Senate ratifies New START, Russian agreement expected soon

[Andrew J.]

From the Associated Press via Yahoo News:

MOSCOW – President Dmitry Medvedev on Thursday welcomed the U.S. Senate's decision to ratify a landmark U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control treaty, but Russian legislators said they need to study a resolution accompanying the document before following suit.

Medvedev's spokeswoman Natalya Timakova said that when he signed the New START treaty with President Barack Obama, they agreed that the ratification process should be conducted simultaneously.

She said that Medvedev voiced hope that both houses of Russian parliament would ratify the pact, but added that they would need some time to analyze the Senate's conditions for its ratification before making their decision.

The New START treaty, signed by Obama and Medvedev in April, would limit each country's strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from the current ceiling of 2,200. It also would re-establish a system for monitoring and verification which ended last year with the expiration of a previous arms control deal.

Legislators in the Kremlin-controlled parliament had said before the Senate landmark ruling on Wednesday that they would approve the treaty quickly after it is ratified in the U.S.

Lower house speaker Boris Gryzlov, however, told reporters Thursday that the Senate's ratification resolution contained some conditions and the legislators need to carefully study the text before making their decision.

He added that the State Duma may ratify the pact Friday if the text of the treaty itself remained unchanged.

"If these conditions don't change the text of the treaty, we may pass a ratification bill even tomorrow," Gryzlov said.

He said that the house would need more time if it finds any changes in the body of the treaty.

Conservative Republicans said the pact would limit U.S. options on missile defense, lacked sufficient procedures to verify Russia's adherence and deserved more time for consideration.

Obama called the treaty a national security imperative and pressed strongly for its approval before Congress, with a Republican majority, assumes power in January. In recent days, he had telephoned a handful of wavering Republicans, eventually locking in their votes.

The Obama administration has argued that the United States must show credibility in its improved relations with its former Cold War foe, and the treaty was critical to any rapprochement. The White House is also counting on Russia to help pressure Iran over its nuclear ambitions.

Republicans had tried to kill the treaty by forcing changes in its language that would have sent it back for negotiations with Moscow. Democrats sought to appease some Republican senators by letting them raise these issues in legislation accompanying the treaty that would not directly affect the pact.

On Wednesday, two such amendments, one on missile defense and one on funding for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, passed with support from both parties.

Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the Duma's foreign affairs committee, said that decision is conditioned on the analysis of the amendments.

"We realize that the process shouldn't be delayed, but we intend to work in such a way that it doesn't affect the quality," he said.

Kosachev said that the Duma may quickly approve the pact Friday without any conditions, or could decide to include some conditions of its own, which could delay the vote.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Thursday that Moscow was still waiting for the official text of the resolution and refused to comment on issues raised by Republicans in the Senate resolution.

"The specific content of the Senate resolution will naturally determine the wording that our legislators will put in the Russian ratification bill," Lavrov said at a briefing.

Retired Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, who helped negotiate previous arms deals with the United States, predicted that the Kremlin-controlled parliament will quickly ratify the New START.

"This treaty is important for the Russian leadership because it formally preserves the nuclear balance with the United States, the last attribute of a superpower," Dvorkin said, according to the Interfax news agency.

Big ups to President Obama for a job well done here.

[K. A. Pital]

So the bit about no mass-deployment of ABM without Russian control is there or not? What happened to the grandeur of ABM plans, America? Romania was on the line, I thought it was going forward. Is it still going on?

[Sea Skimmer]

The limit on ABM they are talking about is the ban on converting existing SLBM launch tubes and existing ICBM silos to launch ABM weapons. Any existing conversions; this includes several US Minuteman silos turned into GBI silos at Vandenberg, are still allowed. As long as the US builds new launchers its ABM forces are otherwise unrestricted in scope. No clause ever existed which would give Russia any kind of ‘control’ of any United States property or weapons systems.

Since no existing US programs were converting ICBM silos or SLBM tubes for ABM this treaty limit means nothing at the moment. It does certainly constrain future options.

[Pelranius]

I prefer mobile launchers, despite the technology hurdles. Though I admit that its not likely the Chinese or Russians are going to be shooting cruise missiles at Nebraska any time soon.

[K. A. Pital]

The limit on ABM they are talking about is the ban on converting existing SLBM launch tubes and existing ICBM silos to launch ABM weapons. Any existing conversions; this includes several US Minuteman silos turned into GBI silos at Vandenberg, are still allowed. As long as the US builds new launchers its ABM forces are otherwise unrestricted in scope. No clause ever existed which would give Russia any kind of ‘control’ of any United States property or weapons systems.

Since no existing US programs were converting ICBM silos or SLBM tubes for ABM this treaty limit means nothing at the moment. It does certainly constrain future options.

Thanks for the clarification, Skimmer - just as I thought. I had no time to read the new START text, and our government was trumping it as "the end of American ABM" on TV. Liars and fucktards, oh they are.

[MKSheppard]

I had no time to read the new START text, and our government was trumping it as "the end of American ABM" on TV. Liars and fucktards, oh they are.

The revelant thing that both sides seem to be focusing on is page two of the preamble:

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties,

At least we got Obama being forced to defend BMD heavier and more vigoriously than Reagan himself and being forced to spend some nice money on strategic forces modernization to bribe GOP senators to vote for this...so even if the Russians try to use the preamble as a legally binding text; we can walk away from it none the worse; but that depends on the President -- Bush walked away from the ABM Treaty; while Clinton/Gore made maintaining the ABM Treaty a cornerstone of their foreign policy.

[Sea Skimmer]

Until near the end they did; but Clinton did approve funding for the earlier work on what became GBI while fully well knowing it would violate the ABM treaty. This paved the way for Bush to leave the treaty because it meant he could begin actually building GBI silos the day after the ABM treaty lapsed.

[Thanas]

Actually Shep, preambles mean almost nothing when it comes to laws and treaties. So I would not put much faith in what it says.

[K. A. Pital]

And in other news, Russia's "Crypto-Fascist United Russia" party pushed the vote through. The real fascists (i.e. Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia) abstained. The parliamentary communist party voted against it. Kremlin-controlled Eser ("Just Russia") voted for it. Just as expected. Well, almost - it is a bit surprising the LDPR abstained, in most or all other issues they vote the same as "United Russia". Purest idiocy - our government is trumpeting a new advanced ICBM as a propaganda piece, at the same time as the new START basically kills its production run in inception, ABM being "killed", despite this clearly being not so. But like I said, all this was expected.

[Pelranius]

Well, if Russia spends less money on the RS-24, that means more money for cruise missiles and the Tu-160 (unless the new treaty stops that too). Of course, oligarchs with nuclear long range bombers isn't a very comforting thought, but there's not a whole lot they can do with it.

[Vympel]

And in other news, Russia's "Crypto-Fascist United Russia" party pushed the vote through. The real fascists (i.e. Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia) abstained. The parliamentary communist party voted against it. Kremlin-controlled Eser ("Just Russia") voted for it. Just as expected. Well, almost - it is a bit surprising the LDPR abstained, in most or all other issues they vote the same as "United Russia". Purest idiocy - our government is trumpeting a new advanced ICBM as a propaganda piece, at the same time as the new START basically kills its production run in inception, ABM being "killed", despite this clearly being not so. But like I said, all this was expected.

I've read the treaty and searched the protocols, where does it say that MIRV-missile production is to stop? Article 2, Clause 2 clearly states:-

"Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself
the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms."

There is no requirement, as far as I can see, that RS-24 missile production is to cease.

[K. A. Pital]

There's a problem with warhead carrier limits, not with MIRV prohibition or anything.

[Vympel]

There's a problem with warhead carrier limits, not with MIRV prohibition or anything.

Ok, where in the treaty (or protocols) is that? I've read it again, I just don't see it.

[K. A. Pital]

There's a problem with warhead carrier limits, not with MIRV prohibition or anything.

Ok, where in the treaty (or protocols) is that? I've read it again, I just don't see it.

If Russia finishes the production run of 8 new SSBNs it started until 2020 and have around 80 strategic bombers, as a matter of fact, Russia hits the limit of deployed warheads hard. There'll be only 300 odd warheads left for the RVSN if other parts of the nuclear triade don't degrade. Which they could. But in any case there's only 30-50 new R-24 missiles to be made depending on the proportion of UR-100N, Topols and Topol-Ms.

START-III limit is 700 carriers and 1550 warheads.

Let's look at the numbers (these calculations were made by a Russian military commentator, anyways, so I'm just reposting). Submarines - three 955, which means 16 carriers and 96 warheads each, five 955U, 20 carriers, 120 warheads each, four 667BRDM, 16 carriers with 64 warheads. A total of 212 carriers and 1144 warheads. ~80 carriers = bombers, one carrier one warhead, according to START rules. A total of ~290 carriers and ~1220 warheads.

There's just 326 warheads left for the RVSN, albeit with 408 carriers. But the MIRV R-24 will quickly deplete this even on its own. However, there are also Topols. Let's assume there'll be around 100 Topols and Topol-Ms combined (the latter being phased in, the former phased out) and ten UR-100N left from the 70 which are here now. There'll be 40, 50, max 60 R-24 left because 40 R-24s is already 160 warheads.

Now, I might fail at reading START-III, and maybe my source does so as well. But it seems the new missile wouldn't see a huge production run because there'd be nothing to deploy it with.

[Mr Bean]

Why not just run the subs at half capacity? Nothing says you can't reload half the cells with cruise missile types and keep the extra warheads elsewhere, same thing with the bombers. Use some fancy book-keeping to keep the warheads on site, the bombers able to instantly reload with nuclear ordinance but technically speaking only armed with convention bombs?

[Questor]

Why not just run the subs at half capacity? Nothing says you can't reload half the cells with cruise missile types and keep the extra warheads elsewhere, same thing with the bombers. Use some fancy book-keeping to keep the warheads on site, the bombers able to instantly reload with nuclear ordinance but technically speaking only armed with convention bombs?

My understanding is that that is what's done with bombers. I.E. If the US went to all strategic bombers, they could have 700 of them, with no limits on the number of weapons those bombers can carry. I don't know if that would mean we'd have to have a separate non-nuclear bomber. I also think this only applies to strategic weapons versus tactical ones.

I think I read somewhere (of course it could have been Tom Clancy) that the navy treats any system that could fire a nuclear weapon as having one if there are nukes aboard, so maybe isolating the systems into individual ships means that things are administratively easier?

[K. A. Pital]

Why not just run the subs at half capacity? Nothing says you can't reload half the cells with cruise missile types and keep the extra warheads elsewhere, same thing with the bombers. Use some fancy book-keeping to keep the warheads on site, the bombers able to instantly reload with nuclear ordinance but technically speaking only armed with convention bombs?

There's no problem with bombers, each bomber is counted as ONE warhead regardless of how many it carries. However, running SSBNs at "half capacity"? Seriously? Anybody ever did that, anyway?

[Mr Bean]

Why not just run the subs at half capacity? Nothing says you can't reload half the cells with cruise missile types and keep the extra warheads elsewhere, same thing with the bombers. Use some fancy book-keeping to keep the warheads on site, the bombers able to instantly reload with nuclear ordinance but technically speaking only armed with convention bombs?

There's no problem with bombers, each bomber is counted as ONE warhead regardless of how many it carries. However, running SSBNs at "half capacity"? Seriously? Anybody ever did that, anyway?

One the mentioned plans of the gear down of American SSBN's is to re-purpose the nuclear launching cells to carry Tomahawks instead. If your SSBN carries both conventional and nukes you have more flexibility. Needless to say you can't have your SSBN launching Tomahawks just off the territorial limit of Russia but unlike the ICBM to conventional warhead plan it's not crazy on the face of it.

My understanding is we've already been using submarines for this already in some capacity but I can't claim sure exact knowledge.

[Kane Starkiller]

Only deployed warheads are counted not the maximum number a missile can carry. Ohio fleet has 336 carriers and could carry 2688 warheads but the actual number of MIRVs per Trident is less than 8.
212 carriers of the Russian fleet with 3 warheads each for example is a total of 636 warheads. Plenty of room for ground forces.

Also I'm not convinced that Russia can easily afford a fleet of 12 SSBNs. UK, with slightly larger GDP (or almost two times in exchange rates) has 4 while US with 7-10 times larger economy has 18 (actually 14 since 4 are converted to SSGNs).

[K. A. Pital]

Only deployed warheads are counted not the maximum number a missile can carry. Ohio fleet has 336 carriers and could carry 2688 warheads but the actual number of MIRVs per Trident is less than 8.
212 carriers of the Russian fleet with 3 warheads each for example is a total of 636 warheads. Plenty of room for ground forces.

Um... the actual number is the number of warheads which can be installed. And Russia usually installs MIRVs to full capacity of the missile. Indeed, why do otherwise?

Also I'm not convinced that Russia can easily afford a fleet of 12 SSBNs. UK, with slightly larger GDP (or almost two times in exchange rates) has 4 while US with 7-10 times larger economy has 18 (actually 14 since 4 are converted to SSGNs)

I am not sure either, hence why I said that Russia's SSBN construction plans have to fail utterly. Or other components of the nuclear triade have to degrade even more quickly.

[Beowulf]

Only deployed warheads are counted not the maximum number a missile can carry. Ohio fleet has 336 carriers and could carry 2688 warheads but the actual number of MIRVs per Trident is less than 8.
212 carriers of the Russian fleet with 3 warheads each for example is a total of 636 warheads. Plenty of room for ground forces.

Um... the actual number is the number of warheads which can be installed. And Russia usually installs MIRVs to full capacity of the missile. Indeed, why do otherwise?

One reason to download it from full capacity is to install full scale and weight decoys, thus improving the ability to get through non-midcourse ABM. Alternatively, downloading allows depressed trajectories for the remaining warheads, reducing flight time and reaction time. Additionally, you can max out both launchers and deployed warheads, with the additional launchers improving the number of targets, even against mid-course ABM. These options are more expensive, of course, but if you've paid for the development of the missile already...

[Vympel]

Um... the actual number is the number of warheads which can be installed.

How do you mean? Kane's right re: counting of the warheads:-

(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be
the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and
on deployed SLBMs.

[K. A. Pital]

Um... the actual number is the number of warheads which can be installed.

How do you mean? Kane's right re: counting of the warheads:-

(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be
the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and
on deployed SLBMs.

I mean that there'll be as many warheads deployed on each SLBM as the project says.