WaPo hit piece on China

[Vympel]

Again with the whole denial of Chinese competency in increasingly larger core areas.

"We have one engine that works" is hardly an established "competency in core areas" by any stretch of the term.

• Your own inane commentary about "rar, needs fifth generation engines!". The Chinese have not yet reached the technical ability for super high thrust engines like the F119 or F135. Even the Russians are having problems producing engines of that thrust class.

Its "inane" to say a fifth generation fighter needs fifth generation engines? Sorry, but pointing out they don't have an adequate engine yet does not magically translate into you having any evidence whatsoever for their design philosophy. Its wish-fulfillment, nothing more.

All these point to:

• An airframe with less T/W than the F-22; so it cannot employ the F-22A's capability to change it's energy state rapidly. This means more of an emphasis on boom and zoom fighting, using speed and altitude instead of engine thrust to change the energy state in a dogfight.

It is just as likely that they will simply try and do their best to emulate the F-22A's capability and fail.

[*]An airframe less stealthy than the F-22 and with less advanced radars and avonics, meaning that they cannot rely on superior stealth and avonics to rack up massive kill ratios in favor of their aircraft. So they will have to rely on cruise speed and altitude to score lopsided kill ratios over legacy aircraft and and lessen the advantage the F-22 has over it.[/list][/list]

As above.

By the way, I also make the same assumptions for PAK-FA; as the Russians are going to be facing the same technical problems and limitations as the Chinese, albeit slightly lessened on some fronts (a little bit greater thrust being available, etc).

"A little bit greater thrust?" Yeah, no. The Russians have quite a bit more capable engines than the Chinese, and have had for some time.

Iran would be able to easily -- it just depends on if they have stopped blowing a whole wad of money each year on their BOMB PROGRAM and BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM. There is also the whole issue of Russia welching on and off on the S-300 contract with them. So they will probably be inclined to buy Chinese in the future.

That assumes the Chinese will be more willing to buck sanctions than the Russians are.

Indonesia would be able to afford it easily as well -- it all depends on a whole host of variables -- for example, will Indonesia manage to stick with South Korea's KF-X once the inevitable cost overruns occur and the Sorks come hat in hand asking for more money?

Vietnam is a slight possibility -- but they are primarily a Russian Arms Client.

Not to mention Vietnam's relations with China aren't historically great. Furthermore, Indonesia, too, is a well established Russian arms client.

So what? You seem to be eternally stuck in the year 2000, where the Chinese were still very much reliant on license production, kits, etc. 2010 is a whole different ball game as a lot of investment over the past 15 years has begun to pay off for the PRC.

No, I just don't buy this inflated talk of China as some rising great power that's going to threaten US dominance anytime in the foreseeable future because they're no longer embarrassing themselves like they were in 2000.

Actually, it went somewhere.

The main primary design would have been this:



With four RR Mk 202 Speys.

I am not exactly sure of the weights; but it would have been in the class of the Vulcan B.2 since both would have had the same installed thrust available. Plus, building something of the Vulcan B.2's weight was well within Chinese expertise; being only 14 or so tonnes heavier -- not exactly an insurmountable obstacle.

The six engined design was a backup, using weaker JT-3D-3Bs.

As part of the program, the H-6I test mule was built -- it flew in 1978 with four Mk 202 Speys. There's only one photo of it available:



The program was cancelled it seems in 1980 as part of an overall military spending cutback.

Come on man, I'm supposed to be impressed by that obvious bad joke? This is the big indicator of China's capability to build a modern long range bomber? An embarrassing POS that went nowhere decades ago?

Since then, they've greatly expanded their aeronautic capabilities and have become significantly richer; yet there is no real long range bomber project visible anywhere.

Exactly. Why do you view this as evidence of anything other than their aeronautic capabilities to actually build a modern long range bomber are worth a damn? Building such an aircraft is an entirely different story, in aeronautical engineering terms, than building tiny little tactical fighters.

No actually, on very credible assumptions.

#1: The Chinese saw a need in 2005 for increased airlift and tanker capability, leading to the infamous contract signing with Russia for 38 IL-76s. That need has not disappeared; in fact it has only increased.

#2: The Russians are clearly not credible anymore to the Chinese leadership in regards to strategic airlifters or tankers after the years long IL-76/78 saga, eliminating them from consideration for an interim buy of strategic airlifters in any serious quantity.

That's a leap in logic. The problems encountered in fulfilling the original order due to problems with the original plant ! = the situation in 2010. You make it sound like the Chinese are a spurned teenager at high school prom.

Because the Russians long ago (before 1988) admitted that if your SAM has a terminal velocity of 880~ m/sec (Mach 3) or greater, it gains a de-facto ABM capability which can be accessed via upgrades to the battle management system and radars.

Which does not, in any way, prove the HQ-9 is adequate.

Considering that the USN will drop to ten carriers by 2014; that leaves us with only three that can be reliably counted to be on station at any one time. You can surge the force to increase this; but it takes time, which may not be present in a crisis.

Against this, one PLA(N) CVA is more than enough to make the parity in forces in the Pacific Rim uncertain towards the US.

First of all, why will the USN be fighting? For what cause? With which allies? And how does 3 carriers to 1 (the Crapyag) = uncertain parity of forces?

Yes, it is likely that the USN will bring some other force multipliers to the table, like our SSN force; but even that is uncertain; since many 688 class SSNs will be retiring in the next decade; and the Virginias are in relatively slow production.

How many SSNs do you think China will have in service by the time the 688s retire? Enough to counter the SSN-688i / SSN-774 horde? That's clearly an absolute fantasy.

Considering that our LCACs are 1970s technology; it's a very safe bet to say that the Yuyi has the same performance characteristics give or take.

Fair enough.

No it's not. The vehicle is clearly in mass production and widespread use which shows that the PLA leadership is satisfied with it's broad technical-tactical characteristics.

... As has every other vehicle they've ever used in quantity. So what? Look, the point I'm making here is that you're being extremely uncritical and praiseworthy about a military about which you have pretty much no solid information apart from what you hear from uncritical and praiseworthy Chinese internet flag wavers jumping up and down everytime they see some of their hardware on whatever state-run media channel they watched the other day. Analysis of military hardware is all well and good and its an enjoyable past time that I like too, but there are many things we simply don't know - heck, what's truly perverse is that we know more about the techno-tactical characteristics of Russia's hardware. Think about that for a moment. How much of the hardware on your average Chinese vehicle could you even name, let alone know the base characteristics of?

So your reply to my study of LOS line of sight in the ZTZ-99 is to ask me to try and prove something that can't be proven unless I get the key to a PLA tank shed, ten hours alone by myself with a camera, a ruler and several pieces of power tools?

By that argument, we can reject all estimates of Russian armor protection levels beyond the early to mid T-72s; since all we have to go on the make up of the T-90's armor is vague drawings showing the existence of cavities for special type armor.

The same can also be said of estimates of protection for the Abrams family, since while we do have a good idea of the general LOS thickness of the armor boxes, we have no real idea of what goes into the special type armor other than educated guesses based off rumors and random statements.

That's hardly the case. The information we have available, open source, on Russian armor etc is far more comprehensive and detailed than the inscrutable assumptions drawn from whatever random pictures might grace our screens from China on any given day.

Take a look at the lifting rings on the armor module. Here, I'll show them again.

The fact that the armor module has 'lifting rings' does not in any way establish the armor of the tank, which is what I said was speculation.

Because we've seen early pre-production A2 shots with less advanced versions of the blocks with more gaps between each block showing that they are clearly some sort of ERA/NERA system.

The Chinese have deployed ERA on their tank or tank prototypes since 1988 and before that they had contacts with the Israelis who developed ERA in the West independently of what was going on in the Soviet Union at the time. They are on their fourth generation of ERA now; FY-IV. So why should Chinese ERA be massively less developed than Russian?

What evidence do we have that Chinese ERA = heavy ERA? The presence or absence of gaps is a red herring to that issue.

Even the Vladimirs still have noticeable portions unprotected. Not as bad as the original T-90s, but they're still there.

I believe I said that.

You yourself have admitted that there are at least 300 ZTZ-99s in service with the PLA Ground Forces. At a rough price of $3 million per tank, that's $900 million dollars, which is quite a bit of change to spend on something that according to Russian experts barely beats a T-62 with ERA addons in terms of protection.

Hardly - for one you're assuming thickness = RHA. T-62s didn't have composite armor.

Production of the ZTZ-96 ended in 2005/06 in favor of the ZTZ-96A. It seems that estimates are for 2009 that about 1,000~ ZTZ-96s and 300~ ZTZ-96As are in service.

ZTZ-96 = ZTZ-96 dude. If I say T-90, do I really need to say T-90A?

The -96A is a significant upgrade of the -96 series which adds a frontal turret armor arrangement similar to the ZTZ-99, partial application of similar ERA to the -99 (glacis and turret side), and a thermal sight to round out the fire control system.

That last bit is a very important part. Thermal sights aren't cheap, even almost 30 years after their introduction on a mass scale. Introducing them to the low end tank is a sign that China is serious about modernization and overall force quality levels.

Yes, I know. Interesting. Genuine question, how do we now the ZTZ-96A has thermal sights?

OK, I admit I was wrong on that and misremembered; there were early rumors that the A2 had a bustle loader. The strange thing is that the ZTZ-98 preproduction prototypes for the ZTZ-99 had a western style layout with a human loader.

They may have decided they prefer not having the extra crew member, and less space in the turret. However, western style ammunition protection doesn't require a human loader, as the Object 240 design shows.

Longer hull also means longer tracks, meaning less ground pressure for a given weight, allowing heavier combat weights to be supported.

And the increased power means that using the same ratio of 21.5 hp/tonne as the T-90A, your tank can weigh 69.7~ tonnes, instead of the 46.5~ tonnes the smaller 1.000 PS engine gives you.

By the way, a comparison of hull lengths:

M1 Abrams: 7.93~m
Leopard 2: 7.72~m
ZTZ-99: 7.93~m (off a nice drawing)
T-90: 6.86m

Clearly, the Abrams and Leopard 2 aren't inconvienced by being about 1 meter longer than the T-90.

I'll grant it may have potential for growth, but this is still based on the assumption that the ZTZ-99's chassis is optimal to support same compared to the M1 Abrams / Leopard 2, which were both built that way from the start.

The MTU-870 family, especially it's 1.500 PS configurations is at this point thirty years old and has a relatively sedate 31.76 L total displacement giving 47~ PS per liter.

Meanwhile, the top of the line in AFV diesel technology in 2010 is the MTU 883 Ka-524 for the USMC EFV which produces 2,700 PS on 27.4 L total displacement for 98.5~ PS per liter.

So yeah, I can easily buy an indigenous MTU-870 derivative being built in China.

But who says they are being completely built in China?

The PLZ-04 has a significantly different turret shape, different muzzle brake, shorter recoil adapter, and is a 155mm/54 system, as opposed to the 152mm/47 of the 2S19.

True, but the question is the fighting compartment, not the vehicle itself.

In 2008 GDLS was given a contract to upgrade the last remaining 435 M1A1s in the US Army inventory to M1A2 SEPv2 configuration. The M1s went a long time ago from active duty or got converted to newer tanks.

Exactly my point.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

No one in SEA is going to buy Chinese "high tech" military equipment, except maybe Thailand, but they are a US ally and likely they won't. All they have bought so far is just some armored vehicles, but that's because they are broke. They prefer US equipment.

Indonesia flat out won't. There are major territorial disputes between SEA and China and they sure as hell won't play ball.

So just how many people will buy Chinese "high tech" armed goods? I think you could count with your fingers.

[Straha]

We aren't, or at least I'm certainly not, trying to restore a concept or idea of elan, or anything like that. It's a much more nuanced argument than that. To summarize it down, what I'm saying is that the mental distinctions that we make now are far more important than the equipment that, in this case, China and the United States have. What matters is, to use a rough dichotomy, the "friend/enemy" distinction. In this specific case, the conception that China is an enemy, whose every move and every new technological development we must respond to.

If you go back to Page One and look at my earliest posts in the thread, I said more or less exactly that myself. What I do not believe is that this compels us to avoid detailed discussion of Chinese military technology.

I am not arguing that discussing military technology is inherently bad, and that we ought never discuss it. What I am saying is two-fold:

A. Focusing solely on the production of new weapons, without placing the weapons into context is bad. Weapons, in and of themselves, do not matter. Period. You may raise an eyebrow, but it's undoubtedly true. Weapons are tools, people and nations use weapons to achieve goals, and focusing on the weapons outside of the context in which they are going to be used is problematic. It leads to hyperventilating over the development of new weapons, to arms races, and catastrophe. When you put weaponry on a pedestal above everything else, as means unto itself, that's bad.

B. Demonizing people, and China in specific, and saying "They are doing X, therefore we must do Y" is bad. Especially when the message is 'They are our enemy, we must build against them.' We agree in the basics here, but I take it a step further. I object to the way this discussion is being held because it only serves the hyperventilating over the Chinese threat. The new yellow peril[/i] red scare enemy. The context in which this discussion is being held, is a bad one. I quoted Doty article for a reason, because it says context is key. When you let a mindset like this control your discussion, you can't change shit. We always be stuck imagining the Chinese as the threat who we arm ourselves against. Even if the main thrust of this thread is about Chinese military technology, the leitmotif is still playing in the background. It ought be challenged.

Understandable, though I think the extent to which he identifies China as "enemy on the rise" is much smaller than the extent to which he's going "Oh, look, Chinese stealth fighter! Shiiiiiny... [starts scribbling numbers down]"

I've seen him do the same for US military hardware both real and imagined.

Yes, but sheppy the cowardly lion is looking at the Chinese tech solely to benchmark it against American tech, and to say "We must maintain, and extend, our lead against them." Even if this part of his mindset is smaller than his milwank approach, it's still a vital part of his view on the issue. Still one that ought be challenged.

And it seems to me that that's what your argument comes down to: that you can't talk about these things without having to constantly reassure yourself and those around you that no you don't have a massive raging chip on your shoulder when it comes to China.

Not at all. There have been half a dozen discussions of various European/Korean/Japanese fighters and fighter programs that weren't held in this way. There was a solidly different approach here, especially when he's saying "we must pay attention, because they are our enemy." That mindset is what's bad. I'm being particularly rough with Shep because he's A. a cowardly fuck about owning up to this, and B. engages in outright or veiled racism all the fucking time, but whether or not I'm being too vituperative with Shep the point still stands, the entire way he's approached China here is problematic.

Moreover, the Pan article that I quoted specifically talks about how doing this with China in specific is bad news bears, and that China occupies a place in the American Rogue's Gallery that is used to justify uniquely horrific things, and to cloud the American ability for self-reproach and more. I quoted this, and have talked about it in specific multiple times, and not once has anyone bothered to respond to it. This is crucial contextual information, because it deals with exactly what's going on in this thread.

*Re-arming is, I'd say, the wrong word for someone who never had good weapons in the first place and is trying to catch up with modern standards of performance...

You're right, my bad. I should have said modernizing. I'm up late packing shit up. Mea culpa.

All right, though in many cases the material balance of forces dictates what mindsets are possible, just as mindsets dictate what thoughts and policies are thinkable. Counterinsurgency tends to bog down when the occupier becomes preoccupied with their own material superiority, for instance; it's difficult to think in terms of 'we're losing' when you know you have vast material superiority. Conversely, having material inferiority forces you to think about conflict in different ways: to focus less on relative ability to inflict physical damage and more on trying to find the weak points in someone's morale.

When the material factors approach parity, a lot of the kind of thinking you condemn can flow out of the simple need to have some idea what others, even those you're not planning to fight, are capable of. You may not take France's ironclad construction as a spur to build more of your own ironclads, but at the very least you need to know that France is building ironclads. And yet even having a community dedicated to figuring out who has what would seem to lead to "how do we counter this?"

You keep focusing this on actual war-fighting, but the mindset that I'm condemning is what leads to these wars in the first place. It doesn't just spring up in wars, it springs up now in peacetime as well. That's why it's important, now more than ever, to challenge this thought process. When you become obsessed with these matters of pure material (They have X, and I have Y) you do stupid shit.

Let me give the clearest example of where this has gone wrong. Iraq. The United States justified the invasion of Iraq because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The underlying message of 2002-2003, was that "The Iraqis have really powerful weapons and they cannot be trusted with them. So we must take them away from the Iraqis." There is a message of clear technological superiority here, Imperialism, colonialism, the works. The result? Look at the news.

The question that ought to have been asked in the halls of government was "Why shouldn't we trust the Iraqis with the weapons that we have ourselves? Why ought we condemn them, while pretending our own hands are clean?"

To put it in your words, the question shouldn't have been "How do we counter this?" it should have been "Why do we need to counter this at all?"

So when this discussion comes up, wherein the message is "The Chinese are modernizing, and we can't trust them to modernize, because we need to keep the lead." I'm going to challenge the mindset. If we don't the result is the Broughton and Mendieta stuff I posted before. Endless war, justified only because these other people can't be trusted with big boy toys.

Which you think is poisonous, but I'm not sure it's avoidable; taken in moderation I don't think it's much of a problem.

It is avoidable, as long as we make people answer the question "Why do we need to counter this?" before they answer "How do we counter this?" As long as we make sure to challenge this militarism whenever it starts to spring up, we're doing some good at least. And I don't accept "Well we're probably not going to change anything" as a justification for not trying.

[Ryan Thunder]

It is avoidable, as long as we make people answer the question "Why do we need to counter this?" before they answer "How do we counter this?" As long as we make sure to challenge this militarism whenever it starts to spring up, we're doing some good at least. And I don't accept "Well we're probably not going to change anything" as a justification for not trying.

The question is never asked because it has a remarkably obvious answer; "Because it's not under our control."

I'm open to hearing how or why that's bad, but I'm just not seeing it.

[Straha]

It is avoidable, as long as we make people answer the question "Why do we need to counter this?" before they answer "How do we counter this?" As long as we make sure to challenge this militarism whenever it starts to spring up, we're doing some good at least. And I don't accept "Well we're probably not going to change anything" as a justification for not trying.

The question is never asked because it has a remarkably obvious answer; "Because it's not under our control."

So what? Why the fuck does that matter? Why does the United States need to force China under its control?

And how does this in anyway respond to the voluminous analysis above on why trying to force things to be under our control generally blows up in our faces? Oh, wait, it doesn't.

I'm open to hearing how or why that's bad, but I'm just not seeing it.

Go read the rest of the god damn thread, you moron. At least Sarevok tried to do that, what's your excuse?

[Korto]

Hugh White, a defense analyst over here, put forward a paper this year holding that there was a serious enough risk of war between China and the US. He saw this war happening accidentally, and more or less through hurt pride on both sides. The argument was that as China grows, pride will cause it to want to take a leading role in the Asian region, no longer taking a back seat to the US. Equally, pride would cause the US to not want to give up its dominant position in Asia (let's face it, who ever wants to give up control?).Such a thing could then lead to animosity, short tempers, and... mistakes.
I would imagine such a war would be a kind of "get out of my backyard" style of thing in the Asian pacific region.
Couldn't find any transcript of the talk he gave that I saw on telly, but there is this.
His hope in the talk was, being aware of the risk, the US and China could work out a power-sharing deal, recognising China's new position but the US still keeping enough say to keep them content.


China is developing massively, by all accounts, with a rocketing economy, and militarys seem to eat, drink and breathe money. With some saying China's economy will be bigger than the US by 2020, I wonder how the military comparison will be in a couple of decades. The US has a massive technological edge (AFAIK), but China has no shortage of smart people.

[K. A. Pital]

No one in SEA is going to buy Chinese "high tech" military equipment, except maybe Thailand, but they are a US ally and likely they won't. All they have bought so far is just some armored vehicles, but that's because they are broke. They prefer US equipment.

Indonesia flat out won't. There are major territorial disputes between SEA and China and they sure as hell won't play ball.

So just how many people will buy Chinese "high tech" armed goods? I think you could count with your fingers.

I think Shep's ideas about China suddenly becoming the arms supplier to everyone is not that well-founded. On the other hand, a clear trend for China to buy more stuff at home and develop own versions of advanced weaponry (and yes, Aegis-like DDGs and fifth-generation fighters are advanced weaponry, even if both projects are so far in infancy). And there are indicators China is succeeding in its advanced weaponry programs. True, it has setbacks, but the main vector of development seems to be unchanged.

As for China building better weapons proving that the US needs to paint China as the new enemy, this is bullshit. But it will inevitably happen, because the lunatic U.S. nationalist establishment which controls almost all the upper echelons of power, and the U.S. military industrial lobby, won't allow this hysteria to die.

[Ryan Thunder]

It is avoidable, as long as we make people answer the question "Why do we need to counter this?" before they answer "How do we counter this?" As long as we make sure to challenge this militarism whenever it starts to spring up, we're doing some good at least. And I don't accept "Well we're probably not going to change anything" as a justification for not trying.

The question is never asked because it has a remarkably obvious answer; "Because it's not under our control."

So what? Why the fuck does that matter? Why does the United States need to force China under its control?

Who said anything about forcing anybody under our (NATO, the first world in general, etc.) control? What kind of imaginary land of fairies and unicorns are you living in where we do not need to find ways to counter weapons systems that we don't control? Is it only bad when we do it and not when the rest of the world does it to us, or what? What the hell do you think this fighter jet is, if not a counter to our own weapons that they don't control?

[Straha]

Who said anything about forcing anybody under our (NATO, the first world in general, etc.) control? What kind of imaginary land of fairies and unicorns are you living in where we do not need to find ways to counter weapons systems that we don't control? Is it only bad when we do it and not when the rest of the world does it to us, or what?

Just a quick glance through your post reveals two strawmen, a total lack of reading comprehension, and the very attitude that I've spent half a dozen posts critiquing.

I was thinking of gearing up to write a response, but then I remembered that you're the idiot who was described as being "completely impervious to reason" when you got the title you so richly deserve. Frankly, even based on your posts in this thread alone, you're not even worth the time that it's taking me to write up this post, nor the skin cells I'm going to lose whilst I type this up. So I'm simply not even going to bother responding. It's not worth it, and it'll do more damage than good to this thread. (Where else will Shep post his pretty pretty pictures?)

If you really want to try and contribute something, go back to my second post in this thread and work your way down. I posted a lot of things, quoted a shit ton of sources, and made a bunch of arguments as to why this mentality you're espousing is downright destructive. Give a coherent response to that, or even show a good faith effort at trying to comprehend what I've been saying, and then, maybe, I'll consider wasting my time trying to educate you.

Otherwise? Begone troll. Go back to the bridge whence you came.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Material superiority is only really significant when it outweighs psychological factors, and all the evidence of history shows that psychology is critical.

The deeper reasons why any nation wins or loses a war are generally psychological. France lost Algeria before it began because the FLN were willing to pay any price for Algerian independence, and France was not willing to pay any price to hold onto Algeria.

I think it is, especially in the industrialized age, a bit of oversimplification to say that deeper reasons for winning or losing war are generally psychological. More accurate way of putting it is that a nation has to have the will to win in order to win a war, but that is not enough. Napoleon, the CSA or Germany in both world wars clearly didn't lose because they lacked the will to win. Like you put it, material superiority is significant only when it outweighs psychological factors, but it is not correct to say that this is a very rare condition in the history of modern warfare. In fact it is quite common and it wasn't exceedingly rare even in ancient times. The Romans were able to win over many of their enemies simply by having a better organized army and vast resources to draw upon. Hell, even as far back as the fall of the Assyrian empire we can find an example of psychology not being the decisive factor.

However, if we are talking about peripheral wars rather than existential conflicts, psychology can be decisive. This boils down to the fact that keeping an overseas colony or fighting the commies in some obscure corner of the world is not a very good motivator for the people, who still live their lives normally apart from the body bags of sons and husbands coming from the war zones. The clear lack of immediate existential threat will erode the morale and popularity of the war sooner or later, although for example in Vietnam it actually happened rather slowly and gradually, so that to this day there is a significant number of historians who believe that the US actually did not lose that war on the home front, but rather because of wrong strategy (both military and political in relations to the South Vietnamese government) chosen during the first half of the war, which then lead to the gradual worsening of morale on the home front. So, even in a case as classical as the Vietnam War the psychological factors may not have been primary but secondary to wrong military and political decisions.

[Sarevok]

^^

Indeed, the military side of the Vietnam war was hardly handled in a competent fashion. One cant just say "oh the Americans fought very well but it was not enough to break the North Vietnamese resolve". There were so many mistakes in the way the war was conduct. I am far from an expert but I would cite instances like how American air power was managed. The Vietnam conflict is probably the most inefficient war in history in terms of sheer amount of air power utilized to actual affect to the enemy on the ground.

[Ryan Thunder]

If you really want to try and contribute something, go back to my second post in this thread and work your way down.

Alright, I get that demonizing and dehumanizing the Chinese and anybody associated with the Chinese is a bad idea and can lead to rash, reactionary behaviour on our part that can have really nasty consequences. That just seemed so obvious that I thought you were going somewhere else.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

I think Shep's ideas about China suddenly becoming the arms supplier to everyone is not that well-founded. On the other hand, a clear trend for China to buy more stuff at home and develop own versions of advanced weaponry (and yes, Aegis-like DDGs and fifth-generation fighters are advanced weaponry, even if both projects are so far in infancy). And there are indicators China is succeeding in its advanced weaponry programs. True, it has setbacks, but the main vector of development seems to be unchanged.

Well yes, but the trouble would be that China's immediate neighbourhood is deeply suspicious of China and will likely refrain from buying Chinese hardware.

That leaves S. America, but even most of them are more Western inclined (or Russian). I suppose Venezuela might consider Chinese hardware if they can afford it.

As for China building better weapons proving that the US needs to paint China as the new enemy, this is bullshit. But it will inevitably happen, because the lunatic U.S. nationalist establishment which controls almost all the upper echelons of power, and the U.S. military industrial lobby, won't allow this hysteria to die.

While true, China's recent diplomatic fuck ups are simply throwing most of the region into the hands of the US and the region has been stocking up on Western and Russian hardware.

[Pelranius]

No one in SEA is going to buy Chinese "high tech" military equipment, except maybe Thailand, but they are a US ally and likely they won't. All they have bought so far is just some armored vehicles, but that's because they are broke. They prefer US equipment.

Indonesia flat out won't. There are major territorial disputes between SEA and China and they sure as hell won't play ball.

So just how many people will buy Chinese "high tech" armed goods? I think you could count with your fingers.

Ummm, what are you talking about? The Thais and Indonesians are buying the latest Chinese YJ-82 antiship missiles (Thailand also purchased the WS-1B MRLS for license production) and China, along with South Korea, is a contender for the Thai submarine contract.

Malaysia has China doing logistical support for its Su-30 (political troubles saw India getting kicked out) and Indonesia is sending its Flanker pilots to China for training.

[Simon_Jester]

I think my actual opinions are in close enough accord with Straha that getting into much further argument with him would be a bad case of violent agreement, but I do have some reservations:

It is avoidable, as long as we make people answer the question "Why do we need to counter this?" before they answer "How do we counter this?" As long as we make sure to challenge this militarism whenever it starts to spring up, we're doing some good at least. And I don't accept "Well we're probably not going to change anything" as a justification for not trying.

One of the channels by which "Why would we need to counter this?" gets automatic answers of the form "Well, someone else, not even the guys who make it, might shoot it at us."

That is not an unreasonable fear; it's been a common problem in industrial warfare since at least the days of the Boer War.

In the case of China it's perhaps unlikely (as Fin points out, and he ought to know). But it becomes increasingly likely as Chinese hardware improves, especially if it becomes competitive with or superior to the export versions of our own products. Or if our own forces gear down with an emphasis on fighting guerillas at the expense of our ability to deal with other people's first-rate equipment. Or if we see widespread defection away from the idea of being reduced to an American client state among relatively poor countries.

And that leads very predictably to "well, we do need the physical capability to counter this," for better or for worse.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Ummm, what are you talking about? The Thais and Indonesians are buying the latest Chinese YJ-82 antiship missiles (Thailand also purchased the WS-1B MRLS for license production) and China, along with South Korea, is a contender for the Thai submarine contract.

You call that hi-tech? And Chinese submarines still suck royally.

Malaysia has China doing logistical support for its Su-30 (political troubles saw India getting kicked out) and Indonesia is sending its Flanker pilots to China for training.

Just wait till the Spratlys issue flares up again. It flared up in a fantastic manner at the Shanghai forum with everyone's eyes rolling.

[Pelranius]

Ummm, what are you talking about? The Thais and Indonesians are buying the latest Chinese YJ-82 antiship missiles (Thailand also purchased the WS-1B MRLS for license production) and China, along with South Korea, is a contender for the Thai submarine contract.

You call that hi-tech? And Chinese submarines still suck royally.

Malaysia has China doing logistical support for its Su-30 (political troubles saw India getting kicked out) and Indonesia is sending its Flanker pilots to China for training.

Just wait till the Spratlys issue flares up again. It flared up in a fantastic manner at the Shanghai forum with everyone's eyes rolling.

Very well, would you like to provide a definition of high tech? Modern antiship missiles take a lot of knowledge and experience to do little things like development and research. And care to expand on the Chinese submarine part? According to ONI, the Song are as quiet as Russian Kilos and Chinese weapons, sensors and battle management systems are decently up to spec, at least for developing world maritime arguments.

So the Spratlys flares up again and what? The Malaysians and Indonesians are still going to China for their Flanker support needs right now, and Kuala Lumpur dumped the Indians (or the other way around) over Malaysia's treatment of Indian Malaysians.

[Straha]

Material superiority is only really significant when it outweighs psychological factors, and all the evidence of history shows that psychology is critical.

The deeper reasons why any nation wins or loses a war are generally psychological. France lost Algeria before it began because the FLN were willing to pay any price for Algerian independence, and France was not willing to pay any price to hold onto Algeria.

I think it is, especially in the industrialized age, a bit of oversimplification to say that deeper reasons for winning or losing war are generally psychological. More accurate way of putting it is that a nation has to have the will to win in order to win a war, but that is not enough. Napoleon, the CSA or Germany in both world wars clearly didn't lose because they lacked the will to win. Like you put it, material superiority is significant only when it outweighs psychological factors, but it is not correct to say that this is a very rare condition in the history of modern warfare. In fact it is quite common and it wasn't exceedingly rare even in ancient times. The Romans were able to win over many of their enemies simply by having a better organized army and vast resources to draw upon. Hell, even as far back as the fall of the Assyrian empire we can find an example of psychology not being the decisive factor.

However, if we are talking about peripheral wars rather than existential conflicts, psychology can be decisive. This boils down to the fact that keeping an overseas colony or fighting the commies in some obscure corner of the world is not a very good motivator for the people, who still live their lives normally apart from the body bags of sons and husbands coming from the war zones. The clear lack of immediate existential threat will erode the morale and popularity of the war sooner or later, although for example in Vietnam it actually happened rather slowly and gradually, so that to this day there is a significant number of historians who believe that the US actually did not lose that war on the home front, but rather because of wrong strategy (both military and political in relations to the South Vietnamese government) chosen during the first half of the war, which then lead to the gradual worsening of morale on the home front. So, even in a case as classical as the Vietnam War the psychological factors may not have been primary but secondary to wrong military and political decisions.

My word, didn't we just have a discussion about how this argument is far more nuanced than "We win or lose wars based on our psychology!". Wait, that's right, we did. There's a huge post in reply to Simon_Jester about just that, with follow-up posts too! Perhaps, if you want to remain relevant to the thread you could read the the thread?

I think my actual opinions are in close enough accord with Straha that getting into much further argument with him would be a bad case of violent agreement,

GOD DAMN IT YOU STEAMING CUNT-BAG! I CONCUR AND THERE'S NOTHING YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT!

It is avoidable, as long as we make people answer the question "Why do we need to counter this?" before they answer "How do we counter this?" As long as we make sure to challenge this militarism whenever it starts to spring up, we're doing some good at least. And I don't accept "Well we're probably not going to change anything" as a justification for not trying.

One of the channels by which "Why would we need to counter this?" gets automatic answers of the form "Well, someone else, not even the guys who make it, might shoot it at us." That is not an unreasonable fear; it's been a common problem in industrial warfare since at least the days of the Boer War.

I do object to this line of thought. Because it basically says "There is this new weapon, it might go off at us, we need to arm up to defeat it." Instead of saying "How might they be shot at us, and why?" it simply becomes a statement of fact. They will be shot at us, because they are weapons and that is what they do. It ascribes a perverse agency to the weapons, which they don't have. It also becomes a game which has already been lost.

Imagine if we found out the Chinese had just developed "The AssRammer 3000, with new stealth penetration capabilities," so the US decides that it must develop a counter, because the Chinese might lose it, sell it to unprincipled schmucks, or whatever else. It becomes the same recursive game we both agree is bad and, like Schwartz and Derber point out, it blinds us to weapons developments that actually matter because we have the kneejerk reaction that any new weapon system must be responded to.

Moreover, there's a sort of silent racism here that I do find profoundly disturbing. The best way to look at it, I think, is Nuclear proliferation. We fear new nations developing Nuclear Weapons (Pakistan, India, North Korea, Iran, etc.) because they might give this technology to other nations, but we don't care about nations that are like 'us' having nuclear weapons even if they're just as likely to proliferate (The US, UK, France, Russia and Israel, for example.) It's the same sort of mentality here. If the British/France/Sweden/Japan/South Korea starts developing this sort of tech we don't care, or don't care quite as much, but if China starts developing this technology? A response is necessary and urgent.

This is the sort of thing that Broughton, and others, criticize. I think it's true. What we ought do is not say "they are developing these weapons, and we must respond because other people might shoot them at us" but rather "Why would other people want to shoot them at us, and where?" and work from there. Placing the question of weapons development firmly in the realm of people, and not just the idea of new weapons systems.

[Marcus Aurelius]

My word, didn't we just have a discussion about how this argument is far more nuanced than "We win or lose wars based on our psychology!". Wait, that's right, we did. There's a huge post in reply to Simon_Jester about just that, with follow-up posts too! Perhaps, if you want to remain relevant to the thread you could read the the thread?

Yes, quite right, I sometimes don't read all the way until end of the thread before posting, although now that I have, your nuanced argument actually does not seem to concern exactly the same thing I was talking about. You seem to be more interested in the process of enemy creation rather that what actually wins wars once they have been started. That is all well and important of it's own right and I mostly agree that concentrating on the weapons and countering imagined (or even real) "gaps" in weapon system performance is not sound and rational foreign policy.

However, for the most part it of course is not about foreign policy at all. The real reasons for inventing an enemy or even exaggerating the capabilities of a potentially "real" enemy are internal to the country where it happens and probably at least partially unavoidable in all countries with a major power status. Asking rational questions about the reasoning behind it all only goes so far. You could almost claim that paranoia is the default status of all major powers, because power becomes a goal in itself and something that has to be maintained or the leaders risk to lose their status at home. Other countries developing better weapons and more credible armies leads to the dilution of the major power status, and even more so if the major power in question is the leading one of its era. Power is very much a zero-sum game or at least it is perceived to be, which amounts to the same thing. Whether there is actual physical threat is not entirely relevant to this matter. The only historically valid alternative has been isolationist policy, which may work for some time, but usually ends badly.

[Uncluttered]

I'll be keeping an eye on this thread.

The way I see it, it's four threads.
Thread 1: Shep talks about chinese weapons, find fault in WaPo article.
Thread 2: Heinlein.
Thread 3: What to do about China.
Thread 4: Lets all gang up on Shep, because he's a pedantic fool.

All of these are interesting discussions, but perhaps they would be easier to read if split.

Thread 1: Shep talks about Chinese weapons
Very interesting read. Shep has some interesting, if not disturbing knowledge.
I have a few comments.

SSBNs that don't aggressively train are expensive artificial reefs. You need to put to sea, and often, or you die horribly in a stupid accident.
Bottoming an SSBN isn't always a good option. You can't do it in certain types of seafloor, or you'll suck in mud. Seafloor that is easy to bottom in, is well mapped, and easier to find a hidden submarine in than relative to mud.

I can't focus on tanks and planes, because they are out of my area of expertize.
I do wonder How many of these designs would be considered defensive vs offensive in strategic terms.

Possessing a prototype doesn't usually mean the infrastructure is in place. Prototypes often have inferior materials, and placeholder internals. Also, Prototypes come in many different levels of sophistication. Some may even be only partially functional.

Thread 2: Heinlein
No Comment

Thread 3: What to do about China.
As long as china develops a middle class, I don't see war with the U.S. on the horizon.....
Democracies with a middle class seldom go to war with each other.
Except that the U.S. is losing its middle class.

Thread 4: Lets all gang up on Shep, because he's a pedantic fool.

Shep is a pedantic fool, and more than a bit of an asshole.
However, his OP was countering a post article with the best facts he knows, and for the most part, his argument is cogent.
That being said, lets be glad he doesn't write public policy.

[Bakustra]

Material superiority is only really significant when it outweighs psychological factors, and all the evidence of history shows that psychology is critical.

The deeper reasons why any nation wins or loses a war are generally psychological. France lost Algeria before it began because the FLN were willing to pay any price for Algerian independence, and France was not willing to pay any price to hold onto Algeria.

I think it is, especially in the industrialized age, a bit of oversimplification to say that deeper reasons for winning or losing war are generally psychological. More accurate way of putting it is that a nation has to have the will to win in order to win a war, but that is not enough. Napoleon, the CSA or Germany in both world wars clearly didn't lose because they lacked the will to win. Like you put it, material superiority is significant only when it outweighs psychological factors, but it is not correct to say that this is a very rare condition in the history of modern warfare. In fact it is quite common and it wasn't exceedingly rare even in ancient times. The Romans were able to win over many of their enemies simply by having a better organized army and vast resources to draw upon. Hell, even as far back as the fall of the Assyrian empire we can find an example of psychology not being the decisive factor.

However, if we are talking about peripheral wars rather than existential conflicts, psychology can be decisive. This boils down to the fact that keeping an overseas colony or fighting the commies in some obscure corner of the world is not a very good motivator for the people, who still live their lives normally apart from the body bags of sons and husbands coming from the war zones. The clear lack of immediate existential threat will erode the morale and popularity of the war sooner or later, although for example in Vietnam it actually happened rather slowly and gradually, so that to this day there is a significant number of historians who believe that the US actually did not lose that war on the home front, but rather because of wrong strategy (both military and political in relations to the South Vietnamese government) chosen during the first half of the war, which then lead to the gradual worsening of morale on the home front. So, even in a case as classical as the Vietnam War the psychological factors may not have been primary but secondary to wrong military and political decisions.

The will to win is not the whole of psychology, and I don't think you really comprehend the level to which psychology plays a role. Rome's legions were better-equipped than the enemies they faced, on average, but they were not invulnerable. Not even Cortez was close to that level of material superiority. Rome's legions could triumph because they were more disciplined, and discipline is psychological in nature. Rome was able to acquire its vast resources because the Romans committed themselves to expansion and conquest, which is again psychological.

Going back to Cortez, I would argue that his triumph was also psychological in nature, as he was able to incorporate himself within the Mexican system and thus become just another ruler, whereas the Spanish who followed were not, and so faced far more opposition (see the Puebloan revolts).

The CSA lost because of material inferiority, I will give you that, but it also made a great many blunders that were dependent on mentality as well, and that mentality is itself what lead to the secession of the CSA.

Even Napoleon and Hitler, who failed because the great powers of their days became their enemies, only made those enemies because of their desires for conquest. Had Hitler remained content with Germany, or with Anschluss, or the Sudetenland... but he did not and could not under his system of belief. So too with Napoleon. Their beliefs lead to their downfalls, and while material questions played an important role in WWII, the war itself happened because of the ambitions of the Axis leaders, and was also decided by those same ambitions. Ambition, of course, is (feel free to say it with me) psychological. That's not to say that psychology is the whole of warfare, but it is very, very important to war, and more so to politics.

[wuguanhui]

re: Thread 1
I broadly agree with Shep's critique of the WaPo article.

Whereas most American "analysts" (I use this term lightly) are divided between those dismissive of Chinese capabilities and those alarmist about the China-threat (see Bill Gertz and Mil-Ind reps), the vast majority of Russian analysts sit firmly in the dismissive camp. I think this is partly because their views are coloured by dated notions set in the early '00s, with extensive Chinese purchases of all types of Russian weaponry. Although those purchases have been scaled back, I do not think Russian analysts look at Chinese industrial capabilities very carefully partly because they do not consider China to be a threat, partly because of Russian pride. Weaponry were the one thing that the Soviets were top notch at. Nobody likes having their glorious achievements being challenged by people they perceived as backward peasants.

SSBNs that don't aggressively train are expensive artificial reefs. You need to put to sea, and often, or you die horribly in a stupid accident.

Do you want to tell me what is the ONI criteria for a "patrol"? I think it might be classified though. I suspect ONI's "patrol" criteria requires ocean activity. Of course the Chinese 094 Jins have 8000km range missiles so they don't need to leave Chinese home waters to hit their targets.

Just my 50cents.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Very well, would you like to provide a definition of high tech? Modern antiship missiles take a lot of knowledge and experience to do little things like development and research. And care to expand on the Chinese submarine part? According to ONI, the Song are as quiet as Russian Kilos and Chinese weapons, sensors and battle management systems are decently up to spec, at least for developing world maritime arguments.

The newest Chinese nuclear submarines are at least a decade behind the Russians and are not even as quiet as a Victor III. I would take any source that claims that they are up to spec with a massive pitch of salt, and plenty of water thereafter.

And even with modern anti-ship missiles, the Chinese are still ways behind the Russians especially on the high end. Kind of says much when they went off to buy the Klub too huh.

So the Spratlys flares up again and what? The Malaysians and Indonesians are still going to China for their Flanker support needs right now, and Kuala Lumpur dumped the Indians (or the other way around) over Malaysia's treatment of Indian Malaysians.

Would you buy weapons and support from a potential rival country? For now the M'sians and Indonesians are trying to keep the balance but they sure as hell aren't going to rely on China if the latter turns altogether antagonistic over the issue.

To quote the Chinese Foreign Minister who told ASEAN countries as such at the ASEAN Ministers Conference in Hanoi: "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."

Well fucking done.

[K. A. Pital]

The Song is a Kilo remake, and therefore it doesn't suck. Chinese SSBNs, on the other hand, are far from being top-notch.

Kind of says much when they went off to buy the Klub too huh.

It is an exceptionally good missile by world's standards. I doubt China can err and say "woo-hooh, we're not buying this good weapon because we'll have an analogue in five years", no.

[Pelranius]

Very well, would you like to provide a definition of high tech? Modern antiship missiles take a lot of knowledge and experience to do little things like development and research. And care to expand on the Chinese submarine part? According to ONI, the Song are as quiet as Russian Kilos and Chinese weapons, sensors and battle management systems are decently up to spec, at least for developing world maritime arguments.

The newest Chinese nuclear submarines are at least a decade behind the Russians and are not even as quiet as a Victor III. I would take any source that claims that they are up to spec with a massive pitch of salt, and plenty of water thereafter.

And even with modern anti-ship missiles, the Chinese are still ways behind the Russians especially on the high end. Kind of says much when they went off to buy the Klub too huh.

China has built area air defense destroyers with multiple AESA radars and amphibious assault warships. Russia is asking France of all people (not that they really have that many options, to be fair) for LPD technology. Russia has advantages over China in naval technology, and vice versa.

Yes, China bought the Klub, because they needed a supersonic submarine launched AShM (Both China and India apparently had trouble with the Klubs). That doesn't address the quality of Chinese subsonic, surface launched AShMs compared to their Russian counterparts.

So the Spratlys flares up again and what? The Malaysians and Indonesians are still going to China for their Flanker support needs right now, and Kuala Lumpur dumped the Indians (or the other way around) over Malaysia's treatment of Indian Malaysians.

Would you buy weapons and support from a potential rival country? For now the M'sians and Indonesians are trying to keep the balance but they sure as hell aren't going to rely on China if the latter turns altogether antagonistic over the issue.

To quote the Chinese Foreign Minister who told ASEAN countries as such at the ASEAN Ministers Conference in Hanoi: "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."

Well fucking done.

The Malaysians and Indonesians certainly don't seem to care/worry enough about China turning altogether antagonistic over the Spratlys to stop buying weapons and getting technical support from China.

As of the statements of the Chinese FM, the Malaysians and Indonesians obviously think its a bunch of hot air directed Chinese domestic audience/Vietnam. They could be wrong but they don't think they are.