LaCroix wrote:Look at your first document, page 10. You see the huge number of banks failing?
The second article (page 23) shows the same abysmal survival rates.
(I ceased after reading these two - tl;dr).
Only reading those two is your mistake, here.
The fourth one goes over the reason for those failures, which is tied directly to the fact that US banking in this period was really free entry banking, rather than actual free banking. The vast majority of failures are linked with declining asset values, namely falls in the prices of particular state bonds that banks were required to hold as reserves in this period. Banks that aren't forced to carry these risky assets don't fail because of them.
Even then, these banks might not necessarily have failed if they had been allowed to branch across state lines, or even at all in some states. Anti-branching laws in existence at the time created a banking industry made up of under-capitalized, over-specialized unit banks. That's a big part of the reason 10,000 some banks in the US failed between 1929 and 1933 (AFTER the Federal Reserve Act, mind) whereas not a single Canadian bank failed in the same period (BEFORE the Bank of Canada was created).
Importantly, actual losses were still very low in this period. Total losses over the whole period from the passage of New York's Free Banking law in the late 1830's to the creation of the National Banking System in 1863 was roughly 2 million dollars, in an economy where yearly GDP was in the range of $1.5 billion (1840) to about $5 billion (1860).
I'm trying to find an un-gated version of 'New Evidence on the Free Banking Era', by Rolnick and Weber.
LaCroix wrote:That matches the experience in Scotland
Strange, Dr White's
Free Banking in Britain concludes that the Scottish system was extraordinarily successful, more so even than the English system of the same time period.
LaCroix wrote:and Chile.
Again,
Ignacio Briones disagrees with your assessment.
LaCroix wrote:Banks did occasionally go bankrupt
Because that
never happens today, right?
LaCroix wrote:(sometimes by the machinations of other banks that actively tried to fail them)
If you have the time, read Dr White's book on Scottish free banking. It contains a description of something called note dueling, where one bank or one group of banks gathers up all as many notes as possible for another bank or group of banks and then presents them all for redemption at once. The idea is to drive the latter bank/group of banks into illiquidity so that the former can steal their circulation while they're clearing their debts.
The Scottish banks actually invented a novel contractual mechanism for avoiding this problem, called an option clause, which successfully halted note duels (until it was banned by the government, that is).
LaCroix wrote:people lost all their money.
As noted above, these losses were no where near as significant as you're making them out to be.
LaCroix wrote:Also, these notes are no legal tender (or else, free banking wouldn't work at all), which leads to problems like rejection or discounts when using them.
Do you have a source as to how common these problems were?
In New York, for instance, the expected value of a randomly selected one dollar note was at more than 99 cents by 1843, and never dipped below that figure.
LaCroix wrote:I fail to see how you can claim free banking a successful system that people would prefer over the current.
By comparing it to flawed real world financial systems instead of a hypothetical perfect one.
George Selgin has an excellent
paper examining the record of the Federal Reserve System vis-a-vie the National Banking System that preceded it. And keep in mind that the National Banking System was NOT a free banking system.