine since I'm apparently neither in this scenario . Error checking? I talk to people about what I want, and pick what seems useful from their added perspective.

[Spoonist]

Pathetic.

How so?

When you are on the same side as the sociopaths, addicts and copycat cultists it doesn't strike you as being pathetic?

The whole argument relies on that others do not actually do what you "think" is the reasonable thing to do. To be able to get to the level of eductation where such an argument exists you depend on civilization. For civilization to evolve you need cooperation. For cooperation to work you need to have rules or structure. etc
So for you to be able to give such a blatantly anti-society, anti-civilization, anti-whatever argument. You rely on not being killed outright. Which relies on everyone else having morals (or adhere to the social stigma rules) that stop them from killing you even if they feel you are a threat to their well being.

So for true anarchists or moral nihilist to exist they rely on the rest of us not to do what they are advocating.

Because I can bet you that if you give as poor an argument IRL as you do here there has been plenty of people who have had to stop themselves from hurting (or killing) you.

And that was just the wordly answer. For the philosophical discussion I can't even be bothered. As I said if you do a quick search on this forum you will find plenty of threads which has already covered this back and forth.

[Simon_Jester]

Hence why I describe it as a heuristic instead of a system. Also, if people disagree with my valuations, that's fine, but I sill evaluate them in such a way. If you were to ask me if it was wrong to jump off a cliff, I would ask if you wanted to die. If you said you did, then there would be nothing wrong about jumping, if you don't want to die then jumping off a cliff would likely be a bad idea (provided you aren't running away from a dude who will kill you).

What if I ask you whether it's wrong for me to push a third party off a cliff?

Then you are faced with having to ask me "Do you want them to die?" and if the answer is "yes," saying that it's OK for me to push them off a cliff. But you are also faced with having to ask the third party "Do you want to die?" and if their answer is "no," saying it is NOT OK for me to push them off a cliff.

Thus your argument would seem contradict itself, saying that it is both wrong and not-wrong to push the person off the cliff.

I really don't think you've thought this through.

I would personally evaluate the pusher in the wrong in the case you outline here. Because I personally don't like coercion and the pusher seems to be coercing. The pushee will likely agree with me, and the pusher will likely disagree, but that's fine since I'm apparently neither in this scenario.

But how is that even consistent? How can "do what you think best" be a viable overarching law if it doesn't settle disagreements between people about what ought to be done?

If you ask Alice whether she wants X to happen and she says "yes," and if you can ask Bob whether he wants X to happen and he says "no," how are you justified in picking Bob's opinion over Alice's? Just because you happen to feel that Bob's idea is more in line with what you'd like to see happen, personally?

Do you just completely ignore this notion that every individual should pursue their own preferences whenever their preferences happen not to match yours? Because that doesn't make a lot of sense.

In that case, you aren't really saying "everyone should do what they think is right." You're saying "everyone should do what I think is right, but I can't be bothered to explain why I think it's right." That's contemptible. And again, it suggests that you either haven't thought this through, or you expect everyone around you to blindly and uncritically accept your views on ethics even though you aren't willing to examine them rigorously.

On top of that, you're ignoring the problem of error-checking in your own personal private "I do what I feel like I ought to do" moral code. Your rules for doing what you think should be done aren't going to be perfect; sometimes you will inevitably follow your rules and wind up harming your own interests anyway. If there's no point of intersection between different individuals' own private moral codes, who's going to talk you out of doing things that even you will regret doing once you discover the effects of your own privately generated rules?

Error checking? I talk to people about what I want, and pick what seems useful from their added perspective.

But there's no real mechanism here for people to talk to you about your choice of priorities. Or about how to ignore things you "shouldn't" want in favor of things you "should." And that's a critical concept in ethics.

Consider a case like "I want chocolate, but I also don't want to weigh 135 kilograms." Here, the desire for chocolate is a short-term desire at war with the long-term desire to avoid being grossly overweight. I have to pick one; I can't just arbitrarily say "I want X to happen so I will work towards X."

That requires a level of critical self-analysis, an ability to prioritize short-term or long-term happiness. And I don't see that ability anywhere in the improvised "ethics" you're promoting, Aranfan.