A duty to help?

[madd0ct0r]

A long while back, I started a thread on wether going vegetarian would cut hunger in the 3rd world.

Surprisingly (for me), some people argued against the underlying assumption that if we could do something to help a stranger, we should, even at a minor cost to ourselves.

At the time, I ducked the question, as was rather more intrested in crop yield stats, but it's only fair to have another go on the merry-go-round.

So. Under what circumstances SHOULD you help a stranger and at what point does it become MUST help?

[evilsoup]

If you assume that all people are equal and equally deserving of dignity, food, comfort, etc.; and that inaction in the face of human suffering is morally equivalent (or at least similar) to actively causing suffering: then of course you are morally obliged to help out others, even strangers.

The first of these is very rarely challenged, except by hard-core right-wingers. The second is much easier to challenge (psychologically, I mean; I have yet to come across a convincing rebuttal of this principle).

Of course it is impossible to help everybody, and you should not run yourself ragged helping others. But the vast majority of people (myself definitely included) don't live up to the standards of this morality.

I'm not entirely sure if you can draw a distinction between 'should' and 'must', morally speaking: surely you are either morally impelled to do something, or you aren't?

[Sarevok]

So. Under what circumstances SHOULD you help a stranger and at what point does it become MUST help?

There is no simple answer to this question. In general life experience will help make the right choice. Everyone must make their own judgment and live with the consequences.

[Simon_Jester]

Sarevok is right. To expand on that:

If you assume that all people are equal and equally deserving of dignity, food, comfort, etc.; and that inaction in the face of human suffering is morally equivalent (or at least similar) to actively causing suffering: then of course you are morally obliged to help out others, even strangers.

The first of these is very rarely challenged, except by hard-core right-wingers. The second is much easier to challenge (psychologically, I mean; I have yet to come across a convincing rebuttal of this principle).

There are two big problems with the second premise. One is that it is an unexamined assumption- why is there no difference between a sin of omission and a sin of commission, in a world where finite resources guarantee that sins of omission will be committed no matter what?

The other flaw in the second premise follows directly from human nature: if you are responsible for all suffering you fail to prevent, then every person is responsible for a huge amount of suffering- even though opportunity costs make it impossible to prevent it all; you haven't the resources to solve everyone's problems.

So while it's not justifiable in a universe full of ideal utilitarian robots, the simple fact that the world is large and we are small means that to some extent "cultivate our own garden." Otherwise society falls apart as people neglect to care for what's in front of them in favor of caring for others and praying it'll all balance out somehow.

Given the way we're wired, we have no choice but to be more committed to benevolent action in our own immediate circle than we are to random strangers- we literally can't avoid it if we're going to behave in any kind of realistic/rational manner.

However, this is not a black-white rule: it's philosophically totally incoherent and absurd to say "these people I care for absolutely, everyone else I care for not at all." This sort of thing is a sliding scale, because you cannot care for every person on Earth to the same extent that you care for your immediate circle, unless you're so cold and hostile to your immediate circle that you'll neither have nor deserve one.

So on the one hand there are commitments where you undertake a moral obligation to do something, to help in a specific situation where you have both the power and the proximity to do something useful. On the other there are people to whom you owe no specific moral debt- they have problems, but you cannot make their problems the focus of your life on a scale commensurate with their needs without effectively sacrificing your own life to theirs.

In between are all the varying degrees of kindness and generosity people show to friends and acquaintances and people who have a sudden desperate need.

Of course it is impossible to help everybody, and you should not run yourself ragged helping others. But the vast majority of people (myself definitely included) don't live up to the standards of this morality.

I'm not entirely sure if you can draw a distinction between 'should' and 'must', morally speaking: surely you are either morally impelled to do something, or you aren't?

No. There are degrees of impulse- things that it would be nice if you did, things that it would be simple decency for you to do, things that it would be horribly wrong for you not to do. Not all moral impulses are strong enough that they should totally override the normal reactions of a human being trying to keep themselves alive and functional in a complex society.

[madd0ct0r]

We also get into positive and negative rights.

ie the right to be alive.

as a negative right, your right to live places a duty on me to NOT kill you. I can fufill this by omission.
as a positive right, your right to live places a duty on me to help you. If you are starving, i MUST share my food ect.
Other parts of your personal morality must impose limits: Presumably, to me, your right to live is inferior my own, but only because I'm a selfish entity. Ie I shouldn't feed you if it starves me.

Some people don't use (or accept) positive rights. It makes things simpler, and means things don't move from should to must.

I remember an argument for acting to end world poverty based only on negative rights (as written by my lovely wife), but I'll have to look it up to remember it in detail.

[Simon_Jester]

Well, I think "only because I'm a selfish entity" understates the case- you can't function on the basis of treating every single person in the world as if their needs were exactly equal to your own in importance; you'll expend yourself into ruin.

An ethical system whose demands don't accomodate the nature of the people who have to use the system is pretty much useless.

[Korto]

I would say you should help (but it's not a duty to do so) in any situation where you can help with negligible cost to yourself.

It's a duty to help in any way reasonable if you have taken on an obligation to help in that kind of circumstance, for instance if you're a fireman, police, paramedic, etc; or you're the damsel in distress's parent or guardian, and so on.

[Talk738kno]

I think that Peter Singer's “Famine Affluence and Morality” is an interesting take on this issue.

[madd0ct0r]

it might be, but with only 16 words from you, I'm finding it hard to guess his arguments

but it's a tropical thunderstorm outside, and I'm on a business trip. He was also the principle source for my wife's writings too. hang on, are you my wife?

the article is here: http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1972----.htm

wiki summary: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Famine,_Af ... d_Morality

with an average write up here: http://www.helium.com/items/910176-resp ... ter-singer
echoed here: http://www.helium.com/items/1855084-sin ... d-morality

[evilsoup]

Sarevok is right. To expand on that:

If you assume that all people are equal and equally deserving of dignity, food, comfort, etc.; and that inaction in the face of human suffering is morally equivalent (or at least similar) to actively causing suffering: then of course you are morally obliged to help out others, even strangers.

The first of these is very rarely challenged, except by hard-core right-wingers. The second is much easier to challenge (psychologically, I mean; I have yet to come across a convincing rebuttal of this principle).

There are two big problems with the second premise. One is that it is an unexamined assumption- why is there no difference between a sin of omission and a sin of commission, in a world where finite resources guarantee that sins of omission will be committed no matter what?

I may not have expressed myself properly here. When I say inaction is morally equivalent to inaction, I do not mean that you should ignore your (lack of) ability to help. For example: if you are walking along a harbour-side and see a man drowning in the water, and you are next to a life buoy (and are close enough to throw it in without danger to yourself), then by not throwing it in you are just as (morally) guilty for the man's death as if you had held his head underwater.

However, if there is a strong storm with high waves, and you are not a particularly strong swimmer (no lifebuoy this time) - let's say that you have a ~10% chance of saving the man, but there's an ~80% chance of your own death - then you are not obliged to dive in to try and save him. You are just as worthy of moral consideration as anyone else.

So you are not responsible for all suffering you fail to prevent: only for that which you could reasonably be able to prevent (or mitigate). Of course this could lead to a sort of reverse donkey's dilemma: so many people need help, how do you choose between them? I would say you should do a calculation based on different people's needs (including your own), your ability to help and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of your actions. If you have made this calculation and acted on it, then your responsibility for all the other inequities is negated (to the extent that it becomes the equivalent of a 'necessary evil').

So while it's not justifiable in a universe full of ideal utilitarian robots, the simple fact that the world is large and we are small means that to some extent "cultivate our own garden." Otherwise society falls apart as people neglect to care for what's in front of them in favor of caring for others and praying it'll all balance out somehow.

I think my above argument addresses this. You (and the people around you) are just as worthy of moral consideration as the starving masses, so your own emotional, financial (etc.) wellbeing is worth putting effort into. On top of that, it is impossible to help others effectively if your own life is falling apart; so there is a pure utilitarian argument for tending to your own first.

Given the way we're wired, we have no choice but to be more committed to benevolent action in our own immediate circle than we are to random strangers- we literally can't avoid it if we're going to behave in any kind of realistic/rational manner.

This is what I meant when I said that it is psychologically easy to argue against the premise. There are strong emotional pressures to help those immediate to you above most other things. There are one or two people I have been pissed off enough with to wish to harm physically; but I recognise that this would be morally wrong.

So on the one hand there are commitments where you undertake a moral obligation to do something, to help in a specific situation where you have both the power and the proximity to do something useful. On the other there are people to whom you owe no specific moral debt- they have problems, but you cannot make their problems the focus of your life on a scale commensurate with their needs without effectively sacrificing your own life to theirs.

Of course it is impossible to help everybody, and you should not run yourself ragged helping others.

I'm not entirely sure if you can draw a distinction between 'should' and 'must', morally speaking: surely you are either morally impelled to do something, or you aren't?

No. There are degrees of impulse- things that it would be nice if you did, things that it would be simple decency for you to do, things that it would be horribly wrong for you not to do. Not all moral impulses are strong enough that they should totally override the normal reactions of a human being trying to keep themselves alive and functional in a complex society.

I would say that after the moral consideration listed above (need, ability, consequences), you must either perform a certain action, or you must not. Of course, even in the age of the Internet, different people have different levels of knowledge and different circumstances; so two equally rational agents can still reach different positions on the same issue or situation.

[madd0ct0r]

Must or Must not, following a calcualtion?

that's a very binary approach, and requires you to judge everything perfectly to be correct.

Sticking with a mathematical theme, why not include probabilities?

So for something you are deciding on:

Calc the PROBABLE COST on you (if it's money, it's reasonably easy. If it's reducing consumption, a little more difficult).
Calc the probable net benefit (how much you will help the target, and the probability this will be achieved) As an example, if I donate to this charity, how much of my money will the starving orphans actually receive?.

I think it becomes a probability density, with helping a little more likely then helping a lot. So you then sum across the probability density to find the probable net benefit to compare to the probable cost on you.

Presumably, could becomes should if there is a probable net benefit, with the impetus moving to must as the probability of large net benefit moves towards certainty, or as the probability of a net COST decreases to zero.

This is still subject to the 'do not run yourself ragged' rule.
(Under which Mother Theresa is acting immorally?)

[evilsoup]

I thought that 'judging probabilities' was implied, given that nobody's perfect. So yeah, that's a reasonable extension.

'Don't run yourself ragged' is more of a guideline, as working yourself to death would mean that you are of no use to anybody in the future. There are exceptions to this, of course.

[Simon_Jester]

There also has to be allowance for human realities- not just the ability to run out of physical resources, but psychological ones. A person can only mentally commit to so much; that's a big limiting factor when it comes to the ability to do good deeds for strangers.

The infamous "monkeysphere," basically. Combine that with the fact that it's hard to trust a stranger (or strange organization) as fully as a known friend or family member, and you see the same kind of "I'm generous to those close to me and indifferent to those far from me" behaviors that most people engage in by default.

[madd0ct0r]

well, on a one-to-one basis yes, but that's why we have charities.

Assuming it's one with a long history that I trust eg: Sally Army, Samaritans, Amnesty International, Engineers without borders ect then I can be reasonably sure that my money will go to help somebody who needs it, minimal mental commitment required.