"Fuck the poor"

[Formless]

At some point people will give up everything they have because they cannot eat their bank account. So therefore, if we take this line of reasoning to its utmost absurdity its actually a moral good to maximize the utility of the poor because they obviously value food, shelter and so on comparatively more than rich people. Unless you claim that money has an absolute, objective value that food, water, healthcare, and so on for no apparent reason does not or cannot have. That's an inconsistency. That's basically what Rye is arguing.

The claim isn't that money has an "objective value," but rather that it is a useful proxy for the level of "desire" that people have for specific goods or services. Indeed, the model treats it as a constant "subjective" value in that sense. You cannot measure how much someone wants something without recourse to the question of what they are willing to give up in order to receive it. Money, in Surlethe's model, is that proxy because it provides for everyone else.

I did say "if" for a reason. But if not, that runs afoul of the relativity of wealth. Jesus's observation about the poor woman's donation hurting her more comparative to the donations by the rich is worth noting here.

Besides, there is also the mistake of assuming that wealth is the only way to measure desire. That's pretty obviously false. What happened to talking to people? Surveying them? I think you are misconstruing my argument here.

[Master of Ossus]

I did say "if" for a reason. But if not, that runs afoul of the relativity of wealth. Jesus's observation about the poor woman's donation hurting her more comparative to the donations by the rich is worth noting here.

That is precisely Bentham's argument. Bentham made it far better than you did.

Besides, there is also the mistake of assuming that wealth is the only way to measure desire. That's pretty obviously false. What happened to talking to people? Surveying them? I think you are misconstruing my argument here.

How the fuck are you going to ask them this if you can't resort to, "Well... what are you willing to give up in order to get it?" Obviously if it's going to be measurable we have to compare peoples' desires to something. How are you going to do that in a survey or by "talking to people?" Like it, love it, gotta have it? You're seriously setting the bar low for yourself, there, by claiming that talking to people is a perfect (or even a workable or acceptable) informational alternative to a free market auction system. It's not "obviously false" that willingness to pay is a good and accurate way of evaluating desire. Indeed, it seems obviously true.

[Formless]

I did say "if" for a reason. But if not, that runs afoul of the relativity of wealth. Jesus's observation about the poor woman's donation hurting her more comparative to the donations by the rich is worth noting here.

That is precisely Bentham's argument. Bentham made it far better than you did.

And I care... why? I explicitly said "IF" you pedantic motherfucker. I didn't say this was my take on it. My take is that money =! necessarily good. Its only of intrinsic value, whereas this argument seems to put it on a pedestal whether you like it or not. Some people don't even give a shit about it, and shouldn't especially in an environment where its being treated as the only measure of their personal worth to society.

Besides, there is also the mistake of assuming that wealth is the only way to measure desire. That's pretty obviously false. What happened to talking to people? Surveying them? I think you are misconstruing my argument here.

How the fuck are you going to ask them this if you can't resort to, "Well... what are you willing to give up in order to get it?" Obviously if it's going to be measurable we have to compare peoples' desires to something. How are you going to do that in a survey or by "talking to people?" Like it, love it, gotta have it? You're seriously setting the bar low for yourself, there, by claiming that talking to people is a perfect (or even a workable or acceptable) informational alternative to a free market auction system. It's not "obviously false" that willingness to pay is a good and accurate way of evaluating desire. Indeed, it seems obviously true.

Or you could, you know, compare the happiness of people (which can be measured by such methods) and see if people in countries that have this policy are any happier than people in countries that don't. Go right to the heart of the matter rather than wallow in idiot land. It is NOT obviously to true to all of us. It doesn't even seem to me to be a valid measure at all, because prices in REAL markets tend to fix themselves. Like Alyrium noted. Thinking that markets are ever going to work the way you describe is stupid.

[Formless]

Ghetto edit: That was supposed to read "instrumental value" not "intrinsic" value. I must be getting tired...

[Simon_Jester]

The core of the dependancy here is that the entire argument hinges on things being worth what their purchaser will pay for them.

Not quite correct. The argument defines worth as that which the purchaser is willing to give up, and avers that no other measure of value or utility is meaningful.

That form of the argument escapes dependancy on the efficient market hypothesis... at the cost of committing seppuku. Because you've just divorced this definition of value from everything else that matters to anyone.

Fine, the true value of a thing is defined by what its purchaser will pay for it. So what? What keeps us from blithely ignoring the true value of things, and just playing around with whatever suits us? How will we suffer for doing so, from a consequentialist point of view?

It's a completely arbitrary system of value, equivalent to judging a person's value by the length of their name or by whether or not they happened to draw the short straw in the last round of selections.

At least if you incorporate the efficient market hypothesis you can credibly claim that your proposed system maximizes something sane people might actually want, rather than existing purely to give you a metric to justify a self-referential system of arbitrary values that depends more on luck than it does on any other signficant factor.

---

Why is that absurd? That your friend is worth as much as what others are willing to give her is the conclusion of this argument; it does not seem absurd to suppose that her value increases as the amount others are willing to give her increases (after all, we apply this argument to all other things, especially commodities). So if your income rises and you're willing to give more to her, whether by chance or by design, then her value rises, all else equal.

I disagree; it seems to me more like this definition of value is the premise, not the conclusion. As written, the argument discounts future payoffs, discounts irrational biases that affect what a purchaser is willing to pay for something without affecting its ability to perform by objective metrics, discounts discounting itself...

It's a pathetically naive model, really.

I need to be more careful conflating wealth with income: the former reflects past value created, the latter reflects current value. But the point of the exercise is to establish that the only objective way to measure the value of X to Y is by how much Y is willing to give up to get X; no other way suffices, because value is entirely subjective: it is "in the eye of the beholder", so to speak. (As a professor used to say, "Put your money where your mouth is!")

In any case, if Michael Jordan for any reason can no longer outbid others for what he wants, he can no longer be said to value it more than others.

My argument works equally well for income. Luck has enormous effects on a person's future income and on their personal wealth. In your original example, you arbitrarily decreed that the system doesn't cover situations where a person loses wealth (or income) due to hostile acts or coercion by others; why not? Why is losing income potential because my business was destroyed by a meteor any different, objectively, than having it blown up by a bomb thrown by someone who hates my "fuck the poor" mindset?

And you are trying to be objective here, aren't you?

Either way we're looking at absurd conclusions that only hold together if the model is taken purely for its own sake as an axiom. In which case it's nothing but circular logic: value is value is value, and it doesn't matter what the consequences are, and there's no reason to define value that way in the first place.

Well, there is the fact that utility is perfectly subjective.

What does that have to do with anything? This form of value isn't any more objective than any other, except insofar as you took a measurement at some point. I could equally well say that a man's worth was defined by his temperature. That would be an objective measure of value. It would also be completely idiotic.

Re. efficient markets, see my first response to Rye. I want to abstract away the differences between theoretical and real markets and focus on the "distributional flaws" of libertarianism.

The problem here is that the argument is so deeply flawed from the very beginning that it presents a target-rich environment to the debater. It's damaged at every level, not just the one you want to pick at.

Not quite. The prescriptive statement is that, "total utility should be maximized". This is a largely uncontroversial moral premise in these parts. The radical departure is the argument's observation that it is perfectly impossible to measure utility derived from resource allocation except as what people are willing to give up to get those resources.

That's not a good measure either because you can't measure what people are willing to part with, only what they are able to part with. They're not the same. In a utility-maximizing scenario, you're trying to optimize some form of preference, not a bank balance. Utilitarian ethics are based on preferences and have been for 150 years; you're ignoring that in favor of this stupid insistence on fiat government issue currency as the ideal unit of measuring utilons.

That still leaves counterfactuals, though. If there were only half as many assets available to bargain for the atmosphere with, would the value of the atmosphere itself change? Why? It's not as if the atmosphere suddenly became less useful, less necessary. Conversely, if the number of assets doubles does the value of the atmosphere double? If so, why? Again, nothing about the atmosphere itself changed.

The amount that people are willing to give up to get it has changed.

Why is that a relevant property? No one's preferences changed. People aren't "more happy" that they get to keep breathing. All that happened is that their willingness to pay you every shiny rock they have to keep breathing now means twice as many shiny rocks.

Why is the inherent utility of the atmosphere measured in shiny rocks?

If you choose to ignore this obvious fault in your proposed model of value, then we can easily recover the "purity" of the original thought experiment. Just say that Q, who is threatening to remove the atmosphere, is the one who put it there in the first place. Suddenly the atmosphere becomes his property, not yours, and instead of threatening to rob you he's renegotiating the rent he charges you for the privilege of breathing his property.

Sure. In that case, Q has to determine between alternative uses of his property: letting us breathe it and not letting us breathe it. If he gets more value out of not letting us breathe it, he will forgo whatever we're willing to pay him to let us use it and utility will be increased.

Which is my point in setting up the scenario, which you're missing.

Why is Q justified in removing the atmosphere unless he is given shiny rocks, purely on a whim? Why does the atmosphere become objectively more valuable when the number of shiny rocks on Earth in the hands of its inhabitants increases? Where's the connection, aside from "well I can count the number of shiny rocks, but counting utilons is hard, so I'll pretend these shiny rocks are utilons!"

This is the economic and sociological equivalent of sophism, and you really shouldn't be wasting your time on it, Surlethe.

But it's fun, eh? Besides, you seem to be wasting more time on it with your long posts, pal

You're approaching Aranfan levels here, though.

Honestly I'd thought you better than to turn "But it's devil's advocacy!" into an excuse for repeating the flawed assumptions of a flawed model regardless of the objections raised. A proper devil's advocate admits, or at least notices, when there's a hole in his argument, and shifts position accordingly.

[Faqa]

Why does the atmosphere become objectively more valuable when the number of shiny rocks on Earth in the hands of its inhabitants increases?

I think the crux of the matter here is that it is more valuable because more people are willing to put value into it.

Of course, by this argument, if we're both willing to give all we have for diametrically opposed outcomes(me to destroy it, you to preserve it), and I have 52 stones whereas you have 51, then it's not valuable enough to keep around. IE, more value is created if it's destroyed than if it's kept around.

This works, assuming that we have no other way to assign value to the commodity - say in the case of an Ipod. In the atmosphere case, we decide that human life being destroyed is, in and of itself, a damaging event that detracts from the value of destroying the atmosphere.

[Simon_Jester]

Why does the atmosphere become objectively more valuable when the number of shiny rocks on Earth in the hands of its inhabitants increases?

I think the crux of the matter here is that it is more valuable because more people are willing to put value into it.

But that's nonsense. The number of people willing to put value into it didn't change; all that changed was inflation. The total wealth of every individual doubled.

Keeping the atmosphere is still something everyone would give everything to keep. All that changed is the total count of shiny rocks in the world.

For that matter, what happens if we're willing to give Q all our property to avoid losing the atmosphere and he won't take all of it? If, say, he only accepts cash donations in currencies with names beginning in letters M through Z? Clearly he's within his rights to do so, but if he does, then the total amount of assets that we can pay him decreases purely because of his whim. Does that mean that the atmosphere is now less valuable just because the limit of what we can pay for it has decreased, as is implied to be the case if we suddenly lose half our money entirely?

This works, assuming that we have no other way to assign value to the commodity - say in the case of an Ipod. In the atmosphere case, we decide that human life being destroyed is, in and of itself, a damaging event that detracts from the value of destroying the atmosphere.

I think the model breaks down much faster than that- again, it ignores so many kinds of costs and so many of the irrationalities and logic errors created when humans sit down to bargain over prices that its claim to be objective is laughable.

If Surlethe wanted to present us with a system for measuring value "objectively" he'd have done better to define an object's value in terms of its temperature or something. At least that we could measure without possibility of ambiguity or stupidity skewing our results. We certainly can't do the same for the number of units of fiat currency an item is worth.

It wouldn't make any sense, but at least he'd be proposing a viable model for making objective measurements of reality and then making a decision based on the measurements, even if the decision-making process was lunacy.

[Alyrium Denryle]

If Surlethe wanted to present us with a system for measuring value "objectively" he'd have done better to define an object's value in terms of its temperature or something. At least that we could measure without possibility of ambiguity or stupidity skewing our results. We certainly can't do the same for the number of units of fiat currency an item is worth.

There is a better way. The physiology of pleasure and pain is measurable.

I will be blunt though. This entire argument is a farce. Prescriptive ethics is a waste of philosophical time. The very assumptions that Utilitarianism, and in fact all prescriptive ethics are flawed

1) The ethical system is complete
2) The ethical system is universal.

Utility is not the only measure of value, thus utilitarian ethics are incomplete.
For an ethical system to be universal it must be justified externally to those applying the system. There must be something about the universe that prescribes the use of the ethical system.

The only way to construct an ethical system that meaningfully guides decision making is to derive them FROM normative ethics, not by prescribing normative ethics from pure thought. One must be an empiricist, not a rationalist.

[Master of Ossus]

And I care... why? I explicitly said "IF" you pedantic motherfucker. I didn't say this was my take on it.

In case you hadn't noticed, the qualifier is irrelevant to my criticism of your post. My criticism is that your analysis does not accurately portray the logical extreme of the argument that you began with--a pithy claim that people would give up everything they had to eat.

My take is that money =! necessarily good. Its only of [instrumental] value, whereas this argument seems to put it on a pedestal whether you like it or not.

No, it doesn't. But in any case, this is another appeal to consequence fallacy (see below).

Some people don't even give a shit about it, and shouldn't especially in an environment where its being treated as the only measure of their personal worth to society.

You're not even attempting to make a logical argument, here. If the environment were in fact to treat money as the only measure of personal worth to society, then people evidently should "give a shit about it."

Your entire dismissal of Surlethe's argument is a ridiculous appeal to consequence fallacy of the structure, "I don't like the conclusion that this argument leads to, ergo it is invalid if I whine about it hard enough." It should be easy to see why this is unsatisfying for anyone else concerned, and this is why Bentham and Rawls' arguments are so much stronger than yours: rather than claim that the conclusion is unappealing, they explain why the premises of the model are flawed, explaining how it leads to poor conclusions.

Indeed, your argument is even weaker than a typical appeal to consequence fallacy, because it is anything but clear that the "logical extreme" that you have assigned is, in fact, its extreme. Indeed, you don't even appear to understand the original argument that was advanced. This is the criticism that I originally put forth of your argument, and I suggested at least two models that you could look to for improvement upon the idea.

Or you could, you know, compare the happiness of people (which can be measured by such methods) and see if people in countries that have this policy are any happier than people in countries that don't.

What "policy" are you talking about, here? We're trying the measure the value of goods and services to individuals; not the value of Surlethe's model's policies to society. My point is that going around with a survey card is an obviously inadequate proxy for asking people what they would surrender in exchange for that good or service when you are trying to determine how much that good or service is worth to them.

Go right to the heart of the matter rather than wallow in idiot land. It is NOT obviously to true to all of us. It doesn't even seem to me to be a valid measure at all, because prices in REAL markets tend to fix themselves. Like Alyrium noted.

Excuse me? How does this eliminate the informational content of prices? Indeed, it seems to be the ultimate in informational content: if competitive markets clear, then they present very good information as to both demand for goods and services and supply, which in turn constitutes very good information as to the level of desire of the marginal consumer and the avoidance threshold of the marginal producer.

Thinking that markets are ever going to work the way you describe is stupid.

In what method have I described them operating? Why is it stupid? And, again, your alternative is "just go around and ask people." This is an obviously inferior system, even if you believe that price data contains very little information about individual consumer preference.

[Alyrium Denryle]

Your entire dismissal of Surlethe's argument is a ridiculous appeal to consequence fallacy of the structure, "I don't like the conclusion that this argument leads to, ergo it is invalid if I whine about it hard enough."

Actually, no. That is exactly how philosophers will critique an ethical argument. By positing a situation where the results of the ethical system in question are clearly unethical.

[Simon_Jester]

Utility is not the only measure of value, thus utilitarian ethics are incomplete.
For an ethical system to be universal it must be justified externally to those applying the system. There must be something about the universe that prescribes the use of the ethical system.

The only way to construct an ethical system that meaningfully guides decision making is to derive them FROM normative ethics, not by prescribing normative ethics from pure thought. One must be an empiricist, not a rationalist.

I'm broadly in agreement on this; that's why I've been going on about how the "cash-value as ethical-value" system is especially worthless. Not only is it prone to random oscillations in the "value" of a given commodity, but the "ethical value" measured by the system is meaningless because it doesn't correspond reliably to any trait any sane human would value.

I'm not sure which is more damning, that it's an attempt to apply a fig leaf of objectivity to what must by nature be a partly normative field (ethics)*... or that it fails in the attempt.

*I am a moral absolutist, but only insofar as I think there are certain normative ethical principles that apply of necessity in the eyes of any competent mind. You can't deduce the principles by which an ethical system should work just by arbitrarily picking something you can measure and deciding to maximize it.

Your entire dismissal of Surlethe's argument is a ridiculous appeal to consequence fallacy of the structure, "I don't like the conclusion that this argument leads to, ergo it is invalid if I whine about it hard enough."

Actually, no. That is exactly how philosophers will critique an ethical argument. By positing a situation where the results of the ethical system in question are clearly unethical.

True.

Surlethe's argument in the original post should not be mistaken for a mathematical proof where a correct chain of reasoning forces you to attack the premises or submit to the irresistible force of the confusion. It is no such thing. It is a philosophical model, a proposal of the form "Hey, why don't we decide to value nothing except the cash value of a commodity?"

If doing so leads to disaster, it is entirely reasonable to argue "No, that is a stupid plan because it leads to disaster." Just as it is valid to defeat a scientific model or mathematical proof by counterexample: if I come up with a brilliant proof that 2+2=5, someone can refute it by placing two rocks beside two rocks and showing that there are four rocks. In that case, my conclusion is demonstrably wrong even if I cannot find a mistake in my reasoning or premises.

[Formless]

And I care... why? I explicitly said "IF" you pedantic motherfucker. I didn't say this was my take on it.

In case you hadn't noticed, the qualifier is irrelevant to my criticism of your post. My criticism is that your analysis does not accurately portray the logical extreme of the argument that you began with--a pithy claim that people would give up everything they had to eat.

If you can eat nothing you fucking die! In any real persons mind that trumps money any day of the week. I really have to spell this out for you?

No, it doesn't. But in any case, this is another appeal to consequence fallacy (see below).

This is utilitarianism we are talking about. Appealing to the consequences is the entire modus operandi of utilitarian ethics. Its a fallacy only when its used to dismiss empirical facts you don't like, not when its used to assert the morality of something. Here, you even say as much:

Your entire dismissal of Surlethe's argument is a ridiculous appeal to consequence fallacy of the structure, "I don't like the conclusion that this argument leads to, ergo it is invalid if I whine about it hard enough." It should be easy to see why this is unsatisfying for anyone else concerned, and this is why Bentham and Rawls' arguments are so much stronger than yours: rather than claim that the conclusion is unappealing, they explain why the premises of the model are flawed, explaining how it leads to poor conclusions.

Moron.

You're not even attempting to make a logical argument, here. If the environment were in fact to treat money as the only measure of personal worth to society, then people evidently should "give a shit about it."

What they should do in that case is change the environment/society. Do you seriously think people should just take it up the ass when they are being screwed over by the rich?

What "policy" are you talking about, here? We're trying the measure the value of goods and services to individuals; not the value of Surlethe's model's policies to society. My point is that going around with a survey card is an obviously inadequate proxy for asking people what they would surrender in exchange for that good or service when you are trying to determine how much that good or service is worth to them.

People don't pay the price they are willing to pay. They pay the price they are forced to pay, because price is outside of their control and certain services are always going to be more valuable to people than money because their lives depend on them. An auction doesn't change that, it just means that now the price is forced on them by competition. You just don't play games like that with food or healthcare. If that's not irresponsible, I don't know what is.

And besides, if Surlethe's policies are of no value or negative value to society (which is what the "happiness" measure will tell you) then any reasonable ethicist will tell you something is wrong with his logic.

Excuse me? How does this eliminate the informational content of prices? Indeed, it seems to be the ultimate in informational content: if competitive markets clear, then they present very good information as to both demand for goods and services and supply, which in turn constitutes very good information as to the level of desire of the marginal consumer and the avoidance threshold of the marginal producer.

Everyone desires certain services equally; a casual study of our fucking biology will indicate that. Information gleaned from what people are willing to pay is weak evidence by comparison to what the sciences can tell us here.

In what method have I described them operating? Why is it stupid? And, again, your alternative is "just go around and ask people." This is an obviously inferior system, even if you believe that price data contains very little information about individual consumer preference.

Acting like prices will fairly correlate to what people are willing to pay. Acting like prices actually represent people's level of desire, rather than being a measure of the greed of sellers. There are so many problems with your arguments I'm starting to wonder if you don't actually subscribe to this idiocy (whereas Surlethe was merely playing devil's advocate).

[Simon_Jester]

To be fair, Formless, there are quite a few services where prices do correlate to the willingness of the buyer to pay for them; it's just that they're usually luxury goods, or goods that it is trivially easy to supply in very large quantities. Food is on that list; health care isn't.

But the price of, say, a Starbucks latte is set by the customer's willingness to pay, because no one makes you buy a latte. It's a luxury. If Starbucks was being truly greedy and charging people 'too much' for lattes, people could stop buying them at any time.

The problem of prices accurately reflecting what people are willing to pay only comes up in situations where there's a major asymmetry between buyer and seller. In the labor market the asymmetry usually favors the employer who buys the labor: they don't need you to work for them as much as you need a job, which means they have more power over your salary than you do. In the health care 'industry' (when run as a business), it favors the seller: I need medical treatment more than you need to give it to me, so you can afford to get away with charging a very high price.

But in, for example, the Starbucks latte market, there is no asymmetry, because customers are free to stop buying and Starbucks is free to stop selling at any time, with no regrets.

The problem I see with this kind of market-fundamentalist model is that it treats all commodities as if they were luxuries that can be taken or left freely. Which is self-evidently wrong when dealing with human beings.

[Formless]

To be fair, Formless, there are quite a few services where prices do correlate to the willingness of the buyer to pay for them; it's just that they're usually luxury goods, or goods that it is trivially easy to supply in very large quantities. Food is on that list; health care isn't.

Well, that's why I always was talking about necessities like food, shelter, water, healthcare, and so on. While some foods are luxuries (such as desserts, lattes, wines, burgers and steaks) food in general is not.

The problem of prices accurately reflecting what people are willing to pay only comes up in situations where there's a major asymmetry between buyer and seller. In the labor market the asymmetry usually favors the employer who buys the labor: they don't need you to work for them as much as you need a job, which means they have more power over your salary than you do. In the health care 'industry' (when run as a business), it favors the seller: I need medical treatment more than you need to give it to me, so you can afford to get away with charging a very high price.

Thing is, when the rich are being treated as more valuable to society than anyone else ("Fuck the Poor" as the title says) you get feedback mechanisms going. The rich often get to that position by being in industries where they could exploit asymmetric situations. Then once they are rich they can use the power that comes with wealth to create asymmetrical situations, like getting the government to tax them less than anyone else.

[Rye]

I think you guys are missing the point of the argument. It's that value and utility are fundamentally subjective, depend on the person, and the only way to measure it is to see what the person is willing to give up. Similarly, what a person has to give up is exactly his value, which is exactly what everybody else has been willing to give up for him.

Value is subjective, utility isn't really. Utility works along social self-perpetuation and ethical hedonistic biases that can be readily identified and confirmed in outcomes. The destruction of all values doesn't logically lead to capitalism, though, more nihilism.

[Master of Ossus]

What "policy" are you talking about, here? We're trying the measure the value of goods and services to individuals; not the value of Surlethe's model's policies to society. My point is that going around with a survey card is an obviously inadequate proxy for asking people what they would surrender in exchange for that good or service when you are trying to determine how much that good or service is worth to them.

People don't pay the price they are willing to pay.

True, they pay the market price in a competitive market. This is typically considerably less than their threshold price.

They pay the price they are forced to pay,

No.

because price is outside of their control and certain services are always going to be more valuable to people than money because their lives depend on them.

Your assumption that things are "more valuable than money" is simply foolish and entirely misses the argument at issue. Money is being used to evaluate the willingness of people to give things p in exchange for goods and services. It is no exaggeration to state that, under the model, it is a perfect measure of total sacrifice to receive something in exchange: presumably, people will part with quite a lot to survive, but this does not mean that they will be forced to do this, as you well know.

An auction doesn't change that, it just means that now the price is forced on them by competition.

The price isn't "forced" on them. It is determined in a competitive market. God. This is the whole point of the argument.

You just don't play games like that with food or healthcare. If that's not irresponsible, I don't know what is.

Nobody is playing games with anything. Again, you appeal to your own misunderstanding of the central model in an effort to debunk it, even though it is nothing more than some massive maze of strawmen that you have constructed for yourself.

And besides, if Surlethe's policies are of no value or negative value to society (which is what the "happiness" measure will tell you) then any reasonable ethicist will tell you something is wrong with his logic.

Evidence?

Everyone desires certain services equally;

Nonsense.

a casual study of our fucking biology will indicate that.

Prove it.

Information gleaned from what people are willing to pay is weak evidence by comparison to what the sciences can tell us here.

Prove it. Provide evidence of a competitively supplied good or service for which everyone's willingness to pay is equal across the entire range of individual demand.

Acting like prices will fairly correlate to what people are willing to pay.

That is from the god-damned model. Your refusal to evaluate it is really not my concern except that you petulently attack it with nothing more than logical fallacies and your own moronic strawmen.

Acting like prices actually represent people's level of desire, rather than being a measure of the greed of sellers.

Okay, this is the basis of your misunderstanding: prices contain VASTLY more information than a "measure of the greed of the sellers." They represent the point at which a marginal seller and a marginal buyer break even and are each no better off for having sold or purchased a good. It would be at least as sensible to claim that the price constituted a measure of the "greed of the buyer," but even this would obviously be false because "greed" has very little to do with it in competitive markets. This competitive price is, then, where individuals are asked to set their own level of consumption of particular goods and services.

There are so many problems with your arguments I'm starting to wonder if you don't actually subscribe to this idiocy (whereas Surlethe was merely playing devil's advocate).

This from someone who doesn't even make a pretense of understanding the informational content of prices.

[Master of Ossus]

Well, that's why I always was talking about necessities like food, shelter, water, healthcare, and so on. While some foods are luxuries (such as desserts, lattes, wines, burgers and steaks) food in general is not.

"Food" is not a good. Rice is a good. Steak is a good. Wheat is a good. Ice cream is a good. "Food" is not a good.

In the same way, "shelter," is not a good, and healthcare is only a good because of the way that it has been aggregated by the existing market structure. Even healthcare isn't really a single "good" (even though it is sometimes discussed as such in political circles for complicated reasons relating to "its" provision). Again, your analogies demonstrate the profound misunderstandings of the original model which drives your criticisms of it.

Thing is, when the rich are being treated as more valuable to society than anyone else ("Fuck the Poor" as the title says) you get feedback mechanisms going. The rich often get to that position by being in industries where they could exploit asymmetric situations. Then once they are rich they can use the power that comes with wealth to create asymmetrical situations, like getting the government to tax them less than anyone else.

The model's premise that money is a proxy for what people are willing to give up in order to receive something in return. Your focus on the "rich" being "treated as more valuable to society than anyone else" doesn't even fully capture the argument that is purely an emotional assault on the model, because it doesn't bother to analyze how income is earned. If you accept the premise (which you obviously haven't since you don't even understand it) that money is a representation of what people are willing to give up in order to receive something, then it is easy to see that the rich are rich precisely because others are willing to give up a lot in order to receive their services. (In the real world, someone who was seriously advocating Surlethe's position would have to explain how this was reasonable across generations, but really I don't think that they would have much trouble justifying this assuming that they had already accepted the rest of the premise). In other words, they are more valuable to society than anyone else: this was evaluated in a competitive market by a society which placed a premium on the services that they offered vis-a-vis the services offered by others.

[Formless]

Your assumption that things are "more valuable than money" is simply foolish and entirely misses the argument at issue. Money is being used to evaluate the willingness of people to give things p in exchange for goods and services. It is no exaggeration to state that, under the model, it is a perfect measure of total sacrifice to receive something in exchange: presumably, people will part with quite a lot to survive, but this does not mean that they will be forced to do this, as you well know.

If I put a gun to your head and tell you to give me all your money, you would say that force is being applied, correct?

Now, say I am a doctor and you have a potentially life threatening, but curable disease. We'll say for a moment that the previous situation happened, and you refused to obey the muggers orders. I ask you to pay me or I refuse to treat you. If you don't pay, you die. Same result as before, you are forced to pay or you die. It doesn't matter that I am not the one to pull the trigger.

a casual study of our fucking biology will indicate that.

Prove it.

Are you for real? Go hungry if you don't believe me. Goddamn, this is so obvious I can't believe someone is seriously trying to claim that money is more desirable than food.

That is from the god-damned model.

I'm disputing the model, fucktard. You provide evidence that it works. I'm not the one making controversial claims here.

Okay, this is the basis of your misunderstanding: prices contain VASTLY more information than a "measure of the greed of the sellers." They represent the point at which a marginal seller and a marginal buyer break even and are each no better off for having sold or purchased a good. It would be at least as sensible to claim that the price constituted a measure of the "greed of the buyer," but even this would obviously be false because "greed" has very little to do with it in competitive markets. This competitive price is, then, where individuals are asked to set their own level of consumption of particular goods and services.

The whole point of participating in a competitive market for the sellers is to make money. Seriously. What the fuck is this bullshit.

"Food" is not a good. Rice is a good. Steak is a good. Wheat is a good. Ice cream is a good. "Food" is not a good.

In the same way, "shelter," is not a good, and healthcare is only a good because of the way that it has been aggregated by the existing market structure. Even healthcare isn't really a single "good" (even though it is sometimes discussed as such in political circles for complicated reasons relating to "its" provision). Again, your analogies demonstrate the profound misunderstandings of the original model which drives your criticisms of it.

This is a thread whose sole purpose is to try and prove the Libertarian ideal as an exercise in devil's advocacy. The people who subscribe to this belief system do treat things like food and water as "goods" and you damn well know it. If these things are not considered "goods" then we aren't arguing for libertarianism, we're arguing for socialism a la Canada. Dumbass.

If you accept the premise (which you obviously haven't since you don't even understand it) that money is a representation of what people are willing to give up in order to receive something, then it is easy to see that the rich are rich precisely because others are willing to give up a lot in order to receive their services.

I don't accept that premise you illiterate! The rich are rich for many reasons

1) inheritance

2) luck

3) because they went into business precisely to make money, and were successful at it

and so on. Please provide evidence that this model works, or fuck off.

[Simon_Jester]

Well, that's why I always was talking about necessities like food, shelter, water, healthcare, and so on. While some foods are luxuries (such as desserts, lattes, wines, burgers and steaks) food in general is not.

"Food" is not a good. Rice is a good. Steak is a good. Wheat is a good. Ice cream is a good. "Food" is not a good.

MoO, you're being foolish. The fact remains that in a very real sense, food is not a luxury. You may, if you are lucky, have the option of choosing one kind of food over another. You do not have the option of choosing to abstain from food entirely. Likewise water or air. You don't really have the choice of abstaining from shelter either.

That is Formless's point: that there exist commodities where the buyer's need for the item is greatly out of proportion to the seller's need to sell it. Or vice versa. In these situations, market-fundamentalist models that are designed to track the price of luxuries like lattes and iPods do not, and can not, apply.

The model's premise that money is a proxy for what people are willing to give up in order to receive something in return.

Speaking for myself, I understand this, and think it's fundamentally wrong- obviously so. Money is NOT a proxy for what people are willing to give up to receive something in return. It is a proxy for what they are both willing and able to give up to receive something in return. That "and able" aspect is important, because Surlethe relies on utilitarianism in his argument Utilitarianism is based on preferences, though, and preferences don't change when the number of available dollars changes.

Letting someone die violates their preferences just as much when they have no money as it does when they have a mountain of money. The amount of money they have does not affect their preferences, and is therefore irrelevant in utilitarianism... which means that the premise of the argument undermines the argument itself. The only way to avoid that is to randomly decide, for the sheer love of doing so, to add an extra term to our utility function that measures how much money someone has and weight their preferences according to their ability to implement those preferences.

Which, again, makes no sense. It is an arbitrary and pointless thing to do, and it in no way improves a moral system to do it.

Your focus on the "rich" being "treated as more valuable to society than anyone else" doesn't even fully capture the argument that is purely an emotional assault on the model, because it doesn't bother to analyze how income is earned. If you accept the premise (which you obviously haven't since you don't even understand it) that money is a representation of what people are willing to give up in order to receive something, then it is easy to see that the rich are rich precisely because others are willing to give up a lot in order to receive their services.

But, once again, the premise itself is deeply flawed, and Formless recognizes this even if he's not quite hitting the nail on the head as well as one might wish.

You cannot simply declare that the cash-equivalent-cost of something is, objectively, its value. There are too many random or irrational factors that influence cash-equivalent cost: hyperbolic discounting, various forms of trickery, random natural events, and so forth.

In other words, they are more valuable to society than anyone else: this was evaluated in a competitive market by a society which placed a premium on the services that they offered vis-a-vis the services offered by others.

Finally, even if we conclude that this is true... why do we care? Why, objectively, are we better off for treating such people as "more valuable to society?" What useful objective is fulfilled?

How is this system an instrumental good?

[Formless]

But, once again, the premise itself is deeply flawed, and Formless recognizes this even if he's not quite hitting the nail on the head as well as one might wish.

It is true, there are days where I am less articulate than I ought to be.

[Master of Ossus]

MoO, you're being foolish. The fact remains that in a very real sense, food is not a luxury. You may, if you are lucky, have the option of choosing one kind of food over another. You do not have the option of choosing to abstain from food entirely. Likewise water or air. You don't really have the choice of abstaining from shelter either.

That is Formless's point: that there exist commodities where the buyer's need for the item is greatly out of proportion to the seller's need to sell it. Or vice versa. In these situations, market-fundamentalist models that are designed to track the price of luxuries like lattes and iPods do not, and can not, apply.

So... in Formless' world, we would expect to see people who sold things like food to be able to charge fundamentally limitless prices for such products. Yet... McDonald's charges something like $7 for a value meal. That might be rated as "expensive," depending on your frame of reference I suppose, but it's hardly infinite and certainly doesn't constitute a substantial fraction of the total net worth of most of their customers (in fact, I'd be hard pressed to find or even conceive of any food supplier who regularly sold their wares at prices which regularly rivaled the net worth of their customers). Ergo, supply and demand seems a much better explanatory model for this situation than Formless'... formless theory.

Your claim that "there exist commodities [for which] market-fundamentalist models... do not, and can[]not, apply" is utterly baseless, at least on the examples advanced to illustrate this claim. Anyone can observe that "market-fundamentalist models" operate very well in situations like this. Indeed, wheat is still one of the markets which is held up as an example of a perfectly competitive market. For that matter, water-diamond paradox is precisely what you are arguing (you cannot go without water, either, so why is it less expensive than diamonds?). I acknowledge that there are situations in which market forces are impeded for both good and for ill, but it's a far step from that to arguing that, therefore, they should not be used to model things at all.

Speaking for myself, I understand this, and think it's fundamentally wrong- obviously so. Money is NOT a proxy for what people are willing to give up to receive something in return. It is a proxy for what they are both willing and able to give up to receive something in return.

That is a distinction without a difference, particularly in a society with a functioning capital system that alleviates things like liquidity concerns.

That "and able" aspect is important, because Surlethe relies on utilitarianism in his argument Utilitarianism is based on preferences, though, and preferences don't change when the number of available dollars changes.

Right, because everyone knows that indifference curves only differ by a constant term as they move outwards or inwards.

While you are much more sophisticated than Formless in that you can actually type in complete sentences and appear to recognize the existence of logical links between statements, you also miss the point of Surlethe's model.

Letting someone die violates their preferences just as much when they have no money as it does when they have a mountain of money. The amount of money they have does not affect their preferences,

Hello non sequitur.

and is therefore irrelevant in utilitarianism... which means that the premise of the argument undermines the argument itself. The only way to avoid that is to randomly decide, for the sheer love of doing so, to add an extra term to our utility function that measures how much money someone has and weight their preferences according to their ability to implement those preferences.

Why is this "for the sheer love of doing so?" The concept of an income constraint is fundamental to the understanding of a utility curve. Without an income constraint, it wouldn't model anything at all.

Which, again, makes no sense. It is an arbitrary and pointless thing to do, and it in no way improves a moral system to do it.

Excuse me? It's fundamental to the model. Who the fuck cares if someone prefers apples to oranges if oranges have been entirely removed from the possible consumption options available to them?

But, once again, the premise itself is deeply flawed, and Formless recognizes this even if he's not quite hitting the nail on the head as well as one might wish.

You cannot simply declare that the cash-equivalent-cost of something is, objectively, its value.

Provide another objective measure of value.

There are too many random or irrational factors that influence cash-equivalent cost: hyperbolic discounting, various forms of trickery, random natural events, and so forth.

How does any of this make the market price anything other than "objective?"

It is a serious question: you apparently do not understand the resolution to the water-diamond paradox, and just as Formless' lack of comprehension drove his criticisms of Surlethe's model, so too does your misunderstanding of a utility function appear to prevent you from fairly evaluating it.

In other words, they are more valuable to society than anyone else: this was evaluated in a competitive market by a society which placed a premium on the services that they offered vis-a-vis the services offered by others.

Finally, even if we conclude that this is true... why do we care? Why, objectively, are we better off for treating such people as "more valuable to society?" What useful objective is fulfilled?

It allows us to better allocate resources amongst society. Take a simple example: I have recently sprained my ankle. I walk into a local doctor's office to ask him to take a look at it, make sure nothing serious is going on, and to treat it for me. While I'm sitting in the waiting room, Tiger Woods hobbles in and sits down next to me. As it so happens, Mr. Woods has also injured his ankle, recently. How do we decide who the doctor should treat first? Surely the analysis should have something to do with Tiger's reliance on his ankle for his job, but what if I were a tennis pro at the local club who also relies upon my ankle in order to make a living? How should society allocate the scarce resources (the doctor's attention) between the two of us?

Within the confines of this situation, there are several obvious and easy solutions: Tiger could offer me a "bribe" to let him go, first. Or we could let the doctor sort it out by placing bids at auction. Whichever way we solve the problem, though, Tiger ought to go first (or to receive better treatment, or however you want to set up the situation) precisely because his ankle is more valuable than mine and because this is illustrated by his higher earnings.

Regardless, society as a whole is better off if Tiger Woods is treated first, even if it turns out that we have identical injuries and even if I was in the waiting room before he was. Having an efficient rationing system based on price is much better than a lottery system, a first-come; first-serve, or any other rationing system that I can easily envision. Perhaps you have another alternative?

How is this system an instrumental good?

It effectively and efficiently allocates scarce resources across a broad range of circumstances, albeit not in all of them.

[Master of Ossus]

If I put a gun to your head and tell you to give me all your money, you would say that force is being applied, correct?

Now, say I am a doctor and you have a potentially life threatening, but curable disease. We'll say for a moment that the previous situation happened, and you refused to obey the muggers orders. I ask you to pay me or I refuse to treat you. If you don't pay, you die. Same result as before, you are forced to pay or you die. It doesn't matter that I am not the one to pull the trigger.

Yeah, Surlethe's idea doesn't work if you assume away any sort of a competitive market. Nice discovery.

Are you for real? Go hungry if you don't believe me. Goddamn, this is so obvious I can't believe someone is seriously trying to claim that money is more desirable than food.

Ummm... yes. My bank account is more desirable than a Happy Meal. Go figure. I cannot believe that you think that this is some devastating criticism of Surlethe's model.

I'm disputing the model, fucktard. You provide evidence that it works. I'm not the one making controversial claims here.

Last time I went to Whole Foods, they did not sit me down and examine my finances before we settled on a price for raspberries, nor did the terms of the transaction involve a handover of my 401k. My model is obviously superior for explaining food prices than your intuition. Indeed, yours appears to be a perfect example of the water-diamond paradox. That has been solved for well over a century: prices are set at the margin.

Okay, this is the basis of your misunderstanding: prices contain VASTLY more information than a "measure of the greed of the sellers." They represent the point at which a marginal seller and a marginal buyer break even and are each no better off for having sold or purchased a good. It would be at least as sensible to claim that the price constituted a measure of the "greed of the buyer," but even this would obviously be false because "greed" has very little to do with it in competitive markets. This competitive price is, then, where individuals are asked to set their own level of consumption of particular goods and services.

The whole point of participating in a competitive market for the sellers is to make money. Seriously. What the fuck is this bullshit.

Yes, but they can't make money by charging arbitrarily high prices, which seems to be the premise of your understanding of the system. Rather, prices are set at the margin: where buyers and sellers are indifferent to making the transaction and therefore where the seller realizes no profit for having sold their good. This is the price at which all buyers and all sellers trade, in a competitive market. It contains information, knowledge of which benefits society.

This is a thread whose sole purpose is to try and prove the Libertarian ideal as an exercise in devil's advocacy. The people who subscribe to this belief system do treat things like food and water as "goods" and you damn well know it. If these things are not considered "goods" then we aren't arguing for libertarianism, we're arguing for socialism a la Canada. Dumbass.

Concededly, I am not an expert in libertarian idealogy (indeed, I only vaguely understand its precise tenants), but what does any of this have to do with your criticism of Surlethe's argument? Even if we grant that food is generically a non-substitutable "good," how does this destroy their model?

I don't accept that premise you illiterate! The rich are rich for many reasons

1) inheritance

2) luck

3) because they went into business precisely to make money, and were successful at it

and so on. Please provide evidence that this model works, or fuck off.

What sort of evidence are you looking for? The fact that it more accurately predicts food prices than you do?

The whole point of playing the Devil's Advocate is to gain a better understanding of an alternative perspective. You have failed utterly at this because you don't understand even the basic precepts of the argument in the OP, and instead run around with a littany of strawmen that you assume to be devastating when in fact they merely reveal your own incomprehension of the system.

You and brianeyci would've gotten along famously.

[Formless]

Goddamnit-- okay, enough quote spaghetti. At this point you're just obfuscating what should be a very simple argument and failing to see the forest for the trees:

First of all, you agree that this proposal breaks down when you assume a competitive market between buyer and seller. You furthermore agree that if I deny you vital healthcare for being unable to pay the results are the same as shooting you during a (botched) mugging. You also imply (or are you failing to see?) that you agree that the market is competitive by conceding that the sellers are motivated by turning a profit, while the buyers obviously want to hang on to as much cash as they can since the model assumes that it is valuable.

See the problem yet? And don't try to weasel out of this with that whole "set at the margin" bullshit-- as soon as a monopoly is formed or the sellers conspire to fix prices so that the buyers have no real choice in prices they can and will charge whatever price they fucking feel like charging.

And if they do this in the right markets they know you will buy. Which brings us to the original point: money is of secondary value to things like food and water. Yes yes, you can say the money in your bank account is more valuable than a cheeseburger. Unless you've had nothing to eat for three goddamn weeks! What you've done is put up a catch-22 and expected me not to see it: any given food can be treated as a luxury item, but if we treat all food as a luxury people who cannot pay will starve to death. Just like in the healthcare example force is effectively at play. Which value takes priority? That you must pay for luxury items, or that you must eat?

At this point, even an ethical egoist would tell you they prioritize food. That should tell you something about the weakness of your argument.

Frankly, this thread is NOT about general Capitalism as you seem to think it is based on your arguments. This thread is literally about how the rich are more deserving than the poor, more worthy to society. You are the one who misunderstands Surlethe, not me. I suggest that if you want to discuss Libertarian ideology any further you do some research on the subject before shooting your mouth off about what is and is not being argued over.

[Master of Ossus]

Goddamnit-- okay, enough quote spaghetti. At this point you're just obfuscating what should be a very simple argument and failing to see the forest for the trees:

First of all, you agree that this proposal breaks down when you assume a competitive market between buyer and seller.

That is the exact opposite of what I said. It is now clear that you not only cannot understand the argument in the OP, you cannot understand English at all.

This is an English-language forum (PR 1). Educate yourself.

You furthermore agree that if I deny you vital healthcare for being unable to pay the results are the same as shooting you during a (botched) mugging. You also imply (or are you failing to see?) that you agree that the market is competitive by conceding that the sellers are motivated by turning a profit, while the buyers obviously want to hang on to as much cash as they can since the model assumes that it is valuable.

See the problem yet? And don't try to weasel out of this with that whole "set at the margin" bullshit-- as soon as a monopoly is formed or the sellers conspire to fix prices so that the buyers have no real choice in prices they can and will charge whatever price they fucking feel like charging.

This is how I replied to this entire line of reasoning, above:

Yeah, Surlethe's idea doesn't work if you assume away any sort of a competitive market. Nice discovery.

So, again, I repeat my golf-clap. Congratulations.

Don't make me go through this with you, again.

But moreover, even if we do set up a monopoly, your claim is still bullshit--you still can't get anything right. A monopolist does not charge "whatever price they fucking feel like charging." They charge a monopoly price, which is higher than the market price but is still finite. It can be evaluated using only a very slight modification of the basic supply-demand model used for everything else, and is easily determinable and verifiably finite.

And if they do this in the right markets they know you will buy. Which brings us to the original point: money is of secondary value to things like food and water. Yes yes, you can say the money in your bank account is more valuable than a cheeseburger. Unless you've had nothing to eat for three goddamn weeks! What you've done is put up a catch-22 and expected me not to see it: any given food can be treated as a luxury item, but if we treat all food as a luxury people who cannot pay will starve to death. Just like in the healthcare example. Which value takes priority? That you must pay for luxury items, or that you must eat?

Bullshit. Even monopolists sets finite prices. Rockefeller did not set oil prices into the stratosphere, nor did OPEC in the 1970's. AT&T did not set the price of phone calls as infinitely high. Swift did not set the price of beef arbitrarily high. They are still bounded by market mechanisms even though they are monopolists.

In short: I did expect you to see this, I simply expected you to evaluate it properly. You are obviously incapable of doing so.

At this point, even an ethical egoist would tell you they prioritize food. That should tell you something about the weakness of your argument.

Frankly, this thread is NOT about general Capitalism as you seem to think it is based on your arguments. This thread is literally about how the rich are more deserving than the poor, more worthy to society.

Okay, and so if we only have enough food for the rich people, why are the poor equally deserving?

You are the one who misunderstands Surlethe, not me. I suggest that if you want to discuss Libertarian ideology any further you do some research on the subject before shooting your mouth off about what is and is not being argued over.

And I suggest that you bother to read the board rules, learn about English, and also learn about Libertarianism before you post, again.

[Formless]

Show me where I said that they set an infinite price rather than just, you know, a price that does not match the value the buyers place on the commodities? Now you are just strawmanning.

Okay, and so if we only have enough food for the rich people, why are the poor equally deserving?

Why are the rich more deserving? Burden of proof is on you, buddy.