Death Penalty: Yea or Nay?

[MarshalPurnell]

Purnell, are you going to justify why this negative formulation of lack of interference from government is better than a positive formulation of formal protection? I brought up lynching for a reason, as while the libertarian ideology from which you draw that tends to minimize this, rights can be infringed upon by ordinary citizens as well as the government. In other words, if you formulate rights solely as a negative of government interference, then a man getting lynched has not had his right to life infringed upon, and a man being beaten for being a Communist has not had his freedom of expression infringed upon either! This is ignoring rights that cannot be formulated with a negative- the right to contract is only meaningful if the contract's terms can be enforced upon both parties! If it's not necessary to formulate rights, only to avoid infringing upon them, then why do so many constitutions formally acknowledge them? Your argument fails descriptively on those grounds. I'm sure that you or your defenders will complain that this paragraph was just a bunch of stuff, but my point is that there are a number of flaws with your approach to rights.

Seeing as you've decided to mimic Simon by using utilitarianism, how can you use a subjective moral system to evaluate the consequences of what you claim to be an objective, universal system of social order, but disallow it for any other relationship to law? In other words, why allow utility in some cases and not in others? Simon misunderstood you as advocating utility in general with regards to the law, but you were not. Are you abandoning what you said earlier? That would seem to be the case, because you're admitting that what constitutes the social order varies from place to place. But you should acknowledge that, then, instead of saying that I'm strawmanning you with your own arguments!

Evaluating on socioeconomic status is tricky, especially since there are so many ways to measure it. Would you use median income, or mean income, or inflation, or a combination of economic factors? Because the US comes out very differently using different measures. But it also ignores intangibles. Consider the case that I brought up earlier. How do you evaluate whether Canada or the US is better at free speech between Canada's sharper restrictions on hate speech and the US's lack of the same? If we fully acknowledge the subjectivity of whether certain social orders are better or not, then it seems that your primary objection to the incorporation of morality, justice, et al into the law is fallen. Because if the question is between whether the social order would be better with this level of protection or that for the freedom of the press, then justice is as valid as socioeconomic status for argumentation and your beliefs falter. But if you don't want to surrender this, explain how an objective approach to the highest social order can be constructed, given subtle differences between various developed nations.

You keep using those words, libertarianism and statism. I do not think they mean what you think they mean. Seriously, there is nothing at all libertarian about holding that natural rights do not exist, that society is a construct for organizing power, and that complex bodies of law are necessary to keep society from breaking down. Nor would a statist claim that society shapes the social order that the state is upheld by, that rights exist in society because of conflict with/within the governing elite, and admit to the inevitability of slow evolution, or provide any kind of rationale at all for the state to not do something.

As for your example, lynchings and beatings of people are a violation of both public peace and the social order; they were always illegal as such. The lack of enforcement was unfortunate, but an example of how particular moral codes can subvert the functioning of the law. Laws, societies, governments, states being imperfect? News at Eleven. My argument was never that ideals exist in real life but that the law must necessarily uphold public order to see to the functioning of society. The importance of contract law to social functioning should also be blatantly obvious, and hence with it the state's affirmative role in enforcing it. Of course it is also conceivable to imagine a society without any "right" to a contract, probably in some tribal setting where dealings with outsiders are not on the same level as anyone within the group. But for anything more complex than that, I expect it began with two merchants making a solemn oath to the Gods and when one did not deliver, the other appealed to the magistrates to punish the oath-breaker. A good deal of social evolution later and the contract in a modern form was born.

In any case I do not need to justify the existence of every single right, since all of those rights are culturally and socially determined. Indeed as I have consistently maintained rights are completely meaningless outside of a society, and are only possible to speak of within the order and peace established by such. There are as many variations of what constitutes a right as there are societies, since rights are essentially memes that have social consensus behind them. I have never held that there is some universal social order, which is something you pulled out of nowhere by misrepresenting how a theoretical model applies to the real world. There are certainly aspects of social order which are necessarily universal because the nature of a public peace requires that they be shared. Like, you know, restraining or neutralizing people who attack others, steal their property, threaten their persons, and so on. To the extent that order is opposed to anarchy it is universal, but beyond that basic level of course societies differ. Which is the serious problem with holding out any kind of positive universal rights, since rights are all socially defined and different societies will have different definitions and scopes.

However one can break down "rights" as memetically associated clusters of behavior. It is not necessary to define rights to exercise the behaviors that constitute them. If the state is passing a public-order, rational basis for establishing law it has a burden to show that any such regulations serve a reasonable purpose. "Rights" then exist in the null-spaces of the law, or are constructed around what the law does address. Thus "freedom of speech", in the absence of any law criminalizing criticism of the ruling party, or attacks on religion, or public gatherings outside of certain limited circumstances, and so on, can obviously be exercised freely. A "right to equality" can be established from the state prosecuting people who discriminate against others on a host of irrelevant factors. Such rights are of course almost always legally recognized anyway, of course, and whether phrased as a negative ("shall not be infringed upon" ring a bell?) or positive assertions is essentially meaningless rhetoric since the execution of those rights is what matters. But because such rights were established as a result of social conflict in particular historical circumstances and have different meanings between societies modelling a "universal right" is therefore problematic without resorting to more or less a priori justifications that are probably not very convincing to someone who does not share the same social and cultural background. Treating them as behaviors and asserting a rational-means test is thus a way of getting around those kinds of cultural and social differences.

And I am under no imperative to rank and order and judge societies, least of all on the relatively nitpicking differences between liberal democracies. In many case a difference may very well just indicate differing social conditions where a rule that may be superfluous somewhere else is needed in that particular context. Obviously using a rational, public order basis demands attention to the context in which the law is being proposed, as should go without saying for any honest reader. Thus the niggling differences between Canadian and American law with regard to free expression could simply be such a case, or it might be that Canada doesn't really require the restrictions that it imposes, though the difference in outcomes is so minor as to make it not terribly important, either. A system of comparison is much more useful when evaluating gross differences than minor ones like that, especially when the influence of context is all-important. Of course, given the complete lack of nuance demonstrated by yourself throughout this debate, such escaping you should not be a surprise.

[AMT]

I would say that we don't levy punishment based on what the family wants. We levy it based on the law.

Agreed, but why? Other societies levy punishment based on what the family wants, particularly if they're powerful and influential.

Because other societies shouldn't always be influential on what we choose as a society. We can either pay the high costs that a death penalty case would need to be prosecuted properly, with no promise of being 100% correct and thus potentially condemning an innocent to die, or we can keep the option open for that persons innocence, rehabilitation, etc., while paying less. It works as both a utilitarian aspect (less cost, more good), while also blocking the ethical dilemma of "what if we kill an innocent person?".

[MarshalPurnell]

Of those reasons the first is troublesome to a modern society because the morality in question was not an abstracted universal set of basic morals, but rather a particular moral law, that of Christianity. A modern, diverse, secular society should not appeal to a particular moral code to justify its laws. People of course try to influence the law along directions indicated by their religion, all the time, and I have not once argued that such should be banned or repressed. I have however held out the rational-basis test on social order as a way to justify such laws as are necessary and to weed out those which are not. In so far as I have advocated anything at all, this is it; that laws should be first and foremost justified on meeting some sort of objective need to maintain public order rather than by divine sanction, or other subjective moral reasoning. In addition I formulated my concept of "rights" as a negative, the absence of interference, rather than as a positive of "formal recognition" or "state protection," a concept that if Bakustra were really familiar with social contract theory in any case he would be well aware of. That is consistent with the existence of such rights in the theoretical system, and allows for the social acceptance of meme-clusters called rights without a necessary formalization of such which before the 19th century most such rights in most countries never had.

Some things, such as life and personal freedom, tend to be held as morally desirable in and of themselves across the majority of modern moral codes. Do you hold any similar things to be axiomatically good? If so, would not the collection of such things be a moral code itself?

The problem with simply holding something axiomatically good is the same as an a priori assumption of rights; others may disagree, and there would not be rational grounds for convincing otherwise, if it were just an assumption. Even something as seemingly simple as the preservation of one's own life being good may be disputed, perhaps by a suicide-bomber intent on martyrdom for example. I do have some things I would take as axiomatically good, but that is fundamentally a matter of subjective personal opinion and hard to "prove" in an objective sense.

That said there are clearly point of very broad agreement across almost all moral codes. Those can certainly be gathered up as a kind of consensus which, there being broad agreement on, would certainly be more privileged in a social context than the precepts of any one particular moral code. Indeed such things are pretty much inevitable because all people require some fundamentally similar things to feel stable and secure. That does tend to be more or less how society operates in the absence of a singular dominant moral code, and the end results are usually much superior. Since the law is an instrument of social order, not the defining force of it, the influence of such a consensus on shaping what the law preserves would be undeniable. But such a consensus would not be its own moral code because it lacks a freestanding self-justification or internal rationalization, and could not provide its own guidance on issues where the consensus breaks down. It's the difference between "almost everyone of these varied perspectives agrees X is a good idea" and "I think X is a good idea because Y."

[Versac]

Versac, I realize that Formless is digging his heels in and being unreasonable, but is it really crucial to act as the Word Usage Police to make sure that the legal uses of homicide, murder, and manslaughter are enforced? If you've got a good reason, then I'll subside, but I just don't think that it's necessarily conducive to free discussion.

As a rule, I enjoy extreme fluidity* of definitions. The murder/manslaughter conflation is a personal outlier, as I've found that those who make it tend to be:
• not fluent English speakers (children and ESL speakers, this merits friendly correction)
• Protestants (fallout from 6th Commandment translation issues, not worth addressing here)
• arguing to emotion in an intellectually dishonest way
I have issues with the last one, which Formless certainly seemed to have fallen into, what with his responses. The fact that 'murder' explicitly refers to the most heinous brand of homicide has naturally resulted in it becoming an emotionally charged word. Its inappropriate use in this last context therefore speaks to willful duplicity in pursuit of a goal. That's something worth questioning.
*definitions flow, they do not teleport

The problem with simply holding something axiomatically good is the same as an a priori assumption of rights; others may disagree, and there would not be rational grounds for convincing otherwise, if it were just an assumption. Even something as seemingly simple as the preservation of one's own life being good may be disputed, perhaps by a suicide-bomber intent on martyrdom for example. I do have some things I would take as axiomatically good, but that is fundamentally a matter of subjective personal opinion and hard to "prove" in an objective sense.

That said there are clearly point of very broad agreement across almost all moral codes. Those can certainly be gathered up as a kind of consensus which, there being broad agreement on, would certainly be more privileged in a social context than the precepts of any one particular moral code. Indeed such things are pretty much inevitable because all people require some fundamentally similar things to feel stable and secure. That does tend to be more or less how society operates in the absence of a singular dominant moral code, and the end results are usually much superior. Since the law is an instrument of social order, not the defining force of it, the influence of such a consensus on shaping what the law preserves would be undeniable. But such a consensus would not be its own moral code because it lacks a freestanding self-justification or internal rationalization, and could not provide its own guidance on issues where the consensus breaks down. It's the difference between "almost everyone of these varied perspectives agrees X is a good idea" and "I think X is a good idea because Y."

Why are the products of social order desirable? What objective measure are you using to establish a society as superior to true anarchy?

[MarshalPurnell]

The problem with simply holding something axiomatically good is the same as an a priori assumption of rights; others may disagree, and there would not be rational grounds for convincing otherwise, if it were just an assumption. Even something as seemingly simple as the preservation of one's own life being good may be disputed, perhaps by a suicide-bomber intent on martyrdom for example. I do have some things I would take as axiomatically good, but that is fundamentally a matter of subjective personal opinion and hard to "prove" in an objective sense.

That said there are clearly point of very broad agreement across almost all moral codes. Those can certainly be gathered up as a kind of consensus which, there being broad agreement on, would certainly be more privileged in a social context than the precepts of any one particular moral code. Indeed such things are pretty much inevitable because all people require some fundamentally similar things to feel stable and secure. That does tend to be more or less how society operates in the absence of a singular dominant moral code, and the end results are usually much superior. Since the law is an instrument of social order, not the defining force of it, the influence of such a consensus on shaping what the law preserves would be undeniable. But such a consensus would not be its own moral code because it lacks a freestanding self-justification or internal rationalization, and could not provide its own guidance on issues where the consensus breaks down. It's the difference between "almost everyone of these varied perspectives agrees X is a good idea" and "I think X is a good idea because Y."

Why are the products of social order desirable? What objective measure are you using to establish a society as superior to true anarchy?

Well, the state of anarchy tends to produce certain outcomes- lack of education, widespread poverty, early deaths across a swath of the population, etc and etc. Those outcomes can be objectively measured and compared with the performance of various social orders. As to why the presence of personal security and so are desirable, there are any number of moral codes that do lead to that conclusion and very few if any that would reject it. I would generally find utilitarian reasoning to be the best justification but like all moral codes it's still subjective and impossible to prove logically. However society relative to anarchy does produce outcomes which the vast majority of people holding the vast majority of moral and ethical perspectives would find desirable, which is why society and not anarchy is the true default position of human existence.

And at some point it generally is necessary to shunt logic aside when dealing with the real world and go with what actually works, regardless of how well it can be fitted into a theoretical framework.

[Big Phil]

I would say that we don't levy punishment based on what the family wants. We levy it based on the law.

Agreed, but why? Other societies levy punishment based on what the family wants, particularly if they're powerful and influential.

Because other societies shouldn't always be influential on what we choose as a society. We can either pay the high costs that a death penalty case would need to be prosecuted properly, with no promise of being 100% correct and thus potentially condemning an innocent to die, or we can keep the option open for that persons innocence, rehabilitation, etc., while paying less. It works as both a utilitarian aspect (less cost, more good), while also blocking the ethical dilemma of "what if we kill an innocent person?".

Death penalty cases don't NEED to cost a lot to prosecute (see China). They do because this country has adopted a very inefficient system that both fucks up the prosecution and the execution of the penalty. People are wrongly prosecuted, and then rather than simply being put to death, spend 10-20 years appealing their sentences, and then finally are either executed or else have sentences commuted or are set free. There are ways to get the prosecution correct in the first place, such that the cost of death penalty cases is lower, but since I don't believe we'd ever get the prosecution correct to begin with, I'm opposed to the entire concept.

[AMT]

Death penalty cases don't NEED to cost a lot to prosecute (see China). They do because this country has adopted a very inefficient system that both fucks up the prosecution and the execution of the penalty. People are wrongly prosecuted, and then rather than simply being put to death, spend 10-20 years appealing their sentences, and then finally are either executed or else have sentences commuted or are set free. There are ways to get the prosecution correct in the first place, such that the cost of death penalty cases is lower, but since I don't believe we'd ever get the prosecution correct to begin with, I'm opposed to the entire concept.

I said properly conduct the cases. Properly in this case would be one that would allow the accused all chances to legally prove their innocence as the other result is execution.

I agree, if we could create a more perfect system where we could, 100% prove guilt or innocence, as well as show that a person can never be rehabilitated, then in that case, the death penalty could be justified, as that would be for the greater good. But since we can't, then I oppose it as well.

[Bakustra]

Versac, I realize that Formless is digging his heels in and being unreasonable, but is it really crucial to act as the Word Usage Police to make sure that the legal uses of homicide, murder, and manslaughter are enforced? If you've got a good reason, then I'll subside, but I just don't think that it's necessarily conducive to free discussion.

As a rule, I enjoy extreme fluidity* of definitions. The murder/manslaughter conflation is a personal outlier, as I've found that those who make it tend to be:
• not fluent English speakers (children and ESL speakers, this merits friendly correction)
• Protestants (fallout from 6th Commandment translation issues, not worth addressing here)
• arguing to emotion in an intellectually dishonest way
I have issues with the last one, which Formless certainly seemed to have fallen into, what with his responses. The fact that 'murder' explicitly refers to the most heinous brand of homicide has naturally resulted in it becoming an emotionally charged word. Its inappropriate use in this last context therefore speaks to willful duplicity in pursuit of a goal. That's something worth questioning.
*definitions flow, they do not teleport

Okay, that's fine by me. I can understand that.

------------

Purnell, I asked you some very simple-to-understand questions, and you ran away from them. I asked you, quite simply, why the negative formulation was superior to the positive formulation, and offered several counter-arguments: 1) That state power is not the only means by which rights can be infringed upon, therefore in order to prevent infringements by the body public, there must be a positive protection of the right. 2) That some rights cannot be formulated negatively, such as the right to contract, as they have no meaning without the power to enforce them. 3) That rights are formulated positively in actual Constitutions around the world.

You responded by ignoring the fact that these were counter-arguments and writing irrelevant paragraphs about them. Is the discussion getting to be too much, too fast for you? Do you need to take a break? If so, feel free. Buried in the paragraphs are a couple of sentences pretending that the two are equivalent because rights supposedly exist in the null-spaces of the law. But then you have to explain why they are enumerated in law, and you respond by handwaving about how this isn't essential. Again, your argument fails descriptively. You also pretend that an enumeration of a right is functionally identical to your negative formulation in which rights need never be enumerated because of a similarity of wording, ignoring the body of case law and statutes dealing with the right to freedom of speech in the US.

I have described your argument as a mix of statism and libertarianism, because you use a statist basis for the basis of your arguments, but on rights you suddenly shift to the libertarian idea that rights are by default protected in some way. I'm curious as to how exactly you can justify this transition while rejecting natural rights- not in the arguments used, since those are

You also ignored the second part of my post, where I asked how you can evaluate a supposedly objective system using subjective means in some cases, but not in others. You instead whine, when challenged, that you are under no imperative to rank societies despite claiming that you can do so in response to my query! So am I to take it that you will not defend yourself, and will continue to pretend that your beliefs are self-evident? Perhaps you missed the key part of my question somehow. I will put it as simply as I can.

If the ranking of social orders is dependent on the individual and subjective, then what exactly locks morality and justice out from the law, given that perceptions of ideal social order will differ as morality and justice do?

This, of course, relies on you acknowledging the full impact of your statements, which I doubt that you will. But the US and Canada have differences. If you acknowledge that which is superior is ultimately up to the individual, as you have tacitly done by dismissing the differences, then you must realize that you have acknowledged that this makes ideal social orders a subjective thing. If you refuse to follow this reasoning, then you must explain which is better objectively, and retract your earlier statements.

Finally, if we're doing the personal remarks game, I have to note that your approach to the question of Canada and hate speech is very illuminating, and that apparently your negative formulation of rights has seeped into other parts of your life, as you have a negative formulation of admitting that you were wrong. Feel free to complain about how this is going too far, but I have to wonder why you're tossing insults if not for effect.

[MarshalPurnell]

Purnell, I asked you some very simple-to-understand questions, and you ran away from them. I asked you, quite simply, why the negative formulation was superior to the positive formulation, and offered several counter-arguments: 1) That state power is not the only means by which rights can be infringed upon, therefore in order to prevent infringements by the body public, there must be a positive protection of the right. 2) That some rights cannot be formulated negatively, such as the right to contract, as they have no meaning without the power to enforce them. 3) That rights are formulated positively in actual Constitutions around the world.

You responded by ignoring the fact that these were counter-arguments and writing irrelevant paragraphs about them. Is the discussion getting to be too much, too fast for you? Do you need to take a break? If so, feel free. Buried in the paragraphs are a couple of sentences pretending that the two are equivalent because rights supposedly exist in the null-spaces of the law. But then you have to explain why they are enumerated in law, and you respond by handwaving about how this isn't essential. Again, your argument fails descriptively. You also pretend that an enumeration of a right is functionally identical to your negative formulation in which rights need never be enumerated because of a similarity of wording, ignoring the body of case law and statutes dealing with the right to freedom of speech in the US.

I have described your argument as a mix of statism and libertarianism, because you use a statist basis for the basis of your arguments, but on rights you suddenly shift to the libertarian idea that rights are by default protected in some way. I'm curious as to how exactly you can justify this transition while rejecting natural rights- not in the arguments used, since those are

You also ignored the second part of my post, where I asked how you can evaluate a supposedly objective system using subjective means in some cases, but not in others. You instead whine, when challenged, that you are under no imperative to rank societies despite claiming that you can do so in response to my query! So am I to take it that you will not defend yourself, and will continue to pretend that your beliefs are self-evident? Perhaps you missed the key part of my question somehow. I will put it as simply as I can.

If the ranking of social orders is dependent on the individual and subjective, then what exactly locks morality and justice out from the law, given that perceptions of ideal social order will differ as morality and justice do?

This, of course, relies on you acknowledging the full impact of your statements, which I doubt that you will. But the US and Canada have differences. If you acknowledge that which is superior is ultimately up to the individual, as you have tacitly done by dismissing the differences, then you must realize that you have acknowledged that this makes ideal social orders a subjective thing. If you refuse to follow this reasoning, then you must explain which is better objectively, and retract your earlier statements.

Finally, if we're doing the personal remarks game, I have to note that your approach to the question of Canada and hate speech is very illuminating, and that apparently your negative formulation of rights has seeped into other parts of your life, as you have a negative formulation of admitting that you were wrong. Feel free to complain about how this is going too far, but I have to wonder why you're tossing insults if not for effect.

The run-around is getting quite tiresome, mostly from your willful refusal to understand. It has long since become obvious to me and to other posters here that you are simply throwing out arguments as you think of them, and pretending to have not received repeated, consistent answers, and tossing around personal attacks so I will get frustrated and leave. Such would be counted as a "win" at least in your mind, and is now the sole reason you persist.

Negative rights are superior to the formulation of positive rights because negative rights are closer to how rights actually exist and operate. As repeatedly mentioned, rights do not exist outside of a social context that recognizes them. However the behaviors that make up rights can be exercised in the absence of any kind of recognition of a meme-cluster collecting them together. It is a persistent legal principle that all things which have not been expressly forbidden, are legal. That is where the exercise of behaviors which, in certain contexts would be called "rights," have a de jure sanction. Since it is the purpose of law to uphold the public peace and social order all laws not germane to that purpose are of dubious necessity, so the burden to justify a restriction is on the state. And I have demonstrated repeatedly how supposed positive rights can be implemented as sanctions on undesirable behavior, which in fact is exactly how a "right to equality" or contract law is enforced. As for the expression of rights as positive, you ignore that the American constitution does not do so, instead laying out a list of restrictions the government is not permitted to enforce. But in any case a constitution is ultimately a cultural and social artifact that represents the evolution of political discourse in a society, often citing various moral prepositions as self-evident to justify the rights so extended and obscure the reality of the state as a hierarchical organization of power.

This is not at all a libertarian conception of rights because it denies the a priori, independent existence of rights. It is simply a recognition of the implications that 1.) that which has not been forbidden is legal, and 2.) that laws should be justified by a rational-basis test with regard to public peace and social order.

As for comparing social orders there is nothing inherent in the nature of a comparison that demands one side or the other be judged superior. The United States and Canada are so utterly similar in most measures that any differences are essentially minor. Both are liberal democracies with high standards of living, life expectancies, per capita incomes, education, food security, public services and etc. On most of those, and especially with regard to health care, Canada produces objectively superior outcomes to those in the United States. However, one must also account for any context that would explain discrepancies as a result of differing requirements for national government, public peace, and so on, as in the case of hate speech. It may be necessary for Canada to outlaw hate speech but not the United States. To go even further it may be necessary for Iran to ban blasphemy and stone people to death, but we can compare that state's social outcomes with any liberal democracy, note the drastic discrepancies in outcomes as well as legal systems, and doubt that Iran has chosen the correct path. On the other hand, looking at the United States and Canada, and seeing that the US has a tendency to mete out harsher prison sentences, we might also doubt but could probably find at least some differences in context like the types and severity of crime in the countries, and be less certain that Canada's practices would necessarily be better if implemented in the US.

Of course you continue to babble on about an "ideal social order" as if I had ever said or even implied such a thing exists. I said that some societies can be judged objectively better than others based on the outcomes they promote. That does not mean there is a "best" social order, only better ones, or that it is possible to say that one of any pair of societies is objectively better. Since the social order is completely reliant on historical, cultural, even geographic and economic contexts, a one-size-fits-all approach is not at all possible or even desirable. But that is what is commanded by assuming a priori, freestanding political rights exist outside the framework of society and shape law, rather than that society creates rights by evolutionary processes and gradually reduces the scope of what the law can legitimacy do (eg, no ex post facto punishments, no torture, no quartering troops in houses, the right to freedom of speech shall not be infringed up, etc). So your entire demand there is just a complete red herring to draw attention from the lack of substance in your posting.

[Bakustra]

Purnell, you can address my actual arguments instead of strawmanning me and ignoring parts of my post outright. Or you can look at this post and claim victory, jumping up and down before tripping over your chair. I mean, I'm happy either way.

[Lord Helmet]

Yea, some people just deserve to die for extreme crimes and without a death penalty they would become a burden on the state with no real chance of rehabilitation to become a productive member of society.

[Metahive]

"Productive member of society"? I'd be cautious about making that a make or break criterium when judging whether or not executions are kosher, considering the wealth of potential abuse it offers. Also, executing people is a higher burden on society just to ensure that wrongful executions are kept at minimum numbers, so nah to that argument.

[Singular Intellect]

"Productive member of society"? I'd be cautious about making that a make or break criterium when judging whether or not executions are kosher, considering the wealth of potential abuse it offers. Also, executing people is a higher burden on society just to ensure that wrongful executions are kept at minimum numbers, so nah to that argument.

Executions should be reserved for those whom we have zero expectation or intent to reintroduce into civilized society, based upon criteria like 'no possible doubt of guilt' and 'rehabilitation isn't going to happen'. At that point, why keep them alive?

[Metahive]

I don't see outliers like that to be a sufficient justification to give the government the radical power to kill its citizens. IMHO to justify the DP it has to be shown to have an overall beneficial effect on society (like net-lowered crimerates etc.), just like any other governmental actions.

[K. A. Pital]

I don't see outliers like that to be a sufficient justification to give the government the radical power to kill its citizens. IMHO to justify the DP it has to be shown to have an overall beneficial effect on society (like net-lowered crimerates etc.), just like any other governmental actions.

To be fair, among non-First World states the presence of the death penalty sometimes has a beneficial effect of lower crime rates. In First World states the crime dynamics are a bit different from other nations; in fact, I have argued that First World states are wealthy enough so that they can have the luxury of abandoning the death penalty, especially as the legal process does not make it any less expensive than incarceration.

[Lord Helmet]

"Productive member of society"? I'd be cautious about making that a make or break criterium when judging whether or not executions are kosher, considering the wealth of potential abuse it offers.

It is not just about them not being productive or even a burden but them also being a deadly threat to members of the general population if not properly confined, i agree individually each of the individual criteria are not alone reason to execute a person but when all these boxes are ticked then it becomes a valid method of dealing with them.

Also, executing people is a higher burden on society just to ensure that wrongful executions are kept at minimum numbers, so nah to that argument.

I do not see how imprisoning a highly dangerous person for his entire life so he cannot escape as well as hurt the guards or other inmates is less of a burden than a thorough investigation that should be done in every case anyway.

[Metahive]

I do not see how imprisoning a highly dangerous person for his entire life so he cannot escape as well as hurt the guards or other inmates is less of a burden than a thorough investigation that

That already came up in this thread and was supported by numbers. Putting people on death row is more expensive than putting them in a supermax. Ensuring you're not executing an innocent person is quite costly.

It is not just about them not being productive or even a burden but them also being a deadly threat to members of the general population if not properly confined, i agree individually each of the individual criteria are not alone reason to execute a person but when all these boxes are ticked then it becomes a valid method of dealing with them.

I already told you my objection to this, care to deal with that instead? It's just two or so posts up.

[Big Phil]

I do not see how imprisoning a highly dangerous person for his entire life so he cannot escape as well as hurt the guards or other inmates is less of a burden than a thorough investigation that

That already came up in this thread and was supported by numbers. Putting people on death row is more expensive than putting them in a supermax. Ensuring you're not executing an innocent person is quite costly.

That's not universally true. In the USA, it is correct that death penalty cases are more expensive, but in other place, the death penalty is far more affordable.

In any case, it's a red herring as, presumably, your issue with the death penalty is moral, not economic.

It is not just about them not being productive or even a burden but them also being a deadly threat to members of the general population if not properly confined, i agree individually each of the individual criteria are not alone reason to execute a person but when all these boxes are ticked then it becomes a valid method of dealing with them.

I already told you my objection to this, care to deal with that instead? It's just two or so posts up.

Yes, you've already given your opinion on why the death penalty is immoral. And Lord Helmet's opinion is that the death penalty does make sense in some cases. So what exactly do you want him to do to address your opinion?

[Metahive]

That's not universally true. In the USA, it is correct that death penalty cases are more expensive, but in other place, the death penalty is far more affordable.

Yes, nations like China which value the individual lives of their citizens way cheaper than the West and don't care as much if some innocent person is caught in the grinder. Is that really the yardstick you'd want to use?

In any case, it's a red herring as, presumably, your issue with the death penalty is moral, not economic.

No, that's not a Red Herring since I was responding to some guy who put forward the opinion that killing people is cheaper than imprisoning them.

Yes, you've already given your opinion on why the death penalty is immoral. And Lord Helmet's opinion is that the death penalty does make sense in some cases. So what exactly do you want him to do to address your opinion

O gosh, I gave my opinion on the DP in a thread that asks people for their opinion regarding the DP, just like everyone else who has replied so far. My, what a faux pas. Also, my argument wasn't moral, it was utilitarian. Not exactly the same thing. I asked people who are pro-DP to show that its introduction has an overall net-benefit effect on society. That a tiny minority of people are just "bad" enough to justify killing them in the opinion of some people here doesn't cut it.

[D.Turtle]

Do we really only value the lives of people if they lead a productive life and add value to society? Doesn't the fact those imprisoned are humans give them an intrinsic value? Even if they are imprisoned for life, and can never be left out, that does not mean they are worthless. Unless you stick them in a 1m by 1m box with zero access to the world, they can still have good experiences, etc that make life worth living.

[Zor]

For a modern industrialized society, no i don't think so. This is on moral grounds. Taking a Human Life can be justified when nessisary for a variety of reasons, but it is still an extreme act. If a viable alternative exists to taking a Human Life, that should be taken. I have not seen evidence which leads me to believe that the supossed benefits of the Death Penalty are present to a degree where it would be justifiable.

Zor

[GeorgeOrr]

My view on the death penalty has changed. I used to be against it in all cases, but now I reserve it for egregious cases, like those responsible for the financial situation in America. You execute the CEOs and bankers and Wall Street goons that caused the problem to set an example. What they did is far worse than what any convicted murderer has done.

[Lord Helmet]

That's not universally true. In the USA, it is correct that death penalty cases are more expensive, but in other place, the death penalty is far more affordable.

In any case, it's a red herring as, presumably, your issue with the death penalty is moral, not economic.

I did find this:

There's a claim that it is more expensive for the state to execute a criminal than to incarcerate him for life. Many opponents present, as fact, that the cost of the death penalty is so expensive (at least $2 million per case?), that we must choose life without parole ("LWOP") at a cost of $1 million for 50 years. Predictably, these pronouncements may be entirely false. JFA (Justice for All) estimates that LWOP cases will cost $1.2 million - $3.6 million more than equivalent death penalty cases.

And life without parole prisoners face, on average, 30 or 40 years in prison while the annual cost of incarceration is $40,000 to $50,000 a year for each prisoner or more! There is no question that the up front costs of the death penalty are significantly higher than for equivalent LWOP cases. There also appears to be no question that, over time, equivalent LWOP cases are much more expensive - from $1.2 to $3.6 million - than death penalty cases. Opponents ludicrously claim that the death penalty costs, over time, 3-10 times more than LWOP.

The $34,200 is conservative, if TIME Magazine's (2/7/94) research is accurate. TIME found that, nationwide, the average cell cost is $24,000/yr. and the maximum security cell cost is $75,000/yr. (as of12/95). Opponents claim that LWOP should replace the DP. Therefore, any cost calculations should be based specifically on cell costs for criminals who have committed the exact same category of offense - in other words, cost comparisons are valid only if you compare the costs of DP-equivalent LWOP cases to the cost of DP cases. The $34,200/yr. cell cost assumes that only 20% of the DP-equivalent LWOP cases would be in maximum security cost cells and that 80% of the DP-equivalent LWOP cases would be in average cost cells. A very conservative estimate. The $60,000/yr., for those on death row, assumes that such cells will average a cost equal to 80% of the $75,000/yr. for the most expensive maximum security cells. A very high estimate. Even though we are calculating a 75% greater cell cost for the DP than for equivalent LWOP cases, equivalent LWOP cases appear to be significantly more expensive, over time, than their DP counterparts. For years, opponents have improperly compared the cost of all LWOP cases to DP cases, when only the DP equivalent LWOP cases are relevant.

Annual cost increases are based upon: 1) historical increases in prison costs, including judicial decisions regarding prison conditions,and the national inflation rate; 2) medical costs, including the immense cost of geriatric care, associated with real LWOP sentences; 3) injury or death to the inmate by violence; 4) injury or death to others caused by the inmate (3 and 4 anticipate no DP and that prisoners, not fearing additional punishment, other than loss of privileges, may increase the likelihood of violence. One could make the same assumptions regarding those on death row. The difference is that death row inmates will average 6 years incarceration vs. 50 years projected for LWOP); 5) the risk and the perceived risk of escape; and 6) the justifiable lack of confidence by the populace in our legislators, governors, parole boards and judges, i.e. a violent inmate will be released upon society.

$75,000 for trial and appeals cost, for DP-equivalent LWOP cases, assumes that the DP is not an option. It is believed that this cost estimate is very low. It is over-estimated that DP cases will cost twenty times more, on average, or $1.5 million. This exaggerated estimate states that the DP will have twenty times more investigation cost, defense and prosecution cost, including court time, guilt/innocence stage, sentencing stage and appellate review time and cost than DP equivalent LWOP cases. Even though abolitionists have greatly exaggerated the cost of DP cases, DP cases still prove to be significantly less expensive, over time, than the DP equivalent LWOP cases.

6 years on death row, prior to execution, reflects the new habeas corpus reform laws, at both the state and federal levels. Some anti-death penalty groups speculate that such time may actually become only 4 years. If so, then DP cases would cost even that much less than the DP equivalent LWOP cases. However, the average time on death row, for those executed from 1973-1994, was 8 years. Therefore, 6 years seems more likely. Even using the 8 year average, the DP equivalent LWOP cases are still $1 million more expensive than their DP counterparts ($2 million @ 2% annual increase).

So the death penalty costs reside mainly in appeals costs. Life without parole prisoners get the same appeals and should be considered to bear the same costs.

[Singular Intellect]

I don't see outliers like that to be a sufficient justification to give the government the radical power to kill its citizens.

Society grants the government the 'radical power' to employ, fund and maintain large military forces along with varied and enormously powerful weaponry to be employed against any enemy against it. The costs in life during military combat operations historically numbered in the multi millions, and in modern 'civilized' times many thousands, both friendly and enemy.

I acknowledge the necessity, usefulness and fallibility of military forces. Yet you seem to be arguing I should start wringing my hands in distress over executing a criminal that meets the criteria I've previously stated in this thread?

Excuse me if rolling my eyes is a understatement of my mockery of such an argument.

[Singular Intellect]

Do we really only value the lives of people if they lead a productive life and add value to society?

I'm actually going to say yes here. When's the last time we saw any news about how depressing and sad it was for society when a known drug dealer died in a bad way?

Doesn't the fact those imprisoned are humans give them an intrinsic value?

No more so than any other human, and as per my above military example, society is quite comfortable killing percieved threats against it and doing so in large scale.

Even if they are imprisoned for life, and can never be left out, that does not mean they are worthless. Unless you stick them in a 1m by 1m box with zero access to the world, they can still have good experiences, etc that make life worth living.

Why should convicted, dangerous individuals who meet my previously asserted criteria have any such 'right'? 'Freedom' is a 'right' almost anyone would insist must be had by all. If we're fine taking that away via imprisonment, what makes life so special? Rights are arbitrary concepts both created and provided by society, and if someone actively decides to not be a positive member of society, what possible justification is there for them to benefit from society's efforts?