Radical American Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki Killed

[Count Chocula]

You've got to realize, PeZook, this is not how Chocula thinks. For reasons unknown, he actually sees his post as some kind of refutal. See, all you have to do (in his mind) at any given time is to attack the opposite camp as you perceive it, and if you succeed in accusing said other camp of acting fully as vile as your own, yours is exonerated. Apparently.

Or maybe that's not it. Maybe it's simpler. Maybe it's that Chocula, being demonstrably without ethics himself, cannot comprehend why anyone would apply the same set of standards to their own camp as to the Enemy. This would account for his immediate assumption that Thanas means and desires that only conservatives should be shot (fully disregarding that Thanas simply applies the murderous neoconservative justifications in this thread in a consistent fashion). No, Thanas is clearly looking for flimsy excuses to Kill the Other. That's how Chocula himself rolls, after all.

Then again, we can always rely on Chocula to distort and/or sidestep the truth in whatever fashion is convenient before running away (usually to return with the same arguments in the forlorn hope nobody remembers them being refuted the last time around). It takes a special kind of chutzpah to claim the rhetoric of the left is comparable either in volume and viciousness to that of the right wing.

First off, Eleas, Thanas offered up snark without any support. He still hasn't provided it. I countered with actual, factual quotes from the other side to both mock his ad hominem and refute his implicit assumption that US "conservatives" are the hate-mongers. Note that he still hasn't responded. I'm happy to trade barbs with Thanas, but not with you.

As for the rest of your armchair psychoanalysis: just, no. I can smell the smarm in your post way over here in the States. You don't know me, my history, my points of view, or anything else about me enough to even pretend to pass judgment. Still, you took the shot. While I could just flood my post with invective, I won't. Why? Because you're pathetic. Thank you SO MUCH for explaining to PeZook my thought processes, I'm sure he or she really needed the help. And, while I could take issue with your arguments, you oh-so-cleverly just smeared me and my motive without actually providing any information to support your positions regarding "how Chocula thinks." No, your approach is just to toss off some insults in my general direction as if you really know who I am. Nice try at snark, but you're not Stark!

Oh BTW Thanas offered up the "conservatives," not me. You're not even worth a curse, so I'll just crib Fgalkin and say "have a nice day," whoever and whatever you are.

[Samuel]

What would someone like J. Edgar Hoover be like if he knew he could get away with simply having "dangerous radical hatemongers" killed, without trial?

Fred Hampton not fit that criteria?

[Simon_Jester]

All I'm going to say is that the Chicago police and the FBI never asserted publicly that they had a right to kill Fred Hampton, or anyone else, at will, by virtue of who they were affiliated with.

Nonetheless, the case of Fred Hampton is a great illustration of this. A blatant assassination by police, directed against an organization that the security organs think could become revolutionary, regardless of whether the man himself was violent.

And, yes, the Chicago police and the FBI got away with it. No trials, no evidence, just barge into the guy's apartment and shoot him dead.

And this was without memos from the president's lawyers assuring them that they can kill whoever they please and get away with it so long as someone slips a blank-check memo in their pocket saying "what has been done, has been done for the good of the State."

What do you think these organizations will be like with such permission, with the president drawing up hit lists himself? Do we have any assurance at all that the future public officials who will step into the shoes of Nixon and Hoover won't feel like drawing up such lists?

[Eleas]

First off, Eleas, Thanas offered up snark without any support. He still hasn't provided it. I countered with actual, factual quotes from the other side

The "other side"? Let's see, by the context of the thread and Thanas' own statements, that would be... what? He certainly didn't rule out extremists from the Democrat side of the aisle (they would fit under generic "extremists"); that is an inference you made, because you desperately want this to be about conservatives versus liberals. I guess the other side didn't exist in context until you invoked it.

to both mock his ad hominem and refute his implicit assumption that US "conservatives" are the hate-mongers. Note that he still hasn't responded.

This may be because you didn't offer anything worthy of a civil response. Try as you might, the constant stream of hatred offered by major news organizations and celebrities does not, in fact, go away because you presented a quote from a random street person during a rally and an admittedly crazy statement made by one single D-list celebrity. Precisely as I said, you do as you're ideologically programmed to do: you split the world into two halves, "Us" and "the Enemy", then start accusing the Enemy of having once or twice engaged in the same practice that largely defines your own camp.

As for the rest of your armchair psychoanalysis: just, no. I can smell the smarm in your post way over here in the States. You don't know me, my history, my points of view, or anything else about me enough to even pretend to pass judgment.

I seem to have struck a nerve. Tell me, why do you think I said what I did? Is it because I love to mock you? Not really. You're not that important. The reason is simple: I can't abide intellectual dishonesty and random bullshit in the face of a genuine threat to a large body of people, myself included. Your tendency toward counterfeit debating is irksome at the best of times; you have a track record of running away and then returning later acting as if the debate hadn't taken place, and of pretending to listen reasonably while in fact not bothering to read what's been said. By this you achieve a veneer of reasoning which allows you to masquerade as someone actually willing to debate, while in actual fact, you're just parroting talking points.

And even that would normally invite a sigh. "Oh, it's just Count Chuckles, he doesn't really know better than to piss on the proverbial rug." Now, it's not that simple, though.

Because this is a thread in which precedent is made, and argued for, that a country that has already run roughshod over international law (and, incidentally, over my country's laws) for simple profit of its most rapacious elements, now has the moral right to kill anyone it wants to. Because of "special circumstances" that need not be defined. This is all irrelevant to you. Instead you promptly seize on the flimsiest possible pretext for your pet tangent because dammit, people in the US and abroad being safe from political assassination isn't nearly as important as the White Man's Burden being shouldered by poor little persecuted you.

And, while I could take issue with your arguments, you oh-so-cleverly just smeared me and my motive without actually providing any information to support your positions regarding "how Chocula thinks." No, your approach is just to toss off some insults in my general direction as if you really know who I am.

At the risk of veering even more into OT, who you are can be easily gleaned by reading your posts: you're a self-absorbed human spambot with cognitive dissonance and a persecution complex a mile wide. Had you possessed principles then matters would be different, but you don't. Principles would mean accepting a different viewpoint without conveniently forgetting you did so later. Principles imply a willingness to admit error. Principles...

ah fuck, why do I bother? Might as well try to teach a codfish the subtle art of origami.

[Samuel]

Because this is a thread in which precedent is made, and argued for, that a country that has already run roughshod over international law (and, incidentally, over my country's laws) for simple profit of its most rapacious elements, now has the moral right to kill anyone it wants to. Because of "special circumstances" that need not be defined. This is all irrelevant to you.

And this is why you are wrong. Because the special circumstances have been defined. Because the "right to kill anyone it wants" is not what is being argued. What the US did was entirely permisable under international law.

Rather than rebutting any of this you attack Count Chocula. It doesn't matter if what you said is true because it is completely and utterly irrelevant. There is a reason Ad Hominum is a logical fallacy, but you spend the time psycho-analyzing the Count instead of defending your own position. I guess principles mean you never have to examine them.

All I'm going to say is that the Chicago police and the FBI never asserted publicly that they had a right to kill Fred Hampton, or anyone else, at will, by virtue of who they were affiliated with.

And neither does the United States government in this case. Awlaki was killed for belonging to a group, actively participating AND going to Yemen, where arresting him would be difficult.

[Eleas]

And this is why you are wrong. Because the special circumstances have been defined. Because the "right to kill anyone it wants" is not what is being argued. What the US did was entirely permisable under international law.

Then I would cop to being wrong. I fail to see where the definition is given in this thread, or how it is permissible under international law. I am, however, open to correction.

Rather than rebutting any of this you attack Count Chocula. It doesn't matter if what you said is true because it is completely and utterly irrelevant. There is a reason Ad Hominum is a logical fallacy, but you spend the time psycho-analyzing the Count instead of defending your own position. I guess principles mean you never have to examine them.

Some points:

• Chocula seized upon the importance of his team vs the Other, not the discussion itself. That was what I was attacking.
• True, I did not offer a rebuttal to the notion of the actions of the US being legal. In perfect honesty, that was because I didn't see where this notion was presented in its entirety, by you or anyone else. From what I can glean from this thread, it's equal parts "he's part of al Qaida, thus fair game" and "we've done it before." My reading comprehension may not be up to snuff at the moment, so I'd love for you to clarify if possible.
• Ad hominem is a fallacy, yes. It means "attack the man, not the argument." You will now tell me where I failed to meet Chocula's argument (and yes, pointing out that his argument was a red herring constitutes meeting it).
• I'll allow that I've been more vitriolic than usual, yes. There are various reasons for this, among other things Choculas implicit hypocrisy. How that translates to me failing to examine my principles is, however, an open question, and I invite you to answer it.

And neither does the United States government in this case. Awlaki was killed for belonging to a group, actively participating AND going to Yemen, where arresting him would be difficult.

Source for this being the official, legal reason?

[Crateria]

And neither does the United States government in this case. Awlaki was killed for belonging to a group, actively participating AND going to Yemen, where arresting him would be difficult.

Source for this being the official rationale?

Yemen being difficult to arrest him in sorta makes sense since the country isn't under the government's total control.

[Eleas]

Yemen being difficult to arrest him in sorta makes sense since the country isn't under the government's total control.

"Sorta makes sense" does not equate to legal grounds for assassination.

EDIT: Apologies. I was correcting my post and you happened to reply before I was done, hence my statement being more imprecise than it should have been.

[Simon_Jester]

All I'm going to say is that the Chicago police and the FBI never asserted publicly that they had a right to kill Fred Hampton, or anyone else, at will, by virtue of who they were affiliated with.

And neither does the United States government in this case. Awlaki was killed for belonging to a group, actively participating AND going to Yemen, where arresting him would be difficult.

I seem to have missed the part where the executive isn't asserting that it can only assassinate people who flee to foreign countries and go hide in the hinterlands to avoid extradition. Why can't they decide, twenty years from now, to assassinate someone because it would be difficult to arrest them in Hoboken? What's the standard of 'difficulty' here? Who stops them from moving those goalposts?

Besides, "it would be impractical to arrest him" is arguably the least important part of the whole business.

Remember, the executive clearly thinks al-Awlaki committed some capital offense, because they saw fit to kill him. Whatever he'd done, or whatever the administration thought he'd done, was sufficient to make the administration want him dead. But they didn't bother to have a trial about this, or to use a process with judicial oversight to decide what this capital offense was, or whether Al-Awlaki had actually done it. Instead, Al-Awlaki's life became forfeit when he crossed a hidden line. While we can guess roughly where the line was, there is no jurisprudence about where it is. There is no known oversight, no known rules of evidence, and no way for the public to review any question about where the line stands.

Only after the state had already decided that al-Awlaki had committed a potentially capital offense, by crossing that line, could they decide whether or not to try to arrest him. And only after deciding it would be hard to arrest him could they decide to assassinate him. By the time we got to the "it would be difficult to arrest him in Yemen" step, the government has already decided it's OK to kill al-Awlaki.

That's the really disturbing part. Normally you have to have some kind of trial before you can mark a citizen for lawful death at the hands of the state.

[PeZook]

You know what's funny? When Poland was under occupation by the fucking Nazis, and the underground resistance movement was working within a conspiracy setup, they still deemed it necessary to convene an underground court to give out death sentences before collaborators or war criminals could be assassinated by the Home Army. These trials carried significant risk to the organization, because the people involved had much knowledge about the Underground State and its structures.

In other words, a goddamned central european quasi-fascist paternal autocracy under occupation by a genocidal enemy saw it fitting to hold trials before assassinating their enemies, while the LAND OF THE FREE and the HOME OF DEMOCRACY consults a lawyer, writes a memo and just does it.

[Crateria]

You know what's funny? When Poland was under occupation by the fucking Nazis, and the underground resistance movement was working within a conspiracy setup, they still deemed it necessary to convene an underground court to give out death sentences before collaborators or war criminals could be assassinated by the Home Army. These trials carried significant risk to the organization, because the people involved had much knowledge about the Underground State and its structures.

In other words, a goddamned central european quasi-fascist paternal autocracy under occupation by a genocidal enemy saw it fitting to hold trials before assassinating their enemies, while the LAND OF THE FREE and the HOME OF DEMOCRACY consults a lawyer, writes a memo and just does it.

America is the land of the lynching tree and the home of the enslaved, fool. It was never about democracy or freedom. It's arguably worse than the Nazis due to the latter being punished for their crimes. No Nuremberg Trials for Kissinger and his ilk.

EDIT: Sorry, I'm in a foul mood right now. I guess I was rude with that, wasn't I. Alright, how about this; the fact that we're behaving worse than a puppet state of a nation whose defining characteristic is batshit crazy moustache-twirling evil and genocide, tells a lot about the US, doesn't it?

[TheHammer]

You know what's funny? When Poland was under occupation by the fucking Nazis, and the underground resistance movement was working within a conspiracy setup, they still deemed it necessary to convene an underground court to give out death sentences before collaborators or war criminals could be assassinated by the Home Army. These trials carried significant risk to the organization, because the people involved had much knowledge about the Underground State and its structures.

In other words, a goddamned central european quasi-fascist paternal autocracy under occupation by a genocidal enemy saw it fitting to hold trials before assassinating their enemies, while the LAND OF THE FREE and the HOME OF DEMOCRACY consults a lawyer, writes a memo and just does it.

What exactly was the format of these trials? I've done a google search but can't find any details on how they were conducted. But logically one would assume that the collaborators were in fact not given a chance to defend themselves at these trial, since bringing them to trial before assassination would not be feasible. Therefore the evidence would essentially all be from the prosecutions stand point. If that assumption is true, then the process would not be altogether different from the process used against Awlaki, which despite your description, was much more extensive than "consult a lawyer and write a memo".

[Samuel]

Then I would cop to being wrong. I fail to see where the definition is given in this thread, or how it is permissible under international law. I am, however, open to correction.

page 2

He was actively fighting as a combatant for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. His presence on the drone strike list was a direct consequence of that fact. As a member of an armed paramilitary force engaging in open hostilities against an American ally, he was a legitimate military target. When you come across those in an active war zone, you are free to kill them. The fact that a drone did it has no more significance than if he had been bombed by aircraft, blown apart by artillery, shot by a rifleman, or stabbed to death with a bayonet. That al-Awlaki was primarily responsible for propaganda within the group does not mean he was a noncombatant, anymore than a logistics force is noncombatant, and there is certainly evidence he had command authority within the group as witnessed by his role in the attempted printer-bombings. He was still an armed member of a paramilitary force engaged in hostilities and therefore subject to being killed on the battlefield.

There was no "blanket assassination order." The use of the term "assassination" is itself a loaded word designed to trigger strong emotions and obscure al-Awlaki's actual circumstances as an armed fighter engaging in hostilities in a war zone. He was only subject to being killed by American forces while he was operating as a hostile fighter in a war zone against American or allied forces. Had he not gone to Yemen to join up with that paramilitary belligerent force and instead gone to some country that was not in the middle of an Islamist-backed civil war, the worst he could have faced would have been extradition back to the US and a trial in the same. If he had just stayed in the US and continued spouting violent incitement on youtube he would not have faced any sanctions whatsoever. The scope of this action is thus highly circumscribed by al-Awlaki's own actions, which were to raise arms against the United States government and to engage an allied government in battle. There is no slippery slope to extend this outside of Americans openly waging war against their own government, and his death can no more be classified as an "assassination" than can the killing of Taliban militia by airstrikes.

[Master of Ossus]

I seem to have missed the part where the executive isn't asserting that it can only assassinate people who flee to foreign countries and go hide in the hinterlands to avoid extradition. Why can't they decide, twenty years from now, to assassinate someone because it would be difficult to arrest them in Hoboken? What's the standard of 'difficulty' here? Who stops them from moving those goalposts?

Besides, "it would be impractical to arrest him" is arguably the least important part of the whole business.

The question is not whether it's impractical to arrest him. The question is whether or not he's a legitimate military target.

Remember, the executive clearly thinks al-Awlaki committed some capital offense, because they saw fit to kill him.

Nonsense. Awlaki was never accused or convicted of having committed a crime. The executive believes that he was a member of a group which is involved in an ongoing armed conflict against the United States. This is a decision that the Executive Branch must be able to make, independent of prior judicial or legislative activity, because such distinctions often have to be made in the field on short notice. There is no doctrinal justification whatsoever for requiring judicial examination of cases like this. None. Nor is it pragmatic.

Whatever he'd done, or whatever the administration thought he'd done, was sufficient to make the administration want him dead. But they didn't bother to have a trial about this, or to use a process with judicial oversight to decide what this capital offense was, or whether Al-Awlaki had actually done it. Instead, Al-Awlaki's life became forfeit when he crossed a hidden line. While we can guess roughly where the line was, there is no jurisprudence about where it is. There is no known oversight, no known rules of evidence, and no way for the public to review any question about where the line stands.

Yes there is. The ICJ oversees such armed conflicts, and is allowed to make determinations on issues like this.

Only after the state had already decided that al-Awlaki had committed a potentially capital offense, by crossing that line, could they decide whether or not to try to arrest him. And only after deciding it would be hard to arrest him could they decide to assassinate him. By the time we got to the "it would be difficult to arrest him in Yemen" step, the government has already decided it's OK to kill al-Awlaki.

That's the really disturbing part. Normally you have to have some kind of trial before you can mark a citizen for lawful death at the hands of the state.

Not when they're a legitimate military target.

If Awlaki had been a member of a military force engaged in hostilities against the US, and the US had killed him while he was operating in this role, his nationality would have been irrelevant and no one would have cared because the legality of the operation would have been obvious. Only because Al Qaeda deliberately flaunts rules of international warfare is this even a consideration, but for some reason people think that this should entitle its members to more procedural protections, rather than fewer. Admittedly, there is something to be said about procedural policies which are designed to protect civilians and reduce the number of civilians who are erroneously targeted, but here there is essentially no serious debate as to whether or not Awlaki was a member of Al Qaeda, and granting him more protection because of this seems counterproductive to promoting international law.

Moreover, the US seems to have conducted this attack in such a way as to minimize the possibility of civilian casualties and maximize its compliance with international law, even though this allowed Awlaki a considerable reprieve and even though the attack may well have been legal even if there was some risk to civiians.

The memorandum did assert that other limitations on the use of force under the laws of war — like avoiding the use of disproportionate force that would increase the possibility of civilian deaths — would constrain any operation against Mr. Awlaki.

That apparently constrained the attack when it finally came. Details about Mr. Awlaki’s location surfaced about a month ago, American officials have said, but his hunters delayed the strike until he left a village and was on a road away from populated areas.

[PeZook]

What exactly was the format of these trials? I've done a google search but can't find any details on how they were conducted. But logically one would assume that the collaborators were in fact not given a chance to defend themselves at these trial, since bringing them to trial before assassination would not be feasible. Therefore the evidence would essentially all be from the prosecutions stand point. If that assumption is true, then the process would not be altogether different from the process used against Awlaki, which despite your description, was much more extensive than "consult a lawyer and write a memo".

The secret courts operated based on the bill passed by the Comittee For National Affairs passed on April 16th 1940.

They consisted of three judges, at least one of which used to work as a judge, a lawyer or at the very least possessed some degree of legal training.

You are right in that the accused was not often brought to trial. If he couldn't be brought before the court due to risk of deconspiration, he/she was assigned a defence lawyer and was tried in absentia. Any verdict had then to be approved by the government in exile (which meant additional risks, as the information had to be smuggled out of the country and then a reply brought back). All proceedings were documented.

The point, however, is that a country under an existential threat saw fit to go the extra mile just to try people before executing them. The courts were secret because if the proceedings were discovered the judges would've been arrested and executed by the occupier.

Your nation, that is not under threat of physical annihilation and champions itself a defender of democracy and rule of law, does not convene a court, does not assign a defence lawyer, and of course keeps the entire process a secret despite no risk to life and limb for those involved. Really classy.

EDIT: Oh yeah, and now we learn that the US did in fact know where Al-Awlaki was FOR A MONTH, but they still killed him instead of trying for capture. Yeah...

[Block]

Knowing where someone is doesn't mean he's capturable.

[PeZook]

Knowing where someone is doesn't mean he's capturable.

He was in a convoy, eating breakfast, away from populated areas, and was within what, three or four hundred kilometres from a large airport. How much more capturable can a terrorist get? Seriously?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Knowing where someone is doesn't mean he's capturable.

He was in a convoy, eating breakfast, away from populated areas, and was within what, three or four hundred kilometres from a large airport. How much more capturable can a terrorist get? Seriously?

Well, if his entourage had lots of anti-air weapons, or whatever, short of a tank brigade...

[Kamakazie Sith]

Knowing where someone is doesn't mean he's capturable.

He was in a convoy, eating breakfast, away from populated areas, and was within what, three or four hundred kilometres from a large airport. How much more capturable can a terrorist get? Seriously?

You sound very naive, PeZook. So, we know Awlaki was three to four hundred kilometers from a large airport which means your standard helicopter will take roughly over an hour to reach him. Let's hope they don't have MANPADs and the strike team doesn't run into problems along the way as the territory might be hostile. All that assumes they already had a team and plan on standby. However, that's not even the most difficult part. The most difficult part will be identifying which vehicle he is in and disabling it and then neutralizing his escorts without killing him. Then you have to capture him and get him back to a safe zone.

[PeZook]

You sound very naive, PeZook. So, we know Awlaki was three to four hundred kilometers from a large airport which means your standard helicopter will take roughly over an hour to reach him. Let's hope they don't have MANPADs and the strike team doesn't run into problems along the way as the territory might be hostile. All that assumes they already had a team and plan on standby. However, that's not even the most difficult part. The most difficult part will be identifying which vehicle he is in and disabling it and then neutralizing his escorts without killing him. Then you have to capture him and get him back to a safe zone.

I know it would be risky, and that just killing him is much, much easier. But the US used to be willing to take these sorts of risks: they raided Bin Laden's safehouse (with all the risks you mention and more). In Somalia, they executed raids in urban areas with mere days to prepare.

Of course, almost the entire US presence in Yemen is set up around drones, so yeah I guess there might not have been assets available that could be used to set up an ambush and try to capture Awlaki. That's my point: the US just doesn't care enough to even try.

[Kamakazie Sith]

I know it would be risky, and that just killing him is much, much easier. But the US used to be willing to take these sorts of risks: they raided Bin Laden's safehouse (with all the risks you mention and more). In Somalia, they executed raids in urban areas with mere days to prepare.

Comparing the Bin Laden raid to the Awlaki scenario is not the same. With Bin Laden there were diplomatic concerns - the raid was conducted without the approval of the Pakistani government so avoiding civilian casualties was likely a top priority and the only way to do that and verify on scene that you've accomplished your objective is to send in special forces. They had months to prepare because Bin Laden wasn't going anywhere. Had Bin Laden been in Awlaki's place the situation would have been the same...death via hellfire missile.

What operation are you refering to with Somalia? I'm assuming you're speaking of the operation which led up to the Battle of Mogadishu? If so, that's a terrible example and here's why; 18 US dead, 72 Wounded, 1 Captured, 1 Allied Soldier killed, 9 Allied Soldiers wounded. The resulting mayhem led to 1,000 - 3,000 Somalian casualties including civilians caught in the cross fire. Again, due process does not take priority over the lives of others. Why you, and others, feel this is the case is shocking and not supported by US law.

The base of operations was right inside Mogadishu so assets were readily available but even if they weren't the risk of collateral damage due to airstrike would have been unacceptable even if it didn't contradict the mission objectives.

Of course, almost the entire US presence in Yemen is set up around drones, so yeah I guess there might not have been assets available that could be used to set up an ambush and try to capture Awlaki. That's my point: the US just doesn't care enough to even try.

You're making a lot of assumptions. Other factors such as diplomatic issues, safety issues, etc could be the reason the US doesn't have ground force assets in place.

[Simon_Jester]

What exactly was the format of these trials? I've done a google search but can't find any details on how they were conducted. But logically one would assume that the collaborators were in fact not given a chance to defend themselves at these trial, since bringing them to trial before assassination would not be feasible. Therefore the evidence would essentially all be from the prosecutions stand point. If that assumption is true, then the process would not be altogether different from the process used against Awlaki, which despite your description, was much more extensive than "consult a lawyer and write a memo".

How do we know this? The entire procedure was secret.

We have assurances, but I'm not all that inclined to take the government's word for it that they think these things through, not after the intelligence fuckups of the past ten years.

The question is not whether it's impractical to arrest him. The question is whether or not he's a legitimate military target.

Deciding that he is a legitimate military target is equivalent to deciding that he's committed a capital offense. The US government now asserts the power to decide, in secret council, that American citizens are legitimate military targets by virtue of affiliation with private organizations it has decided to be "at war" with.

This should not reassure you.

Nonsense. Awlaki was never accused or convicted of having committed a crime. The executive believes that he was a member of a group which is involved in an ongoing armed conflict against the United States. This is a decision that the Executive Branch must be able to make, independent of prior judicial or legislative activity, because such distinctions often have to be made in the field on short notice. There is no doctrinal justification whatsoever for requiring judicial examination of cases like this. None. Nor is it pragmatic.

I would be far more comfortable with this decision if it had been made in the field or on short notice. Instead, the decision was made in cold blood, we knew for months that the US government wanted al-Awlaki dead, and yet there was no attempt to observe or even consider any kind of review process.

If al-Awlaki had been shot, rifle in hand, trying to attack US troops in Afghanistan, I would not have a problem with that. Because then there's no question of him being uniquely targeted for death by the government, and by its very nature his actions make his intent to kill Americans as blatant as possible.

It's when it's possible for someone to sign a document saying "kill this man" and have the government adopt a systematic policy of carrying out that order no matter how long it takes, no matter where the man chooses to go or what he chooses to do, that I think there's a chilling effect. Especially when that decision can be made without proof, or without a need to present that proof for examination later on, as is the case with al-Awlaki.

The review of the proof might be an open-and-shut case, but in this case there was plenty of time for there to be such a case. The decision to kill al-Awlaki was not made under any kind of time pressure or urgency, nor was there any obvious danger from taking some time several months ago to present the case for why he needs to die.

If he's so obviously a "legitimate military target" that you are prepared to accept his status as such without even seeing the evidence the state has against him, then surely it wouldn't be hard for the state to prove his status by presenting the evidence, right?

Yes there is. The ICJ oversees such armed conflicts, and is allowed to make determinations on issues like this.

Would you be opposed to a case being brought against the US government in that court, then, under the circumstances?

Only after the state had already decided that al-Awlaki had committed a potentially capital offense, by crossing that line, could they decide whether or not to try to arrest him. And only after deciding it would be hard to arrest him could they decide to assassinate him. By the time we got to the "it would be difficult to arrest him in Yemen" step, the government has already decided it's OK to kill al-Awlaki.

That's the really disturbing part. Normally you have to have some kind of trial before you can mark a citizen for lawful death at the hands of the state.

Not when they're a legitimate military target.

Again, what concerns me is the limit of the state's power to label individuals as "legitimate military targets." What is the limit? How wide a net can the state cast when looking for such? When dealing with a tangle of loosely connected international (or domestic) groups, some of which are violent and some of which aren't, which members of which groups become "legitimate military targets?" What would it look like if the current US government policy about "legitimate military targets" who can be assassinated at will had been applied to previous eras when the US was experiencing civil unrest? What will it look like in the future, if this thinking is applied to civil unrest in the US in the future?

Al-Awlaki's death raises all these questions, and the government's refusal to acknowledge hard limits on its own power in these matters is what disturbs me more than the man's death itself does.

[Eleas]

Then I would cop to being wrong. I fail to see where the definition is given in this thread, or how it is permissible under international law. I am, however, open to correction.

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He was actively fighting as a combatant for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. His presence on the drone strike list was a direct consequence of that fact. As a member of an armed paramilitary force engaging in open hostilities against an American ally, he was a legitimate military target. When you come across those in an active war zone, you are free to kill them.

Thank you. Contrary to what Purnell said, however, Awlaki was not demonstrated ITT to be a combatant at all, and he was put on a list on unclear grounds. Therefore, your statement carries neither concrete definition nor demonstrates legality.


Since you didn't bother acknowledging my response to the other points, I assume this means you agree with them.

EDIT: By "unclear grounds" I mean to say that the rationale was not given. There's the whole thorny issue with the rights of "illegal combatants" to be factored in, as well.

[MarshalPurnell]

Oh for fuck's sake, do you people need to check to verify if the sky is blue every morning?

He declared himself at war with the United States and took obvious, effectual steps to pursue that end. He did not go to Yemen to play tourist, and did not join Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula for their fabulous dental plan. He had established links to Nidal Hassan and Umar Abdulmatallb, including the latter placing him on site at an Al Qaeda training camp, and openly boasted about how they were good "students" while proclaiming a desire for more of the same. The government had some other intelligence indicating he was taking an operational role and so placed him on a list of Al Qaeda targets in Yemen to be hit to degrade the operational capabilities of Al Qaeda; note of course that the fellow propagandist Salman Khan, definitively linked to Al Qaeda by his editorial control over Inspire magazine, was not placed on the list. In any case one would have to be deliberately obtuse (or remarkably stupid) to ignore the mass of evidence showing the al-Awlaki was a member of Al Qaeda and had joined the same to wage war on America.

In this thread there's been a lot of wailing and overwrought concern about his death, which could rather easily be misinterpreted as sympathy for al-Awlaki. There have been all kind of unsupported and unsupportable allegations, like that the American government intended to kill al-Awlaki in any circumstances in any part of the world because he was on a drone target strike list for a warzone in Yemen. There have been ludicrous slippery slope implications, as if Al Qaeda and the Black Panthers are the same kind of dissident organization rather than one being, you know, a major insurgency and terrorist group responsible for killing thousands of Americans harboring itself in various other countries around the world. But we can't let little things like the actual circumstances of this get in the way of decrying of the War on Terror and good old-fashioned enjoyment of a smug sense of superiority, can we?

[Bakustra]

If you do believe that the US did the wrong thing and acted illegally against al-Awlaki, then why shouldn't you feel sympathetic to someone who was murdered without a chance of ever receiving justice? Tell me, would Allied atrocities be right if they managed to kill or torment or rape people who sincerely believed in the Nazi cause? Would it be wrong to feel sympathy for someone gunned down while surrendering if they voted NSDAP in 1932? The actions of al-Awlaki and his beliefs do not change whether people should feel sympathy for him if he was indeed murdered without chance of justice. Otherwise, we could justify atrocities as long as the people we did them to did evil or supported it. Is that what you really want to endorse?