(UK) Strategic Defense and Security Review

[TimothyC]

Selected exerpts from The Strategic Defense and Security Review:

Naval Forces
2.A.3 In the maritime environment, Future Force 2020 will be able to provide: nuclear Continuous At Sea Deterrence; maritime defence of the UK and its South Atlantic Overseas Territories; an enduring presence within priority regions of the world to contribute to conventional deterrence and containment; powerful intervention capabilities from our surface and submarine fleets; the ability to land forces from the sea by helicopter and over-the-beach with protective vehicles and supplies from specialist ships; and the ability to command UK and allied naval forces at up to Task Force level.
2.A.4 Capabilities will include:

• the Trident force and its supporting elements;
• the seven new Astute-class nuclear hunter-killer submarines (SSNs), able to deploy rapidly from the UK to operational areas, fuelled for 25 years and limited in endurance only by the food they can carry. Capable of operating in secret across the world’s oceans, they will contribute to the protection of the nuclear deterrent and maritime Task Groups and provide global strategic intelligence and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile strike capability. They are designed to be adaptable throughout their operational lives, with modular systems to reduce the costs of future upgrades;
• carrier-strike based around a single new operational carrier with the second planned to be kept at extended readiness. The carrier will embark Joint Strike Fighters and helicopters (see box overleaf);
• a surface fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers, providing military flexibility across a variety of operations, from full-scale naval warfare, to providing maritime security (for example protecting trade and energy supplies) and projecting UK influence (for example through
  their visible presence or supporting building the capacity of regional partners). These will include six Type 45 destroyers, a highly capable air defence destroyer whose missile system can protect both naval forces and UK sovereign territory, and the current Type 23 frigates. Both ship types operate the Merlin helicopter and the Type 45 can also operate the Chinook helicopter. As soon as possible after 2020 the Type 23 will be replaced by Type 26 frigates, designed to be easily adapted to change roles and capabilities depending on the strategic circumstances;
• the Royal Marines, whose 3 Commando Brigade will provide one key element of our high readiness Response Force. They will be able to land and sustain a commando group of up to 1,800 personnel from the sea from a helicopter platform and protective vehicles, logistics and command and control support from specialist ships, including landing and command ship. It would allow us to conduct an operation such as Sierra Leone in 2000;
• a maritime helicopter force based around Wildcat and Merlin helicopters, with numbers aligned to the overall size of the future maritime force structure. These will be capable of locating and attacking enemy forces in both antisubmarine and anti-surface warfare;
• 14 mine counter-measures vessels, based on existing Hunt and Sandown class ships with a replacement programme which will also have the flexibility to be used for other roles such as hydrography or offshore patrol. This capability provides a significant level of security and protection of the UK’s nuclear deterrent;
• a global oceanographic survey capability and an ice patrol ship;
• a fleet of resupply and refuelling vessels scaled to meet the Royal Navy’s requirements;
• maritime strategic transport provided by six roll-on, roll-off ferries;
• maritime intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities based on network enabled warships, submarines and aircraft;
• a streamlined Naval regional structure to command reserve forces and represent the Royal Navy throughout the UK.

2.A.5 We will accordingly:

• decommission HMS Ark Royal immediately;
• reduce by four the number of frigates;
• place at extended readiness a landing and command ship. Either HMS Ocean or HMS Illustrious will be decommissioned following a short study of which provides the most effective helicopter platform capability. A Bay-class amphibious support ship will be decommissioned

Aircraft carriers
Decisions on defence equipment require judgements on what our Armed Forces will need 20 to 30 years from now. That is particularly true for large warships like carriers and the fast jets that fly off them. The previous Administration ordered two new carriers three times the size of our existing ones. It planned to equip them from a combat air fleet of around 150 fifth generation Joint Strike Fighters. This £20 billion programme was crowding out other important investment in the Armed Forces.
The National Security Council has therefore looked hard at the strategic, industrial and financial aspects of this programme, and has taken a number of difficult but necessary decisions to achieve by the 2020s an adaptable and effective carrier-strike capability in balance with the rest of the Armed Force structure. The key conclusions are:

• There is a strategic requirement for a future carrier-strike capability. The Invincible-class carriers were designed principally to meet Cold War threats on the high seas, with short-range jets providing air defence for a naval task group, without the ability to interoperate aircraft with our key allies and whose primary mission was anti-submarine warfare. A Queen Elizabeth-class carrier, operating the most modern combat jets, will give the UK the ability to project military power more than 700 nautical miles over land as well as sea, from anywhere in the world. Both the US and France, for example, have used this freedom of manoeuvre to deliver combat airpower in Afghanistan from secure carrier bases in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This capability will give the UK long term political flexibility to act without depending, at times of regional tension, on agreement from other countries to use of their bases for any mission we want to undertake. It will also give us in-built military flexibility to adapt our approach over the 50 years of the carrier’s working life. In particular, it provides options for a coercive response to crises, as a complement or alternative to ground engagements. It contributes to an overall Force Structure geared towards helping deter or contain threats from relatively well-equipped regional powers, as well as dealing with insurgencies and non-state actors in failing states.
• We will need to operate only one aircraft carrier. We cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of strike capability previously planned. We are unlikely to face adversaries in large-scale air combat. We are far more likely to engage in precision operations, which may need to overcome sophisticated air defence capabilities. The single carrier will therefore routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations while retaining the capacity to deploy up to the 36 previously planned, providing combat and intelligence capability much greater than the existing Harriers. It will be able to carry a wide range of helicopters, including up to 12 Chinook or Merlin transports and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix of aircraft will depend on the mission, allowing the carrier to support a broad range of operations including landing a Royal Marines Commando Group, or a Special Forces Squadron conducting a counterterrorism strike, assisting with humanitarian crises or the evacuation of UK nationals.
• A single carrier needs to be fully effective. As currently designed, the Queen Elizabeth will not be fully interoperable with key allies, since their naval jets could not land on it. Pursuit of closer partnership is a core strategic principle for the Strategic Defence and Security Review because it is clear that the UK will in most circumstances act militarily as part of a wider coalition. We will therefore install catapult and arrestor gear. This will delay the in-service date of the new carrier from 2016 to around 2020. But it will allow greater interoperability with US and French carriers and naval jets. It provides the basis for developing joint Maritime Task Groups in the future. This should both ensure continuous carrier-strike availability, and reduce the overall carrier protection requirements on the rest of the fleet, releasing ships for other naval tasks such as protection of key sea-lanes, or conducting counter- piracy and narcotics operations.
• The strike needs to be made more capable. Installing the catapult and arrestor will allow the UK to acquire the carrier-variant of Joint Strike Fighter ready to deploy on the converted carrier instead of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. This version of the jet has a longer range and greater payload: this, not large numbers of aircraft, is the critical requirement for precision strike operations in the future. The UK plans to operate a single model of JSF, instead of different land and naval variants. Overall, the carrier-variant of the JSF will be cheaper, reducing through-life costs by around 25%.
• The current, limited carrier-strike capability will be retired. We must face up to the difficult choices put off by the last Government. Over the next five years combat air support to operations in Afghanistan must be the over-riding priority: the Harrier fleet would not be able to provide this and sustain a carrier-strike role at the same time. Even after 2015, short-range Harriers – whether operating from HMS Illustrious or HMS Queen Elizabeth – would provide only a very limited coercive capability. We judge it unlikely that this would be sufficiently useful in the latter half of the decade to be a cost-effective use of defence resources.

This new carrier-strike policy is consistent with the Strategic Defence and Security Review’s overall approach of holding defence capabilities at different levels of readiness appropriate to the strategic context. It makes strategic sense to focus on developing a more effective and appropriate carrier-strike capability to deal with the uncertain evolution in type and scale of potential threats from various states in the next decade and beyond. To provide further insurance against unpredictable changes in that strategic environment, our current plan is to hold one of the two new carriers at extended readiness. That leaves open options to rotate them, to ensure a continuous UK carrier-strike capability; or to re-generate more quickly a two-carrier strike capability. Alternatively, we might sell one of the carriers, relying on cooperation with a close ally to provide continuous carrier-strike capability. The next strategic defence and security review in 2015 will provide an opportunity to review these options as the future strategic environment develops. Retaining this flexibility of choice is at the core of the Government’s adaptable approach.

Air Forces
2.A.9 In the air environment, Future Force 2020 will be able to provide: air defence of the UK and its South Atlantic Overseas Territories; a credible and capable combat air presence to contribute to conventional deterrence and containment; an expeditionary combat air contribution to enduring land operations; strategic and tactical airlift; and other air power capabilities, including ISTAR, helicopters and RAF Regiment ground units.
2.A.10 Capabilities will include:

• a fast jet fleet of Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft (see box overleaf) with around one third at high readiness. These are two of the world’s most capable combat aircraft, able to operate in the future high-threat airspace while providing air defence, precision ground attack and combat ISTAR capabilities;
• a modern strategic and tactical airlift fleet based on seven C-17, 22 A400M transport aircraft and up to 14 specially converted Airbus A330 future strategic transport and Tanker aircraft able rapidly to deploy, support and recover our forces and their equipment anywhere in the world and to provide airborne refuelling to maximise the range and endurance of our aircraft. It will replace the ageing TriStar and VC10 fleets; the first aircraft is due to be delivered towards the end of 2011;
• 12 new Chinook helicopters to increase battlefield mobility from land and sea, operating alongside Merlin medium lift helicopters to move personnel and equipment quickly over long distances. This rationalised fleet will beeasier and more cost-effective to support and will deliver significant operational advantages;
• command and control capabilities to direct air operations in the UK and overseas, centred on the deployable Joint Force Air Component Headquarters to command multinational forces across a theatre of operations;
• strategic surveillance and intelligence platforms capable of providing wide-area coverage as part of our broader combat ISTAR capability. These include the E3D Sentry AWACS to provide airborne command, control and surveillance; Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft to provide global independent strategic intelligence gathering; and a range of unmanned air systems to complement our strategic ISTAR assets and reduce the risk to our forces of operating over hostile territory;
• the Storm Shadow cruise missile carried by our current and future fast jets – a state of the art capability to strike ground targets at medium to long range;
• advanced air launched weapons to complement the capabilities of Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter;
• enhancements to our simulated training to produce a more efficient and cost-effective training environment;
• RAF Regiment Force Protection squadrons at high readiness to protect deployed aircraft and personnel in hostile areas;
• chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) detection, identification and monitoring units.

2.A.11 We will accordingly:

• in the transitional period, retain a reduced Tornado fleet, but remove Harrier from service in 2011 as the fast jet force moves to two operational types – Joint Strike Fighter and Typhoon. Retaining the Tornado fleet allows a fast jet contribution to be sustained in Afghanistan and support to concurrent operations which would not have been possible if Harrier was retained instead;
• reduce our planned number of Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Installing a catapult on the new aircraft carrier will allow us to switch to the more capable carrier variant;
• not bring into service the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft programme. We will depend on other maritime assets to contribute to the tasks previously planned for them;
• withdraw the three variants of the TriStar transport/tanker aircraft from service from 2013 as we transition to the more capable A330;
• reduce the role of the VC-10 transport/tanker aircraft to undertake air-to-air refuelling only, with the target of withdrawing it by 2013 as A330 enters service;
• withdraw the C-130J Hercules tactical transport aircraft from service by 2022, a decade earlier than planned, as we transition to the larger and more capable A400M aircraft;
• withdraw the Sentinel airborne ground surveillance aircraft once it is no longer required to support operations in Afghanistan.

Fast jet fleets
Our fast jet fleet will be made up of two modern and highly capable multi-role combat aircraft, Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter. This combination will provide the flexibility and strike power to deal with a variety of new and existing threats, while also radically improving cost-effectiveness and efficiency.
Our current fleet of Harrier and Tornado air defence and ground attack aircraft have performed magnificently over the last 30 years, and Tornados currently provide essential support to our forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. But these aircraft risk becoming outdated as threats continue to become more varied and sophisticated, and maintenance of such veteran fleets will become an increasing challenge. Rationalising our fast jet forces to two advanced and efficient fleets makes operational and economic sense.
We will therefore continue to develop our modern and extremely capable land-based Typhoon fighter, upgrading its ability to attack ground targets, and give it the additional advanced capabilities it needs to maintain its fighting edge over the next 20 years. We will also buy the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, a state-of the-art aircraft with an exceptionally broad range of capabilities, and an expected service life of several decades. It is specifically designed to operate independently in very challenging environments. It will carry a variety of electronic sensors to build up an unmatched picture of the threats around it, which it will be able to share with other UK and allied air, ground and maritime forces, linking into our future military networks. Joint Strike Fighter is also designed to be more affordable across its operating life, benefitting from an expected production run of more than 3,000 aircraft.

Overseas bases
We will maintain our network of permanent joint operating bases, including: in Gibraltar; in the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus; British Forces South Atlantic Islands, based on the Falkland Islands and Ascension Island and maintaining a regular presence in South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands; and on Diego Garcia in British Indian Ocean Territory. These bases give us and in some cases our allies wide geographical reach and logistic support hubs for deployed forces. They will continue to be central to our ability to deploy military force around the world and respond to changing strategic circumstances.
We will also maintain our training areas in Canada, Kenya and Brunei. These help prepare our forces for operations. They are also concrete manifestations of our close and valued defence relationships with these countries.
The UK currently also has a major military presence in Germany, with 20,000 service personnel and their families based there. For more than 50 years the Federal Government has supported the British military presence providing essential training and operational opportunities as well as basing. The presence of the British military has played an important role in demonstrating Alliance solidarity, and has also been a symbol of steadfast UK-German friendship. But there is no longer any operational requirement for UK forces to be based there, and the current arrangements impose financial costs on the UK, disruption on personnel and their families and opportunity costs in terms of wider Army coherence. We therefore aim to withdraw all forces from Germany by 2020.

The Deterrent
3.1 The National Security Tasks and Planning Guidelines set out the need for a minimum effective nuclear deterrent as the ultimate means to deter the most extreme threats. In parallel with the Strategic Defence and Security Review we have conducted a review of our nuclear declaratory policy, and scrutinised Trident replacement to ensure value for money, including the scope for further reductions in the scale of our nuclear weapons capability. The conclusions are set out below.
The strategic context
3.2 No state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge – a state’s intent in relation to the use or threat of use of its capabilities could change relatively quickly, and while we will continue to work internationally to enhance mutual trust and security, we cannot rule out a major shift in the international security situation which would put us under grave threat.
3.3 Despite the success of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) over the last 40 years in limiting the number of states with nuclear capabilities, large arsenals remain and the risk of nuclear proliferation continues. We cannot discount the possibility that the number of states armed with nuclear weapons might increase. Equally there is a risk that some countries might in future seek to sponsor nuclear terrorism. We must not allow such states to threaten our national security or to deter us and the international community from taking the action required to maintain regional and global security.
3.4 It is also important to recognise that the UK’s nuclear deterrent supports collective security through NATO for the Euro-Atlantic area; nuclear deterrence plays an important part in NATO’s overall strategy and the UK’s nuclear forces make a substantial contribution.
Nuclear weapons policy
3.5 At the beginning of this Parliament, the Foreign Secretary announced a review of our nuclear declaratory policy to ensure that it is appropriate to the political and security context in 2010 and beyond. The UK has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies, and we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use.
3.6 As a responsible nuclear weapon state and party to the NPT, the UK also remains committed to the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We will continue to work to control proliferation and to make progress on multilateral disarmament, to build trust and confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and to take tangible steps towards a safer and more stable world where countries with nuclear weapons feel able to relinquish them.
3.7 We are now able to give an assurance that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasise the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and note that thisbreach of those non-proliferation obligations. We also note that while there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from states developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.
Value for money
3.8 In December 2006, the previous Government published The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent White Paper (Cm6994). In March 2007 Parliament voted to retain a minimum nuclear deterrent based on the current Trident missile delivery system. Under the previous Government, work started on a programme to replace the current Vanguard class submarines when they leave service in the late 2020s. In May this year the Coalition programme for government stated that ‘we will maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent, and have agreed that the renewal of Trident will be scrutinised to ensure value for money. Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives’. The value for money review has now been completed.
3.9 The Government will maintain a continuous submarine-based deterrent and begin the work of replacing its existing submarines. We will therefore proceed with the renewal of Trident and the submarine replacement programme, incorporating the savings and changes set out below. The first investment decision (Initial Gate) will be approved, and the next phase of the project commenced, by the end of this year.
3.10 The review has concluded that the overall cost of the submarine and warhead replacement programmes and associated infrastructure remains within the £20 billion cost estimate foreseen in 2006 at 2006 prices. To drive value for money we will:

• defer decisions on a replacement to the current warhead
• reduce the cost of the replacement submarine missile compartment
• extend the life of the current Vanguard class submarines and re-profile the programme to build replacement submarines
• consequently, take the second investment decision (Main Gate) finalising the detailed acquisition plans, design and number of submarines around 2016
• work with British industry to improve efficiency and optimise to expected demand its capacity to build and support submarines.

As a result of our reassessment of the minimum necessary requirements for credible deterrence we will:

• reduce the number of warheads onboard each submarine from 48 to 40
• reduce our requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120
• reduce our overall nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 180
• reduce the number of operational missiles on each submarine.

The overall impact of the changes identified by the value for money review will be to reduce costs by £3.2 billion, saving approximately £1.2 billion and deferring spending of up to £2 billion from the next 10 years; we expect some of the deferred spend ultimately to be translated into real savings in later years. These savings do not alter in any way the nature and credibility of the nuclear deterrent, including maintenance of Continuous At Sea Deterrence. Further detail is set out below.
Scale
3.11 The Government has concluded that we can meet the minimum requirement of an effective and credible level of deterrence with a smaller nuclear weapons capability. We will therefore cut the maximum number of nuclear warheads onboard each deployed submarine from 48 to 40. Together with improved stockpile management, that will reduce our requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120. We will also reduce the number of operational missiles on the Vanguard class submarines to no more than eight. These changes will start to take effect over the next few years. This will enable us to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid 2020s.
Replacement warheads
3.12 Since 2006, work has been progressing in order to determine the optimum life of the existing warhead stockpile and the range of replacement options. Under the 1958 UK-US Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes (the ‘Mutual Defence Agreement’) we have agreed on the future of the Trident D5 delivery system and determined that a replacement warhead is not required until at least the late 2030s. Decisions on replacing the warhead will not therefore be required in this Parliament. This will defer £500 million of spending from the next 10 years. We have also reached agreement with the US over the size of the missile tubes in the new submarines; this has enabled us to reduce the cost of the submarine missile compartment by up to £250 million.
Submarines
3.13 We have reviewed the scope to extend the life of the existing Vanguard class submarines and have concluded that, with sufficient investment, we can safely operate them into the late 2020s and early 2030s. This affords us the opportunity to adjust the build programme of the replacement submarines to match, reducing cost in the short-term with the aim of delivering the first new submarine in 2028. Later this year detailed design work on the new class of submarines will begin. This will provide the information needed in order to determine whether maintaining continuous at sea deterrence would require four submarines, or a fleet of only three. A decision on submarine numbers would be required at the Main Gate point of our acquisition programme, around 2016.
3.14 We have also determined that the next generation of submarines can be configured with only eight operational missile tubes, rather than the 16 on the current Vanguard class. Together with the US, we will now proceed with a common design for the missile compartment that provides that capacity.
Industry and infrastructure
3.15 The value for money work has also examined the organisations and infrastructure that support our deterrent to ensure that they are as efficient as possible. We have identified a number of areas where spending can be reduced and in some cases deferred in order to minimise expenditure. As a result, we have agreed to defer and potentially to remove over £1 billion of future spending on infrastructure over the next 10 years.
3.16 Across the whole of the nuclear defence programme we will be working closely with our industrial suppliers to improve commercial arrangements and efficiency. Under this Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme we expect to deliver substantial savings of at least £900 million over the next 10 years.

In short:

• Ark Royal is to be decommissioned - My guess is that she's going to India.
• All Six T45s will be build to provide escort for
• Both Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales both of which will be full CATOBAR carriers.
• Either Illustrious or Ocean will be scrapped going forward. Which one is going to be a hard choice as While Illustrious has had the more recent refit, she isn't designed to haul large numbers of marines from point to point. Against Ocean is the fact that she was built to civilian standards, and has had her share of problems (like the engine room starting to fill with fuel at one point).
• The four remaining T22s will probably be pulled from service (to reduce the number of frigates by four).
• One of the Bay class ships will be pulled from service. No clue which one.
• Build a new Minewarfare ship to replace those in service.
• Continue with the T26 program to replace the current frigates. My guess is that they will be built at a less than 1:1 ratio, resulting in further major surface combatants going forward.
• Only procure The C model of the F-35 for both the FAA and the RAF. Watch out for the RAF trying to grab the jets from the FAA.
• Cut in RAF JSF procurement.
• Not buy any of the Nimrod MRA.4s. This is probably the biggest blow to the RAF out of a large number of blows.
• Phase out of the Sentinel Mini-JSTARS post Afghanistan.
• Probable effective reduction in the tanker force following the transition from TriStars to A330s
• Reduction in the nuclear deterrent to just 3 SSBNs carrying 40 warheads on 8 SLBMs each.
  • Politically this allows for the Liberal Democrats to vote for this as the reduction in nuclear forces is in line with their stated goal or eliminating the force altogether.
  • With the actual decision on the Trident replacement delayed until the next Parliament the Conservatives hope that they will not need to be in a coalition government (the Liberal Democrats would likely vote against any replacement).
• Pull out of all forces from Germany by 2020. This is long overdue as it costs a lot more to keep a unit deployed than it does to keep them at home. With the NATO border now being 500+ miles further east, basing in Germany isn't as effective as it once was.

[Cecelia5578]

Here's a potentially stupid question: what about eliminating Trident altogether, and making the F-35Cs on the new CVs the new tip of the British nuclear spear?

[Thanas]

Can't get to where they would be needed in case of emergency. Say, china nukes the UK. What are the JSF going to do? Launch impotently from their carriers and hope they got enough fuel to China, where they will then heroically die face the Chinese airforce and air defence system?

That even assumes the carrier will not get sunk while it takes the long, long trip to china.


EDIT: In short, the only way this would work is if the UK abandons an independent nuclear deterrent and aligns itself for all eternity with the US.

[Psychic_Sandwich]

I forsee, at some point in the future when 'cuts cuts cuts' is no longer the name of the political game, the second carrier being brought out of extended readiness and filled with comparatively cheap planes like F-18s or Rafales. Or, since the RAF is apparently getting F-35Cs as well, grabbing them from the RAF (oh, the irony!).

This will probably be after something blows up that Downing Street isn't happy with, and they can't deploy a carrier because Queen Elizabeth is down for maintainance.

[Cecelia5578]

Can't get to where they would be needed in case of emergency. Say, china nukes the UK. What are the JSF going to do? Launch impotently from their carriers and hope they got enough fuel to China, where they will then heroically die face the Chinese airforce and air defence system?

That even assumes the carrier will not get sunk while it takes the long, long trip to china.


EDIT: In short, the only way this would work is if the UK abandons an independent nuclear deterrent and aligns itself for all eternity with the US.

Well, its just that, with the learned opinion being (which I agree with) that BMD will make ballistic missiles obsolete, there really seems no alternative to either ditching Trident or relying on the US.

[Colonel Olrik]

Well, its just that, with the learned opinion being (which I agree with) that BMD will make ballistic missiles obsolete, there really seems no alternative to either ditching Trident or relying on the US.

Or in high Mach bombers that deliver high Mach nuclear tipped missiles, made in Europe.

[Cecelia5578]

Well, its just that, with the learned opinion being (which I agree with) that BMD will make ballistic missiles obsolete, there really seems no alternative to either ditching Trident or relying on the US.

Or in high Mach bombers that deliver high Mach nuclear tipped missiles, made in Europe.

Can the UK seriously afford something like that?

[Guardsman Bass]

More importantly, would they have the time for that, or would they have to keep the nuclear bombers out on carriers the whole time? I thought one of the reasons why they do the subs is because the amount of time the British would have to launch their retaliation to an incoming nuclear strike would be pretty minimal - not long enough to get a bunch of bombers off the ground.

[TimothyC]

Quick mea culpa, I had the wrong HMS Ocean. As far as I can tell the current one hasn't had engine flooding trouble.

[Pelranius]

Well, at least things could be worse.

I've got to echo Stuart's opinion on HPCA, why are they retiring the Sentinel ASTOR?

[JointStrikeFighter]

The electronics are probably obsolete already and the ISR capabilities will be heavily duplicated by the F-35 [this is the real strength of the F35]

[TC27]

Well it could have being worse (we are basically almost bankrupt) but its still pretty bad. Its really the same old story for our forces - take the pain now and you'll get your jam tomorrow.

Things that stand out to me:

1. The Tornado's escaping the axe is a suprise - I think this is down to criticism of the Harrier as a CAS platform in Afganistain and the RAF being determined to get all the fast jest to itself.

2. The Army has escaped relatively lightly because of Afganistain (apart from loosing equipment it isnt using at the moment). I think the axe will fall on the army at some later point post Afganistain as we rationalise it down to fit in with our strategic sea/air lift capabilities.

3. The carrier situation is absurd but given the gap between the hulls being in the water and the F35 coming into service something like this was always going to happen. It would have being useful to keep naval fixed wing avation alive until 2020 with the GR9s though.

4. What happens to HMS Queen Elizabeth when she's placed in reserve is important - to be a useful reserve she needs cats + traps fitted and not be sold to India.

5. People should go to prison for the Nimrod MR4 debacle - BAe has basically finally finished building them at great expense to the MOD and now they are going straight into the bin...its also a massive capability to lose for an Island nation.

Finally I think the RAF top brass can congratulate themselves (I hope they burn in hell personally) on the almost completion of decades of hard work in killing off naval fixed wing avation. The next step will be to keep the F35Cs off the carriers when they are delivered...I hope the Navy is up for a fight!

[Big Orange]

And in the last six decades wasn't it (ironically) Royal Navy fighter planes that more often saw real combat than the RAF? And I heard that the RAF also meanly fucks over the Army when providing logistics for them and it seems bizarre that a significant chunk of the British Army is still stranded in Germany two decades after the Soviets folded. Anyway these big cutbacks and a semi-crippled military is the sad final result of Britain trying to punch above its own weight in the last five decades after its global empire fragmented.

[TC27]

Anyway these big cutbacks and a semi-crippled military is the sad final result of Britain trying to punch above its own weight in the last five decades after its global empire fragmented.

Can you explain this?...its often trotted out regarding whenever UK defence issues are talked about but to me it makes no sense. Surely the fact that we have priotised the welfare state and the NHS over defence for at least the last five decades shows we have little concern generally about punching above or at 'our weight'.

The real struggle for the UK is to decide what post cold war military capacity we need and then to try and make it a reality...we still havent really figured it put and have just 'salami sliced' our existing services instead of following a genuine strategic vision.

[Sea Skimmer]

The electronics are probably obsolete already and the ISR capabilities will be heavily duplicated by the F-35 [this is the real strength of the F35]

The electronics are a tad old, the radar IIRC is an improvement of an podded radar used by the U-2 that dates to the mid 1990s, but that’s not really a compelling reason to ditch it for a jet still 10 years away from really useful level of operational capability.

Personally I think the competeing issue is the squadron of RQ-9 Reapers the UK recently bought. While the Lynx II radar on these aircraft is not anything like as powerful as the system on ASTOR (thing only weighs 60 something pounds) it is very modern and capable of a very high resolution when required. You combined that with the FLIR camera, and eventually Gorgon Stare pods to positively identify targets, up 3,000lb of weapons to kill them with, and up to three times the endurance in flying hours (not sure how distance covered stacks up but it’d still favor Reaper) and its just generally a way more useful capability.

Also ASTOR was partly produced because of a NATO requirement for airborne radar systems, but NATO has now dropped the manned portion of that requirement (they wanted yet another new plane based on an Airbus A321 for everyone else to fly because the hell with commonality). Meanwhile the unmanned portion is to be covered by German Eurohawks carrying MP-RTIP, which may be the most advanced radar in the world at the moment. I have no real doubt that Eurohawk will crap all over the performance of ASTOR, if only because it can fly 20,000 feet higher.

Of course ASTOR is also just easy to cut since it’s just not a high profile kind of project, and being a unique platform it’s surely a tad expensive to operate. If you’ve got to kill something it seems like a sound choice to me.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Note: Queen Elizabeth is not entering service until 2020 because she's going to be fitted with cat and traps, so she'd definitely getting them.

Other thoughts: Honestly, 2020 is a decade away, and UAVs are making huge strides in capability. I suspect the Royal Navy is actually hoping to have some kind of combat capable UAV to deploy on the Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales by that point, perhaps even as their only regular complement for "operations other than war" in addition to helicopers, with the RAF being forced to train the F-35C pilots to operate off carriers so they can do so in a major war.

[Simon_Jester]

Can the UK seriously afford something like that?

Dunno. Imagine it's possible, in small numbers, if the development costs were amortized over Europe as a whole. But it would effectively be a Eurobomber, and I suspect many EU member states would not be comfortable with getting behind the development of such an... 'aggressive' weapon.

You'd be looking at something a lot faster than the Concorde, more like the never-fielded B-70 if you wanted it to be an effective deterrent. Developing the expertise to build such a plane in Europe may be a challenge, since as far as I know they never even tried to approach the Mach 3 speed range.

[Stuart]

Note: Queen Elizabeth is not entering service until 2020 because she's going to be fitted with cat and traps, so she'd definitely getting them.

The situation concerning the British carriers seems a bit confused and there's a lot of bad information out there. Some of this is due to the British Government using the term "Queen Elizabeth" to refer to both the ship and the class. I've asked around and the real facts appear to be this.

Queen Elizabeth will be built to the original design with a ski jump, entering service in 2016. She will serve for four years with a British air group of helicopters only. However, she will also embark USMC AV-8Bs on an as-needed basis. Comment from the hills around Quantico. "Oh good. We got us another spare deck." Later the ship will carry USMC F-35Bs now and then. Once Prince of Wales is commissioned, QE will be reduced to extended maintenance and refitted with cats and wires. Thereafter she will alternate with PoW although it will be possible to surge both carriers if needed.

Prince of Wales will be modified under construction, delaying her completion from 2017 to 2019. She will enter service with an air group of 12 F-35Cs, 10 CH-47s and 8 AH-64s. The F-35C group can be surged to 30 - with enough aircraft to give 30 per carrier. therefater she will alternate with QE although it will be possible to surge both carriers if needed.

Ark Royal is a floating wreck. She never got refitted properly and has deteriorated very badly. Although she was due to go in 2014 there is serious doubt that she could have made it that long. Taking her out of service is a recognition of reality more than anything else. I also hear that Ark Royal is a very unhappy ship with poor morale. I don't know why.

Invincible has already gone. She was stricken from the Navy List last month

Illlustrious is in good condition and is coming out of a major refit shortly.

Ocean is another floating wreck. In very poor condition due to light construction and inadequate maintenance.

A choice is to be made between Ocean and Illustrious as the LPH until QE arrives. For obvious reasons my money is on Illustrious

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

How did any of the newer RN ships turn out to be a wreck? Poor maintenance? Construction? Rusting at the dockside?

[Cecelia5578]

How did any of the newer RN ships turn out to be a wreck? Poor maintenance? Construction? Rusting at the dockside?

I think in Ocean's case its because she was built to commercial standards, and has gotten *a lot* of use since she was commissioned.

Another thing I was thinking of, it'd sorta (I'm sure someone will set me straight here) make sense for the Brits to buy a couple of Americas (LHA-6) from the US. Would probably be delivered sooner, and almost the same size. And it'd be able to do all of the amphib stuff sans F-35 until its introduced. OTOH they'd be hitching their wagons to the F-35B, but on the other other hand I've heard the EM catapults the RN wants to use have their own problems as well.

[MKSheppard]

We could just you know, deliver to the British CVAN-80 and CVAN-82. It's the build rate set by congress that determines how fast Newport News can crank them out -- and NN has a nice huge dock that is not being used to build ships; and it has in the past easily swallowed up supercarriers.

[JointStrikeFighter]

England might like creating jobs with its defence industry.

[TC27]

Large sections of the first carrier are already built plus the government is locked into building both by penalty clauses so buying an American CV isnt going to happen.

[Stuart]

How did any of the newer RN ships turn out to be a wreck? Poor maintenance? Construction? Rusting at the dockside?

All of the above. RN ships were designed for a short operational life. For example, the Type 23 frigates were designed for a hull life of 18 years, half that of their American equivalents. The reason behind that was that in the 1980s, the then MoD decided that half-life refits of major warships was an uneconomic proposition and that it was better to build a new ship than rebuild an old one. Actually, that isn't worng in itself. The majority of the cost of a ship these days resides in its electronics fit and the hull is only a small component of the total cost (in fact, on a Type 23, the hull is 8 percent of the total cost of the ship). Therefore, since the majority of the cost of a refit is replacing the electronics and this pretty much equates to the cost of a new ship, replacing the hull completely by buying a new ship to carry the new electronics makes sense. Therefore, the ships were designed to be replaced rather than refitted and that dictated a short operational life. What this analysis neglected to consider is that the government would simply refuse to authorize the construction of new ships so the older ones had to soldier on.

This was exacerbated by shortage of money for maintenance. The support funding of the fleet was slashed back and no money was made available for ongoing hull repairs so the work simply wasn't done. This is where another impact of the short hull life designs comes in. because the refusal to make timely orders for new ships has forced the Navy to run ships on beyond their operational life, the maintenance costs of those ships has soared. Plot out maintenance costs against hull life and it's an exponentional curve with the break in the curve being at the hull life of the ship in question. To give some idea of the impact this has on the Royal Navy, look at these averages.

Type 42B2 destroyers. Designed hull life, 22 years. Actual hull service life 28 years
Type 42B3 destroyers. Designed hull life, 22 years. Actual hull service life 30 years
Type 23 frigates. Designed hull life, 18 years. Actual hull service life 34 years
Invincible class. Designed hull life, 25 years. Actual hull service life 35 years

So, with money for maintenance short and the demands for maintenance rising exponentially, something had to give and that was that ships spent time alongside when they needn't. This threw a much greater burden on the ships that were operational and extended deployment times which pushed up the rate of deterioration. Remember, hull life is predicated on a certain level of usage. If that level of usage is exceeded, then hull life drops accordingly. Put simply if a ship is designed for a hull life of 18 years with four months at sea per year, pushing her up to eight months at sea per year will reduce her hull life to nine years. This is what the comment one reads after WW1 and WW2 about the ships used then "worn out after war service" means. So, maintenance and its costs for older ships go up, deployability goes down. This throws a greater burden on the newer ships and wears them out faster. Add in the fact that the RN tends to drive its ships harder than the USN and we have a perfect storm brewing.

If the previous Labour government had set out with a deliberate policy to destroy the Royal Navy, they couldn't have done a better job of it.

[Eternal_Freedom]

As tempting as it is to consider buying a couple CVN's from Newport News, I see a few problems:

1. Even more expensive than the QE class (CVN-78 was, IIRC, priced at $8.4 billion)
2. No increase in jobs for the UK defense industry, which the loony lefties in the cabinet must be pining for
3. I don't think we actually have a harbour that can hold those big carriers. When I was a boy my dad took me down to see USS Harry S Truman when it moored in the Solent. It wouldn't fit in Porstmouth.
4. I don't know about the maintenance costs for those carriers, but I suspect it's a lot higher than the projected maintenance cost for the QE class
5. The RN has no experience with nuclear-powered supercarriers