VI Corps, Gettysburg, July 3rd.

[Shawn]

One of the great “what ifs” of the American Civil War was the postulation that Gen. Meade launched a counter attack on the Confederate center immediately after repulsing Picket’s Charge.

While not intending to discuss the effectiveness of such an attack or its probably of success, I have been wondering if such an attack was possible. Specifically, I wonder if the VI Corps was in position to make such an assault. I have looked but I cannot find any references as to where the VI corps was stationed on July 3rd. I know some of the sub units were engaged but where were the bulk of the men positioned and how quickly could then get to Cemetery Ridge.

Any help would be appreciated.

[TC Pilot]

Well, wikipedia's map puts Sedgewick (VI. Corps commander) at the extreme southern end of the Union line refusing the left flank... which doesn't seem right to me.

Anyway, the assault wasn't over until well into the afternoon. When exactly I'm not sure, but let's just say it was over at 3:00 PM (pretty generous, I think), which would give about five hours before dark. If VI. Corps had been at the center of the line, yeah, I figure they could have made a fairly substantial counterattack before darkness falls, but adding in the extra time to bring the corps up from another point in the line, I doubt it.

[Shawn]

My problem is that it is recorded that some of the VI Corps units saw action on July 2. However I can’t find any information on if they rejoined their parent formations on July 3rd. Furthermore, where was each of the three divisions of the Corps on the 3rd? Were they, as you imply, at the south end of the line behind the Round Tops (which is where I believe them to have been posted but not at the extreme end. I’m thinking that it was somewhere behind Little Round Top). Then it is unclear if they were deployed in line or in a more condensed march order. If the latter, I believe if Meade acted with alacrity, orders could have been sent to move the Corps to the area behind the famous copse of trees with daylight to spare. From there, who can tell.

[TC Pilot]

I've looked around a bit more. At least one brigade was sent from VI. Corps to reinforce Culp's Hill. A few more maps I've looked at show at least large portions of Sedgewick's command at the extreme south end of the Union line. I also got the time completely off. The Confederate assault had barely even begun at 3:00 PM, so the window between the Confederate retreat and dark is even less than suggested..

So, no, I'm pretty confident in saying that unless Meade had known Lee's plan ahead of time and brought up VI. Corps beforehand, there's simply not enough time for it to counterattack on July 3.

[Sea Skimmer]

The only quick way to counter attack would also have been to chase the rebels right back across that same open ground... into the face of the largest collection of artillery tubes ever assembled on US soil for a single bombardment in Confederate hands. Doesn't seem like a very good idea even if time had allowed for it. Confederate artillery fire would in fact have been converging on an attacking force in the center, making things even worse. The Confederates were low on ammunition at the batteries, but had a lot more in the trains and in any case Federal commanders had no way of knowing any of this. Repeating the tactic you just shot to pieces doesn't sound like a good idea.

Having killed so many rebels, and taken so many losses themselves it made a lot of sense to prepare the entire Federal army to pursue the Confederates and attempt to cut off the lines of retreat at the operational level, which is exactly what the Federals then attempted to do, and failed out. Its doubtful that one Federal corps, even if prepared to attack would have actually destroyed or routed the Confederates in my mind. The battle area was just too big for that to work.

[Shawn]

Its doubtful that one Federal corps, even if prepared to attack would have actually destroyed or routed the Confederates in my mind. The battle area was just too big for that to work.

I never said it was a good idea. It was just one of the more popular "what ifs". However, that being said, the VI Corps was the largest corps in the AoP with about 16,000 men. Also, they were fresh and their morale was unshaken. The rebs that participated in Picket's charged were shattered. Longstreet's two other divisions were beat up on July 2nd and Ewell's forces were out of position and they had been engaged on the 2nd. That leaves one of A.P. Hill's divisions under Anderson to receive the charge. As you note the Rebs did have a gun line (without long range ammunition) between Cemetary and Seminary Ridge. The question is: could the Union guns suppress or drive off the Confederate gunners in the time it would take for the VI Corps to arrive in place, deploy and then move forward.

[Sea Skimmer]

Not a chance; the range was too great and the batteries too numerous and too dispersed. Just as poor observation crippled Confederate fire so would it cripple any Union bombardment even were the firepower sufficient and not actually outnumbered. If you advanced the Union guns halfway across the field, then a successful duel might have been possible but I don't see that happening and it would mean setting up under fire. As it was one of the many flaws in Lee's plan was his failure to allocate more then a single eight gun battery of artillery to advance with Pickets attack to provide closer support, but this just generally reflects what a dumb idea it was to attack across such a wide open space with a force which just wasn't that massive.

[CJvR]

Well, wikipedia's map puts Sedgewick (VI. Corps commander) at the extreme southern end of the Union line refusing the left flank... which doesn't seem right to me.

Given the events of June 2 that deployment is fairly sensible. After the Round tops the landscape flattens out and a renewed Confederate effort there would have been dangerous without a solid Union flank guard.

[Sea Skimmer]

Aye, the flank had to be protected, the round tops are not very big at all and literally you couldn't put enough guns on them to prevent an attempt at encircling them from the south.

[Shawn]

Aye, the flank had to be protected, the round tops are not very big at all and literally you couldn't put enough guns on them to prevent an attempt at encircling them from the south.

But did you need an actual physical presence south of the Round Tops. If I'm not misstaken, Big Round Top provided an excellent O.P. and the land south of there was open. A move around that flank would have been observed and countered unless it was a very long end run. Besides, weren't Buford's brigades posted in the area to act as a screen/trip wire force?

[Isolder74]

Here is the Gettysburg battlefield. As you can see there isn't much open area between Little Round Top, Big Round Top or Seminary Ridge. If VI Corps arrived and move in on the Union's Flank south of the battle there really isn't much open ground to take advantage of. There is also the area known as Devil's Den which is very narrow and rocky. This area is not ideal spot to stage a pitched attach of any kind.

[Shawn]

On the third day, the Rebels held Devil's Den and the V Corps with parts of the shattered III Corps held the Round Tops and the southern edge of Cemetary Ridge.

If you look on the map, due south of Big Round Top is open country. From the top of Big Round Top any grand flanking movements would be spotted long before the Confederates got into position to be a threat. That’s why I have trouble thinking the VI was so far to the south, especially if Buford’s brigades are in the area to act as pickets.

[Isolder74]

JULY 2 1863

The success of his army in the fighting on July 1 encouraged Lee to renew the battle on July 2. An early morning reconnaissance of the Federal left revealed that their line did not extend as far south as Little Round Top. Lee directed Longstreet to take two divisions of I Corps and march south until they reached the flank of the Federal forces. They would attack from this point, supported by a division of A.P. Hill's corps - a total force of nearly 20,000 men. While Longstreet carried out the main offensive, Ewell was ordered to conduct a demonstration against the Federal right. However, he was given discretion to mount a full-scale attack should the opportunity present itself.

The Federal army was well prepared for Lee's offensive. Six of its seven corps had arrived on the battlefield, and VI Corps was making a thirty-six-mile forced march to reach it. Meade had deployed his army in a fish-hook-shaped formation, with the right on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill, the center along Cemetery Ridge, and the left on Little Round Top. The left of the Federal line was held by Major General Daniel Sickles's III Corps. Sickles was dissatisfied with his assigned position and in the early afternoon, without orders, he advanced his line nearly half a mile west in order to take advantage of the high open ground around a nearby peach orchard.

Soon after Sickles took up this new position, Longstreet attacked. Third Corps was hard pressed and Meade sent V Corps and part of 11 Corps to reinforce Sickles in the Peach Orchard. But, after furious fighting, Longstreet's forces broke through, causing Sickles's entire line to collapse. The Confederates pursued to the base of Little Round Top, but Federal reinforcements, including elements of VI Corps, checked their advance. Farther north, elements of a division of the Confederate III Corps advanced to the slopes of Cemetery Ridge before they too were forced to retire.

On the Federal right, Ewell did not attack until evening, after Longstreet's onslaught had subsided. The effort to storm Cemetery Hill was ultimately unsuccessful. Ewell's attacks were also repulsed at Culp's Hill, although a foothold was gained near the base of the hill.

The second day's fighting had cost each army some 9,000 casualties. Lee's forces had again gained ground, but had failed to dislodge the Federal army from its strong position.

Vi Corps is manning the positions and reinforcing the positions held by the Union forces on Little Round Top. In a sense they are part of the 3 bars on that part of the field. VI Corps can't take part in any counter offensives, if one was even possible because they are a mite bit busy at that time. I see no indication in the records of the battle of VI Corps moving their position during the day of July 3. There was not any major Federal or Confederate Actions on the Left flank on the day of July 3. A better map would show Confederate positions close to the Unions lines on the left flank but a majority of the Confederate effort was concentrated on the central attack. Those troops were firing on the Union troops in order to keep them tied down to prevent a reinforcing of the center.

There was also an attempt by a Confederate cavalry unit to try and sortie into the rear of the Union position. They were not able to reach a position to be an affect on the battle.

Furthermore there is a stream, that is why Devil's Den is there in the first place, that moves south of the battlefield. The area is not as open as you might think.

[Isolder74]

Here are some better maps over the traditional simplified ones.

Day one



Day Two



Day Three



See how close the Confederate positions are to the Union lines on day 3. There really isn't much VI corps can do on the end of day 3. They could possibly flank the end of the Confederate lines and possibly prevent the divisions on the south end of the Confederate army from escaping but not much else they could really manage.

[Shawn]

Thanks Isolder.

I never thought that Meade had VI corps so far to the end of the line especially when he predicted an assault on his middle on day three.

Live and learn.

[Isolder74]

Thanks Isolder.

I never thought that Meade had VI corps so far to the end of the line especially when he predicted an assault on his middle on day three.

Live and learn.

Well he did use them to hold that section of the field and with the losses from the previous day there really wasn't any reserves for the Union for Meade to take advantage of.

Also consider that the left of the Union lines had almost collapsed the day before it wasn't safe to move VI corps back into reserve.

On day two see the group on the map in the middle? That is VI corps. He can't move troops that are making holding the left possible.

[CJvR]

Besides we are not just talking a tactical flanking move here but a strategic flanking move. Lee had a record of bold surprising marches to gain an advantage. Moving AoNV south in strength (which Longstreet recommended IIRC) to gain a good position would have put the Union army in a difficult position unless they had a strong force on the left flank that could counter and delay any such movement.

[Shawn]

Longstreet did indeed recommend a grand wheel around the Union’s left flank. Unfortunately on the morning of day two when he suggested the maneuver it was impossible (o.k. difficult) to pull off. Stuart was still in transit to Gettysburg, Lee would have no screen to scout the way and fend off Yankee patrols.

Furthermore, the AoNV was not in a good position for such a maneuver. The II Corps was more or less detached from the II and I Corps with the town of Gettysburg interspaced between the two.

After day two, when Stuart had shown up, the situation was altered but Longstreet’s plan was still not practical. The II Corps was actually holding a piece of the trench line on Culp’s Hill and Hood’s and McClaw’s divisions were in close contact with the Union left. I don’t see how a grand flanking maneuver would work, the Union would spot it and react.

And before anyone mentions it, I know the AoNV was able to break off contact under a driving rain and march back to the Potomac. However, in that case it was backing away from the Army of the Potomac not trying to sidle around its flank.