His reading and mine don't conflict- he is referring to the military estimates, not the million killed estimate that I was arguing against. The reason I brought them up is that Broomstick declared that it was obviously reasonable to use the million dead estimate because the military had developed it, but I pointed out that the military did not develop it and they instead developed a wide range of estimates. I do not consider those estimates to be any more trustworthy, because they lack data like the actual dispositions of Japanese troops or the extent to which the civilian populace would fight. Such data is not likely to be available or easy to get, but that speaks against speaking authoritatively on the issue more than just accepting a million dead.Samuel wrote:Can you provide links to your sources or a way to check them? I tend to trust Sea Skimmer's reading of the situation more. Can you show something he is missing or a reason he is wrong?Bakustra wrote:They did extrapolate, and
The point is that there were more than just two alternatives available, even if the US did not consider them. Some of them may well have been more effective than the bombings, and it is difficult to really reduce things down to a single decision and declare that these were the only two effective options.We could have asked for a white peace after Midway for Japan. It would have saved a ton of lives. War is about achieving objectives that your opponent does not want you to achieve and is willing to kill in order to prevent you from getting what you want.That they were not seen as practical or desirable at the time does not mean that they were not practical in fact.
I'm not sure how this is an indictment of the atomic bombings over war in general.
I already mentioned that- my main argument with this is that strategic bombing is not something that really can be done morally, because doing it in a way to minimize casualties means that you minimize effectiveness.However, if we mentioned it, the Japanese would know which city were attacking next and could have defended it better.If they had wanted to spare the civilians, they could have told them this to make evacuations more effective, had they been heeded.
Of course, since it was illegal to read the leaflets in the first place, it is unknown how effective they would be. The people most likely to read them are the people most likely to already be planning to leave.
Leaflets and other psy-ops in Southeast Asia caused the largest number of Japanese surrenders before the end of WWII, but I doubt that the military would necessarily have heeded this and devoted resources to evacuation.
The atomic bombs were more destructive than anything except the Tokyo firebombing, so I think that they would have demanded more medical supplies proportionally, which would have been split between thirty-three or so cities if distributed.We were firebombing the whole country. I think no matter where they were, the medical supplies would have been needed.Because they didn't, heeding the warnings would have resulted in a splintered and ineffectual distribution of evacuations and medical supplies, possibly doing more damage because supplies would have to be rushed to Hiroshima from where they had been brought across Japan.
So the US didn't care about the civilian casualties then (although the US did not bomb Kyoto during the war, Kyoto wouldn't have been able to handle all the refugees).People left cities in Japan as well. The difference was there were no other cities to hide in- you could go to the countryside, but everything else was a target.PS: The English did evacuate a number of people from London during the Blitz, particularly children considered non-essential to industry, and a number of people left on their own.
Total war is a-ok with attacking the whole of enemy economic apparatus, which the World Trade Center counted as part of. Not to mention that that still applies to the atomic bomb, since they didn't target political and military leadership, but rather office and factory workers in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.Edit- on the 9/11 tangent, the atomic bombings are not comparable. Nuking the cities destroyed military targets that were in them. By contrast, destroying the World Trade Center did not destroy military targets. In fact, from a military point of view it was counter productive- it would have been more intelligent to have those two planes back up to hit the White House or Congress and the Pentagon. As it is, the didn't get the former and did slight damage to the latter.
If you can hit actual political and military leadership and you pass it up to hit office workers, you are just aiming to cause as much carnage as possible.
Actually the Japanese Army and Navy had nuclear programs that guessed correctly that the US probably had single digits of nuclear weapons, which is why we dropped one on Nagasaki just days afterward- to make it look like we had more.Broomstick wrote:^ This.Alyeska wrote:The Japanese might have known they couldn't win, but they still believed the US could loose. Make the fight bloody enough and the Allies have to stop fighting. The nuclear bombs demonstrated that a single bomber can flatten an entire city. Now what happens when 300 bombers fly? The nuclear bomb meant the US couldn't actually loose. And once the Japanese realized this, that meant resistance to the death only meant death, nothing else.
It wasn't just that the US would win - the Japanese couldn't touch them. No going down in a blaze of glory, with a last ditch swing to take as many of the enemy with you as you could.... No, atomic warfare meant the enemy would destroy your nation and kill you without even risking a scratch. No chance to poke the enemy in the eye and spit in his face as he shoots you, no, just death from the sky, and you can't reach him.
Of course, now we know the US simply didn't have enough A-bombs to do that... but the Japanese couldn't know that then. How many did we have? 2? 5? 10? Hey, we'd listed 30 cities on those leaflets, did we have 30 atomic bombs? How fast were we making them?