Let's improve democracy

[Alyrium Denryle]

I forgot one of my coolest and most popular ideas: The negative vote.

For elections when you don't feel compelled to vote for any one party but you do hate one party more than the others (BNP, Tories, Labour, whoever), you can instead use your vote to take off one of their supporters. People basically do this already by voting for their main rivals, but I would prefer to have a purely negative effect without voting tactically.

I can definitely get behind this idea. If this were implimented, I would feel a bit better about voting in our upcoming elections, as I want to vote neither republican or democrat. I would however like to remove republican votes without actually adding to the democrats. If these votes counted towards majority, it may cause both candidates to fail at winning the election, as "No Confidence" has the potential to win, forcing a new campaign and election. That would be fan-fucking-tastic.

(Functionally speaking: As it stands now, if we assume that there is a number line, and that each vote has a statistically equal chance of being allotted to one politician or the other, each politician starts at 0 on that number line. When a vote is cast, it is given to one side, and effectively takes it away from the other. This causes a net movement of 2, where one politician gains a vote, and the other effectively loses it, candidate 1 moves up an integer, candidate 2 moves down an integer. This is why when an election is won 52 to 48, the point difference is 4. This alternative would also cause a net movement of 2 percentage points, but would take votes from a candidate, and the other just loses the potential vote. This could mean, if neither party or candidate is well liked, that neither could be elected with appropriate reforms in our electoral system. A president for example cannot be elected on a plurality, and if Electoral Votes were apportioned as "no confidence", it could mean a new election must be held, or a runoff election between the candidates--including third party--least affected by the no confidence votes)

[Alyrium Denryle]

That is why no one can serve more than once in a row. The system for voting no-confidence would be a 60 supermajority vote. Additionally, the professional organizations would post candidates from their respective number, but the combination of all of them in the relevant group would vote.

How does this help with the creation of institutionalized memory and the boni that brings?

Boni? That is not a term I am familiar with.

In any case, with any amount of institutionalized memory, comes a tradeoff. Corruption, and having someone set in their ways and politically entrenched. A dynamic system may well be preferable. There will always be a third of the number who have been in for six years, and the really good ones will stand for election more than once, just offset by a six year term (or 2 year, depending on how the rotation is set up), and as a result will be able to maintain a lot of legislative experience. The rotation interval however keeps people from worrying about re-election prospects, and avoids "Lame Duck" legislative sessions.

[Knife]

I too, am an advocate of the 'none of the above' vote similar to the 'negative vote'. If 'none of the above' gets more votes than any of the candidates, then you scrap that election and start over with new candidates.

[Dave]

I too, am an advocate of the 'none of the above' vote similar to the 'negative vote'. If 'none of the above' gets more votes than any of the candidates, then you scrap that election and start over with new candidates.

Who retains power in that circumstance? I can easily envision a scenario where the incumbents tell their supporters to repeatedly hit the "fuck the system" "none of the above" button to drag out their term, if only in a lame duck fashion.

Also, while I find Alyrium's 4th anti-corruption branch a good idea, how does it deal with the "asshole in line of succession" situation we saw with Bush-Cheney? What if the asshole has taken great care to remain immaculate but has known negative inclinations or tendencies?

As an aside, perhaps the anti-corruption branch should have multiple independent competing sub-branches, who's goal it is to root out corruption not only in the greater 3 branches, but also among themselves.

Finally, in the pie in the sky dream chance that an improved democracy such as those proposed here had a chance to become implemented, how do you sell this to the public? Or am I asking the wrong question here?

[Knife]

I too, am an advocate of the 'none of the above' vote similar to the 'negative vote'. If 'none of the above' gets more votes than any of the candidates, then you scrap that election and start over with new candidates.

Who retains power in that circumstance? I can easily envision a scenario where the incumbents tell their supporters to repeatedly hit the "fuck the system" "none of the above" button to drag out their term, if only in a lame duck fashion.?

I outlined earlier in the thread my idea of one month publicly funded campaigns. If none of the above wins, that leaves one month to register new candidates, and another month to campaign per my outline before the new year and a change in office actually begins.

[Thanas]

That is why no one can serve more than once in a row. The system for voting no-confidence would be a 60 supermajority vote. Additionally, the professional organizations would post candidates from their respective number, but the combination of all of them in the relevant group would vote.

How does this help with the creation of institutionalized memory and the boni that brings?

Boni? That is not a term I am familiar with.

Advantages.

In any case, with any amount of institutionalized memory, comes a tradeoff. Corruption, and having someone set in their ways and politically entrenched. A dynamic system may well be preferable. There will always be a third of the number who have been in for six years, and the really good ones will stand for election more than once, just offset by a six year term (or 2 year, depending on how the rotation is set up), and as a result will be able to maintain a lot of legislative experience. The rotation interval however keeps people from worrying about re-election prospects, and avoids "Lame Duck" legislative sessions.

I am not sure about that, seeing how people who know their time in office is up usually try to ram things through half-baked. And institutional memory is more than just six years - for example, in the current senate, people got their reputation due to working for several terms in the field. As a result, they are very well known among partners etc. That in turn provides security and a certain amount of expertise.

[Bottlestein]

Alyrium's system deals with Agenda-Setting between terms, but I do not see how he is stopping it during a term. I may have to redraw the Strategic Form though - his voting chain is fairly complex.

Also @ Thanas: "Institutional Memory" is not really a term that makes sense in Game Theory - it is simply Agenda-Setting that becomes player-independent and state-conserving.

[Alyrium Denryle]

I am not sure about that, seeing how people who know their time in office is up usually try to ram things through half-baked. And institutional memory is more than just six years - for example, in the current senate, people got their reputation due to working for several terms in the field. As a result, they are very well known among partners etc. That in turn provides security and a certain amount of expertise.

In this case, the individuals already have expertise in the field in question. So someone put into the Public Health committee do not need to sit on the committee for a few years just to have a basic grasp of public health issues. So, the expertise is not an issue, save on procedural issues. Procedure though can be made way the fuck less convoluted than it currently is.

You also still have preservation of institutional knowledge. Experiments with monkeys have shown this actually. You dont need individuals in there for a long time, you need continuity, so there are experienced individuals there when the young ones are coming in. You do not need a 20 year vet though, a five year vet should be sufficient to teach the new ones procedure. What you want to avoid though, are entrenched factions. You get deadlock and political parties that way.

One solution is to have a long term public servant on each legislative committee who keeps and knows the annals, but does not have a vote. This way, the history and institutional knowledge of each committee is invested in one person who can advise the committee. When they reach the point that they want to retire, they begin training a new one.

[Thanas]

I am not sure if allowing professionals to set standards for themselves is a good idea, seeing how allowing lawyers to do so has resulted in less than stellar justice in the USA.

Also, in your example the one long term public servant will be in an excellent position to play kingmaker and grab much of the power for himself.

[Alyrium Denryle]

I am not sure if allowing professionals to set standards for themselves is a good idea, seeing how allowing lawyers to do so has resulted in less than stellar justice in the USA.

Also, in your example the one long term public servant will be in an excellent position to play kingmaker and grab much of the power for himself.

That is why committees are made of groups with different interests. It is not just doctors making those decisions, but also lawyers, ethicists, economists, etc. Each group with separate interests acting as a check against the others.

With no vote, and no power other than reading from the records when asked, there would be no mechanism by which such an individual could play kingmaker, and there would be one for each legislative committee. They may end up brokering disputes... If you can see a scenario by which they could actually go for a power grab, by all means.

[Thanas]

Quite simple, every position in history which has involved giving one person or one agency control of the records has that person/agency eventually grow power far beyond what was originally intended. Simply because people will ask them for advice.

And I really, really distrust your committee idea. It seems to defy the idea of popular sovereignty. Frankly, this whole thing sounds like something where power is concentrated in the hands of experts.

[Phantasee]

It outlines the establishment of some kind of technocracy, not an improvement of democracy. "We know better than you, so we'll write the bills, but feel free to vote on our proposals so you can pretend you have a say."

[MKSheppard]

Take US Constitutional system at present.

1.) Remove all these stupid annoying money limitations on free speech. Instead of promoting openness, it just pushes everything into increasingly byzantine backdoors upon backdoors upon backdoors and cut-outs between increasing amounts of front groups.

Others in this thread have talked about a kind of FOIA for campaign finance. Something like that would be very useful -- require politicans to post within 30-60 days of winning or losing their election a semi-comprehensive accounting of their finances. In a lot of cases, the campaign fund is used as a slush fund by politicans once they have been re-elected at least once. More transparency through better accounting would help combat this.

2.) Institute Term Limits system-wide.

President: 2 x 4 Year Terms
Representatives: 4 x 2 Year Terms
Senators: 2 x 6 Year Terms

3.) Institute Anti-Nepotism Rule.

An Elected or Appointed position cannot be directly passed through direct or close relatives without an interval of one term -- nor can an elected/appointed official appoint a direct/close relative to a vacant position.

For example:

This would prevent stuff like:

Michigan-15: In the hands of the Dingell family since:

John Dingell Sr: 1933-1955
John Dingell Jr: 1955-Present

And of course the infamous Alaskan senatorial seat swap:

Frank Murkowski, Senator from Alaska; is elected to the Alaskan governorship. He fills his expired Senate seat with....his daughter, Lisa Murkowski.

This so annoyed and pissed off Alaskans that they eventually passed a law stripping the governor of his power to make direct appointments.

Of course; the anti-nepotism rule can be easily circumvented by any political machine -- for example, when John F Kennedy was elected President, his vacant senate seat was filled by the Governor of Massachussets. Of course, the Governor was "advised" by the Kennedy machine to appoint Benjamin A Smith II, a "seatwarmer" until Ted Kennedy was old enough to run for the Senate.

But that kind of political machine is increasingly rare -- as far as I know, the last bastion of this kind of massive concentration of power is in Chicago under the "enlightened" rule of the Daley family.

[Phantasee]

But are the Dingells hurting Michigan or the House, or have they been positive contributors to the betterment if the State and country? Because I can see situations where it's not necessarily a bad thing. A man who had a popular father could run in his seat but he'd still need popular support to get the nomination and elected, no?

[Alyrium Denryle]

It outlines the establishment of some kind of technocracy, not an improvement of democracy. "We know better than you, so we'll write the bills, but feel free to vote on our proposals so you can pretend you have a say."

Thing is, it is not pretending. The biggest problem with democracy is that morons and the uneducated have a huge amount of power. All a politician need to in order to get elected is play the passions and prejudices of the seething plebeian horde, and those who get elected known jack and shit about the subjects they are making laws about, and instead of making them on the basis of reality, do so based on two things: Ideology, and what will get them the most votes from said seething plebeian horde.

With this system in place, those who are in position to know what the fuck it is they are doing (including lawyers everywhere for the physical writing), with internal and external checks on their power, are the ones doing the law-construction. They can be petitioned by The People, and can be checked by an elected lower house AND the chief executive.

All things considered, what makes you think that The People have a say now? Or that The People should be making the decisions? For fuck's sake, nearly 50% of the population actually voted for McCain/Palin, and where was the public outcry when the PATRIOT act got passed, or when Habeus Corpus got suspended?

[Alphawolf55]

I have no problem with people voting for their own leaders and having a say in their destiny but I do think that Congress handles too many things that these individuals can't be expected to understand. Most of these people grew up never using a computer and we expect them to make decent internet laws? Same with healthcare, tax laws. Things that really require at a decent amount of studying to understand, it's ridiculous to expect a senator to understand these things along with 50 others.

Granted, one of the big things I would not want scientist controlling is the purse of America. I could see alot of people really into their fields proposing huge budgets for things that sound awesome but aren't top priority. Kind of like military spending right now.

[Alyrium Denryle]

I have no problem with people voting for their own leaders and having a say in their destiny but I do think that Congress handles too many things that these individuals can't be expected to understand. Most of these people grew up never using a computer and we expect them to make decent internet laws? Same with healthcare, tax laws. Things that really require at a decent amount of studying to understand, it's ridiculous to expect a senator to understand these things along with 50 others.

Granted, one of the big things I would not want scientist controlling is the purse of America. I could see alot of people really into their fields proposing huge budgets for things that sound awesome but aren't top priority. Kind of like military spending right now.

That is why it is not all scientists... I have gone over the length and breadth of who would be on the committees. Budgeting would need to be done by special session of all committees, and there would always be accountants and those good with tax policy and finance to make sure that someone does not go overboard with the purse strings, and that everything is paid for. Granted, you could probably expect an increase in the budgets of NASA, the NIH, NSF, EPA, DOE etc

[MKSheppard]

But are the Dingells hurting Michigan or the House, or have they been positive contributors to the betterment if the State and country? Because I can see situations where it's not necessarily a bad thing. A man who had a popular father could run in his seat but he'd still need popular support to get the nomination and elected, no?

Ah, the old "but he brings home the goddamned bacon!" and "they're experienced!" (read, they know all the little procedural tricks of Congress) argument.

Never mind that one of the more popular pasttimes when it comes to the US Congress on this board is complaining about how fucking old the members of it are, and how they can't understand all this new technology etc etc.

Dingell is 84, and has served as a Congresscritter since 1955 -- for 55 fucking years (!!!).

How do you expect him to have any realistic understanding of modern technology, or the effects that the laws that Congress passes have on the average voter, when he's been a Congressman since 1955 and has been insulated from the general public. Remember George H.W. Bush's amazement in one of his presidental campaigns at the supermarket checkout scanner as a amazing piece of technology?

"The Internet is a Series of Tubes" anyone?

[Simon_Jester]

I've heard that the Bush amazement thing wasn't because they thought the technology was magic, but because of the prices. Or something. That said, insulation from change in the social environmeny can definitely be a problem.

[Bakustra]

So, Shep, is it your contention that John Dingell received and maintains his Congressional seat solely because of his father? Because he's popularly elected, oddly enough. Nepotism might explain his initial victories, but if he was totally incompetent, he'd have been out on his ass long ago. The age of officeholders is related to this, but only slightly, in that the American system heavily favors incumbents. So regardless of your proposal, you would still have aging officeholders. Incorporating term limits would help, but at the expense of handing the functions of government over to lobbyists. (As an aside, I find it grotesquely amusing that you think political experience is a bad thing.) Eliminating lobbyists would be very difficult and result in an even less-informed legislative body. Frankly, the cure is far worse than the disease in this case.

I've heard that the Bush amazement thing wasn't because they thought the technology was magic, but because of the prices. Or something. That said, insulation from change in the social environmeny can definitely be a problem.

Well, it's essentially inevitable under the current system. Senators and Representatives can hold on to positions for a long time because the system favors incumbents, and barring populist movements, only the canny can get into office (and the canny majority usually reigns in anybody too idealistic). So they hold onto their offices for a long time. It's an institutional defect in some respects, but on the other hand, they tend to hire young pages to keep up with policy for them. Lobbyists also help with this.

[Alphawolf55]

I keep hearing this argument. "If you insert term limits, the lobbyist win!"

What is this based on?

[Bakustra]

I keep hearing this argument. "If you insert term limits, the lobbyist win!"

What is this based on?

Generally, a Representative or Senator that's freshly elected will not have a full range of knowledge on issues. They also will have to acclimate to the conditions in Washington, get to know people and all that. That takes about a year. Re-election campaigning can take up to a year, and still takes months in most cases (especially with primary challenges). So Representatives are rarely very productive in their first term, and are often ignorant about key positions that they are asked to vote on.

Lobbyists serve an important function- they provide easy information to Congresspersons. But that information is generally slanted. The NRA never provides any information that suggests tight gun laws might be tied to lower crime rates, while gun-control groups do the inverse. So this makes it problematic for congresspersons. They tend to rely on lobbyists initially for policies they have little experience with. Experienced politicians have the advantage of being able to compile information and make contacts with professionals and experts that can provide them with advice. They also gain knowledge from working, get better at hiring knowledgeable or diligent pages, and so on. Generally, experience helps.

Now consider the proposed method of term limits. This would prevent people from gaining a lot of experience, and a representative would only have about four productive years before forced retirement. Experienced politicians also help newer politicians acclimate, and generally have a great deal of soft power thanks to their experience and the respect many hold them in. Hard term limits eliminate all that, and essentially force legislators to rely on lobbyist sources for information.

This is extra-problematic because foreign policy in the US is overwhelmingly dominated by right-wing groups, and only a tiny, tiny fraction of politicians would have foreign policy experience. This would essentially shut down an entire half of the political spectrum when it comes to foreign policy, or rather kill it permanently, as it's already essentially shut down.

[Alphawolf55]

Wouldn't you just be able to theoritically set up expert groups that newcomers could contact with ready information?

[Bakustra]

Wouldn't you just be able to theoritically set up expert groups that newcomers could contact with ready information?

Right. That's what lobbyists are. The problem is that they're partisan, which is something that would apply to essentially any group you can think up. On many of these problems, anybody that's informed has an opinion. On others, the non-partisan are generally pretty out of it and poor at communicating to outsiders. Even then, they would tend to be either partisan or wield unacceptable amounts of kingmaking power.

[Alyrium Denryle]

Wouldn't you just be able to theoritically set up expert groups that newcomers could contact with ready information?

Or, you know, set up the system such that only people who already know the subject material are forced to make those decisions?

Right. That's what lobbyists are. The problem is that they're partisan, which is something that would apply to essentially any group you can think up. On many of these problems, anybody that's informed has an opinion. On others, the non-partisan are generally pretty out of it and poor at communicating to outsiders. Even then, they would tend to be either partisan or wield unacceptable amounts of kingmaking power.

Then you need to make a tradeoff. Do you want your expert groups to have a lot of soft power, or do you want your lawmakers beholden to partisan groups?

I would rather a lot of soft power be in the hands of the individuals best equipped to make decisions. Kingmaker power is not necessarily bad, if the results you get are actually good.

If congress listened to climatologists rather than lobbyists in the energy industry, we would have had climate change issues solved a long time ago, and the Deepwater Horizon spill would never have happened if the MMS was not snorting meth off of toaster ovens.