Could the League of Nations have worked?

[Sea Skimmer]

Because as bad as things were, as Bobalot pointed out, they WEREN"T on the brink of collapse? Despite the shortage of troops British armies faced in 1918, they were still able to field a large army and increase tank production, with plans to produce several thousand more in 1919. The Germans couldn't do that. Not for their airforce, not for their army divisions.

By 1918 the total strength of the British Army was shrinking, down 10% over 1917 levels comparing the first week of each year, despite increasing conscription age to 51; that sounds like not on the verge of collapse to you? And this is with the US in the war and already supplying large numbers of support troops and shipping assets. In 1917 the butchery was so bad that the British government simply refused to continue to send British forces in France reinforcements for some months. Meanwhile its questionable the French mutiny of 1917 would have been put down as quickly as it was if the brunt of French troops didn’t hear the news that the US was entering the war just as it began. That could have been the end of the allies on its own.

Except that the Allied powers DIDN"T collapse in 1917 but Germany did in 1918. American intervention was significant here only because it served as a source of cash, resources and ammunition in 1917, but to argue that it was a near run thing is a bit misleading. Russia is the only power that was so severely dependent on Britain largess that it could have, and did collapse.

Without US money and resources the British and French would have had nearly as dire food shortages the Germans did, as should only be expected when France in particular had actual farmland under the enemy boot and a greater share of its population mobilized. Not to mention a large chunk of its industrial economy occupied. Throw on top of that heavier losses and harder worked men and yeah, collapse becomes a damn lot more likely. You can also forget about thousands of tanks, the steel won’t exist. As it was the US had to rip up railroad track just to meet the demands of trench railways in France as even US mobilized resources couldn’t meet the true demands of world war war. That also led to fun stuff like concrete ships.

Even if said tanks did exist they still can’t be decisive, no WW1 tank could be, and Germany could just keep slowly retreating uphill. As it was British and French debt in money and material reached about 8 billion US dollars by 1918, and most of that came after the US declaration of War. In comparison total US war spending was 32 billion. That is just a huge pile of resources. The US made 300,000 tons of gunpowder alone, enough for 300 million 75mm shells (relevant number when the war had about 1 billion shells fired by all sides, most of about 75mm caliber). How on earth do the allies replace that kind of low interest aid and mass resources? It can’t be done, and without that many of the late war material advantages of the western allies evaporate. Even if the British and French somehow had the money, the US would never disrupt its economy and rail system to allow it to be spent on the scale that war mobilization ultimately did. The US converted about 36% of its GDP to war production, not as high as WW2, but it was done in less time.

America contributions in 1917, the time when you said it was so close? It was as a provider of ammunition, resources, and cheap loan for Britain so that she in turn can carry the Allies powers.
You COULD argue that if America had not done so, the Allies would had stopped fighting in 1917 due to the cost and losses involved. But to argue that it was America contribution that tipped the fight is........ exaggeration at best.

No it is not at all. The Allies still had a chance to win without the US; but not at all good one and it is completely based on the Germans collapsing into a revolution. They allies meanwhile had a dead serious chance of being actually defeated in the field and forced not into a negotiated peace but a complete reversal of fortune. The allies were never clearly wining the war on land until well into 1918 after German squandered all its men attacking to forestall the arrival of American forces. In fact Germany had managed to amass superior numbers in 1918 on the western front for this offensive; meaning if they hadn’t launched it successful allied attacks would have been fucking impossible. As it was the Spring Offensive cost the Germans about 1 million men, the allies lost about 800,000, but in the same timeframe the US put 1.3 million men into France, 3 million by the end of the War. So during the spring offensive Allied effective strength went up a million and a half men… when the total German army coming out of the operation was about 4.2 million on all fronts, and you think this wasn’t tipping the balance? That is absurd.

[bobalot]

Bobalot, stop this bullshit of pretending that we didn't address your points, when you also completely fail to address the fact that the Western allies were also on the brink of collapse. Aside from a cursory dismissal, you never even bothered to address the French mutinies or the massive effect of the German submarine campaign in 1917 against the British.

This is rich coming from a guy who falsely accused who accused me about "lying" about numerous things above. I see you didn't even bother concede that. If my lies are so obvious, you would recreate them using the quote tags, but you haven't. Try considering less raging posting.

You made a new gigantic claims that I see you have conveniently not bothered to reply to, such as:

Most colonies were a net loss to their owning powers.

Are you going to concede you made this howler up?

I didn't even have to bother pointing the complete collapse of the Italian army too because you're that big of a fucking liar.

You have accused me about lying about numerous things and now the Italian collapse. Where?

Any serious student of the First World War can easily see it was a near-run thing. You say Germany was collapsing in 1918? The Allies were on their knees in 1917.French Army in Mutiny. British Trade at Standstill. Russia completely gone. Italian Army routed. Romania occupied. Again, you keep asking for evidence about how it was a near-run thing, and yet you keep pretending it doesn't exist, you fucking liar.

This debate was never about the effect of America's involvement militarily in WW1. It was about how fair the Treaty of Versailles was and how fair it's enforcement was. You disagreed and then disagreed on my response to one line you posted (below). I admit, I shouldn't have ever explored this tangent because its irrelevant.

Finally, again, the fact of the matter is Germany almost won the war. They won the war in the East, period. They may have won the war in the West if the US had never intervened.

How does Germany's military prowess have any relationship to actual Treaty of Versailles? Maybe we should have considered a fairer treaty for Germany post WW2 because they almost defeated the allies, and would have perhaps had a good chance of defeating them if America wasn't flooding the allies with cash and materials.

This entire tangent has detracted from my original question above.

BTW, If you read above, I never denied that Germany had successes in 1917 or the Allies had suffered serious defeats. I simply pointed out that Germany had it's own problems with materials, supplies and their incredibly inadequate allies and even a massive all out offensive using every soldier they could muster with their elite troops in stormtrooper units couldn't break the allied lines. American troops didn't arrive in significant numbers during much of that offensive. The burden of the fighting was taken up by British and French units.

If Germany couldn't win an all out offensive with their best units spearheading it, how exactly could they win the war? Perhaps they could have settled into a stalemate and held onto the gains in the east, but then the problem of the blockade comes into play. It was causing serious industrial problems and slowly starving Germany.

And you again conveniently ignore that America's own principles for settling the conflict equitably were almost totally ignored. Russian and German territory was handed over to Poland despite plebiscites rejecting their inclusion in Poland.

Plebiscites ignored about Poland? You named one. I already pointed out there was low level civil conflict in that region and that a League of Nations committee split up the region, leaving many Poles in Germany and many Germans in Poland. Even the Plebiscite itself was marred by German paramilitaries intimidation their opponents. You falsely claimed that the Polish army conquered it.

You claim that I have not shown that Germany was not emasculated, and yet I had already shown how their equivalent of Washington fucking DC was physically seperated from their country

Which did exactly what to German Power?

e·mas·cu·late (-msky-lt)
tr.v. e·mas·cu·lat·ed, e·mas·cu·lat·ing, e·mas·cu·lates
1. To castrate.
2. To deprive of strength or vigor; weaken.
adj. (-lt)
Deprived of virility, strength, or vigor.

The Germany economy recovered in 1923 and powered along until the Great Depression hit, which ruined every bodies economies. It's industrial production easily surpassed pre 1913 production in this period.

I already pointed out the main reason why this particular territory was handed to Poland (rather than parts of East Prussia) was because most of the people who lived there were Polish (even after a long period of systematic Germanization by the German Government).

not to mention the provisions limiting its army

This not an unexpected outcome when losing such a war. It reduced Germany's military power, but economic? Nope. Even militarily, they had enough power to crush local revolts but no longer had any force projection into other countries. This was hardly the end of the world.

and handing over its overseas colonies to folks like Japan who barely did anything in the war.

I already showed you that these colonies were a net loss. Their loss didn't cripple Germany's power, or industrial capability.

Bobalot is full of fail and trying to win via the age old "I will claim my opponent did not present evidence, even though he actually did" bullshit that constantly the liars in this board. It's bullshit, and it's a complete waste of everyone's time.

This is hilarious coming from a guy who claimed that most colonies didn't make any money for their owners and then conveniently forgot back up this huge claim. I actually did take the time to respond to your claims (such as the Upper Silesia partition), while you have been falsely accusing me of lying , making claims I never made and generally acting a whiney little shit.

[Zinegata]

Bobalot, again:

You are a lying twit.

I have no need to reply to your "points", when you're off hollering about Germany final offensive, which I never used as evidence to show that the war was a near-run thing and that the Allies were on their knees in 1917, and the balance was only tipped by the Americans. Plenty of evidence has been cited. The French mutinies. The Italian Army's rout. British Army's size in permanent decline and their trade was a standstill. Russia fucking gone.

My fundamental point was that it was a close war until the Americans came in, and yet the Germans were treated as though they were completely vanquished. You think that would not cause some discontent amongst the Germans, especially when they had agreed to negotiate following American's 14 point principles?

This is in complete contrast to the situation in Russia. When the Germans were negotiating with Russia, the latter was in the middle of a fucking full-scaled civil war. The Russian government was so weak that a Corps of Czech Prisoners of War was seriously enough to contest its control over the entire fucking region of Siberia. Russia was totally beaten.

Besides which, with Germany still at war with France, Germany, and the US, how can they not impose harsh terms on the Russians and risk being stabbed in the back in the East? Hell, Brest-Litovsk was aborgated not by the Western Allies, despite your fanciful claims. It was actually abrogated by the Bolsheviks, when they realized Germany was finished.

You are now moving goalposts because your argument that it wasn't a near-run thing was completely and totally wrecked. Now you're trying to move the goalposts in terms of "German power", which you completely fail to define at any point or juncture:

Which did exactly what to German Power?

So for the benefit of everyone, stop this bullshit and define "German Power". Are you referring to military power? Are you referring to economic power? Are you referring to national pride and prestige? Because in all three cases it can be demonstrated pretty fucking easily how Versailles was designed to emasculate "German Power". Fuck, in all three cases, it has already been demonstrated.

1) Military - Germany was stripped of a navy and air force and left with an army of 100,000 men.
2) Economic power - aside from the reperations and occupation or cessation of several highly industrialized areas (including the Saar basin for 15 years), Germany also lost its merchant fleet, which was one of the largest in the world at the time, along with all of the coaling stations in the colonies.
3) Pride & Prestige - historic German territories were ceded, either without plebiscite or even with plebiscites wherein there was an actual fucking German majority, in direct contradiction to the 14 point's "right of self-determination" clause.

Also...

Plebiscites ignored about Poland? You named one. I already pointed out there was low level civil conflict in that region and that a League of Nations committee split up the region, leaving many Poles in Germany and many Germans in Poland. Even the Plebiscite itself was marred by German paramilitaries intimidation their opponents. You falsely claimed that the Polish army conquered it.

No I didn't. I said that the Germans won the plebiscite in Silesia by a factor of 60 to 40. Polish troops moved in to take over part of Silesia anyway. It's irrelevant that German paramilitaries moved in. They won the plebiscite. Again, if "self-determination" was to be followed, then why the fuck was part of Silesia handed over to Poland anyway?

You're a fucking liar whose anti-German bias is as fucking obvious as the morons who drafted the Treaty of Versailles.

BTW, there was a grand total of three plebiscites held for the German territories. Northern Scheswig voted to go to Denmark by a landslide, so no issue there too. Saar voted to stay German, and would have probably sparked a war if the French tried to maintain its occupation. But then you've got all these areas being turned over WITHOUT plebiscite:

* Most of the Prussian provinces of Province of Posen (now Poznan) and of West Prussia which Prussia had annexed in the Partitions of Poland (1772–1795) were ceded to Poland (area 53,800 km², 4,224,000 inhabitants (1931)) without a plebiscite.
* The Hultschin area of Upper Silesia was transferred to Czechoslovakia (area 316 or 333 km², 49,000 inhabitants) without a plebiscite.
* The area of Soldau in East Prussia, an important railway junction on the Warsaw–Danzig route, was transferred to Poland without a plebiscite (area 492 km²).[14]
* The northern part of East Prussia known as the "Memelland" or Memel Territory was placed under the control of France and was later annexed by Lithuania.

Again, this isn't "right of self-determination". It's a fucking land grab, plain and simple. And again, you can go "But Brest-Litovsk was a land grab too", but it would be an incredibly stupid comparison. Germany was still at war with the US, UK, and France when Brest-Litovsk was signed. The Allies were at war with no one when Versailles was signed. Wilson certainly thought in terms of a negotiated peace in 1918; but the rest of the Allies just wanted vengeance for getting trounced for 4 years in the West.

[Zinegata]

This maybe a tangent, but how exactly was the Treaty of Versailles unfair? It far less harsh than the treaty Germany imposed on Russia.

Hell, you know what, since bobalot is a fucking moron who claims that his question hasn't been anwered, let's answer it again in simpler terms:

It is fucking stupid to not think of Versailles as unfair, and yet compare it to Brest-Litovsk. Both were "Woe be the vanquished" treaties. The victor imposes terms on the loser to emasculate the latter, and the latter doesn't get to protest the terms.

If Brest-Litovsk was unfair, then Versailles was unfair. It's that fucking simple. Yet bobalot wants to troll and engage in semantic gymnastics than actually fucking debate.

[Sea Skimmer]

1) Military - Germany was stripped of a navy and air force and left with an army of 100,000 men.

That’s really understating how punitive it was even. The allies started by specifying that the army had to have a very high proportion of cavalry three divisions to seven infantry, specifically to make it more expensive and less effective. The General Staff and all similar command organization were banned. Any increase in the gendarmes other then that in proportion to the population increase from 1913 was banned despite well known social unrest. The number of machine guns, artillery pieces, rifles as well as the amount of ammunition held for each weapon was restricted. Military personal’s careers were restricted, new officers could only sign on for 25 year terms, existing officers had to serve until at least age 45 or else leave the German army within two months of the treaty being signed. The ratio of officers allowed to be discharged per year for reasons of ill health ect… was fixed at 5%. German officers could not leave Germany. Germany was banned from producing water cooled machine guns, heavy artillery and armored vehicles. Further restrictions were applied to which German arms plants could make what in an attempt to strangle them further. The full intention was not just to make Germany have a small military, but to make that force incapable of accomplishing anything but riot suppression. Otherwise they would have just plain deprived Germany of an army all together. The Navy was allowed a few predreadnoughts only as a deterrent to the Russian communists attacking from the sea.

2) Economic power - aside from the reperations and occupation or cessation of several highly industrialized areas (including the Saar basin for 15 years), Germany also lost its merchant fleet, which was one of the largest in the world at the time, along with all of the coaling stations in the colonies.

They also forced Germany to give all the allied nations most favored nation status for trade laws, and only then after an initial five year period in which all imports from France would be duty free as well as three years from Poland. A whole bunch of other similar themed clauses also existed all aimed at generally undermining the German economy for years as well as clauses by which the allies could force Germany into other trade and regulation treaties for five years. The treaty goes on for over four hundred articles...

[Artemas]

it was still less punitive than either 1871, brest-litovsk or potsdam. so i guess the question is: by which metric do we measure "unfairness"?

zinegata, aren't you the retard who made the hague and the hundred days thread, and then argued against the opinions of most historians and experts?

maybe you should slow your horses buddy


anyway, the UN proved to be relevant because the great powers were all invited, and more, enticed to play a part of the organization. the league never had this boon, with the US becoming extremely isolationist, russia in collapse, germany beaten, and the remainder exhausted.

[Zinegata]

it was still less punitive than either 1871, brest-litovsk or potsdam.

Define "punitive". Are you referring to territorial concessions? Economic concessions? Army size restrictions? Reparations?

And do you realize how fucking stupid it is to try and compare all of these treaties even if you break it down this way?

Let's go by territory for instance. In 1871 the French were forced to give up Alsace-Lorraine. Total land area of around 15K square kilometers.

German East Africa, which was ceded to the Allies, by itself had a land area of 995K square kilometers. That's already seriously over sixty times the land area of Alsace-Lorraine. And that's not yet counting all of the European territories Germany lost (Ponzan alone was larger than Alsace-Lorraine), and all of the colonies they gave up.

Now, you can try to move goalposts and say "Alsace Lorraine is more valuable than East Africa!", but all you're proving is that these treaties are not really comparable from an economic, territorial, and pride/prestige level because the value differs depending on your goalpost. France may not give a damn about Germany losing Ponzan, but the Germans and the Poles do.

It's thus fucking stupid to judge a treaty's "fairness" by the supposed "value" gained or lost by each power. You're never going to get an agreement.

However, what can be easily shown is whether or not a treaty was drafted fairly by a simple measure: Did both sides actually sit down and talk about the terms? Was there any give and take? In the case of Versailles, there wasn't. It was a "woe be the vanquished" treaty. And again, a ton of evidence has already been shown how it emasculates the German military, economy, and pride/prestige, and none of it was ever refuted.

[K. A. Pital]

So the only thing defenders of the Versallies butcher treaty can say is that "Brest-Litovsk was worse"? Good grief. I don't see how that's refuting Zinegata's point. Stupidity will not be tolerated in history. But sure, show us how the First World War victorious parties were treating opponents "fair". We're speaking about the same nations which invaded the former ally when said ally had an internal revolution and refused to take part in the war at all.

[Thanas]

Agreed with Stas and especially with Sea Skimmer. Heck, just take a look at the idea of a General staff being banned - a German invention which was the heart of German military power, institutional memory and innovation.

Likewise, using the desperation offensive which only happened due to the threat of Allied reinforcements as proof that Germany would have faltered without American intervention is pretty damn stupid.

And I doubt any Historian would disagree that the German delegation to Versailles got seriously shafted.



I am also not impressed by the behavior of bobalot and artemas in this thread.

[thejester]

Likewise, using the desperation offensive which only happened due to the threat of Allied reinforcements as proof that Germany would have faltered without American intervention is pretty damn stupid.

Jay Winter puts forward a pretty convincing case that the 'desperation offensive' was the only thing that kept the civil distrubance in Germany in January 1918 from spiralling out of control; 'as long as that promise [of military victory] appeared possible, then the home front stayed the course', in his words.

Zinegata's position in general strikes me as pretty disingenious; as if American intervention was some sort of deus ex machina that grabbed victory from the jaws of defeat in 1917. The 'desperation offensive' of 1918 was a direct result of the 'desperation offensive' of 1917 (unrestricted submarine warfare), itself a prett obvious crisis of faith in victory on the part of the Germans. The French Army and the Third Republic more broadly went through a crisis in 1917, but this shouldn't be overplayed - it reflected frustration with incompetent prosecution of the war rather than the feelings present in, say, Petrograd at the same time. It wasn't solved by the entry of the US either (although that was important, Doughty notes that the mutinies in the French Army peaked after the US entry in April and that censors reports suggested at the time the US entry was having a negative effect on morale in the trenches) and actually improved as the international situation deteriorated in the second half of the year; Michael Neiberg fingers the collapse of the Kerensky government as the decisive moment in the improvement in French morale, as the French Army took a backs-against-the-wall view. This isn't just idle talk either - in October Sixth Army (the formation most affected by the mutinies) undertook an offensive in the Chemin des Dames that took 11,000 prisoners for the cost of something like 2500 KIA and a similar number MIA. That suggests that while the French Army was still 'fragile' it was also not on its knees and capable of taking effective, large-scale offensive action and secondly that the Allied superiority on the attack that was so evident in 1918 was also beginning to mature.

American money and economic power was certainly crucial to the Allies, as Skimmer has outlined, but overt American intervention was hardly the difference between victory and defeat. The two biggest problems for the Allies - the U-Boat offensive and the crisis in France - were both solved by the time the next two problems (the October revolution and the rout of the Italians) occurred; by late 1917 the French Army had steadied and was capable of large-scale offensive action, and the introduction of convoys stabilised tonnage losses. The British Army was understrength, but then so was the German Army, by a staggering 665,000 at the start of 1918; the troops moved from the East filled in the gaps in the Westheer, at the cost of Germany not having a strategic reserve. So no, the Allies were not 'on their knees' in 1917; at best you can point to the continuance of a stalemate, the difference being Germany cannot afford to keep fighting given it's economic situation.

[Thanas]

Likewise, using the desperation offensive which only happened due to the threat of Allied reinforcements as proof that Germany would have faltered without American intervention is pretty damn stupid.

Jay Winter puts forward a pretty convincing case that the 'desperation offensive' was the only thing that kept the civil distrubance in Germany in January 1918 from spiralling out of control; 'as long as that promise [of military victory] appeared possible, then the home front stayed the course', in his words.

What are his sources?

[Zinegata]

Uh, what?

The 1917 submarine offensive was far from a "desperation" offensive. It was a deliberate decision to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare after experience gained in the past three years. Again, 1917 was the year that Russia surrendered. Germany was in a very strong position in 1917 - and I've yet to see any serious historian argue that the submarine offensive was launched because the Germans felt that they were about to lose the war. Rather, they felt that adding one more nail to the coffin would be enough to let them win outright in 1917. Certainly, it was also used for boosting home morale ("We're blockading the Brits like how they're blockading us!"), but I doubt that this was ever the primary motivation.

It's also worth noting that when the German revolution started, the rebellion began with the sailors of the surface fleet - who had mostly sat the war out without fighting. Not disgruntled civilians complaining about the lack of rations. Moreover, the rebellion seemed motivated primarily by the fact that they were being deliberately sent out on a suicide mission.

What you can argue is that Germany brought America's involvement into the First World War on themselves, and the U-boat campaign was a major reason why America intervened. However, the U-boat war alone wasn't enough to convince America to go to war either - it took another diplomatic incident (the Zimmerman Telegram) before America finally threw its hat on the ring.

Finally, it still does not change the fundamental point that the "final score" at the end of the war was largely because America had tipped the balance. A net gain of 1.5 million soldiers on the Allied side is not a trivial contribution. It was the contribution that ensured final victory. Nor that Germany had befuddled the Allies for four years despite fighting on two fronts against a numerically superior foe; to the point that Russia had even collapsed.

That both Germany and the United States had virtually no say in crafting the Treaty of Versailles points to the latent unfairness of that document.

[Thanas]

I also was referring to Operation Michel, not the submarine warfare.

[thejester]

'Desperation' is perhaps a little strong but I can't agree with the idea that Germany undertook it out of a position of strength:

Therefore my conclusion is that a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, launched in time to produce a peace before the harvest of the summer of 1917-i.e. [before] the 1st of August-has to accept the possibility of American belligerence, because we have no choice. In spite of the risk of a diplomatic rupture with America, unrestricted submarine warfare is nevertheless the correct means to conclude this war victoriously. It is also the only means that will achieve this end.

...

From the moment back in autumn 1916 when I declared the time had come to strike against England the situation has steadily improved in our favour. The crop failure, in conjunction with the effects of the war on England up to now, gives us the opportunity to force a decision before the next harvest. If we do not make use of what may well be the last opportunity, then I see no other option than that of mutual exhaustion, without our succeeding in bringing the war to an end on terms that would secure our future as a world power.

That's from the Holtzendorff memorandum of 22 December 1916, arguing forcefully for unrestricted submarine warfare. I think my point stands: one gamble (opportunity to knock England out of the war) leads to the US entering the war which leads to another gamble (the Spring Offensive). I also think you're being disingenious in saying 'all this happened in 1917!', as the decisions around unrestricted submarine warfare took place before the Russian Revolution and well before the mutinies, the collapse of the Italians etc.

Also:

Finally, it still does not change the fundamental point that the "final score" at the end of the war was largely because America had tipped the balance. A net gain of 1.5 million soldiers on the Allied side is not a trivial contribution. It was the contribution that ensured final victory. Nor that Germany had befuddled the Allies for four years despite fighting on two fronts against a numerically superior foe; to the point that Russia had even collapsed.

No, it wasn't. Skimmer has outlined why US intervention was important: US Army troops are not one of the reasons, however. Of those 1.5, how many saw actual fighting and in what way was this fighting decisive? The direct American contribution to stopping the Spring Offensives was negligible, as was their role in the counteroffensives/the Hundred Days. The German Army was already suffering severe problems in the face of manpower shortages and Allied material and increasing tactical and operational superiority before March 1918; the spring offensives greatly exacerbated these problems, but didn't create them. How do you explain events such as the Marne counteroffensives, the 'Black Day' and the breaching of the Hindenburg Line - all successes unthinkable a year previously and achieved with only a small amount of American participation?

Thanas: this work in question was a conference paper, published in 1918: Year of Victory. He cites a bunch of a secondary work including The First World War: an agrarian intepretation by Offer and a bunch of his own stuff. WW1 not really my area so I'm only vaguely aware of Winters scholarship: here's his Yale bio if you're interested.

[Zinegata]

The von Holtzendorff memo was written by navy; which had just suffered a strategic defeat at Jutland and had all but accepted Britain's superiority in surface ships. This wasn't the German government admitting that it was losing the war and thinking that using U-boats was the only way to win the war. This was the German navy admitting that the High Seas Fleet was never going to win against the British Grand Fleet and arguing to the German government that they had best resort to commerce warfare.

In fact, the memo being written in 1916 - prior to Germany's victory over Russia - shows that the writer was in fact quite misinformed about the overall status of the war because the events of 1917 proved otherwise.

Moreover, the additional 1.5 million troops was inconsequential? Did you actually read Sea Skimmer's post? We're not talking just about the Spring Offensive, which is increasingly becoming a red herring in this thread. We're talking about the whole of 1918 - and in the final Allied offensives the American forces did participate enmasse. Adding another 1.5 million troops when Germany was down to just over 4 million troops did tip the balance and allow the Allies to launch its final successful offensives in 1918.

[Thanas]

Thanas: this work in question was a conference paper, published in 1918: Year of Victory. He cites a bunch of a secondary work including The First World War: an agrarian intepretation by Offer and a bunch of his own stuff. WW1 not really my area so I'm only vaguely aware of Winters scholarship: here's his Yale bio if you're interested.

First, regarding the Holtzendorff memo I find it not that supportive of your argument, considering the context.

As regards to Winters, what are his primary sources? Secondary sources are not worth that much, especially when he talks about the willpower of an entire nation. It is not as if this topic is as clear cut that secondary sources on their own will suffice.

[thejester]

The von Holtzendorff memo was written by navy; which had just suffered a strategic defeat at Jutland and had all but accepted Britain's superiority in surface ships. This wasn't the German government admitting that it was losing the war and thinking that using U-boats was the only way to win the war. This was the German navy admitting that the High Seas Fleet was never going to win against the British Grand Fleet and arguing to the German government that they had best resort to commerce warfare.

In fact, the memo being written in 1916 - prior to Germany's victory over Russia - shows that the writer was in fact quite misinformed about the overall status of the war because the events of 1917 proved otherwise.

Sorry but how do you reconcile that view with the second part of the memo that I quoted?

The crop failure, in conjunction with the effects of the war on England up to now, gives us the opportunity to force a decision before the next harvest. If we do not make use of what may well be the last opportunity, then I see no other option than that of mutual exhaustion, without our succeeding in bringing the war to an end on terms that would secure our future as a world power.

Von Holtzendorff clearly outlines his argument: we have an opportunity to beat England now, an opportunity that is unlikely to reoccur. That opportunity will also probably mean the entry of the US onto the side of the Entente, but it will be irrelevant as the war will essentially be over. Under your argument, German leadership knows it is winning but decides to go ahead with unrestricted submarine warfare despite knowing full well the enormous risk it poses. Either you're wrong, or the German leadership was staggeringly stupid. I'm leaning towards the former.

Moreover, the additional 1.5 million troops was inconsequential? Did you actually read Sea Skimmer's post? We're not talking just about the Spring Offensive, which is increasingly becoming a red herring in this thread. We're talking about the whole of 1918 - and in the final Allied offensives the American forces did participate enmasse. Adding another 1.5 million troops when Germany was down to just over 4 million troops did tip the balance and allow the Allies to launch its final successful offensives in 1918.

The Spring Offensive isn't a red herring, and in any case I specifically asked you to outline the role of American troops in the following battles:

- Marne counteroffensive;
- Amiens ('The Black Day');
- Breaching of the Hindenburg Line;

I'll give you a clue: American troops were present at the Marne Counteroffensive (1st and 2d ID) and during the overall Allied effort to breach the Hindenburg Line (Meuse-Argonne Offensive and IIRC two divisions with the Australian Corps at Mont St-Quentin); but in all cases they were part of a broader Allied effort and in no way could you say they were decisive on their own. American troops fought well and had some impressive successes but the simple fact is the bulk of the fighting, dying and winning between July and November 1918 was done by the BEF and the French Army. Having actual US troops on the ground was not the difference between victory and defeat during the Allied counteroffensives.

[thejester]

Thanas: this work in question was a conference paper, published in 1918: Year of Victory. He cites a bunch of a secondary work including The First World War: an agrarian intepretation by Offer and a bunch of his own stuff. WW1 not really my area so I'm only vaguely aware of Winters scholarship: here's his Yale bio if you're interested.

First, regarding the Holtzendorff memo I find it not that supportive of your argument, considering the context.

As regards to Winters, what are his primary sources? Secondary sources are not worth that much, especially when he talks about the willpower of an entire nation. It is not as if this topic is as clear cut that secondary sources on their own will suffice.

As I said, it's a conference paper in which Winters cites (among others) his considerable body of work on the issue of the relationship between war and European society; I haven't got the essay on me so I can't give specific references, I'll do so tomorrow. And TBH, I'm not going to spend tomorrow slogging through ~20 years of historiography to identify his body of primary material. I think that's a slightly unrealistic and unreasonable standard of evidence given this is a) an argument on the internet and b) we're talking about a professor at Yale, not some random bloke on the internet.

[Thanas]

The von Holtzendorff memo was written by navy; which had just suffered a strategic defeat at Jutland and had all but accepted Britain's superiority in surface ships. This wasn't the German government admitting that it was losing the war and thinking that using U-boats was the only way to win the war. This was the German navy admitting that the High Seas Fleet was never going to win against the British Grand Fleet and arguing to the German government that they had best resort to commerce warfare.

In fact, the memo being written in 1916 - prior to Germany's victory over Russia - shows that the writer was in fact quite misinformed about the overall status of the war because the events of 1917 proved otherwise.

Sorry but how do you reconcile that view with the second part of the memo that I quoted?

The crop failure, in conjunction with the effects of the war on England up to now, gives us the opportunity to force a decision before the next harvest. If we do not make use of what may well be the last opportunity, then I see no other option than that of mutual exhaustion, without our succeeding in bringing the war to an end on terms that would secure our future as a world power.

I can however read the entirely opposite within that....do you have the original German at hand?

As I said, it's a conference paper in which Winters cites (among others) his considerable body of work on the issue of the relationship between war and European society; I haven't got the essay on me so I can't give specific references, I'll do so tomorrow. And TBH, I'm not going to spend tomorrow slogging through ~20 years of historiography to identify his body of primary material. I think that's a slightly unrealistic and unreasonable standard of evidence given this is a) an argument on the internet and b) we're talking about a professor at Yale, not some random bloke on the internet.

He must at least have some written references to that. As for the professorship, I am not that impressed by it given that people like Luttwak managed to get professorships at well-respected "elite" universities as well.

BTW, you brought up the argument, so at least citing the primary evidence should be just fair.

[thejester]

I can however read the entirely opposite within that....do you have the original German at hand?

No, I'm working off an English translation.

He must at least have some written references to that. As for the professorship, I am not that impressed by it given that people like Luttwak managed to get professorships at well-respected "elite" universities as well.

BTW, you brought up the argument, so at least citing the primary evidence should be just fair.

Mate, seriously? The standard of evidence here is now 'you must cite primary sources'?

[PainRack]

No it is not at all. The Allies still had a chance to win without the US; but not at all good one and it is completely based on the Germans collapsing into a revolution. They allies meanwhile had a dead serious chance of being actually defeated in the field and forced not into a negotiated peace but a complete reversal of fortune. The allies were never clearly wining the war on land until well into 1918 after German squandered all its men attacking to forestall the arrival of American forces. In fact Germany had managed to amass superior numbers in 1918 on the western front for this offensive; meaning if they hadn’t launched it successful allied attacks would have been fucking impossible. As it was the Spring Offensive cost the Germans about 1 million men, the allies lost about 800,000, but in the same timeframe the US put 1.3 million men into France, 3 million by the end of the War. So during the spring offensive Allied effective strength went up a million and a half men… when the total German army coming out of the operation was about 4.2 million on all fronts, and you think this wasn’t tipping the balance? That is absurd.

We are comparing the risk of a potential collapse of the Allies in 1917 vs the Germans collapsing in 1918, right?

How is it likely that the Allies will likely collapse in 1917 if America said she would not join the war? The French mutinies, submarine warfare was overcome by the Allies without America entering the war. Or are we now in the scenario that America refusal to join the war= America refuses to supply the Allies.

[Thanas]

Mate, seriously? The standard of evidence here is now 'you must cite primary sources'?

At least tell me what they are. Because otherwise, how am I supposed to check them or even understand what he is arguing?


And I have tracked down the Holtzenplotz memo in full:

Wortlaut der Denkschrift der Chefs des Admiralstabes Admiral v. Holtzendorff an den Chef des Generalstabes Generalfeldmarschall v. Hindenburg.


Ganz geheim. Berlin, 22. Dezember 1916.

Euerer Exzellenz beehre ich mich in der Anlage ein Schreiben über die Notwendigkeit eines baldigen Beginns des uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieges ergebenst zu übersenden. Die Niederschrift ist im Wesentlichen eine Fortsetzung der auch Euerer Exzellenz mit B. Nr. 22 247 I vom 27. August 1916 übersandten Denkschrift „Die Schiffsraumfrage und die Versorgung Englands im Jahre 1916“.
Gestützt auf die eingehenden Ausführungen der Anlage, darf ich Euere Exzellenz bitten, nachstehendem Gedankengange zu folgen, und hoffe, eine volle Übereinstimmung unserer Ansichten darüber zu erzielen, dass es unumgänglich notwendig ist, unser Vorgehen gegen Englands Seeverkehr baldigst bis zur äußersten Möglichkeit zu steigern, um die Gunst der Lage auszunutzen und uns einen schnellen Sieg zu sichern.

1.
Der Krieg verlangt eine Entscheidung vor Herbst 1917, wenn er nicht in allgemeiner Erschöpfung aller Parteien und damit für uns verhängnisvoll enden soll. Von unseren Gegnern sind Italien und Frankreich in ihrem Wirtschaftsgefüge so stark erschüttert, dass sie nur noch durch die Energie und Tatkraft Englands aufrecht erhalten werden. Gelingt es, England das Rückgrat zu brechen, so ist der Krieg sofort zu unseren Gunsten entschieden. Englands Rückgrat ist aber der Schiffsraum, der den großbritannischen Inseln die notwendige Zufuhr für die Erhaltung des Lebens und der Kriegsindustrie bringt und die Zahlungsfähigkeit im Auslande sichert.

2.
Der augenblickliche Stand der in dem schon erwähnten Schreiben vom 27. August ausführlich behandelten Schiffsraumfrage ist in der Anlage nochmals dargelegt.
Er ist kurz folgender:
Die Frachten sind auf einer großen Reihe wichtiger Gebiete ins ungeheuerliche, zum Teil auf das Zehnfache und noch darüber hinaus gestiegen. Auch aus zahlreichen anderen Zeugnissen wissen wir mit Bestimmtheit, dass es überall an Frachtraum fehlt.
Die augenblicklich noch vorhandene englische Tonnage wird mit etwa 20 Millionen Brutto-Register-Tonnen zutreffend anzunehmen sein. Von diesen sind mindestens 8,6 Millionen t requiriert für militärische Zwecke und ½ Million in der Küstenschifffahrt beschäftigt, schätzungsweise 1 Million in Reparatur bzw. vorübergehend unbenutzbar; etwa 2 Millionen t müssen im Interesse der Verbündeten fahren, so dass für die englische Versorgung höchstens noch 8 Millionen t englischer Tonnage zur Verfügung stehen. Eine Durchrechnung der Statistik des Seeverkehrs in den englischen Häfen ergibt noch weniger. In den Monaten Juli—September 1916 fuhren darnach nur rund 6¾ Millionen Br.-Reg.-T. englischen Schiffsraumes auf England. Daneben lässt sich der sonstige nach England fahrende Schiffsraum auf 900 000 t feindlicher — nicht englischer — und reichlich 3 Millionen Tonnen neutraler Tonnage berechnen. Insgesamt wird England also von nur noch rund 10¾ Millionen Br.-Reg.-T. versorgt.

3.
Lässt schon die bisher geleistete Arbeit im Kampfe gegen den Schiffsraum ein weiteres Vorgehen auf diesem Wege für uns aussichtsreich erscheinen, so hat der ungewöhnlich schlechte Ausfall der diesjährigen Welternte in Brotfrucht und Futtermitteln uns eine ganz einzigartige Gelegenheit in den Schoß geworfen, die nicht auszunutzen niemand verantworten kann. Nordamerika und Kanada werden voraussichtlich schon von Februar ab so gut wie kein Getreide mehr an England abgeben können. Dann muss dieses seine Versorgung auf dem weiten Wege von Argentinien, und da Argentinien infolge seiner schlechten Ernte nur wenig liefern kann, aus Indien und in der Hauptsache aus Australien beziehen. In der Anlage ist im einzelnen ausgeführt, dass eine solche Verlängerung des Weges der Zufuhr für unsere Gegner ein Mehr an Schiffsraum von 720 000 t für die Getreidefracht beansprucht. Praktisch genommen heißt das, dass bis zum August 1917 von den verfügbaren 10¾ Millionen Tonnen ¾ Millionen für eine Leistung in Anspruch genommen werden, die bisher gar nicht notwendig war.

4.
Unter so günstigen Vorbedingungen verspricht ein energisch und mit aller Kraft geführter Schlag gegen den englischen Schiffsraum unbedingt sicheren Erfolg, so dass ich meine Äußerung vom 27. August 1916: „Unsere klar erkennbare Kriegsaufgabe ist darnach, jetzt durch Vernichten vom Transportraum die Entscheidung zu unseren Gunsten herbeizuführen“, und weiter: „Vom militärischen Standpunkte lässt sich nicht verantworten, von der Waffe des U-Bootes auch jetzt noch keinen Gebrauch zu machen“ nur wiederholen und stark unterstreichen kann. Ich stehe nicht an zu erklären, dass wir, wie die Verhältnisse jetzt liegen, mit uneingeschränktem U-Boot-Krieg in fünf Monaten England zum Frieden zwingen können. Dies gilt jedoch nur vom uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieg; von dem zurzeit geführten U-Boot-Kreuzerkrieg auch dann nicht, wenn alle bewaffneten Schiffe zum Abschuss freigegeben werden.

5.
Ausgehend von der früher bereits als Monatsleistung genannten Vernichtung von 600 000 t Schiffsraum durch den uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieg und der in der Anlage näher begründeten Erwartung, dass durch ihn mindestens zwei Fünftel des neutralen Schiffsverkehrs von der Fahrt nach England von vornherein abgeschreckt werden, lässt sich errechnen, dass der englische Seeverkehr nach fünf Monaten um etwa 39% des heutigen zurückgegangen sein wird. Dies würde England nicht ertragen können, weder im Hinblick auf die Verhältnisse nach dem Kriege, noch auch bezüglich der Möglichkeit, den Krieg fortzusetzen. Es steht heute schon vor einer Lebensmittelnot, die es zwingt, den Versuch zu machen, dieselben Streckungsmaßnahmen einzuführen, zu denen wir im Laufe des Krieges als blockiertes Land haben greifen müssen. Die Voraussetzungen für eine derartige Organisation sind von vornherein in England völlig anders, und zwar unvergleichlich viel ungünstiger als bei uns. Es fehlt an Behörden, und es fehlt an der Erziehung des Volkes zu entsprechender Einordnung in solchen Zwang. Noch aus einem anderen Grunde wird die gleichmäßige Herabsetzung der Brotration für die ganze Bevölkerung sich in England jetzt nicht mehr durchführen lassen. Sie war in Deutschland zu einer Zeit möglich, als vorübergehend andere Lebensmittel die plötzliche Verringerung der Brotration ausgleichen konnten. Dieser Augenblick ist in England verpasst und kann durch nichts zurückgebracht werden. Mit etwa drei Fünftel des Seeverkehrs lässt sich aber die Lebensmittelversorgung ohne gleichmäßige kräftige Rationierung des Brotgetreideverbrauches bei gleichzeitiger Aufrechterhaltung der Kriegsindustrie nicht durchführen. Der Einwand, dass England genügend Brotgetreide und Rohstoffe im Lande haben könnte, um über die Gefahrzeit bis zur nächsten Ernte wegzukommen, ist in der Anlage ausführlich widerlegt.
Dazu kommt, dass der uneingeschränkte U-Boot-Krieg für England mit dem Wegfall der Versorgung aus Dänemark und Holland sofort die Fettnot bedeuten würde, da ein Drittel der ganzen englischen Buttereinfuhr aus Dänemark kommt und die gesamte Margarinezufuhr aus Holland. Ferner bedeutet es Verschärfung des Erz- und Holzmangels durch Bedrohung der Erz- und Holzzufuhr aus Skandinavien bei gleichzeitigem schärferem Erfassen der spanischen Erzzufuhr. Damit wird unmittelbar die Kohlenförderung verringert, da das dazu nötige Holz nicht mehr aufzubringen sein wird, ferner die Eisen- und Stahl- sowie die von beiden abhängige Munitionserzeugung. Schließlich gibt er uns endlich die so lange ersehnte Gelegenheit, wirksam gegen die neutrale Munitionszufuhr vorzugehen und damit der Armee eine Erleichterung zu verschaffen.
Demgegenüber würde der U-Boot-Kreuzerkrieg auch nach allgemeiner Freigabe der bewaffneten Dampfer nach fünf Monaten nur eine Verringerung der nach England fahrenden Tonnage um 5 × 400 000 Tonnen — etwa 18% des gegenwärtigen monatlichen Seeverkehrs, also weniger als die Hälfte des uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieges ergeben. Nach den bisherigen Erfahrungen kann keinesfalls darauf gerechnet werden, dass die Freigabe der bewaffneten Dampfer ein erhebliches Mehr an versenktem Frachtraum gegenüber den in den letzten beiden Monaten erreichten rund 400 000 t bringen wird. Sie wird vielmehr voraussichtlich nur den sonst infolge fortschreitender Bewaffnung zu erwartenden Abfall ausgleichen. Ich bin mir darüber klar, dass auch der Fortfall von rund einem Fünftel des jetzigen englischen Seeverkehrs sehr störend auf die englische Versorgung einwirken wird. Ich halte aber für ausgeschlossen, dass das jetzt unter Lloyd George's zum äußersten entschlossener Leitung stehende England dadurch zum Frieden gezwungen werden könnte, zumal da die oben erwähnten Wirkungen der Fett-, Holz- und Erznot und die nachhaltige Einwirkung auf die Munitionszufuhr fortfallen. Dazu kommt der Fortfall der psychologischen Wirkungen der Panik und des Schreckens. Diese nur vom uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieg zu erwartenden Wirkungen schätze ich als eine unentbehrliche Voraussetzung des Erfolges ein. Wie schwer sie wiegen, beweisen die Erfahrungen, die wir im Anfang des U-Boot-Krieges vom Frühjahr 1915, als die Engländer noch an seinen vollen Ernst glaubten, und sogar in dem kurzen U-Boot-Krieg vom März und April 1916 gemacht haben.
Voraussetzung ist ferner, dass Beginn und Ankündigung des uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieges derart zusammenfallen, dass zu Verhandlungen, insbesondere zwischen England und den Neutralen, keine Zeit bleibt. Nur in diesem Falle wird der heilsame Schrecken in den Feind und die Neutralen fahren.

6.
Die Ankündigung des uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieges wird die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika erneut vor die Frage stellen, ob sie die Folgerungen aus der von ihr bisher eingenommenen Haltung gegenüber der U-Boot-Verwendung ziehen will oder nicht. Ich bin durchaus der Ansicht, dass der Krieg mit Amerika eine so ernste Angelegenheit ist, dass alles geschehen muss, um ihn zu vermeiden. Die Scheu vor dem Bruch darf aber meines Erachtens nicht dazu führen, im entscheidenden Augenblick vor dem Gebrauch der Waffe zurückzuschrecken, die uns den Sieg verheißt.
Auf jeden Fall ist es zweckmäßig, die für uns ungünstigere Lösung als wahrscheinlich anzunehmen und sich klarzumachen, welchen Einfluss auf den Gang des Krieges der Zutritt Amerikas zu unseren Gegnern haben würde. In Bezug auf den Schiffsraum könnte dieser Einfluss nur sehr gering sein. Es ist nicht zu erwarten, dass mehr als ein geringer Bruchteil der in amerikanischen und vielleicht auch anderen neutralen Häfen liegenden Tonnage der Mittelmächte alsbald in die Fahrt nach England eingestellt werden könnte. Bei weitem der größte Teil lässt sich so beschädigen, dass er in der entscheidenden Zeit der ersten Monate nicht würde fahren können. Die Vorbereitungen dazu sind getroffen. Es würden auch zunächst keine Besatzungen dafür zu haben sein. Ebensowenig ausschlaggebende Wirkung wird man amerikanischen Truppen, die schon wegen Mangels an Schiffsraum nicht in erheblichem Umfange herübergebracht werden könnten, und amerikanischem Geld zuschreiben dürfen, das fehlende Zufuhr und Schiffsräume nicht ersetzen kann. Es bleibt nur die Frage, wie Amerika sich angesichts eines Friedensschlusses, zu dem England genötigt wird, verhalten würde. Es ist nicht anzunehmen, dass es sich dann entschließen würde, den Krieg allein gegen uns fortzusetzen, da ihm keine Mittel zur Verfügung stehen, entscheidend gegen uns vorzugehen, während sein Seeverkehr durch unsere U-Boote geschädigt wird. Im Gegenteil ist zu erwarten, dass es dem englischen Friedensschluss beitreten wird, um möglichst schnell wieder in gesunde Wirtschaftsverhältnisse zu gelangen.
Ich komme daher zu dem Schluss, dass ein uneingeschränkter U-Boot-Krieg, der so rechtzeitig eröffnet wird, dass er den Frieden vor der Welternte des Sommers 1917, also vor dem 1. August, herbeiführt, selbst den Bruch mit Amerika in Kauf nehmen muss, weil uns gar keine andere Wahl bleibt. Ein bald einsetzender uneingeschränkter U-Boot-Krieg ist also trotz der Gefahr eines Bruches mit Amerika das richtige Mittel, den Krieg siegreich zu beenden. Es ist auch der einzige Weg zu diesem Ziel.

7.
Seitdem ich im Herbst 1916 den Augenblick zum Zuschlagen gegen England für gekommen erklärte, hat die Lage sich noch wesentlich für uns verbessert. Der Ausfall der Welternte, verbunden mit der bisherigen Wirkung des Krieges auf England, gibt uns noch einmal die Gelegenheit, vor dem Einbringen der neuen Ernte die Entscheidung zu unseren Gunsten herbeizuführen. Nutzen wir diese nach menschlichem Ermessen letzte Gelegenheit nicht aus, so sehe ich keine andere Möglichkeit als die der gegenseitigen Erschöpfung, ohne dass es uns dabei gelingen kann, den Krieg so zu beenden, dass unsere Zukunft als Weltmacht gesichert wird.
Um rechtzeitig die nötige Wirkung erzielen zu können, muss der uneingeschränkte U-Boot-Krieg spätestens am 1. Februar beginnen. Ich bitte Euere Exzellenz um Äußerung, ob die militärische Lage auf dem Kontinent, insbesondere gegenüber den noch verbleibenden Neutralen, diesen Zeitpunkt gestatten wird. Zum Treffen der nötigen Vorbereitungen bedarf ich eines Zeitraums von drei Wochen.

I think this is more ambigous than you make it out to be.

Let me highlight a few choice passages:

1. Der Krieg verlangt eine Entscheidung vor Herbst 1917, wenn er nicht in allgemeiner Erschöpfung aller Parteien und damit für uns verhängnisvoll enden soll. Von unseren Gegnern sind Italien und Frankreich in ihrem Wirtschaftsgefüge so stark erschüttert, dass sie nur noch durch die Energie und Tatkraft Englands aufrecht erhalten werden. Gelingt es, England das Rückgrat zu brechen, so ist der Krieg sofort zu unseren Gunsten entschieden. Englands Rückgrat ist aber der Schiffsraum, der den großbritannischen Inseln die notwendige Zufuhr für die Erhaltung des Lebens und der Kriegsindustrie bringt und die Zahlungsfähigkeit im Auslande sichert.

Here he basically says that unless the war will be decided before Autumn 1917 it will result in war-weariness on all parties and thus will be bad for Germany (in the context of becoming a Weltmacht or superpower). If however Englands tonnage will be knocked out, England will be knocked out and therefore the war will be won.

Paragraph 2 details the british tonnage.

Paragraph 3 details how the bad harvests around the world actually profit Germany because they give a narrow window of opportunity as to knocking out English foodstuff shipping. Paragraph 4 says that England could be broken within five months via unrestricted U-Boat warfare. Paragraph 5 details how England is worse equipped than Germany to get through famines and how a quick and decisive unrestricted sub-warfare campaign will get more results. Lots of details and assumptions about the weakness of the English national psyche here.

Paragraph 6 however is a clincher. Here he details how it must be very important that the USA must be kept neutral, however he estimates that even if it does not stay neutral, the US mobilization will be too late to have any impact provided Britain will be broken in five months. He also says that the unrestricted sub-warfare campaign is the right option and the only option to be victorious.

Now, it all depends on how you interpret this. To me, it reads more as if he defines victory as one in which Germany can dictate the peace terms and attain Weltmacht (cf Par. 7). It is even more telling when one looks at the context surrounding this memo, the Propaganda battle between the Reichskanzler and the military minds and the popular opinion, where Propaganda allegedly used the "Weltmacht or bust" principle. See this article by Mommsen for the broader context.

Paragraph 7 is in which he once more says that the crop failures have hit the allies harder than Germany itself. Here he also defines his standards for victory: "ohne dass es uns dabei gelingen kann, den Krieg so zu beenden, dass unsere Zukunft als Weltmacht gesichert wird.", in short the achievement of a secure World Power. This, in context with the war aims he exposed as Propaganda coup means IMO not that Germany would lose the war should the strategy not be enacted, but more that Germany would not be able to claim world power status as a prize of war.

(I am not even considering the various power struggles going on and Holtzendorff needing to legitimize his position/status by appearing hawkish etc.)

[Zinegata]

The Spring Offensive isn't a red herring, and in any case I specifically asked you to outline the role of American troops in the following battles:

- Marne counteroffensive;
- Amiens ('The Black Day');
- Breaching of the Hindenburg Line;

I'll give you a clue: American troops were present at the Marne Counteroffensive (1st and 2d ID) and during the overall Allied effort to breach the Hindenburg Line (Meuse-Argonne Offensive and IIRC two divisions with the Australian Corps at Mont St-Quentin); but in all cases they were part of a broader Allied effort and in no way could you say they were decisive on their own. American troops fought well and had some impressive successes but the simple fact is the bulk of the fighting, dying and winning between July and November 1918 was done by the BEF and the French Army. Having actual US troops on the ground was not the difference between victory and defeat during the Allied counteroffensives.

Uh, hello? The argument was not "America won the war all on their own!". It's that America tipped the balance in favor of the Allies.

Again: America added over one million soldiers during the war. This is already 1/4 of the German Army's total strength. Obviously, a million men attacking 4 million would not be decisive; but when added to the British and French strengths they were certainly the factor that made the Allied offensives possible.

Moreover, focusing on specific parts of the 1918 offensive isn't very honest, as American units were also operating in areas that were not necessarily covered by the above three battles. That's called cherry-picking, much like how you're asking me to look for American involvement in the final German offensive... when we know that the bulk of the AEF was still coming over and in training at that particular time.

A more relevant figure is the total US casualty rate, which amounts to about 330K in 1918. These casualties were suffered regardless of the battlefield they fought in (and removes the cherry-picking factor), and would have likely been sustained by the other Allies if the Americans didn't take over these sectors - the war being a war of attrition. Could the French have taken another 330K casualties and still kept fighting?

Which brings me to a massive omission on your part: You haven't proved that the French and British could have won against the Germans in 1918 on their own. Care to show some actual figures to demonstrate that the French and British were guaranteed victory even without the infusion of a million men?

[Simon_Jester]

I'm a bit unclear on what, exactly, are the positions being staked out here.

Zinegata, your position is that 'the Americans tipped the balance of WWI in the Allied favor, where previously it had been stalemated or in the Central Powers' favor.' Is that right?

And what about everyone else? I get the feeling that some of us are getting caught up in debate against an exaggerated version of the other party's argument.

[thejester]

Mate, seriously? The standard of evidence here is now 'you must cite primary sources'?

At least tell me what they are. Because otherwise, how am I supposed to check them or even understand what he is arguing?

Winter also cites his own work, The Great War and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century, Vintage Press, 1996. Relevant citations for his thesis in particular are Offer and Deist; he's clearly a big fan of the latter, and that particular article was originally published in German: ’Zur Realität der "DolchstoBlegende" published in Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft. Studien zur preufiischen Militärgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991). [Sorry if some of the German characters haven't carried across in that C&P].

And I have tracked down the Holtzenplotz memo in full:

I think this is more ambigous than you make it out to be.

Now, it all depends on how you interpret this. To me, it reads more as if he defines victory as one in which Germany can dictate the peace terms and attain Weltmacht (cf Par. 7). It is even more telling when one looks at the context surrounding this memo, the Propaganda battle between the Reichskanzler and the military minds and the popular opinion, where Propaganda allegedly used the "Weltmacht or bust" principle. See this article by Mommsen for the broader context.

Paragraph 7 is in which he once more says that the crop failures have hit the allies harder than Germany itself. Here he also defines his standards for victory: "ohne dass es uns dabei gelingen kann, den Krieg so zu beenden, dass unsere Zukunft als Weltmacht gesichert wird.", in short the achievement of a secure World Power. This, in context with the war aims he exposed as Propaganda coup means IMO not that Germany would lose the war should the strategy not be enacted, but more that Germany would not be able to claim world power status as a prize of war.

(I am not even considering the various power struggles going on and Holtzendorff needing to legitimize his position/status by appearing hawkish etc.)

Ok, but in your interpretation would you say that:

- he puts forward this argument in the context of Germany having the upper hand in the war, as Zinegata claimed?

- and what is your view on the issue I raised in my previous post: if Germany did indeed have the upper hand, why did the leadership undertake such a huge gamble?

Uh, hello? The argument was not "America won the war all on their own!". It's that America tipped the balance in favor of the Allies.

Again: America added over one million soldiers during the war. This is already 1/4 of the German Army's total strength. Obviously, a million men attacking 4 million would not be decisive; but when added to the British and French strengths they were certainly the factor that made the Allied offensives possible.

Moreover, focusing on specific parts of the 1918 offensive isn't very honest, as American units were also operating in areas that were not necessarily covered by the above three battles. That's called cherry-picking, much like how you're asking me to look for American involvement in the final German offensive... when we know that the bulk of the AEF was still coming over and in training at that particular time.

A more relevant figure is the total US casualty rate, which amounts to about 330K in 1918. These casualties were suffered regardless of the battlefield they fought in (and removes the cherry-picking factor), and would have likely been sustained by the other Allies if the Americans didn't take over these sectors - the war being a war of attrition. Could the French have taken another 330K casualties and still kept fighting?

Which brings me to a massive omission on your part: You haven't proved that the French and British could have won against the Germans in 1918 on their own. Care to show some actual figures to demonstrate that the French and British were guaranteed victory even without the infusion of a million men?

What's amusing about you accusing me of cherry-picking is that it reveals how little you know about what happened in the field in 1918. The breaching of the Hindbenburg Line in September 1918 included the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the single biggest operation undertaken by the AEF in the war...I struggle to understand how mentioning it is cherry-picking. What I was trying to get you to understand is that Foch's concept of operations from July onwards involved sequential hammer blows from Allied armies:

July 18-Aug 3: Marne counteroffensive by French Tenth (including 1st and 2d US ID), Sixth, Ninth, Fifth and Fourth armies; 29,000 Germans and 600+ cannon captured.
Aug 8-: Amiens counteroffensive by French First Army and British Fourth Army; the 'black day' of the German Army, 29,000 Germans captured in the first four days of the offensive, with the overall number at 65,000+ by the end of August.
Aug 14: Hindenberg and Ludendorff inform the Kaiser 'we [the army] have reached the limits of our endurance'; Doughty, Foley etc agree that by this stage the German Army is in freefall, with rising desertion rates, insubordination and the onset of the flu pandemic. Allies have a clear operational superiority.
Aug 20-28: French Tenth, First and Third armies and British Third and First armies push forward in what Ludendorff describes as another 'black day', capturing Nolon, Albert and Bapaume;
Aug 31- Sep 27: US First Army, British Third, Fourth and First Armies and French Tenth and First Armies closed up to the Hindenburg line in a series of small battles.
26 September: First phase of Foch's 'grand offensive launched' by French Fourth and US First Armies in the direction of Mezieres;
28 September: Belgian Army, British Second Army and French Sixth Army attack at Ypres;
29 September: British Fourth Army (including 2 US divisions) attacks through the Hinbenburg Line at the St. Quentin Canal; Hindenburg and Ludendorff insist on peace at once when they meet with the Kaiser.
6 October: Note passed through the Swiss Government to President Wilson asking for an armistice;
8 October: British First and Third Armies capture Cambrai and break through the Hindenburg Line.

I could fill in the rest of the month but I think you get the point. The AEF was not in itself a tipping point, but used as part of a much broader Allied effort; and the German Army was already disintegrating in July and August. You'll further note that the Meuse-Argonne offensive of 26 September was far from a military triumph:

Despite Pershing's optimism and confidence, the offensive, which began early on September 26, quickly bogged down and had stalled by the twenty-ninth. Officers in the Operations Bureau of the GQG criticized the Americans for using twice as many troops as needed in the attack, taking heavy casualties, and not being able to coordinate the complex maneuvre. Doughty, Phyrric Victory, p. 492

This view of the Americans as enthusiastic amateurs who took heavy casualties because they hadn't learnt the hard lessons of 1915-1917 was a view shared by the Australians who attacked alongside them at St Quentin. That's not a slight on them; they were green formations, learning their craft. But I also think it shows the folly of arguing they were a tipping point. The counteroffensives of July and August saw the German Army in terminal decline, and the most important results of the effort to breach the Hindenburg Line came not from the Americans or French but the British.