Zinegata wrote:Likewise, the Philippine Division and numerous American formations - which formed the core of Bataan's defense - had been in constant fighting on the way to retreat to Bataan. The former in particular was in very bad shape, and when they reached Bataan they were greeted by immediate orders of half-rations. Yet they did manage to reorganize their troops and their lines. Again, the failure of leadership at Singapore is clear for all to see. There is a reason why Wainwright was awarded the Medal of Honor, while Percival was denied a Knighthood.
Percival by contrast essentially allowed his troops to vaporize. Discussion of pre-war fortifcations along the Johore is frankly moot, when Percival had 6,000 trained engineers yet he refused to throw up any entrenchments along the Johore because he feared it would damage morale. Bluntly, such stupidity would have been more damaging to morale - as there was a feeling amongst the Commonwealth troops that incompetent British commanders were sending them off to die needlessly - which Percival did do to the Australian 22nd Brigade by covering his ears and pretending it didn't need reinforcements. That's why the Australians started deserting in the first place - and why some captured Indian soldiers ended up signing up for Japan's INA.
Try again. If one was attempting to argue that Wainwright or the Americans fought better than Singapore defenders, guess what? You're right.
I'm contesting however that the defeat and dissolution was due mostly to the fault of the British commanders responsible.
Let's see the original point through shall we? The retreat of the Phillipines 1st Division as well as American forces were facillitated by the relatively larger resources of the American army, including trucks. The Indian Corp on the other hand, faced Japanese light armour, and withdrew through the jungle/swamp on foot, re-established another fighting positiono, was forced back again, routed through roads and jungle, re-established itself, fought again, retreated..... and etc UNTIL it was finally expended in Johore.
The Phillipines division on the other hand had fought holding actions to secure the retreat into Baataan at that point. While they were major battles, the scale of the losses is not similar. The Indian Corp did not collapse after one battle. They effectively collapsed after withdrawing the whole of Malaya coast, fighting more than 5 major battles before they did collapse. And they did it without the tanks, less artillery, literally no aircover/anti aircraft guns the Phillipine defenders enjoyed.
Perceival was also leading a multi-national, coalition force, unlike MacArthur which held effective command powers over both Phillipines and American forces.
You also brought up Stimson old argument that they failed to fortify the "northern" coasts of Singapore. For your information, there WAS a defensive line built in Johore, ordered by Perceival. Of course, it wasn't fully completed because pre-war construction didn't occur, and more importantly, other engineering efforts had been built in Kuala Lumpur and etc. If the argument becomes that Perceival should had concentrated his engineering efforts in Johore, then this ignores the oders and campaign strategy that Perceival, Brooke Popham and Wavell established and he had to follow. Namely, fight holding actions in the north of Malaya, holding key critical points which would allow more reinforcements to arrive to fight the Japanese. The Singapore Strategy. Perceival could and was criticised for holding on to positions far longer than warranted,believing that holding longer at Kuala Lumpur for example would buy more time for convoys to arrive. yet, at the same period of time, his immediate superiors and later, Wavell was ordering him to launch "aggressive" actions up north so as to stymie the Japanese.
As for the 22nd Brigade, I would highlight that it was slightly more complex than that, and a proper discussion would talk about the incompetence of Bennet as well as the failure in establishing lines of communication here. Essentially, Perceival had limited forces and he held men in reserve to meet the feint at Tekong. His HQ failed to realise the threat involved due to poor communications and then Bennet screwed up his defensive lines and movement of reinforcements.
A failure on the part of the commanders certainly, but hardly one that "doomed" Singapore resistance or shortened it by months. Such failure was already guranteed, as lack of ammunition denied artillery fire support, meaning the Fortress of Singapore, even its field artillery could not act effectively as counter-battery fire, much less provide support to her troops. Limited airpower.
Thus, assertions that Churchill was blind to the situation on the ground are frankly a bit exagerrated - to the point of being just "fashionable Churchill-bashing". Based on the resources available, high command (Churchill) could have reasonably expected sustained resistance.
Except Dills pre 1941, Alan Brook CIGS during the invasion did not believe that Perceival could hold on much longer. Brooke in 23 January decrided the despatch of 18th division to Singapore.
Quote" On the other hand, reinforcemetns for Singapore might well be too late, as turned out to be the case with the 18th Division, whilst reinforcements to Burma might still save the situation there"
This was while the Japanese were still completing the conquest of Johore. It also ignores other committee meetings earlier where Brooke discussed whether planned reinforcements to Singapore was too late and Burma might be a better choice.
Even fucking Yamashita himself agreed that they could have resisted for weeks if not months and there was nothing he could have done about it.
And Yamashita was a blowhard, more importantly, the exact quote in his memoirs was that the British could had held off his initial attack with the men he despatched, which would mean it would take him weeks or months to build up supplies for ANOTHER attack.
His difficulties were entirely self inflicted, from the fact that he failed to build up and gather supplies, the return of one Japanese division, the failure to shift IJA aircraft up fast enough to exploit captured landing fields which decreased his airpower.......
Oops, sorry, that's ignoring the fact that the Japanese resources were on a shoestring and these difficulties, along with his determination to capture Singapore as a gift for the Emperor for his anniversary determined the risky nature of the attack. Of course, the problem is, while you discount the material difficulties of the Japanese which would had prevented another, later attack and which did hinder the assault on Singapore, you fail to extend that courtesy to the British who were operating under similar material problems.
But the British commanders on the ground lost their nerve. They were inexcusably - arguably criminally - incompetent. That they were not sacked by Churchill is a valid argument against Churchill, but still does not excuse Percival or his other generals. If they wanted to check out, they should have done it themselves and not taken the whole garrison with them.
I disagree. The British garrison was limited in ammunition, the city centre was crammed with refugees and firefighting was gone. The garrision at that point in time was already scattered and morale/discipline was gone. Perceival and other responsible commanders surrended, citing the futility of further fighting and the damage it would had done to civilian refugees. Left unspoken was the fear of further Japanese brutality, already seen in Alexender hospital.
Furthermore, pre-war estimates was that the Malayan garrison would have to hold out for 70 to 90 days before the fleet arrived to secure naval superiority. The defences of Malaya was not significantly improved to meet her new needs. Given the increased Japanese capabilities, its indeed remarkable that despite the odds, the Malayan forces DID manage to hold out for 70 days, the pre-war estimate of how long they could hold out without relief. They were short infantry battalions, short on aircraft, had insufficient artillery even to meet a less limited Japanese threat. The expected danger of Japan occuyping the Kra isthmus, being able to secure an advanced base in Indo-China and etc saw the evolvement of the Malayan appreciation, which demanded 556 aircraft, preferably 700 for defence, an additional 10 battalions for basic security, more artillery and anti-tank guns. Dill lobbied for armoured cars and tanks, and Perceival survey was that they would require 2 tank battalions to meet the expected Japanese tanks.
They had none of this. They did receive 6 additional battalions, being short by only 3 battalions, but they were short of 400 odd aircraft. And the RAF were the MAIN defenders of Malaya. The most important part of the British shield was not filled, and yet, I repeat, they MET the expected period of relief of 70 days before they surrended.
Let him land on any Lyran world to taste firsthand the wrath of peace loving people thwarted by the myopic greed of a few miserly old farts- Katrina Steiner
