Laconia incident

[K. A. Pital]

And that has to do with what exactly? And not to nitpick, but not all governments are "elected".

Perhaps not; some have other forms of legitimacy, e.g. coming to power after a civil war or revolution, both of which are forms of popular legitimization. In time, governments can lose legitimacy, but when they do, the Army usually no longer supports them.

You have to judge things on a case by case basis. As a reasonable human being you can look and say that killing a three year old is not the same thing as killing an adult in terms of threat level, and thus how they should be treated.

Indeed. A child is not the same level of threat as a tank driver. So is a woman.

However, again I'm struck by your apparent dehumanization of the tank driver, and soldiers in general. In your last statement, you are flat out valuing the life of one human being over another. Do you think that tank driver's family would consider his life worth less than that of anyone else? While that tank driver himself might be willing to lay his life on the line in defense of those women and children, that doesn't mean it holds ANY less value.

The tank driver is essentially a person who is a legalized murderer. He has been given weapons of war and the order to kill other people. Quite obviously, not only is he a greater threat than a child or a woman, but he is also a person who is commiting immoral acts which are, however, legal due to the state and concept of war.

I wouldn't say his life is essentially worth more or less by some sort of fiat, but he devalues it himself (in case of a volunteer army, by his own will, in case of draft not as clearly so) through his actions. Kind of like a criminal, say, a serial killer, devalues his life compared to other members of the society.

[PeZook]

The Hammer also keeps ignoring the fact that your opponents, if they do not necessarily share his own convictions about warfare, may see him declaring non-combatans a target as an atrocity, and then want to take revenge if he ever loses the war, or create a blood feud that will last for generations. It also galvanizes resistance if you create an impression that you are out for blood, rather than just victory: people who have no choice (or THINK they have no choice) will fight back desperately. Same for people who are enraged: the Nazis were EXTREMELY brutal in their counterinsurgency work, but all it did was bring more people to help the resistance movements.

So you should avoid, at all costs, the impression that you will brutalize and kill civilians and unarmed soldiers - as much as is feasible, of course, and the decision to attack or not is not always very clear.

There is also another pragmatic argument to be made: one bomb wrecking a factory does orders of magnitude more to limit the enemy's combat capability than the same bomb blowing up a school, and you probably have a limited number of bombs and aircraft sorties to use. So arguably civilians, even factory workers, is a waste of resources: unless you kill a majority of the workers in a tank factory, they'll just train up new people, while wrecked machine tools are not something so easily replaced in wartime.

[Simon_Jester]

The rhetoric of total war imposes very real costs- encourages people to fight to the last bullet and the last man, because you've given them precious few reasons to expect anything other than annihilation at the end of the road. Hitler paid those costs in full during the Second World War, but the Allies paid a share of it too: demands for unconditional surrender made the war for Germany longer than it might have been.*

It takes very little of that sort of bloody-mindedness to convince people that you're planning to exterminate them at the end of the war, and that it is worth resisting you to that level.
_________

*I understand why those demands were made; no one wanted to repeat the World War One experience of a Germany lying to itself and saying it hadn't really been beaten, that its armies stood everywhere on conquered soil right up to the end, and so on.

Still, though, quite a few people died to bring about the total defeat of Germany, who might have lived had the Allies been willing to settle for a negotiated peace. We should be willing to face that squarely, not bluster about how it was a hard necessity and therefore ignorable.

[TheHammer]

You have to judge things on a case by case basis. As a reasonable human being you can look and say that killing a three year old is not the same thing as killing an adult in terms of threat level, and thus how they should be treated.

Indeed. A child is not the same level of threat as a tank driver. So is a woman.

A persons role is more important than whether they are a woman or a child. We've seen children and women armed, sometimes effectively, as snipers and saboteurs. But I know that's not what you're getting at and neither am I. The point I'm driving at is sometimes a "non combatant" has as much value miltarily as a truck full of soldiers.

However, again I'm struck by your apparent dehumanization of the tank driver, and soldiers in general. In your last statement, you are flat out valuing the life of one human being over another. Do you think that tank driver's family would consider his life worth less than that of anyone else? While that tank driver himself might be willing to lay his life on the line in defense of those women and children, that doesn't mean it holds ANY less value.

The tank driver is essentially a person who is a legalized murderer. He has been given weapons of war and the order to kill other people. Quite obviously, not only is he a greater threat than a child or a woman, but he is also a person who is commiting immoral acts which are, however, legal due to the state and concept of war.

I wouldn't say his life is essentially worth more or less by some sort of fiat, but he devalues it himself (in case of a volunteer army, by his own will, in case of draft not as clearly so) through his actions. Kind of like a criminal, say, a serial killer, devalues his life compared to other members of the society.

If someone breaks in to your home and you are forced to kill him is that an immoral act? If you have to commit an immoral act to prevent an even greater immoral act from occuring what would be your thoughts in that case? I'm not saying that all soldiers are good people. Clearly they aren't. But I also don't think a blanket statement that they've "devalued their own life" by the act of putting on a uniform is warranted either.

[TheHammer]

The Hammer also keeps ignoring the fact that your opponents, if they do not necessarily share his own convictions about warfare, may see him declaring non-combatans a target as an atrocity, and then want to take revenge if he ever loses the war, or create a blood feud that will last for generations. It also galvanizes resistance if you create an impression that you are out for blood, rather than just victory: people who have no choice (or THINK they have no choice) will fight back desperately. Same for people who are enraged: the Nazis were EXTREMELY brutal in their counterinsurgency work, but all it did was bring more people to help the resistance movements.

So you should avoid, at all costs, the impression that you will brutalize and kill civilians and unarmed soldiers - as much as is feasible, of course, and the decision to attack or not is not always very clear.

You presume too much. First of all, I never said I would declare "open season" on civilians. Merely that if you are going to be horrified over those civilian deaths that do occur that you should be equally horrified at the deaths of soldiers. That's all I'm saying.

There is also another pragmatic argument to be made: one bomb wrecking a factory does orders of magnitude more to limit the enemy's combat capability than the same bomb blowing up a school, and you probably have a limited number of bombs and aircraft sorties to use. So arguably civilians, even factory workers, is a waste of resources: unless you kill a majority of the workers in a tank factory, they'll just train up new people, while wrecked machine tools are not something so easily replaced in wartime.

Skilled labor is not so easily replaced as you might think. Sure bombing the factory would make more sense, but perhaps that target is better defended than the bus that transports workers to it. Same way that sinking a battleship would do more damage, but blowing up the bus full of sailors headed to it might be more feasible militarily. Anyway, I'm not interested in priortizing targets. It is irrelevant to my point.

[Isolder74]

Skilled labor is not so easily replaced as you might think. Sure bombing the factory would make more sense, but perhaps that target is better defended than the bus that transports workers to it. Same way that sinking a battleship would do more damage, but blowing up the bus full of sailors headed to it might be more feasible militarily. Anyway, I'm not interested in priortizing targets. It is irrelevant to my point.

Why? Killing sailors does not take the battleship out of action sinking, even at high risk, does. There really isn't any military value of bombing a bus filled with easily replaceable sailors. Even a bus full of high ranking officers would be of no real value either.

[General Trelane (Retired)]

Skilled labor is not so easily replaced as you might think. Sure bombing the factory would make more sense, but perhaps that target is better defended than the bus that transports workers to it. Same way that sinking a battleship would do more damage, but blowing up the bus full of sailors headed to it might be more feasible militarily. Anyway, I'm not interested in priortizing targets. It is irrelevant to my point.

Why? Killing sailors does not take the battleship out of action sinking, even at high risk, does. There really isn't any military value of bombing a bus filled with easily replaceable sailors. Even a bus full of high ranking officers would be of no real value either.

How so? Training replacements take time and can be a real bottleneck. Note that Hitler specifically asked Doenitz to order U-boat crews to target surviving merchant sailors because he recognized that the allies could far easier replace ships than such trained sailors. Doenitz agreed with that premise, but he refused to issue such orders because he knew there was no way to creatively interpret the rules of war to allow this. Instead, he requested improved torpedoes that would sink merchant ships more quickly thereby giving the sailors less time to escape and thus reduce their survival chances.

But just to be clear, I'm not defending Hammer. I would joyfully tear into his arguments, but there are plenty of people doing that already.

[Simon_Jester]

Military operations during the Second World War were often badly disrupted by attacks on a general's headquarters or personal vehicle. Trained personnel may be replaceable, but getting replacements takes a lot of time, and the enemy can do a lot with that time if they're clever.

[TheHammer]

Skilled labor is not so easily replaced as you might think. Sure bombing the factory would make more sense, but perhaps that target is better defended than the bus that transports workers to it. Same way that sinking a battleship would do more damage, but blowing up the bus full of sailors headed to it might be more feasible militarily. Anyway, I'm not interested in priortizing targets. It is irrelevant to my point.

Why? Killing sailors does not take the battleship out of action sinking, even at high risk, does. There really isn't any military value of bombing a bus filled with easily replaceable sailors. Even a bus full of high ranking officers would be of no real value either.

I'm not interested in a debate about which target should be a priority over another. I could come up with numerous hypotheticals, but its really besides the point I'm trying to make: That morally, killing the bus full of sailors would be equivalent to killing a bus full of factory workers.

[K. A. Pital]

Now, a child is statistically less likely to be as efficient as a soldier at killing. So is any non-combatant. Women and children are not only untrained, they are also weaker than men (as we know, even the procedure of draft presumes physical testing to see if the man is fit to be a soldier). A civilian man would be less efficient simply because he is untrained.

On the other hand, soldiers are people trained in the use of weapons. They are combatants. The concept of combatant itself lends credency to the idea that they are ready to fortfeit their life, because (gasp!) their type of service is war, and war is killing and dying.

I don't dehumanize soldiers - their profession dehumanizes them. I stand by my statements.

[The Asiduo]

I haven't read the whole topic, but I read some of the "moral" argument a frw pages, and, oh man...

Anyway, IMHO, the whole "Laconia Incident" was, making a comparison, just like the bombing of the Monte Cassino Abbey in 1944: a stupid, stupid mistake that only had useful results for the germans. In Monte Cassino, german sources and the friars testimonies tell us that the germans never occupied the abbey and had friendly relations with the monks. But, some air photographs made the abbey a target for bombing: so, an abbey full of monks was bombed, and only civilians were killed. Then the germans evacuated the abbey and linked it with their defense system, making the defenses sector even more hard to pass through for the allies.

The Laconia incident was just like it: the germans HAD a policy of rescue for crews of sunken ships: in this case, there was a special factor, that was the italian POWs. So, the germans try to rescue these guys, and they're bombed, causing half of the wrecked crew to die of exposure afterwards, and the submarine involved escaped. Then, Dönitz issues the "Laconia Order", which forbade submarine commanders from rescuing survivors. I'm puzzled: if the common german policy was to ignore survivors after sinking, then, what was the purpose of the "Laconia Order"?. So, the scenario for "unrestricted submarine warfare" was completely set.

The Laconia incident had far-reaching consequences. Until then, as indicated in point #1 of the "Laconia Order", it was common for U-boats to assist torpedoed survivors with food, water, simple medical care for the wounded, and a compass bearing to the nearest landmass; it was extremely rare for survivors to be brought on board as space on a U-boat was barely enough for its own crew. Now Dönitz prohibited rescues; survivors were to be left in the sea. Even afterwards, U-boats would still occasionally provide aid for survivors.

In both cases, the allies acted in "gun-ho" attitude against the germans, and in both cases, the only results were making the war harder for themselves. I don't know if they were morally justified or not, but both incidents were stupid mistakes which, in the end, made things easier for the germans.

[Samuel]

The comparison isn't really good though. We bombed Monte Cassino because of faulty intelligence. We bombed the submarine because submarines were sinking ships and they had established they would fire at allied rescue ships so we had no reason to let it live.

[The Asiduo]

The comparison isn't really good though. We bombed Monte Cassino because of faulty intelligence. We bombed the submarine because submarines were sinking ships and they had established they would fire at allied rescue ships so we had no reason to let it live.

All right, I guess: in any case, the rescue attempt WAS real, and the allied intelligence thought it was fake, so it was also faulty intelligence in that case. And bombing the abbey also had the idea of "Germans using a neutral place to hide, breaking the laws of war, morality or whatever" but in both cases, the results were:

German loses: none.
German achievements: Now they have an excuse for: occupying the abbey/using unrestricted submarine warfare.
Allied loses: civilians/prisoners and staff. Plus, the campaings in both the Italian front and the sea got more dangerous.
Allied achievements: None.

Again, "gun-ho" attitude in both cases leading to results which only served the germans: stupid decissions.

[PeZook]

Dude, the Laconia Order would've happened anyway, officially or in practice, since rescuing survivors would quickly become suicidal as the number of ASW aircraft increased.

The Allies wouldn't have made their primary ASW weapon (the airplane) useless by being really really really careful to check if the sub was rescuing survivors or not just in case the Germans might get an excuse to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare (and therefore letting it escape in 90% of cases). And since convoy battles involved lots of armed ships anyway, no sane uboat commander would surface to rescue survivors.

And of course convoy battles were what really counted in the battle of the atlantic, since all the important supplies were convoyed.

In other words, the attack changed nothing in practice.

[The Asiduo]

Dude, the Laconia Order would've happened anyway, officially or in practice, since rescuing survivors would quickly become suicidal as the number of ASW aircraft increased.

The Allies wouldn't have made their primary ASW weapon (the airplane) useless by being really really really careful to check if the sub was rescuing survivors or not just in case the Germans might get an excuse to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare (and therefore letting it escape in 90% of cases). And since convoy battles involved lots of armed ships anyway, no sane uboat commander would surface to rescue survivors.

And of course convoy battles were what really counted in the battle of the atlantic, since all the important supplies were convoyed.

In other words, the attack changed nothing in practice.

IMHO that's what we call: "pseudohistory". "Oh, if this or that had happened, then, blah, blah, blah". You could argue that even without the allies bombing the abbey of Monte Cassino, the germans also would have eventually occupied it and killed a lot of monks, so the bombing of the abbey didn't change anything. Or what if the germans hadn't attacked the USSR and THEN the Laconia incident had happened. They would have emitted the order?. IMHO, when we're arguing about history, it's better talk about the facts, and let the "what-if"s to Philip K. Dick or Stephen Fry: it's fun to speculate, but I found it rather pointless.

The fact remains that the germans issued the order as some kind of reprisal for the Laconia Incident. What would happened if the allies wouldn't have bombed the rescue operation?. Who knows!, but the facts indicate that the only real consequences this action had were:

- Half of the survivors dead by exposure.
- Excuse for the germans to launch unrestricted submarine warfare.

Perhaps in a strategic perspective, it didn't matter much, because, the allies had an strategic advantage in the sea, and also in Italy, and in both cases they won eventually. But, it's undeniable that these stupid decisions made little to help them, and cost many lives of civilians and staff.

[PeZook]

It's not that it didn't matter much, it's that it didn't matter at all. You say I indulge in pseudohistory, but the fact is that battle of the atlantic would be decided in convoy battles, where there would literally be no attempt to rescue survivors from torpedoed ships.

So...how did the laconia order make the war easier for the Germans, when their main targets (the convoys) would be unaffected by the "policy" of helping survivors? It didn't make locating and attacking the convoys any easier.

Furthermore, I take issue with you saying it was a stupid decision because the subs escaped ; How the hell were the bomber crews supposed to know they'd miss? You have to evaluate decisions in the context of the available information, not 20/20 hindsight.

[Big Phil]

- Excuse for the germans to launch unrestricted submarine warfare.

The Germans made up their own excuses - remember the "border incident" that result in WWII? Are you going to blame the Poles now for starting the war?

[The Asiduo]

It's not that it didn't matter much, it's that it didn't matter at all. You say I indulge in pseudohistory, but the fact is that battle of the atlantic would be decided in convoy battles, where there would literally be no attempt to rescue survivors from torpedoed ships.

So...how did the laconia order make the war easier for the Germans, when their main targets (the convoys) would be unaffected by the "policy" of helping survivors? It didn't make locating and attacking the convoys any easier.

Furthermore, I take issue with you saying it was a stupid decision because the subs escaped ; How the hell were the bomber crews supposed to know they'd miss? You have to evaluate decisions in the context of the available information, not 20/20 hindsight.

Well, again, in a strategic perspective, I guess that it wasn't so important. Also, in the case of Monte Cassino bombing, also it didn't matter in a strategic perspective: the Italian Front was a rather secondary and stalled front at that time, even before the bombing (the stallment of the Anzio landings was the main strategic failure there), and the main focus of the allied strategic effort was in preparing the invasion of Normandy in the following months.

But, AGAIN, this decission didn't have any good consequences for the allies AT ALL. Perhaps the "convoys" would have been lost anyway, but at last there wasn't a policy of "Not helping the survivors AT ALL". I consider that the issue of the survivors of the sunken convoys dying because of lack of help of submarines it's NOT a minor issue. (Also it's not a minor issue the deaths of civilians in the bombing of Monte Cassino).

I know they didn't had ALL THE FACTS at the time, and I know that my reasoning it's "ex post facto" (Well, pretty much ALL historic analysis is "ex post facto"), so I know it's rather easy to criticize after all the facts surface. But I think it's curious how the defenders of the Laconia Incident in few cases say: "Well, it was a mistake, perhaps", instead I've read in this topic creepy stuff such as: "It was all justified because the germans were EVIL and were killing jews and russians".

My opinion is simple: it was a mistake, and the only ones who faced bad consequences of these event were the allies, not the germans.

[General Trelane (Retired)]

But I think it's curious how the defenders of the Laconia Incident in few cases say: "Well, it was a mistake, perhaps", instead I've read in this topic creepy stuff such as: "It was all justified because the germans were EVIL and were killing jews and russians".

I'm curious. . .you initially admitted that you hadn't read the entire thread; have you read it all now?

[The Asiduo]

But I think it's curious how the defenders of the Laconia Incident in few cases say: "Well, it was a mistake, perhaps", instead I've read in this topic creepy stuff such as: "It was all justified because the germans were EVIL and were killing jews and russians".

I'm curious. . .you initially admitted that you hadn't read the entire thread; have you read it all now?

Actually, not yet. But, I read that part.

[PeZook]

Well, again, in a strategic perspective, I guess that it wasn't so important. Also, in the case of Monte Cassino bombing, also it didn't matter in a strategic perspective: the Italian Front was a rather secondary and stalled front at that time, even before the bombing (the stallment of the Anzio landings was the main strategic failure there), and the main focus of the allied strategic effort was in preparing the invasion of Normandy in the following months.

But, AGAIN, this decission didn't have any good consequences for the allies AT ALL. Perhaps the "convoys" would have been lost anyway, but at last there wasn't a policy of "Not helping the survivors AT ALL". I consider that the issue of the survivors of the sunken convoys dying because of lack of help of submarines it's NOT a minor issue. (Also it's not a minor issue the deaths of civilians in the bombing of Monte Cassino).

Well, returning to the previous discussion for a moment: what of the dead Russian civilians and soldiers? For your comment to have any meaning, it would have to be turned into policy: and what policy would that be? Not bombing German subs if they were engaged in rescue ops? Those subs would then submerge and go on hunting vital supplies ; Not bombing historic structures you believe to be occupied and part of enemy fortifications? Do I really have to explain why this is a really bad policy...

In short: what the hell were the Allies supposed to do with Monte Cassino? What were they supposed to do in the Laconia case? Let the subs go so that they could've maybe given aid to a couple dozen sailors in the future while potentially killing hundreds directly, and tens of thousands indirectly?

I know they didn't had ALL THE FACTS at the time, and I know that my reasoning it's "ex post facto" (Well, pretty much ALL historic analysis is "ex post facto"), so I know it's rather easy to criticize after all the facts surface. But I think it's curious how the defenders of the Laconia Incident in few cases say: "Well, it was a mistake, perhaps", instead I've read in this topic creepy stuff such as: "It was all justified because the germans were EVIL and were killing jews and russians".

Why is it curious? First, the arguments were more nuanced than "anything goes because the Nazis are evil", second, is it not a legitimate argument that ending the war quickly should be the highest priority?

My opinion is simple: it was a mistake, and the only ones who faced bad consequences of these event were the allies, not the germans.

It's only a mistake if the people making that decision had the information that clearly showed it was a mistake: in the monte cassino case they just plain did not have all the relevant information, while in the Laconia case, the decision was justified by the fact they could've killed several subs had the attack succeeded. In other words: the potential negative consequences were rather minor (since the precious supplies were convoyed, thus survivors could be rescued by escorts, and would never be aided by uboats anyway), while pontential gains quite substantial (especially since killing one sub reduced the number Germans could keep deployed by two or more)

[The Asiduo]

Well, returning to the previous discussion for a moment: what of the dead Russian civilians and soldiers? For your comment to have any meaning, it would have to be turned into policy: and what policy would that be? Not bombing German subs if they were engaged in rescue ops? Those subs would then submerge and go on hunting vital supplies ; Not bombing historic structures you believe to be occupied and part of enemy fortifications? Do I really have to explain why this is a really bad policy...

I only think that the following situation:

a) A ship is sunk by a submarine attack.
b) Your enemy informs you that is going to rescue the crew.
c) You got to the place, and confirm that is what is happening.
d) You attack anyway, putting in danger your own people.
e) At the end, you didn't kill any sub, you only cause the death of your own people and make the war more dangerous to your troops.

So, in short, the allies acted on a gun-ho attitude instead of taking more subtle considerations, and only caused problems and losses for themselves: I'm sorry, mister, that's a mistake. Perhaps (only perhaps) an honest mistake, but a mistake nonetheless.

[PeZook]

I only think that the following situation:

a) A ship is sunk by a submarine attack.
b) Your enemy informs you that is going to rescue the crew.
c) You got to the place, and confirm that is what is happening.
d) You attack anyway, putting in danger your own people.
e) At the end, you didn't kill any sub, you only cause the death of your own people and make the war more dangerous to your troops.

So, in short, the allies acted on a gun-ho attitude instead of taking more subtle considerations, and only caused problems and losses for themselves: I'm sorry, mister, that's a mistake. Perhaps (only perhaps) an honest mistake, but a mistake nonetheless.

Okay, fine. If you really really need to call this a mistake, I can admit that it technically is under the strictest possible interpretation of the definition.

I dislike that, because it means that the exact same decision made in the exact same circumstances may be a mistake or not, depending on dumb luck, which makes the distinction useless.

But you don't stop there ; It is obvious you think it was a bad decision, not just a mistake, and that the Allies should've considered "more subtle considerations" when I keep pointing out that those subtle considerations are not necessarily what you think they are. You admitted yourself: in the strategic sense, the Laconia incident changed little if anything against the allies. If the bombs hit, however, the Germans would've lost at least one sub, which would have far-reaching consequences for the overall battle. Your insistence that the incident somehow made the war measurably harder for the Allies is ridiculous: if anything, regulations that sparing survivors should take priority over destroying uboats would've made fighting the Kriegsmarine harder, since destroyers in convoy battles would be forced to pick up survivors first, exposing themselves and the convoy to attack (the Germans certainly didn't give a fuck about warships picking people up).

That is ignoring the fact that what makes war truly dangerous for the troops is a lack of armor, ammunition, fuel, locomotives, trucks, clothes, boots, cooking fuel, medical supplies and food, not the occasional rescue attempt given to a couple dozen sailors (who'd mostly die anyway if not located and rescued by allied assets). Each sub could sink tens thousands of tonnes of supplies if left alone. That made them a priority target over even substantial number of survivors: destroyers sometimes ran over shipwrecked sailors so that they could execute a depth charge attack. And it was like that everywhere else, on land or sea: if a building was fortified and garrisoned, it was shelled, even if the troops there gave up their rations to the civilians in the basement out of the goodnes of their hearts (and then proceeded to machinegun advancing allied troops ten minutes later...)

But back on topic, any rescues of torpedoes survivors would've ended by late 1943 anyway, even without a Laconia order, as staying surfaced during the day became suicidal for uboats at about that time. In that context, even in hindsight, the decision to attack was justified by its possible gains.

[fgalkin]

Well, returning to the previous discussion for a moment: what of the dead Russian civilians and soldiers? For your comment to have any meaning, it would have to be turned into policy: and what policy would that be? Not bombing German subs if they were engaged in rescue ops? Those subs would then submerge and go on hunting vital supplies ; Not bombing historic structures you believe to be occupied and part of enemy fortifications? Do I really have to explain why this is a really bad policy...

I only think that the following situation:

a) A ship is sunk by a submarine attack.
b) Your enemy informs you that is going to rescue the crew.
c) You got to the place, and confirm that is what is happening.
d) You attack anyway, putting in danger your own people.
e) At the end, you didn't kill any sub, you only cause the death of your own people and make the war more dangerous to your troops.

So, in short, the allies acted on a gun-ho attitude instead of taking more subtle considerations, and only caused problems and losses for themselves: I'm sorry, mister, that's a mistake. Perhaps (only perhaps) an honest mistake, but a mistake nonetheless.

I would dispute that this was a genuine humanitarian mission and that attacking it was unjustified. The order to rescue the crew was given only once it was ascertained that the ship was carrying 1500 Italian PoWs. Moreover, the U-boats were not towing them towards the nearest landmass (which would be the Allied-held Liberia) but tried to rendezvous with Vichy warships. It would appear that the Nazis wanted to have their cake and eat it, presenting what was essentially an attempt to repatriate Axis POWs as a humanitarian rescue mission (they were aware of the composition of the Laconia's passengers, but they never actually informed anyone of it). Moreover, they have violated the laws of war by using the Red Cross emblem to do it.

Bombing the Laconia survivors was no different than, say, bombing a troop train with wounded heading away from the front, and that had happened plenty of times and was not considered a warcrime.

Have a very nice day.
-fgalkin

[The Asiduo]

Only some comments:

a) No, I don't think the "Laconia Rescue" was an "humanitarian" effort by the germans, but they were rescuing the crew anyway, regardless of the intention.

b) No, I'm not saying "bombing the Laconia" was a "war crime", though I'm amused with the idea that with the "war crimes" usually when is the "enemy" commiting them. are "war crimes" but when is "our beloved nation" then we get all this talk about good intentions or evil enemies.

c) In any case, I think "war crime" is just a legal fiction invented post-war to judge the german leaders. I agree with Arthur "Bomber" Harris, though, when questioned about if his methods of bombing cities were "criminal" he said: "War itself is criminal".

d) Again, arguing that: "even if the allies hadn't bombed the Laconia, the order blah blah" is just pseudohistory, akin to predict what had happened if the germans had Godzilla on their side: it can be funny, and it's good for alternate-history novels, but in historic arguments, is just pointless speculation. At least some hard evidence would be more clarifying in this case, but otherwise, all this is just like Viktor Suvorov arguing that "Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike": good speculation, but without hard evidence, is just that: speculation.

And, instead of some historical evidence, reading or anything, all we got is the same dialectical discourse: "the germans were the ultimate evil, we were the ultimate good guys", which pretty much justifies every stupid mistake (as Laconia or Monte Cassino) or crime commited by the allies in WW2.