Immortality - Is it worth it?

[ArmorPierce]

You can feel like that if you want. There are assorted thought experiments that deconstruct your viewpoint down to its basic flaws, but every time a transhumanist does that it just causes the opposition to repeat 'but... dead... is... dead...' over and over again, so I won't do it again now.

Bear in mind that from the point of view of the people who don't believe in the 'continuity flaw' philosophy, you are the one kidding yourself. I'm pretty confident you're wrong because this fits neatly into a big set of intuitive human beliefs that look really silly once you actually try to replicate the basic mechanisms of intelligence and consciousness. The vast set of utterly wrong human intuitive beliefs about physics, chemistry, biology etc have fallen to empirical enquiry and are now drilled out of children in school. The equally large set of wrong intuitive beliefs about psychology and consciousness has resisted assault until very recently, but we're now finally starting to make some progress on it.

A copy is a copy. A new individual, not the same person. THe new person will feel like he's the same person but he is not. Lets say you are copied while still being a live. Would you have a problem with the new individual putting you in a cage and taking over your life or killing you because you're no longer necessary?

[GrandMasterTerwynn]

You can feel like that if you want. There are assorted thought experiments that deconstruct your viewpoint down to its basic flaws, but every time a transhumanist does that it just causes the opposition to repeat 'but... dead... is... dead...' over and over again, so I won't do it again now.

Bear in mind that from the point of view of the people who don't believe in the 'continuity flaw' philosophy, you are the one kidding yourself. I'm pretty confident you're wrong because this fits neatly into a big set of intuitive human beliefs that look really silly once you actually try to replicate the basic mechanisms of intelligence and consciousness. The vast set of utterly wrong human intuitive beliefs about physics, chemistry, biology etc have fallen to empirical enquiry and are now drilled out of children in school. The equally large set of wrong intuitive beliefs about psychology and consciousness has resisted assault until very recently, but we're now finally starting to make some progress on it.

A copy is a copy. A new individual, not the same person. THe new person will feel like he's the same person but he is not. Lets say you are copied while still being a live. Would you have a problem with the new individual putting you in a cage and taking over your life or killing you because you're no longer necessary?

I see you've graduated from the "restate the same argument that was already addressed because your brain refuses to see that the argument has already been stated" school of debate.

If you were magically duplicated, from the standpoint of the outside world, both instances of you are you. As far as both copies are concerned, they are both you. It's just that one of you will shortly have the memory of caving the other's skull in with a tire-iron out of some irrational fear that the other will try to 'take over' your life and cave your skull in with a tire-iron.

For the instance of you who couldn't get to the tire-iron quickly enough, your individual experience has just come to a bloody, violent, end. Very inconvenient for that instance of you. However, the information that makes up you is still preserved in the instance of you who is still alive.

Let's take the magical duplication thing a step further. Let's say that you are taken into the magical duplicator and duplicated. Only the machine takes the liberty of redistributing half of the isotopes in the first instance of you into the second. If you both were to be incinerated and analyzed via mass spectrography, there would be no discernible difference between the two of you. Now which of you is the copy? Is it instance A, who is convinced that he is you, and that instance B is the evil clone hellbent on taking over his life? Or is it instance B, who is convinced that he is you, and that instance A is the evil clone hellbent on taking over his life? Or is the copy whichever of you couldn't get to the tire-iron fast enough?

[K. A. Pital]

If you were magically duplicated, from the standpoint of the outside world, both instances of you are you. As far as both copies are concerned, they are both you.

However, from the standpoint of each copy the copy is "you", whereas the other copy is not. Objectively both experiment objects will stop being identical as soon as their experience diverges (i.e. next split-second after copying), and considering self-awareness, each copy would consider itself the prime object even during the process of copying. You can't just handwave this with "well, everybody thinks that's you" - both copies are a consciousness, which means not just being aware of the outside world, but also being aware of their own existence. The opinion of others is irrelevant to the experiment, because they are only experiencing awareness of the object from the outside - thus ignoring any issues arising with self-awareness.

[ArmorPierce]

I see you've graduated from the "restate the same argument that was already addressed because your brain refuses to see that the argument has already been stated" school of debate.

If you were magically duplicated, from the standpoint of the outside world, both instances of you are you. As far as both copies are concerned, they are both you. It's just that one of you will shortly have the memory of caving the other's skull in with a tire-iron out of some irrational fear that the other will try to 'take over' your life and cave your skull in with a tire-iron.

The copy is 'you' for everyone except for the copied individual. The copy will feel like he's you but that's of little comfort for the copied.

For the instance of you who couldn't get to the tire-iron quickly enough, your individual experience has just come to a bloody, violent, end. Very inconvenient for that instance of you. However, the information that makes up you is still preserved in the instance of you who is still alive.

Obviously the information is preserved, doesn't make that person 'you' in a literal sense, you're dead.

Let's take the magical duplication thing a step further. Let's say that you are taken into the magical duplicator and duplicated. Only the machine takes the liberty of redistributing half of the isotopes in the first instance of you into the second. If you both were to be incinerated and analyzed via mass spectrography, there would be no discernible difference between the two of you. Now which of you is the copy? Is it instance A, who is convinced that he is you, and that instance B is the evil clone hellbent on taking over his life? Or is it instance B, who is convinced that he is you, and that instance A is the evil clone hellbent on taking over his life? Or is the copy whichever of you couldn't get to the tire-iron fast enough?

Completely different situation than what I am referring to. Making a digital copy and then downloading it into a copy is purely what I am talking about. The only way I could see of computerizing yourself would be by doing it over time rather than all out at once for example.

As for your situation, they are now two separate individuals who will never be the same individual. Who is the original individual doesn't matter and has nothing to do with them being the same individual now.

[Singular Intellect]

The only way I could see of computerizing yourself would be by doing it over time rather than all out at once for example.

So what's the difference between gradually replacing all brains cells with new/artificial ones over a period of time, and doing so instantly?

Scenario 1: Every brain cell is scanned, destroyed and replaced by a new, identical one. Process takes many days.

Scenario 2: Every brain cell is scanned, destroyed and replaced by a new, identical one. Process takes one second.

What's the difference? Even if scenario two resulted in a blackout for the second, how's that different from me blacking out now, with no memory, sensation or recollection during said blackout? Did I 'die' and then get reborn?

[K. A. Pital]

The only way I could see of computerizing yourself would be by doing it over time rather than all out at once for example.

So what's the difference between gradually replacing all brains cells with new/artificial ones over a period of time, and doing so instantly?

Scenario 1: Every brain cell is scanned, destroyed and replaced by a new, identical one. Process takes many days.

Scenario 2: Every brain cell is scanned, destroyed and replaced by a new, identical one. Process takes one second.

What's the difference? Even if scenario two resulted in a blackout for the second, how's that different from me blacking out now, with no memory, sensation or recollection during said blackout? Did I 'die' and then get reborn?

The difference is that continuity of the object is not in question at all in the partial example (unless, of course, for the entire duration of the process the consciousness has to be "switched off"). A second individual consciousness identical (and by that we mean fully identical) to the original one is never born at all, which means the copy never existed in the first place and the entire dilemma evaporates at the stage of "there wasn't a copy, so any discussion is pointless".

If the person remains self-aware of itself during the process of replacement of his brain, this means there was no copy and that's the end of it. If doesn't mean you can't go with "one second", but during that second both minds will have to be active and realize themselves as part of ONE mind, not as separate entities. If that is what happens (sort of like your mind suddenly realizing there's an entire second brain for it to use and then the first part of your brain is destroyed) - there is no copying, only expansion/contraction of the capabilities of a single mind, which is self-aware and one.

As soon as a self-aware individual entity is created, that entity is a new living mind and may not be claimed as being the original - the original is still another self-aware and individual entity. If they can be aware of themselves and each other as separate beings, they are no longer one. Your braincell is not aware of itself - so losing one or a part of them isn't "destroying an individual", but your entire brain is self-aware. How simple is that? That's why the destruction of non-self-aware elements is not murder.

By contrast, if we were to imagine a superintelligence with sentient subroutines, as sci-fi loves, those subroutines would be self-aware and thus their termination would constittue murder even if they are a part of a greater mind. Self-awareness is important.

Finally, temporarily non-self-awareness is not an argument against the point. When we sleep we are not self-aware at the instance. However, killing a person in his sleep is not any less a killing than doing so while he is actively aware of himself, i.e. awake.

[Guardsman Bass]

Finally, temporarily non-self-awareness is not an argument against the point. When we sleep we are not self-aware at the instance. However, killing a person in his sleep is not any less a killing than doing so while he is actively aware of himself, i.e. awake.

I'd also point out that you can objectively measure continuous brain activity even when the subject is asleep. That's different from complete cessation of brain activity, and the replacement of the physical brain that generates it.

[Simon_Jester]

But is brain activity the same as self-awareness, consciousness, sentience, or whatever we're using to define who is alive and who isn't?

[Broomstick]

There seems to be connection between all those phenomena, yes.

[Simon_Jester]

Yes, but if we're going to pick nits about what is and is not 'alive' or whether a mind in the process of being copied is one person, two people, or zero people at various stages during the process...

...I don't think it makes sense. At least, not without nailing down our terms very carefully.

[K. A. Pital]

But is brain activity the same as self-awareness, consciousness, sentience, or whatever we're using to define who is alive and who isn't?

To a great extent it is. For example, persons in a vegetative state are judged as being effectively dead (people often refer to them as "living dead" or "vegetables" colloquially) because their brain activity has ceased and there's almost zero probability of it resuming - and once it ceased, self-awareness is no longer possible, so it is a necessary condition. Cessation of brain activity is death. It doesn't matter if a husk remains "alive" (i.e. demonstrates other typical biological life characteristics) thereafter. Forcible and complete cessation of brain activity is, therefore, killing of a living mind.

In fact, brain activity is about the best thing we have to separate complete death from non-death states (i.e. respiratory or circulatory collapse which hasn't yet caused a brain death). Science hasn't come up with a better separator for quite a while now.

[PeZook]

To a great extent it is. For example, persons in a vegetative state are judged as being effectively dead (people often refer to them as "living dead" or "vegetables" colloquially) because their brain activity has ceased and there's almost zero probability of it resuming - and once it ceased, self-awareness is no longer possible, so it is a necessary condition. Cessation of brain activity is death. It doesn't matter if a husk remains "alive" (i.e. demonstrates other typical biological life characteristics) thereafter. Forcible and complete cessation of brain activity is, therefore, killing of a living mind.

But this definition is brought about by the fact the human brain has no capability to shut down and resume function safely: once activity ceases, it's gone, hence why CPR needs to restore the body's support functions within 4 minutes or so, before the sugar and oxygen in the blood runs out.

If humans had the ability to shut themselves down, we'd have different definitions, and that's a problem future human society will have to tackle. Hell, there are creatures (usually simple ones, yeah) that can survive while frozen and resume activity even now...

[K. A. Pital]

But this definition is brought about by the fact the human brain has no capability to shut down and resume function safely: once activity ceases, it's gone, hence why CPR needs to restore the body's support functions within 4 minutes or so, before the sugar and oxygen in the blood runs out.

Exactly. This is a problem, because the human mind is not just a collection of neurons, but also the electrical signals between them which, if shut down, mean the brain's dead. The "turn off/on" concepts stem from mechanical engineering and not from biology.

If humans had the ability to shut themselves down, we'd have different definitions, and that's a problem future human society will have to tackle. Hell, there are creatures (usually simple ones, yeah) that can survive while frozen and resume activity even now...

If they did, but they (us) don't. As for the creatures that survive frozen and resume activity, usually their brain lacks either higher nervous activity alltogether or lacks consciousness/intellect. This makes the problem a lot easier. Why? Because a mind driven almost entirely by instincts, with almost zero long-term memory (I read in a science journal that the long-term memory span of a cat equals around three days) can technically die and be restored, and nobody would notice the difference. In a technical sense, there wasn't even a living intellect there, and the nervous command center can resume activity even after what would mean certain mind death for a human.

If we were to apply this analogy to humans, this would mean a man's brain resumes activity while he loses all memories and his personality and starts anew, utilizing mostly instincts and genetic memory. A case of utter amnesia is usually what we consider an irreversible change of personality and one of the few cases when people say that "the former Mr/Ms A is gone", treating the complete amnesiac as an entirely new individual.

Whichever angle you look at it, the problems stemming from human biology can't be handwaved.

[PeZook]

If they did, but they (us) don't. As for the creatures that survive frozen and resume activity, usually their brain lacks either higher nervous activity alltogether or lacks consciousness/intellect. This makes the problem a lot easier. Why? Because a mind driven almost entirely by instincts, with almost zero long-term memory (I read in a science journal that the long-term memory span of a cat equals around three days) can technically die and be restored, and nobody would notice the difference. In a technical sense, there wasn't even a living intellect there, and the nervous command center can resume activity even after what would mean certain mind death for a human.

We don't right now. But a human-like (not necessarily human, an AI built from scratch would qualify) mind running on a mainframe somewhere would have this capability and would retain all memories (because they'd be stored on a different medium than the brain's neural network).

Suddenly the definition of mind-death changes a lot, doesn't it? And if the AI is running in an android body, the only difference is the hardware. Of course, It's obviously a philosophical question

[K. A. Pital]

Yup, once you separate memory, personality and de-facto activity (i.e. current thinking process) into neat little black boxes which can be switched on and off at will without any damage to either of the components, you changed the definition of mind death. Once humans get to the point, I think, that question will be a philosophical one again. That's mind-bogglingly advanced compared to bare biology and even simple brain simulations inside computer software, which are as of now our best Turing AI bet.

[Broomstick]

But is brain activity the same as self-awareness, consciousness, sentience, or whatever we're using to define who is alive and who isn't?

To a great extent it is. For example, persons in a vegetative state are judged as being effectively dead (people often refer to them as "living dead" or "vegetables" colloquially) because their brain activity has ceased and there's almost zero probability of it resuming

[Nitpick] (for the sake of accuracy) - The correct term for when all brain activity has ceased is "brain death". A person in a "vegetative state" still retains some very minimal brain activity, typically sufficient to keep the heart beating and the lungs working but no more. As there have been cases of people spontaneously returning to higher brain function after that state, and the body is able to maintain a minimal level of self-support (heartbeat and breathing) such a person is not regarded as dead, though the longer they persist in such a state the lower the odds of recovery.

Under current US law, if a person is brain dead you can harvest organs or disconnect life support without getting the courts involved. If they are in a vegetative state you can do neither, and if you do, under the law it's killing someone and you will be looking at a murder trial. [/nitpick]

[U-95]

I agree. The fact the brain cannot shut down (at least with our current knowledge) is something very important. At most, it can enter into a kind of "stand-by" mode (when sleeping, unconscious, coma...)

If you could pass what's contained on the human brain to another support that had properties more akin to computers (ability to turn on and off, to be serviceable in a way it didn't mean the loss of data, just needing electricity and without the need of sleep, eat, drink, etc) it's difficult to see how human could be that, being something so different (hope you can understand me). Even one may ask if the one who suffered that Frankenstein-like fate would not become mad for that largue change.

[GrandMasterTerwynn]

I agree. The fact the brain cannot shut down (at least with our current knowledge) is something very important. At most, it can enter into a kind of "stand-by" mode (when sleeping, unconscious, coma...)

If you could pass what's contained on the human brain to another support that had properties more akin to computers (ability to turn on and off, to be serviceable in a way it didn't mean the loss of data, just needing electricity and without the need of sleep, eat, drink, etc) it's difficult to see how human could be that, being something so different (hope you can understand me). Even one may ask if the one who suffered that Frankenstein-like fate would not become mad for that largue change.

Eh?

If you had a computer powerful enough to properly simulate all the neurochemical activity necessary to describe a working brain, and the storage space necessary to describe all the connections (or whatever the granularity requirement for a human consciousness sim indistinguishable from the one running on wetware actually is,) I do not see why a person uploaded to such a machine would not be human.

It's like running Dosbox, or a Nintendo emulator, or a Commodore 64 emulator on your personal computer. To the DOS software/Nintendo game/C64 software, it can't tell that it's not running on original hardware.

You'd still be you, regardless if you were running on three pounds of squishy organic paste or The Server Farm of Tomorrowtm. If you were given read/write access to the simulation itself in order to optimize its execution in ways not possible in biology then, yes, you could well become post-human. However, if the simulation was constrained to biological rules, and you had no way to change that, then digital you will not magically become some post-human Terminator hellbent on destroying all that is squishy.

[U-95]

No, I mean that perhaps some people could be affected by the implications of having their mind uploaded to a computer -no food, no need to sleep, etc- and losing their body, having it replaced with other artificial. I'm also aware that also mean robots, not just an inmobile computer and that the said robot could have functions that mimic the human ones.

Sorry, perhaps to think on the RPG Cyberpunk 2020 and the nasty things that happen there when you abuse of cybernetic implants (usually you become a cyberpsychopath whose objetive is to kill everyone made of flesh and blood) is influencing me.

[GrandMasterTerwynn]

No, I mean that perhaps some people could be affected by the implications of having their mind uploaded to a computer -no food, no need to sleep, etc- and losing their body, having it replaced with other artificial. I'm also aware that also mean robots, not just an inmobile computer and that the said robot could have functions that mimic the human ones.

Ever heard of a game called The Sims? Depending on your method of upload, you could directly wire the digital human into a digital body that periodically demands digital food. You could also simulate the cues that feed into the brain circuits that govern the circadian rhythm, inducing sleep/wake cycles. If a digital person needs such aids to get them through the transition process, I have no doubt such aids would be fairly straightforward to supply.

[U-95]

No, I mean that perhaps some people could be affected by the implications of having their mind uploaded to a computer -no food, no need to sleep, etc- and losing their body, having it replaced with other artificial. I'm also aware that also mean robots, not just an inmobile computer and that the said robot could have functions that mimic the human ones.

Ever heard of a game called The Sims? Depending on your method of upload, you could directly wire the digital human into a digital body that periodically demands digital food. You could also simulate the cues that feed into the brain circuits that govern the circadian rhythm, inducing sleep/wake cycles. If a digital person needs such aids to get them through the transition process, I have no doubt such aids would be fairly straightforward to supply.

I mention that above; that robot could be built to have to feed, etc. (no, not a food composed of screws, nuts, machine oil, etc) and programation that simulated circadian rythms. However, you'd know you're no longer a human but a robot and that could affect some people. At least if it was done without their consent and/or checking if due to his/her psychological profile is a good idea.

[Justforfun000]

Wait a sec....I'm just noticing that comment about the cat...3-day maximum long term memory? How is that possible? That means you could leave a cat for a week and by the time you return, you'd be a stranger to them. That doesn't make sense...

Most animals seem to have long-term memory of a significant length in MY experience..what is this study? Can you find it? Thanks..

[U-95]

Wait a sec....I'm just noticing that comment about the cat...3-day maximum long term memory? How is that possible? That means you could leave a cat for a week and by the time you return, you'd be a stranger to them. That doesn't make sense...

Most animals seem to have long-term memory of a significant length in MY experience..what is this study? Can you find it? Thanks..

In my opinion, it could work just for kittens whose brain is still developing, but that's just wild especulation.

[Feil]

Given how poorly I can remember the things that I did three days ago except the ones that I can reconstruct from my knowledge that three days ago was Sunday and that there are certain things that I always do on Sundays, I'd say that a three day kitty memory span is actually pretty good