Declared and acknowledged membership in an armed, organized group is sufficient grounds to consider the individual in question a member of an armed, organized group. The guidelines the ICRC put up, which you linked to, revolved around distinguishing when a civilian (someone, by definition, not a member of a party engaged in hostilities) has crossed the line into becoming a combatant. It does not apply in cases where the individual was a combatant from the very beginning; "continuous combat function" is how a civilian crosses that line and loses their status as a civilian even without formal membership in an armed, organized group. A civilian who transports munitions for an insurgent group has not crossed that line, while a declared and acknowledged combatant performing the same non-combat task (providing logistical support) is subject to direct attack and always has been. Likewise members of combatant forces performing other non-combat tasks that enable others to engage in combat are fair game and always have been, which is why for example Jessica Lynch was not "protected" despite have no frontline combat purpose. If we were to take it literally and without any broader context, logistical personnel of all insurgencies would be completely immune to direct attack, making it impossible to legally attack supply lines of insurgent forces.Vympel wrote:Indeed it would, unless they were engaging in hostilities at the actual time they were killed or are known to carry out a continuous combat function and thus lose their protection from direct attack. This is a problem, why?It is instead an attack on the use of drone strikes against Al Qaeda, period, since his interpretation of the article would require the assumption that every member of Al Qaeda is a civilian and would require some adjudication beforehand that they are combatants (by whom?) before direct attack could be legal.
And in any event the US essentially asserted that he was, in fact, known to carry out a continuous combat function. There is independent public evidence that he had a role recruiting and training personnel, which is certainly a combat function. The American and Yemeni governments have also claimed intelligence that he played a role in operational planning of attacks, which is a leadership function that would certainly make him a legitimate target. The public rationale for targeting al-Awlaki is thus in conformity with the provisions that you have posted; you just believe the evidence is insufficient. Or that the US is lying, whatever. I think the balance of evidence from al-Awlaki's own statements and from Abdullmatallab's interrogation and confession are enough to remove any reasonable doubt that he performed a recruitment and training role that contributed to AQAP attacks, even if the evidence for an operational planning role is not sufficient or not publicly available. Al-Awlaki said he was at war with the United States, that he considered Hassan and Abdullmatallab to be "good students" and wanted more like them, and Abdulmatallab's interrogation placed al-Awlaki at the training camp- if that is not sufficient, or too readily discounted (Abdulmatallab was coerced! Al-Awlaki was talking metaphorically!) then I have nothing else and further argument is pretty much pointless.