Thanas wrote:If that were true, Simon, then you also have to accept that 9/11 was a legitimate target. After all, if the Geneva convention does not apply here and Al-quida has not signed anything, how do you hold them accountable?
The legitimacy of the target hinges on the legitimacy of the war, and the relationship between the war aims of the group and the targets they pick as part of their warfighting.
I don't believe Al Qaeda's goals
justify, from an ethical standpoint, the 9/11 attacks. What they're fighting for, as far as I'm concerned, is simply
not good enough to justify committing that scale of evil.
And of course I can damn well say the same about any number of other attacks made by one party against another in pretty much every war since time began, or at least since recorded history began; we can sling "you did it too" and "but it's happened before" at each other from now until Judgment Day and accomplish nothing.*
That's a side issue as far as I'm concerned. The point is that the question of whether a given act of war is 'justified' or 'legitimate' simply
has to boil down to the question: "justified by what?" I said as much to Bakustra: the concept of justified and unjustified acts of war cannot be abstracted out from what the justification
is, from the issue of who you are fighting, and why, and how.
It is my judgment of those issues, in the specific context, that makes me label the 9/11 attacks as unjustified- as worse than unjustified, as an outright atrocity and a large one by historical standards. They are very far from the only thing I label that way; again, we could go over various examples of historical atrocities forever and it would do us no good.*
*I'd be just as happy, for the record, if we didn't go there- not so much because I fear the debate as because it's a pointless waste of our time to rehash the same old ground when we are probably actually fairly close to agreement on the subject of which acts of warlike aggression are legitimate and which aren't.
You might argue that they are bound by the customs of war. However, this is fishy on its own, especially if you yourself also feel not bound to abide by the same customs (like treating prisoners of war). In reverse, this argument justifies al-quida and that is not an argument that I think one should make.
I would argue that we
are bound, by custom if not by law, to abide by some reasonable and fair standard of prisoner treatment.
And it may only be custom, the common humanity that has driven people to behave in "chivalrous" ways towards defeated enemies throughout history. It may only be custom, if there are no laws that we can apply gracefully to the problem of fighting against something like Al Qaeda- a large organization of stateless renegades led by a charismatic warlord who fight for ideological causes while spitting on all the old conventions governing warfare between nations.
If there are no such laws, we should
invent such laws, because I doubt Al-Qaeda will be the last international terrorist organization.
But even under the old laws and the old customs, we have to recognize that the applicable standards for the use of force and for civilian casualties are
not those of conventional police work as practiced in the territory of a nation-state with overwhelming force on its side.
As I said before, to "arrest" bin Laden the way the police might arrest a Mafia boss would take a force the size of an army, equipped to fight like an army, and given permission to cause as much damage to the landscape as an army would. It would be difficult, dangerous, bloody, and indistinguishable from warfare as far as anyone caught up in it was concerned.
For this reason, when we apply the old laws and customs to the
specific act of tracking down and killing bin Laden, the conduct of the US military in this operation would seem to be justified. They sent a team of specialists to infiltrate the territory held by bin Laden's supporters, storm his combination home/command post, and kill him, much as they would an enemy general or minister.
If we are fighting a war, there is nothing particularly out of line about this.
If we are engaged in a police action there might be... but, Al Qaeda is too big and powerful for normal police practices to be applied, as anyone with a gram of sense knows from taking a casual glance at the realities.
Meanwhile, I find the attempt to phrase this as some kind of feudal struggle completely idiotic and can only find intellectual contempt for people who attempt such. Just because it is a kind of nice way to get out of the dilemma does not make it valid.
It's not a way out of the dilemma; it's a frame of reference in which to comprehend the idea of powerful men waging private wars- with all the bloodshed of a war, even with none of the formalities.
Ideally, wars would exist only within a very tightly defined framework. In practice, no one is powerful enough to enforce the framework on people who don't want to play along; bin Laden had enough loyal followers and a big enough home-court advantage to ignore the rules.
Calling him a criminal, with the implication of a small scale threat that ordinary law enforcement can handle, is simply ridiculous. Bin Laden was a man who aspired to control countries, and arguably had the resources to bring it off if he had been free to operate unopposed.
Thinking of him as a private individual with a large following, large enough that he
personally can interact with states on peer-to-peer terms- the practical equivalent of a major African warlord whose power rivals that of "his" government, say- makes a lot more sense to me.
And a man like that does, as an empirical matter, have the power to fight wars. If you'll forgive a reference to Roman history, Crassus's comment about the ability to raise one's own army comes to my mind... as does the role of political contests between powerful individuals who had the personal loyalty of armies, men whose
private significance was comparable to that of entire barbarian states on the Roman periphery, in the collapse of the Roman Republic and the birth of the Empire.
It's not really a "feudal" struggle because our side of the war is modern and not medieval, and because bin Laden's side isn't formally organized into a feudal structure. But that doesn't mean it's appropriate to interpret bin Laden as just another random private citizen given how large his personal power base was.
Also, Simon, your interpretation of the social contrat excluding people who reject it seems to be a bit off a reach as well.
Within reason, we can extend social-contract protections to people who reject the contract. This is a matter of collective generosity and decency- something we do to avoid turning ourselves into the sort of coldly pseudo-civilized regime that committed so many atrocities in the 20th century.
But there is, again as a practical matter, a limit; we have to balance mercy against prudence.
We can acknowledge the rights of the citizen who breaks a law and is pursued by our police because the disparity of power is so large. We can still catch the criminal, punish him, and stop him from doing it again without having to engage in brutality.
Against a force of armed men the size of an army, with a strong territorial base in a remote part of the world where the people are tied to them by strong cultural bonds, that breaks down. We could not have, could never have, sent Interpol to arrest bin Laden.
If we're going to oppose such a force at all, if we're not just going to sit back and let them do as they please*, then we are forced to relax our observance of the formalities, because the rules that work for arresting an individual criminal do not work for arresting an army.
*And don't rule this out as a rhetorical option; I am proposing it seriously and if it strikes you as a bad idea, so be it. What
would happen if we left Al Qaeda totally alone, and how bad would it be? Answer that question, and you've at least half-answered any further question about what should and should not be done to fight them.
Bakustra wrote:Simon, since you're carrying things over from other threads, might I point out that you're rewriting arguments to make them more reasonable again?
I think the problem is that I interpret certain people's arguments in a different light- I can read between the lines with a fairly good guess as to what Duchess is thinking, for instance, as a result of previous conversations I've had with her. So when I see you breaking out what is, to me, a cartoon version of her argument, into which you are free to read all your own biases, even at the expense of the argument itself... well, I step in because I agree with her to an extent in any case.
First of all, bin Laden did not, in fact, act like a warlord. Duchess says that because she is desperate to validate the actions of the US, but he behaved like any modern-day, Western or non-Western, political figure, issuing statements and rallying supporters. He does not act like a medieval warlord except in the vaguest of ways. I'm going to guess that he didn't think like a warlord either. This is just a guess based on his actions and statements, mind.
What is, to you, the definition of a "warlord?" Or an aristocrat?
Did medieval kings (shiekhs, princes, whatever) not make speeches and rally supporters? They had to do it by word of mouth, of course, since they were dealing with illiterate populations and mass media hadn't been invented yet. But do you honestly believe for a moment that Saladin or Joan of Arc wouldn't have been quite happy to tape-record speeches for distribution among their followers,
had they been able to do so?
It is impossible to understand any part of the developing world without understanding the interaction between old and new ideas. Nor is "the developing world" limited exclusively to brown people- the same is true of the American evangelical movement and the rural backwaters from which it draws its greatest strength.
In every corner of the globe that is not thoroughly permeated by the ideas of the industrial and post-industrial ages, we see interaction between the old and the new. People trying to run their societies in the old way (by military dictatorship) using new technology (tanks and radio broadcasts). People trying to run their societies in the new way (regular elections) and running into problems with old cultural mores (people reflexively voting for whichever patrón-equivalent happens to dominate the immediate area because he's the big man).
It happens. We have to deal with it as it happens, and one of the realities of that is that there are private individuals out there who have their own army-sized fighting forces and the finances to match, who have the
physical capability to fight wars large enough to pose a real challenge to nation-states, even if not to overthrow those nation-states outright.
Her argument was that the notion of "states" never entered the Muslim world, which is pretty goddamned false and honestly repugnant as well, being as it is just another, slightly disguised form of dismissing Muslims as medieval barbarians...
Conveniently, it is not merely false and repugnant, it is also a cartoon version of her argument.
Again, this is about the interaction of old and new, not about "all Muslims are barbarians." At most, it is about "
Osama bin Laden and his followers are barbarians," which is a very different argument from saying the people of a place like Turkey or Bangladesh- or, hell, Pakistan- are barbarians.
In addition, our leaders have acted publicly as though Bin Laden were a criminal, so if Duchess is right in this being the way that the upper echelons of power think (and I wouldn't be that surprised at this point), then they are deliberately deceiving the public in a number of ways.
I doubt very much that the people in the upper echelons of power think like Duchess. Duchess tends to think like a medieval holdover when it comes to matters of war, peace, honor, and dishonor, which is why she advanced the argument in the first place.
Barack Obama and George Bush do
not think like medieval holdovers; they think like modern politicians. There is a difference. Their concept of "honor," insofar as it exists at all, is much vaguer and much less important to their notion of good policy. They are less interested in the form, the sentiment, the "fitting-ness" of it all, and far more in calculation: will this help or hurt my election chances? Which interest groups do I pander to next?
This is the difference between the medieval aristocracy and the bourgeoisie that replaced them in power during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Despite being born long after this shift of power was finished in her home country, Duchess is on the
old side of that line, politically. Insofar as she espouses more modern opinions, that's because even old-style aristocrats were capable of changing with the times and recognizing new arguments about rights and law- as the French aristocrats who backed the French Revolution demonstrated quite effectively.
But it is nonetheless an interesting frame of reference to look at the war, even if a modern politician wouldn't think of it that way. Osama bin Laden may have been a private citizen, but he wasn't "just" a private citizen, any more than someone like Crassus was. Crassus played a major role in Roman politics for years because while he was a private citizen, he was a citizen whose physical resources were large enough to make him a major player in the state.
In most Western countries, it's hard to imagine any individual being that rich and powerful. Even someone like Bill Gates or Warren Buffett (or Donald Trump) isn't rich enough to be
powerful in their own right, not really; they're just rich enough to be a celebrity with a relatively loud popular voice.
In the developing world, things are different, individuals
can be that powerful, and we have to deal with that reality.
Furthermore, what would be foolish about trying Bin Laden, as you oh-so-cleverly implied?
What would be foolish is trying to arrest him against his will when he is perfectly capable of grabbing a rifle and objecting violently to the arrest. You know this, or should. Metahive knows it, and has made it quite clear that he has no objection to the way the actual commando raid against bin Laden's compound went down.
How about you?
I don't think you get what I was saying in my last paragraph. See, I was pointing out that the violation of the Geneva Conventions by someone did not invalidate them for everyone. Otherwise, ought we to have raped, tortured, and murdered every Axis POW in WWII, since those powers disregarded the Geneva Conventions? Hmm, Simon? The Conventions are a burden on the signers, but they are multilateral- an agreement that the signatories will treat the defined POWs and other categories according to the Conventions- not a set of bilateral agreements between all the signatory parties that are invalidated by the behavior of one, nor do they not apply suddenly to combatants of a nation that had not signed them.
(Note: there is no guarantee that I agree with Duchess, or anyone else you happen to disagree with, on the details of this issue).
The limits of our treatment of people who violate the Geneva Conventions, or any other laws of war, depends on the circumstances. When fighting a group which is
normally decent in its conduct but has started acting in vile ways, we should behave decently towards them, so that there won't be any major atrocities burning into their minds after they come back to their senses and start behaving decently once again.
When fighting a group of stateless renegades, one which denounces the laws of war as foul lies promoted by the strong to cover up their oppression of the weak, and who
preferentially target innocent people over those directly involved in the oppression in question... well, then we need a new set of rules. The old ones aren't going to cut it.
One big difference is that standards of evidence play a huge role- we have to be very careful about who we treat like a terrorist, much more careful than we do about who we treat like a POW, because POWs carry handy insignia telling us who they are and terrorists don't. No one worries about trying a POW to find out if they're a member of the enemy army or not; we
should worry, very much, about trying captives to make sure they're really terrorists.
When the terrorists are weak, the normal rules of law enforcement are good enough. When the terrorists have their own army, and territorial bases stretching across hundreds of kilometers of remote wilderness... well, again, we may well need to write up some new rules on how to deal with this in a humane yet efficient fashion.
I'm open to suggestions on what those laws should look like.
Metahive wrote:Simon Jester wrote:If they have enough firepower to fight on the scale of war, the legalities are irrelevant- they are fighting a war, and if anyone is going to stop them, they must be stopped using the tools of war. A war is going on, as defined by simple and practical measurements such as the number of random explosions per square mile, whether the legalists want to admit it or not.
Could be applied to the Triads, the Camorra, the N'Drangheta, the Russian Mafa or even some ghetto street gangs. Are you saying they all have the right to declare war upon nations and consider themselves legal institutions just because they're armed? I also question that Al-Quaeda constitutes some sort of military threat to degree you make them out here.
The Taliban certainly does; they
were a national government once upon a time, remember?
More generally,
no I do not think all groups can declare war by virtue of owning weapons. But as a brute fact, whether a war exists has nothing to do with formalities. This is why things like "undeclared war" have any meaning: because you can be killing people
en masse through organized application of large scale violence without
anyone having bothered to fill out the paperwork from a legal standpoint.
The Mafia is not powerful enough to do this- not large enough scale relative to what they'd need to be. They live in areas where the police (and the state militaries backing those police) have more than enough power to crush them at any time. When police come to arrest a Mob boss, the Mob boss doesn't get into a shootout with the police because they know how that would end. They may hire lawyers, they may bribe judges, they may intimidate... but they are in no way a credible challenge for the armed might of the state.
A nation is
always powerful enough to do this; that's practically the minimal definition of what makes a nation: the ability to wage war against an outsider trying to enforce their will on the nation.
But there is a big gap between national militaries and
normal criminal organizations. Al Qaeda lies in this gap, as do a lot of revolutionary movements and powerful warlords around the world. They really can touch off armed conflict on a large enough scale that it takes an army to stop them. What is that, if not the power- not the right, the
power- to fight a war?
But it does not take two nation-states to fight a war; war existed before nation-states.
We are talking about the modern, legal definition though, otherwise you'll have an exceedingly hard time to actually pin anything onto Al-Quaeda or Bin Laden.
Hardly.
If a medieval warlord had conspired to collapse a building and crush thousands of subjects of another warlord, no one would be surprised if the target responded by declaring war, then tracking down and killing the offender. It would be a perfectly straightforward situation: A commits a grievous offense against the people of B, B attempts to punish A, B realizes that this will take an army and a long time, so B settles in for a long war that ends in the death of A when someone storms A's house and kills A.
Seems perfectly reasonable to me as a description of a "war," by any definition of "war" that matches reality. Hell, there are war stories dating back to preliterate times that run that way.
How's Al Quaeda any different from other armed terrorist organisations like the Rote Armee Fraktion, the ETA or the PIRA that were never considered anything but criminal organisations and not some pseudo-nation body with the legal right to declare wars? You're just special pleading.
Who said anything about legal rights? I'm not talking about rights. I'm talking about power.
If the Rote Armee Fraktion was never treated as anything but a criminal organization, that just goes to show they weren't as big and strong as Al Qaeda. Not big enough to need an army to stop them, and not big enough to be taken seriously, because warfare
is how a state deals with openly declared enemies it takes seriously.
Whether Al Qaeda has the "right" to declare a war in some formal sense is immaterial if they have the power to make a war happen in the practical sense. Which they do, or at any rate did: by committing violent acts so provocative that their openly declared enemies were driven to respond with large scale organized violence rather than allow such provocations to continue.