FDR Pearl Harbor conspiracy theory

[Zinegata]

During the Second World War, Admiral Max Horton eventually had his convoys actively seek out U-boats to "bring them to battle". They had such a surplus that they could afford to risk losing merchant ships as long as they managed to destroy U-boats in turn.

There was no similar margin available during the First World War, wherein the U-boats actually sank more ships (over 4,000) than during the Second World War (albeit the tonnage was higher in the Second World War). The problem during WW1 is that the British essentially let the U-boats run amok and did very little to counter them. It was only late in the conflict that they began using convoys which finally stopped the bleeding.

[Sea Skimmer]

The convoys themselves never sought out U-boats, that makes no sense as it would actively delay the arrival of vital cargo's in England and monopolize merchant shipping ton-miles which was hardly in surplus. Convoys were actively directed away from known U-boat contacts throughout the war whenever it made sense. What happened was by 1943 the allies had enough escorts that they could form dedicated support groups on top of the convoy escorts, usually but not always centered on a CVE. The support groups would join low speed convoys and use them as bait, but then break off to hunt any and all submarine contacts to extinction. They would also break off to hunt down U-boats located nearby via radio intercepts. Convoy escorts meanwhile normally broke off a hunt within a few hours in ordered to rejoin the convoy allowing a great many U-boats to escape. As the number of support groups rose and CVE ratios went up some simply patrolled the ocean to seek out and destroy U-boats actively filling in the weak spots of Atlantic air coverage. By 1944 a whole barrier system of these groups was in place with land based air patrols all around them, and U-boat life expectancy dropped to less then one mission.

Funny enough though these active hunting tactics are largely what the British were doing in WW1 prior to introducing convoys. In WW1 few ships had hydrophones or more then one or two depth charges prior to 1916-1917 so convoys were felt to merely offer rich collections of targets, with the escorts being near helpless against a submerged submarine. A convoy was also thought to be very exposed to the Germans simply laying floating mines in its path; luckily drifting mines in the North Atlantic did not prove very effective. They made the North Sea a lake of death until the mid 1920s.

So instead prior to convoys the British strategy was that of a ‘defended sea lane’ in which constant warship and air patrols were supposed to simply force the U-boats to be submerged all the time, robbing them of mobility and making it difficult for them to attack large numbers of discreet targets. Many of the ships operated in groups to make sweeps and hopefully ambush submarines at night and generally keep them bust. The defended sea lane via surface ship concept did not work against large numbers of U-boats as appeared in 1917, the ocean is just too big but it had a fairly logical basis. The concept more or less did work with aircraft and blimps in both world wars. Patrol enough and all the submarine can do is silent creep until the batteries run out.

Also WW1 merchant ships were slow as balls on average, 4-6 knots never mind all the stuff that was still sailing, so it was hard to provide a constant escort with enough endurance to follow along for so damn long. A destroyer steaming at 6 knots wastes fuel like crazy and then must return to port. By 1917 decent numbers of dedicated long range escort designs had appeared, as well as sufficient stocks of depth charges to make them effective. The same issues came up again in WW2 but experienced helped deal with them, and the lack of a German fleet meant many destroyers could be converted into dedicated escorts and more resources thrown at building new vessels. Convoys certainly could have and should have been used earlier in WW1, but it would have been and was troublesome in its own ways. Convoys are inherently inefficient, they move only as fast as the slowest ship and they overwhelm the ports and railroads doing the loading and unloading by having 60-80 ships arrive in one day, and none the rest of the week. For this reason in both wars all fast merchant ships, and that could mean only 7-8 knots in WW1 and not much faster in WW2 sailed independently throughout the war. The independent ships helped even out the flow of supplies. This issue was a huge factor in why the British would not use convoys. As long as U-boat tonnage counts were limited, it seemed simply worth eating the losses in favor of using all other shipping more efficiently.

[bz249]

Also WW1 merchant ships were slow as balls on average, 4-6 knots never mind all the stuff that was still sailing, so it was hard to provide a constant escort with enough endurance to follow along for so damn long. A destroyer steaming at 6 knots wastes fuel like crazy and then must return to port. By 1917 decent numbers of dedicated long range escort designs had appeared, as well as sufficient stocks of depth charges to make them effective. The same issues came up again in WW2 but experienced helped deal with them, and the lack of a German fleet meant many destroyers could be converted into dedicated escorts and more resources thrown at building new vessels. Convoys certainly could have and should have been used earlier in WW1, but it would have been and was troublesome in its own ways. Convoys are inherently inefficient, they move only as fast as the slowest ship and they overwhelm the ports and railroads doing the loading and unloading by having 60-80 ships arrive in one day, and none the rest of the week. For this reason in both wars all fast merchant ships, and that could mean only 7-8 knots in WW1 and not much faster in WW2 sailed independently throughout the war. The independent ships helped even out the flow of supplies. This issue was a huge factor in why the British would not use convoys. As long as U-boat tonnage counts were limited, it seemed simply worth eating the losses in favor of using all other shipping more efficiently.

Forcing the enemy to use an inefficient transport method is one of the goals of the submarine/cruiser war, even better when the convoy required something rare and valuable (like a battleship) which was the prime reason for the surface raiders, to force the British to use battleship escorted convoys. So simple fleet in being, if they can maintain a credible threat is a really nasty thing on its own.

[CaptHawkeye]

Versus what exactly? The Kreigsmarine wasn't cheap itself and the U-Boats required extensive specialization in personnel and equipment to build, maintain, and operate.

[Zinegata]

The convoys themselves never sought out U-boats, that makes no sense as it would actively delay the arrival of vital cargo's in England and monopolize merchant shipping ton-miles which was hardly in surplus.

I was under the impression that they deliberately chose not to avoid the U-boats in several instances in 1943, particularly in the case of ONS convoys which were bound for the US and had empty cargo holds anyway. They *could* have avoided the U-boats entirely, but they chose not to.

But yes, with all of the dedicated hunter-killer groups operating around the "bait", very few U-boats actually managed to attack the actual convoys. And in the few cases they did (i.e. ONS 5), they still suffered heavy losses.

Also WW1 merchant ships were slow as balls on average, 4-6 knots never mind all the stuff that was still sailing, so it was hard to provide a constant escort with enough endurance to follow along for so damn long. A destroyer steaming at 6 knots wastes fuel like crazy and then must return to port. By 1917 decent numbers of dedicated long range escort designs had appeared, as well as sufficient stocks of depth charges to make them effective.

True, but the issue during the First World War was going to be decided by the large ocean-going merchant ships on which the bulk of the goods were carried, not the smaller slower ships that were usually relegated to coastal work. The problem with the Royal Navy was that they over-estimated the number of ships that they had to convoy by also counting the small fry. It turned out that there were only a few hundred of the big ocean-going merchants that were vital to the war effort, which COULD be afforded the protection of convoy.

Moreover, submarines during the First World War tended to rely on their deck gun to sink merchants, as opposed to torpedoes. So just having a few warships on watch - even without Depth Charges or Hydrophones - was enough to deter most submarine attacks. Even the old armored cruisers may have done the job.

Anyway, by sweeping the important targets off the sealanes and putting them in convoy, the U-boats turned their attention instead to the smaller aforementioned coastal ships - which greatly contributed to the U-boat kill count, but prevented the U-boats from delivering a war-wining blow in 1917.

[Sea Skimmer]

I was under the impression that they deliberately chose not to avoid the U-boats in several instances in 1943, particularly in the case of ONS convoys which were bound for the US and had empty cargo holds anyway. They *could* have avoided the U-boats entirely, but they chose not to.

That may very well have occurred and I am simply ignorant of any details; now that you mention it sounds kind of familiar from i want to say 'Battlefield', but it doesn't seem like it could have been on a major scale because 1943 was one of the tightest years for allied shipping with such large invasions on all fronts and build up in the UK being at near its peak. Empty hulls aren't as bad as full ones, but you of course lose all the future trips which really adds up. Still not quite the same as actively turning into the U-boats which is what I had thought you meant, and which might make sense if you had a really massive escort but not otherwise. In general diverting around the U-boats was already easier said then done as U-boats not in contact generated only limited radio traffic, direction finding wasn't massively accurate, the Germans themselves intercepted allied traffic to the convoy vessels and still had some aerial recon into 1943. Also if more then one wolf pack was in operation that really complicated life since the patrol lines would be stacked in depth as well as widt. Its really quite impressive how so many different factors came together to kill off the U-boats in 1943. But also not surprising since the U-boat is such a one dimensional weapon.

True, but the issue during the First World War was going to be decided by the large ocean-going merchant ships on which the bulk of the goods were carried, not the smaller slower ships that were usually relegated to coastal work.

The problem with the Royal Navy was that they over-estimated the number of ships that they had to convoy by also counting the small fry. It turned out that there were only a few hundred of the big ocean-going merchants that were vital to the war effort, which COULD be afforded the protection of convoy.

Yes, placing the tankers and ammo ships into priority convoys was a good move; steadily better administration of the shipping supply helped make this possible. Really you'd figure, if the Germans didn't knock off unrestricted warfare in 1915 then surely convoys would have appeared earlier, but as it was the threat dropped off a lot just as it was reaching the first crisis point that would have forced action. For all the losses the allies did take, it never seems to have had an actual effect on the battlefield. Or at least not on the western front. The effect on the battles in the Mediterranean theater seems to have existed, at least to a limited degree.

Moreover, submarines during the First World War tended to rely on their deck gun to sink merchants, as opposed to torpedoes. So just having a few warships on watch - even without Depth Charges or Hydrophones - was enough to deter most submarine attacks. Even the old armored cruisers may have done the job.

It certainly cut way down on the U-boats killing power; but then a much more comprehensive program of arming merchant ships could have done the same general thing. Strip the guns off an armored cruiser and you could arm twenty or so merchants. Ultimately this is also what happened in 1917 with a large number of otherwise worthless British-French-American cruisers being disarmed and you then had some merchants sporting guns as heavy as 7in. If the war had gone into 1919 they would have started scrapping some of those ships too, the steel shortage was pretty bad. Unfortunately the US basically produced no artillery for the allies before or after the declaration of war so a huge possible supply of low grade weapons for this purpose was never exploited.

Anyway, by sweeping the important targets off the sealanes and putting them in convoy, the U-boats turned their attention instead to the smaller aforementioned coastal ships - which greatly contributed to the U-boat kill count, but prevented the U-boats from delivering a war-wining blow in 1917.

The US declaring war sure didn't help either; not that US merchant shipping wasn't already heavily involved, but it allowed the allies to greatly improve the efficiently of shipping control and organization since now military orders could be issued to vessels very far away from the battle area. Convoys with a neutral US would have been much harder to organize as ports like NYC couldn't have been used to marshal them.

[U-95]

Very interesting discussion, thanks; I love WWII submarine warfare.

Effectively, during WWI (at least during its first part) submarines caused lots of troubles to the Royal Navy: just see what happened to the cruisers, Hogue, Aboukir, and Cressy. In that epoch, before the hydrophones and depth charges were invented, the unique way to detect a submarine was when it was running on the surface -to rechargue its batteries or to sink a ship worthless of a torpedo with the deck gun-. That's why the Q-Ship was invented: a ship that looked like a pathetic freighter but that was heavily armed to lure a submarine to surface and sink it with the deck gun. When it appeared, sometimes after some "role-playing" of the role of freighter the ship would show its weapons and destroy the u-boat.

Other way was to ram it with a larguer ship -the battleship HMS Dreadnought sank so one- an u-boat that couldn't submerge fast enough.

The convoy system appeared, I guess, due to logistic reasons. If you have, let's say, 5 escorts and 50 freighters, you cannot assign one escort to each freighter and sending 5 escorts with 5 freighters is prohibitive in terms of fuel and time, so it's better to send all ships together having at least some protection and assuring that, even if some are sank, others will arrive to its place.

In 1943 and later as Sea Skimmer says things were becoming grimmer and grimmer to the Kriegsmarine (see the movie Das Boot, despite it takes place in the year 1941, to get an idea), with the nearly-mass produced CVEs, better and better ASW tactics, and US shipyards churning also out dozens of destroyers and Liberty-Class freighters, the Allies intercepting and decoding their messages and the germans having more and more difficulties to replace the submarines & crews lost -and having lost their Milk cows (U-boats designed to refuel and resupply another boats). Note they were even able to sink japanese submarines (like the I-52) that were in missions with Germany of exchanging raw materials, technologies, etc.

The Kriegsmarine had an advanced submarine -the type XXI- in development, but it appeared too late to change the outcome.

The battleships escorting convoys were not -of course- to defend it against uboats, but against surface raiders: -the battleships Schnarhorst and Gneiseau and the pocket battleships like the Admiral Graf Spee-.

[Sea Skimmer]

Other way was to ram it with a larguer ship -the battleship HMS Dreadnought sank so one- an u-boat that couldn't submerge fast enough.

I believe the U-boat Dreadnought sank actually had broached after firing a torpedo; ballast control was very tricky on those things after you dumped the torpedo weight. But ramming one on the surface when taken by surprise in bad weather or night was certainly viable as diving time was measured in minutes for those early U-boats. I've never been clear on just when crash diving measured in seconds became feasible, I think by late if WW1 U-boats could do it but I'm not sure. Certainly it was possible by the 1920s, just in time for high speed aircraft to begin appearing.

My favorite early anti U-boat weapon was the explosive sweep, a submerged mine towed by a destroyer. Good idea in theory, until the tow cable wrapped around the destroyers propellers and pulled the charge into her…

[CaptHawkeye]

The Kriegsmarine had an advanced submarine -the type XXI- in development, but it appeared too late to change the outcome.

Yeah but it's not as if their development wasn't known to the Allies. Sea Skimmer said it somewhere else but the Allies had already been designing tactics against the Electroboot and the Type XXI design had some serious deficiencies. Like how the snorkel was still detectable by radar. Not like it mattered, since by 1944-45 most U-Boats were getting bombed in port before they could even sortie.

The battleships escorting convoys were not -of course- to defend it against uboats, but against surface raiders: -the battleships Schnarhorst and Gneiseau and the pocket battleships like the Admiral Graf Spee-.

The idea of using battleships as merchant raiders has always struck me as patently ridiculous anyway. They're going to have to sink a hell of a lot of merchant tonnage to make up for their cost. All while operating in an enviornment where they will likely not often posses air cover or escort from submarines and even destroyers taking the occasional shot at them. A battleship just draws too much attention to itself to safely operate alone.

[PeZook]

Yeah but it's not as if their development wasn't known to the Allies. Sea Skimmer said it somewhere else but the Allies had already been designing tactics against the Electroboot and the Type XXI design had some serious deficiencies. Like how the snorkel was still detectable by radar. Not like it mattered, since by 1944-45 most U-Boats were getting bombed in port before they could even sortie.

The Allies would've likely been able to comfortably hunt the Type XXI. Several were sunk by aircraft while in transit from their shipyards to bases in Norway. The quality of manufacture was also piss-poor on them, with hasty construction making them unable to dive as deep as early-war boats, propulsion bearing problems and of course the famous "we can kill the entire crew by snorkeling" problem didn't exactly help

Germany was also running out of qualified crews to man the things.

[Sea Skimmer]

The Kriegsmarine had an advanced submarine -the type XXI- in development, but it appeared too late to change the outcome.

Yeah but it's not as if their development wasn't known to the Allies. Sea Skimmer said it somewhere else but the Allies had already been designing tactics against the Electroboot and the Type XXI design had some serious deficiencies. Like how the snorkel was still detectable by radar. Not like it mattered, since by 1944-45 most U-Boats were getting bombed in port before they could even sortie.

And without bases in France any U-boat war was hopeless anyway. Type XXI took the slow allied escorts out of the equation, the problem is in real life by the time the first XXI was ready the allies already had about 600 escorts capable of 20-28 knots and canceled hoards more for lack of any real need, as well as greatly enlarged fleets of proper destroyers and ASW weapons like Squid which were an order of magnitude more effective then depth charges over the stern. You went from 20-30 depth charge patterns giving a fair chance of a submarine kill to more like 2-4 attack patterns from the ahead throwing ASW weapons. Meanwhile the allied merchant fleets kept getting bigger and above all, faster. While prewar stuff was usually under 10 knots, and a Liberty ship did 11 knots the Victory ship could hit 17 knots which is as fast as the U-boat on the surface. New built tanker speeds also rose a great deal. Suddenly the XXI being faster isn't so much of an advantage as a vital necessity. The very best the XXI could hope for was to restore a decent kill to death ratio for the submarine force, instead of utter suicide. That's still total defeat for the Germans. Never mind how crazy CVE numbers got late in the war or the improved late war homing torpedoes which compared to the Mk24 had enough speed to chase down a submarine at anything but the very top of XXI speed range; and top speed kills all battery power in 1-2 hours.

The idea of using battleships as merchant raiders has always struck me as patently ridiculous anyway. They're going to have to sink a hell of a lot of merchant tonnage to make up for their cost. All while operating in an enviornment where they will likely not often posses air cover or escort from submarines and even destroyers taking the occasional shot at them. A battleship just draws too much attention to itself to safely operate alone.

Its basically the worst idea ever as soon as the radio was invented. Even if you ambush a convoy with a battleship scattering limits how much you can really sink, and you need a whole battle fleet in the first place to sustain raider operations on a really useful level.

[Thanas]

Updated the title.

[U-95]

Yes, the type XXI appeared too late to be of significance and when Allies' ASW measures were the death sentence of the uboats (don't forget also the Hedhehog that was replaced by Squid); however, had she appeared earlier perhaps the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic could have been different -sure the Allies would have won, but perhaps at a higher price-. There're reports of Schnee's approach in the U-2511 to a british task force, closing to just 500 meters of the cruiser HMS Norfolk; however, some people says it was a myth that actually didn't happen and surely in other circunstances, the sub could have detected. Also, correct; with most of the German industry in shambles and most submariners in the depth of the sea, there were not only lack of quality control manufacturing the boats but also of skilled crews to handle them
Still, it was a good submarine that -supposedly- paved the way for the development of the current submarines: as you know, vessels designed to stay submerged most of the time and that are faster submerged than on surface -unlike the previous classes (Gatos, Balaos, German type VII, etc.) that basically were submersibles-.

I know it's just a game, but I saw one example of the effectivity of those ASW things in a Silent Hunter III mission; commanding a type XXI submarine, I found an US task force with a carrier, a battleship, some cruisers, and of course destroyers. Was able to approach quite close to them and launch a spread of six torpedoes to the two larguest ships; however, I screwed up and was detected by a destroyer. Crash-dived with evasive maneuvers to >200 meters and entered into silent running, just to see the destroyer launching something (guess a Squid or a Hedgehog) that caused a huge explosion and destroyed the sub when I was trying an emergency surface to at least save the crew. Not a good way to end.

"we can kill the entire crew by snorkeling"

Why? I knew the snorkel had (and has) the disadvantage that when the valves that avoid the enter of sea water into it, the diesels suck the air causing ear injuries, but I didn't know it could kill the submarine crew.

A final note on the use of battleships as commerce raiders: supposedly, the Kriegsmarine had a very ambitious plan to expand it during the 30's ("Plan-Z"). Among many other vessels, it included the "H Class"; largue battleships more powerful than the Bismarck (and eventually that even the Yamato in terms of caliber), carriers, and (the point) three battlecruiser-like ships ("O class") with Bismarck-size guns with a very poor armor that would be used for commerce raiding. Supposedly, that huge fleet could challenge the Royal Navy in terms of power in 1944 (and perhaps the US Navy, but I seriously doubt it).
The outbreak of WWII cancelled the plan, as the resources were allocated to the Wermacht and the Luftwaffe, so only the submarines and the surface ships (Bismarck, etc) were built, being used to commerce raiding and not for combat another warships (remember the Bismarck sank the Hood in a sense for self-defense, because the former and the Prince of Wales found her and her escort the Prinz Eugen).

[HMS Sophia]

Why? I knew the snorkel had (and has) the disadvantage that when the valves that avoid the enter of sea water into it, the diesels suck the air causing ear injuries, but I didn't know it could kill the submarine crew.

If the snorkel went underwater at any point (such as if a wave crested over it) then apparently the diesel engine could very rapidly flood the U-boat with fumes, which would take some time to filter out. This was not good for the crew, as I'm pretty sure diesel fumes are mostly carbon monoxide.
I don't remember where I read that. It was a book on the north Atlantic conflict.

[CaptHawkeye]

Still, it was a good submarine that -supposedly- paved the way for the development of the current submarines: as you know, vessels designed to stay submerged most of the time and that are faster submerged than on surface -unlike the previous classes (Gatos, Balaos, German type VII, etc.) that basically were submersibles-.

USS Nautilus ultimately did far more to usher in the age of the true submarine and not submersible boat. You really just weren't going to make something like long term submersion of a craft possible until the nuclear reactor came about.

A final note on the use of battleships as commerce raiders: supposedly, the Kriegsmarine had a very ambitious plan to expand it during the 30's ("Plan-Z"). Among many other vessels, it included the "H Class"; largue battleships more powerful than the Bismarck (and eventually that even the Yamato in terms of caliber), carriers, and (the point) three battlecruiser-like ships ("O class") with Bismarck-size guns with a very poor armor that would be used for commerce raiding. Supposedly, that huge fleet could challenge the Royal Navy in terms of power in 1944 (and perhaps the US Navy, but I seriously doubt it).

Everyone on this website knows about Plan Z. Their was also no way Plan Z was ever, ever going to happen. In order for Plan Z to come to fruition Germany would have to put way effort into the redevelopment of the Navy. A goal which plays little role in Hitler's grand dreams of Lebensraum. Tell me, how many Panzer Divisions or Fighter Squadrons would Germany be willing to trade for a few more destroyers or a battleship? The more you want for the Navy means less for the Heer and Luftwaffe. A plan which doesn't even make sense considering the Nazis were hoping to flat avoid war with Britain in the first place.

The outbreak of WWII cancelled the plan, as the resources were allocated to the Wermacht and the Luftwaffe, so only the submarines and the surface ships (Bismarck, etc) were built,

It wasn't the outbreak of the war that killed Plan Z. It was dead in the water only a few years after it had been proposed when it became apparent to the Nazi's Germany did not have the industrial capacity to rebuild the every branch of the Wehrmacht. On top of that the technical expertise and experience of German shipbuilders and design teams was lost while transitioning the Versailles/Weimar Republic period and made even worse by the assanine manner in which the Nazi party tried to control it.

But let's say Plan Z does go down, what makes you think Britain and France would not respond in turn? Unlike the Heer and Luftwaffe, which could slip by the Versailles Treaty by hiding weapons development and doctrine under the excuse of "research", a naval buildup would call far, far more attention to Germany's plans than anything else. A naval buildup is not something the Allies would ignore or try to ignore, and they would respond in kind. Germany could not build a bigger navy than Britain could in 1914 and they certainly won't be able to do it in 1933-38 with half of their industrial power under French control. Any number or quality of ships they can build the RN will simply do better. So a dreadnought race is totally out of the question, again.

Plan Z made little room for carriers in Germany's plans and Germany had precisely zero operational understanding of how to build and deploy carriers. Yet again, we're talking about big ships that are going to take LOTS of money, manpower, metal, oil, and time to build. Not things Germany has in abundance or even in any quantity.

being used to commerce raiding and not for combat another warships (remember the Bismarck sank the Hood in a sense for self-defense, because the former and the Prince of Wales found her and her escort the Prinz Eugen).

Also remember that HMS Hood was a fossil who's design was considered poor even when she was brand new, and Prince of Wales was just in no shape to even be fighting. Bismarck's triumph over both of them was nothing spectacular in hindsight.

[U-95]

USS Nautilus ultimately did far more to usher in the age of the true submarine and not submersible boat. You really just weren't going to make something like long term submersion of a craft possible until the nuclear reactor came about.

That's quite true. Even modern AIP can't compare to nuclear power, in which the unique limit to the time one submarine can be submerged. Nonetheless, I believed the hull design of the Type XXI was what marked the way to modern submarines. At least, the USSR had two classes (Whiskey and November) that were clearly based on that ship; however, I recognize they were diesel-electric, not nuclear ones and that even if the Type XXI had never existed, sooner or later someone would design a vessel with alike or better underwater properties.

Tell me, how many Panzer Divisions or Fighter Squadrons would Germany be willing to trade for a few more destroyers or a battleship? The more you want for the Navy means less for the Heer and Luftwaffe. A plan which doesn't even make sense considering the Nazis were hoping to flat avoid war with Britain in the first place.

A whole lot of them, including things like the Maus or the Rate that made a Tiger look nearly like a joke and that surely would me more useful. That's quite true.

But let's say Plan Z does go down, what makes you think Britain and France would not respond in turn? Unlike the Heer and Luftwaffe, which could slip by the Versailles Treaty by hiding weapons development and doctrine under the excuse of "research", a naval buildup would call far, far more attention to Germany's plans than anything else. A naval buildup is not something the Allies would ignore or try to ignore, and they would respond in kind. Germany could not build a bigger navy than Britain could in 1914 and they certainly won't be able to do it in 1933-38 with half of their industrial power under French control. Any number or quality of ships they can build the RN will simply do better. So a dreadnought race is totally out of the question, again.

Plan Z made little room for carriers in Germany's plans and Germany had precisely zero operational understanding of how to build and deploy carriers. Yet again, we're talking about big ships that are going to take LOTS of money, manpower, metal, oil, and time to build. Not things Germany has in abundance or even in any quantity.

Four carriers, I think. Nonetheless, without experience with them, the Kriegsmarine would have problems with carrier operations -unless they requested help from Japan, who had far more experience-, and it's quite clear building warships is an allocation so huge of resources that it's hard to hide it. One thing were the japanese, who were able to maintain the construction of the Yamatos in secrecy, but other much different thing is to build a navy that could defeat the mighty RN. Maybe a fleet so large would make sense for a future clash with the US Navy, but this is nothing but wild speculation and before that there'd be obvious and much closer obstacles.

Also remember that HMS Hood was a fossil who's design was considered poor even when she was brand new, and Prince of Wales was just in no shape to even be fighting. Bismarck's triumph over both of them was nothing spectacular in hindsight.

Yes. In theory the HMS Hood was going to be modernized, but there was no time to do that and she still was a battlecruiser -good weapons and speed, but obtained in exchangue for armor- with more than 20 years of service, with systems in dire shape and other diverse flaws.
The Prince of Wales was almost brand-new and had even civilian technicals on board when she departed to hunt the Bismarck. Given the damage caused by Bismarck and the subsequent trouble the British battleship had with her guns, perhaps if Admiral Lütjens had decided to chase the enemy battleship, he could have sank her.

[Sea Skimmer]

That's quite true. Even modern AIP can't compare to nuclear power, in which the unique limit to the time one submarine can be submerged. Nonetheless, I believed the hull design of the Type XXI was what marked the way to modern submarines. At least, the USSR had two classes (Whiskey and November) that were clearly based on that ship; however, I recognize they were diesel-electric, not nuclear ones and that even if the Type XXI had never existed, sooner or later someone would design a vessel with alike or better underwater properties.

You mean Whiskey and Zulu; November was the first commie SSN. Certainly the improved hull form was going to come sooner then later. Traditional submarines had a hull form optimized for surface operations, once surface operations became suicidal in the face of radar equipped 300mph class patrol planes someone was going to make the switch. The allies found you could already make major improvements to existing subs just by welding on more casing when they went to create XXI surrogates for training

What’s interesting is nobody needed war experience to dream this up because Japan was actually the one to first built such a submarine… starting all the way back in December 1937 with the one off No.71 type. While only 213 tons and with only 3 x 450mm torpedo tubes making it purely a technology demonstrator, it made no less then 25 knots underwater on trials lasting several years. The IJN however was only interested in long range fleet submarines with high surface speeds usable in fleet actions, and so the thing was actually scrapped in 1940! It took until 1945 for a full size roughly 1,300 ton successor to the launched, STS class. The thing was a lot like the XXI and made 19 knots submerged, including being intended for modular mass assembly and mounting only 25mm AA guns for deck armament. Only three out one hundred planned boats were ever completed and saw no action. Germans get way too much credit in history.

Four carriers, I think. Nonetheless, without experience with them, the Kriegsmarine would have problems with carrier operations -unless they requested help from Japan, who had far more experience-, and it's quite clear building warships is an allocation so huge of resources that it's hard to hide it. One thing were the japanese, who were able to maintain the construction of the Yamatos in secrecy, but other much different thing is to build a navy that could defeat the mighty RN.

Its worth noting that the allies were still fully aware Japan was working on two new battleships at least by 1940; they simply did not have any specific details of the ships and foolishly assumed Japan would not vastly exceed the treaty limits for reasons of politics and economy.

The Prince of Wales was almost brand-new and had even civilian technicals on board when she departed to hunt the Bismarck. Given the damage caused by Bismarck and the subsequent trouble the British battleship had with her guns, perhaps if Admiral Lütjens had decided to chase the enemy battleship, he could have sank her.

He probably would have, but Prince of Whales had begun hitting, and her captain believed he was fully capable of continuing the battle and was ordered by the Admiralty to break off the action. IIRC After being criticized for ‘running away’ by following that order he then requested a court marshal to clear his name but this was refused. Arguments can go either way for what Lütjens should have done either hunting convoys as ordered or continuing the fight; unfortunately for him the best option overall, just return to Germany and call it a job well done having sunk one battlecruiser with only light damage, was just not very realistic. If Lutjens did such a thing Hitler might have given him a medal, but he then might never be given a major command at sea again and ended up commanding some group of heavy coastal batteries in Norway instead.

If the snorkel went underwater at any point (such as if a wave crested over it) then apparently the diesel engine could very rapidly flood the U-boat with fumes, which would take some time to filter out. This was not good for the crew, as I'm pretty sure diesel fumes are mostly carbon monoxide.
I don't remember where I read that. It was a book on the north Atlantic conflict.

If everything is working properly the diesel engine exhaust was always dumped overboard underwater through a muffler assembly. Some AIP submarines still have to do the same thing, such as the Swedish Sterling engines. What happened when water goes over the snorkel is exactly as U-95 noted, a valve closed and the diesel then sucked air out of the submarine, which caused an immediate rapid pressure drop which was very painful for the crews ears and which could indeed cause death if it was protracted from bad ballast control. On poorly built boats, which was a lot of them, the exhaust would indeed leak into the submarine but that wasn’t ‘normal’.

The snorkel design itself was copied from captured Dutch submarines; though Italian designers did trials with snorkels as early as the 1920s without putting them into fleet service. The Dutch had never intended the snorkel for use in the North Atlantic nor specifically for combat use at all. Rather they invented it because the main operating area for Dutch submarines was the East Indies. As one might imagine, a submarine on the surface in the tropical sun becomes absurdly hot and nobody had air conditioning on 1930s submarines. So the snorkel was a way to cruise in peacetime submerged, and thus keep everyone cooler while running on diesel power. Weather was normally calm so the snorkel would only rarely be covered by wave action..

Snorkeling generally sucked, the piping took up a great deal of space in the submarine and the size of the pipe was limited so you could only snorkel at 5-6 knots IIRC. Might have been slower then that. This beat creeping on batteries but it was a huge loss of mobility compared to surface cruising. The snorkel also did not ventilate the submarine itself the same way running diesels on the surface did, making life for the crew ever more miserable.

[Simon_Jester]

Tell me, how many Panzer Divisions or Fighter Squadrons would Germany be willing to trade for a few more destroyers or a battleship? The more you want for the Navy means less for the Heer and Luftwaffe. A plan which doesn't even make sense considering the Nazis were hoping to flat avoid war with Britain in the first place.

A whole lot of them, including things like the Maus or the Rate that made a Tiger look nearly like a joke and that surely would me more useful. That's quite true.

Um. This is very unclear, I don't know what you mean. Could you explain?

Do you mean that the Germans should have traded a great deal of steel used on various silly experimental projects for one or two battleships? What difference would those ships have made? Historically, the most effective things any German battleship accomplished involved sitting in port and threatening to sail. That forced a great deal more caution onto the British than any actual operation they carried out.

But it would be a colossal waste to build more battleships just so they could sit in port and do nothing. Do you really think the war would have looked very different if the Germans had only been outnumbered in modern battleships by a dozen to four instead of a dozen to two?

Four carriers, I think. Nonetheless, without experience with them, the Kriegsmarine would have problems with carrier operations -unless they requested help from Japan, who had far more experience-, and it's quite clear building warships is an allocation so huge of resources that it's hard to hide it. One thing were the japanese, who were able to maintain the construction of the Yamatos in secrecy, but other much different thing is to build a navy that could defeat the mighty RN. Maybe a fleet so large would make sense for a future clash with the US Navy, but this is nothing but wild speculation and before that there'd be obvious and much closer obstacles.

The Germans simply did not have the capacity to build a fleet to take on the RN or the USN without people noticing and engaging in a corresponding buildup. Germany is, bluntly, too fucking small- not large enough to supply the huge armies needed to subdue most of Europe while simultaneously creating a gigantic fleet.

Yes. In theory the HMS Hood was going to be modernized, but there was no time to do that and she still was a battlecruiser -good weapons and speed, but obtained in exchangue for armor- with more than 20 years of service, with systems in dire shape and other diverse flaws.
The Prince of Wales was almost brand-new and had even civilian technicals on board when she departed to hunt the Bismarck. Given the damage caused by Bismarck and the subsequent trouble the British battleship had with her guns, perhaps if Admiral Lütjens had decided to chase the enemy battleship, he could have sank her.

Perhaps, perhaps not, and you can bet with great confidence that Bismarck would have been badly damaged- delayed, hit by more shells, damaged in more places, less able to escape the cordon of British ships rapidly closing from all sides. And trading one German battleship for one British battleship was an exchange that massively favored the British.

I don't see what strategy you think the Germans could have, or should have, pursued in the Atlantic. Why would building four battleships instead of two (at massive expense in terms of weakened army forces or submarine construction) profit the Germans?

[PeZook]

Why? I knew the snorkel had (and has) the disadvantage that when the valves that avoid the enter of sea water into it, the diesels suck the air causing ear injuries, but I didn't know it could kill the submarine crew.

It's not a problem with snorkels per se, just the particular ones mounted on Type XXIs. It was closed off from waves by a ballasting balls, which had the tendency to stick in place. If the crew didn't diagnose the problem in time and shut off the diesels...well...

[U-95]

The thing was a lot like the XXI and made 19 knots submerged, including being intended for modular mass assembly and mounting only 25mm AA guns for deck armament. Only three out one hundred planned boats were ever completed and saw no action. Germans get way too much credit in history.

AKA I-200 class: a fully-fledged attack submarine (and along them a very different sub: the I-400 class). That's quite correct. They were even faster than the Type XXI

It's not a problem with snorkels per se, just the particular ones mounted on Type XXIs. It was closed off from waves by a ballasting balls, which had the tendency to stick in place. If the crew didn't diagnose the problem in time and shut off the diesels...well...

Ouch. Not a good way to die. Besides, about what you say about life quality on subs, at least Type XXIs were more comfortable (at least a bit more) than types VII and IX. Having to be on a crammed VII with that... sure, submariner would be a synomyn of a real man.

Post subject: Re: FDR Pearl Harbor conspiracy theory Reply with quote
U-95 wrote:
Quote:
Tell me, how many Panzer Divisions or Fighter Squadrons would Germany be willing to trade for a few more destroyers or a battleship? The more you want for the Navy means less for the Heer and Luftwaffe. A plan which doesn't even make sense considering the Nazis were hoping to flat avoid war with Britain in the first place.
A whole lot of them, including things like the Maus or the Rate that made a Tiger look nearly like a joke and that surely would me more useful. That's quite true.
Um. This is very unclear, I don't know what you mean. Could you explain?

Do you mean that the Germans should have traded a great deal of steel used on various silly experimental projects for one or two battleships? What difference would those ships have made? Historically, the most effective things any German battleship accomplished involved sitting in port and threatening to sail. That forced a great deal more caution onto the British than any actual operation they carried out.

But it would be a colossal waste to build more battleships just so they could sit in port and do nothing. Do you really think the war would have looked very different if the Germans had only been outnumbered in modern battleships by a dozen to four instead of a dozen to two?

No, I mean that they could have used that steel to build not only the tanks we know the Wermacht had -Panzers IV, Panthers, Tigers...- but also something larguer. See the projects of super-heavy tanks Germany had. However, they'd be quite vulnerable to air attack.

Besides, a battleship would not have been very useful as you say. In WWI, they could have a reason to exist (and recognizing their vulnerabilities), but Taranto and Pearl Harbor demonstrated how airplanes could doom them (and the sinking of several british battleships by german submarines that they were vulnerable), and much later the sink of Musashi&Yamato confirmed that.

The Germans simply did not have the capacity to build a fleet to take on the RN or the USN without people noticing and engaging in a corresponding buildup. Germany is, bluntly, too fucking small- not large enough to supply the huge armies needed to subdue most of Europe while simultaneously creating a gigantic fleet.

Perhaps when they had conquered a largue territory could think on building a large fleet, not before; as you say, simply put Germany was too small to be able to build a fleet largue enough to intimidate the RN and USN. Other thing is that if Germany was able to conquer the United Kingdom and defeat the USSR (something quite dubious given its large size), they'd have to think on a way to defeat the USN.

[Simon_Jester]

No, I mean that they could have used that steel to build not only the tanks we know the Wermacht had -Panzers IV, Panthers, Tigers...- but also something larguer. See the projects of super-heavy tanks Germany had. However, they'd be quite vulnerable to air attack.

Would a handful of such enormous tanks actually have been useful, though? I very much doubt it. Worse than battleships, even- because battleships are highly mobile and their existence ties down enemy battleships as a way of honoring the threat.

Perhaps when they had conquered a largue territory could think on building a large fleet, not before; as you say, simply put Germany was too small to be able to build a fleet largue enough to intimidate the RN and USN. Other thing is that if Germany was able to conquer the United Kingdom and defeat the USSR (something quite dubious given its large size), they'd have to think on a way to defeat the USN.

Yes, but that's with a strategic horizon of ten years or more- less than that simply isn't feasible. And it would require the Germans to learn carrier operations, too; battleships and U-boats wouldn't cut it.

[PeZook]

Would a handful of such enormous tanks actually have been useful, though? I very much doubt it. Worse than battleships, even- because battleships are highly mobile and their existence ties down enemy battleships as a way of honoring the threat.

The Maus would be unable to use most of Europe's bridges, and I wouldn't hold my breath for the performance of its transmission and suspension systems

[fgalkin]

I think Blue Emu on the Paradox forums have put it best

Unfortunately, as the Maus Division grinds slowly forward across the Russian Steppe, continental drift is slowly carrying their destination off in the other direction... are they getting CLOSER to Moscow?... or further away?

Have a very nice day.
-fgalkin

[Imperial Overlord]

The Maus would be unable to use most of Europe's bridges, and I wouldn't hold my breath for the performance of its transmission and suspension systems

Can you imagine the logistics and support train that say a battalion of those beasts would generate? Half the combat engineers in Germany would be busy throwing up new bridges just to get the damn things to the battlefield.

[Sea Skimmer]

A lot of people think the main use for Maus would have been as an adjunt to the various fortress ports on the Atlantic Wall, but that’s probably too rational of thinking even if planned production was only five a month. Bridging/snorkeling/rafting probably wouldn’t even have been as big a problem, since you can predict the rivers, as the even more mundane issue of bogging down in the mud and then needing 500 tons of pulling force to recover such a vehicle. Being so underpowered its doubtful that other Maus tanks could have ever helped recover each other, while even with King Tigers you’d need seven or eight of them if the mud hole was bad enough.