Did the Allies know they were going to win?

[Stravo]

When you read about WWII history there is a definite trend in the literature that the Allies had such an overwhelming advantage in materials, men and resources that there was no conceivable way that the Germans or Japanese were going to win the war. Victory was inevitable.

However the mood in Allied countries and their propaganda was "Do whatever it takes, we can't afford to lose this war." And older history books I've read painted the conflict as more of a "on the razor's edge" the whole way until D-Day and even then the Allies could have lost.

Did the allies know they were going to win? Did they at the time the war was raging, absent the 20-20 hindsight we have now, suspect that this was a done deal and that all it would take was a few more years of meatgrinding battles but that the end result would be victory? or were they like the US was during the Cold War completely ignorant of the actual capabilities and limitations of the Axis powers?

[Eternal_Freedom]

My knowledge of WWII is limited to an amatuer interest, but I m under the impression that there were periods when it really looked like the Allies were going to lose. Mid-to-late 1940 comes to mind; German forces have stormed across Europe and are banging at Britain's gates. The US is not yet involved and Russia has signed a non-aggression pact with Germany.

At the time Britain was preparing for a massive German invasion and was gearing itself to fight to the death (hence the whole home Guard thing).

Generally though, you can look at several key moments and battles that were "turning points," and were seen as such at the time. The Battle of Britain springs to mind, as does the battles around Malta.

AFAIK, those turning points came down to Hitler and Co making the wrong decision: Goering bombing cities instead of continuing to attack aribases, Hitler ordering the Panzers to abandon the drive to Berlin to swing north and south, giving the Russians time to dig in.

[Sea Skimmer]

Depends on who and when, periods did exist when the Axis were expected to win or stalemate the war, mostly between the Fall of France and early 1942. The main fear was basically that the Germans would be able to FULLY exploit all the industry they had captured and basically make it all function as well captured as it would in its original owners hands. That couldn't happen, workers aside, because Germany and France ect... all needed imports but if the UK fell then this would not matter as the Germans would have control of the seas around Europe. The other fear was a collapse of the USSR, which was another way for the Germans to solve the raw material issue.

However its often hard to separate rear fears from worst case planning. The US planned for some worst case stuff that had to have appeared more or less absurd even at the time, like a Japanese invasion of California.

[Simon_Jester]

When you read about WWII history there is a definite trend in the literature that the Allies had such an overwhelming advantage in materials, men and resources that there was no conceivable way that the Germans or Japanese were going to win the war. Victory was inevitable.

However the mood in Allied countries and their propaganda was "Do whatever it takes, we can't afford to lose this war." And older history books I've read painted the conflict as more of a "on the razor's edge" the whole way until D-Day and even then the Allies could have lost.

Did the allies know they were going to win? Did they at the time the war was raging, absent the 20-20 hindsight we have now, suspect that this was a done deal and that all it would take was a few more years of meatgrinding battles but that the end result would be victory? or were they like the US was during the Cold War completely ignorant of the actual capabilities and limitations of the Axis powers?

In Churchill's history of the Second World War, he said the point at which he was sure of victory was December 8, 1941- when the US entered the war. Instead of freaking out about Pearl Harbor, he went to bed and "slept the sleep of the saved and thankful..." or so he says. That may be something to take with a grain of salt; I dont' know.

[Stravo]

I'm sorry I should have been clearer I meant after the US enters the war. I realize that after Dunkirk and the Fall of France as well as the losses to Japan in the Pacific things did look very grim for the Allies. It's when the US enters the war that things really turned around and I wonder if the argument can be made that most people in the know were pretty confident of winning.

[Simon_Jester]

I think most people who knew the balance of forces were confident of victory by, oh, the end of 1942 unless the Axis managed to pull a miracle superweapon out of their ass (like, say, the atomic bomb).

The average man in the street wouldn't have that much information, so it's hard to say what they'd think.

Exactly when in 1942 informed people went from "we might lose" to "we're sure to win" is hard to say.

I'm pretty sure the average man's conviction that the war would be won came some time in 1944- when the Germans had been driven back far enough that it was plain they weren't going to be able to easily reverse the situation.

[That NOS Guy]

Exactly when in 1942 informed people went from "we might lose" to "we're sure to win" is hard to say.

Probably by late fall/early winter with Guadalcanal sliding towards the US coupled with the Torch landings going off, and that whole Stalingrad thing.

[PeZook]

Probably by late fall/early winter with Guadalcanal sliding towards the US coupled with the Torch landings going off, and that whole Stalingrad thing.

Plus the Battle Of The Atlantic was really turning suicidal for the uboats by then.

[Shawn]

If you are going to use U-Boat losses as a measuring stick, then I'd say February 1943 and onward.

[CaptHawkeye]

Churchill often blew the losses taken caused by the U-Boats out of proportion. As long as the Americans were building ships faster than the Germans could sink them the U-Boat blockade was not going to work.

The layman felt that Europe was forever going to be Nazi dominated and that the Soviet Union was going to quickly collapse in on the pressure from the Third Reich, right up until Operation Barbarossa failed. Once Stalingrad happened no one doubted the capability of the Soviet Union to fight the lion's share of the biggest armed conflict in history. After D-Day it was all downhill and everyone knew it.

Really, when you're a world leader during this period, it really isn't advisable to think the Axis powers weren't basically capable of anything. You didn't know, and you weren't going to call Hitler's bluff. For all you knew the Japanese would be invading the Panama canal by December 8th and the Nazis were going to have the A-bomb by 1943.

[Zinegata]

The balance of forces between the Allies and the Axis was relatively even up until 1941, and the Allied superiority in numbers and material didn't really begin to tell until 1942. Even so, some of the most "decisive" battles of the war i.e. - Midway, Guadalcanal, Stalingrad - happened before US and Soviet industry had been restored to peak efficiency. The US was still gearing up for the war during this period (and during the fighting for Guadalcanal they were down to a single carrier in the whole Pacific), while the Soviets were still restructuring all of the factories they evacuated east of the Urals. There was still a very real possibility of the Allies being defeated or stalemated during this period in various fronts.

By 1943 however, Allied leadership had become reasonably confident that they could win the war - the only question was the time and cost. This is why the Allies were confident enough to claim that their aim was "unconditional surrender" during the Casablanca Conference.

That being said, the Allies also proved to be horrendously misinformed of the strengths and capabilities of the German / Japanese industry, and the the Allies (especially the Americans) habitually over-estimated the power of the Axis war machine. There are also instances wherein the Allies had the needed information, but still panicked and overreacted anyway.

For instance... The huge American aircraft production was partly brought about because they thought the Germans were seriously producing that many planes, when in reality they were only producing a fraction of that number. In the Pacific, Skimmer mentioned in a previous thread how the US Navy did not know how many carriers the Japanese possessed, and developed an entire class of heavy cruisers (the Alaska) to counter hoax Japanese battlecrusiers.

Perhaps most damaging of all was the Allied failure to concentrate their bombing campaign on oil targets. German industry didn't have a lot of oil to play with - and were highly reliant on its synthetic oil plants. Only in 1944 would the Allies make serious attempts to finally take out these facilities, which proved devastating to the Luftwaffe and the remaining Panzer forces.

[PeZook]

If you are going to use U-Boat losses as a measuring stick, then I'd say February 1943 and onward.

February 1943 was when it all came together, but the end of 1942 was really when it was quickly becoming obvious how the current crop of u-boars were obsolete. The only question was to roll out and deploy enough ASW tech to really make patrols suicidal.

[spaceviking]

I think it is worth pointing out that there is a difference between when the Allies knew they would win and when the allies knew they would not be conquered. Even up until Kursk there were significant elements in the Soviet government that would have been willing to give Germany pretty generous borders in exchange for a truce.

[PainRack]

Would it be more accurate to say that the Allies regained the confidence that they would win the war in Europe?

[MKSheppard]

Did the allies know they were going to win?

The issue was very much uncertain well into 1942.

I recently skimmed The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops and found the following generalized tidbits about the US Army in WW2:

There was a choice between a large ground army of 100-200 divisions, and a large Army Air Force of over 1 million men. If you wanted the 1+ million man AAF, you had to accept 90~ divisions as the maximum mobilizable force.

This decision was made in September/October 1942 when it became clear that Russia was not falling easily and that Russia would still continue to field large forces into 1943, and thus a slow build up of strategic airpower in England could be afforded.

Later towards the end of 1943, the War Department considered activating 15 new divisions and reducing the AAF to just 1.8~ million enlisted men. However, in order to provide manpower for the B-29 program, and other lesser stuff like the Army College Program, and rotation of personnel between CONUS and overseas; the extra 15 divisions for 1944 was tabled and the force remained at 90 divisions.

[Bedlam]

That rases an interesting question to me (and maybe one worthy of another thread). If it looked like Russian as going to fall when would the Allies have invaded in the West (if they would at all).

To what extent did the Allies allow Russia to Bleed or at least take the brunt of the fighting while they prepaired, if they wanted to could a succesful invasion have been mounted earlier (although with higher casualties)?

[MKSheppard]

That rases an interesting question to me (and maybe one worthy of another thread). If it looked like Russian as going to fall when would the Allies have invaded in the West (if they would at all).

Page 116 of the book I mentioned earlier had data on this:

But in 1940 and 1941 offensive warfare, however desirable, seemed on sober calculation of means a possibility only for the future. During most of this period, it was by no means certain that Great Britain could stand up under the hammer strokes of the Luftwaffe which were pulverizing her cities. A War Department G-2 conference in May 1941, attended by the G-2 of GHQ, attempted to estimate the military power which the United States could exert if the British should be defeated and came to the following conclusions:

May-November 1941:
An unbalanced force without combat aviation could be put into the field in any area not within a thousand miles from the west coast of Europe or Africa.

November 1941-April 1942:
A small force with combat aviation could be used.

April-November 1942:
Balanced forces would be available up to the limit of ship tonnage.

After November 1942:
Shipping, equipment, and training would permit an expeditionary force of 430,000 to be put into action.

[Memo (S), G-2 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 28 May 41, sub: Conference; Office Chief of WPD WD, 27 May 41. 381/13 (S).]

[D.Turtle]

The issue was very much uncertain well into 1942.

I recently skimmed The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops and found the following generalized tidbits about the US Army in WW2:

There was a choice between a large ground army of 100-200 divisions, and a large Army Air Force of over 1 million men. If you wanted the 1+ million man AAF, you had to accept 90~ divisions as the maximum mobilizable force.

This decision was made in September/October 1942 when it became clear that Russia was not falling easily and that Russia would still continue to field large forces into 1943, and thus a slow build up of strategic airpower in England could be afforded.

Later towards the end of 1943, the War Department considered activating 15 new divisions and reducing the AAF to just 1.8~ million enlisted men. However, in order to provide manpower for the B-29 program, and other lesser stuff like the Army College Program, and rotation of personnel between CONUS and overseas; the extra 15 divisions for 1944 was tabled and the force remained at 90 divisions.

I found this to be quite interesting. Apparently the peak estimate, for army strength needed to be sure to win the war, was 350 divisions - made in September 1942.

After that, the estimates quickly dropped, until it was decided by July 1943 to limit the army to about 90 divisions in total (the number of divisions already raised at that point).

[khursed]

I think the biggest distinction to be made is not "can we" but "how will we?"

Because yes the USA had the ressources and man power to win the war nearly single handedly, however, when Japan hit Pearl Harbour, they could have crippled the pacific fleet had they actually destroyed the four carrier that were supposed to be there, and also hit the naval supply base and especially the submarine base.

However since the IJN still functionned under the archaic ideas of battleship supremacy, they achieved a victory that lost them the war.

Stalin began to cry for help from the get go, the Germans came very close to winning the war in the east, and something few people realize is the importance of Richard Sorge who informed Stalin of the condition on which Japan would attack the USSR, which lead them to move troops from the east to provide the USSR with its first victory of the war when they reached Moscow.

Some say it wouldn't have changed anything, Napoleon did conquer Moscow and still lost to the Russian winter. Maybe the Nazi would have faced the same end no matter what.

What I think is relevent, is the overall cost. Maybe the war could have been won at a greater discount in human life, maybe it could have gone on to be even bloodier.

Talking about it over 65 years later, we have all the luxury in the world to discuss what ifs...

[phongn]

Because yes the USA had the ressources and man power to win the war nearly single handedly, however, when Japan hit Pearl Harbour, they could have crippled the pacific fleet had they actually destroyed the four carrier that were supposed to be there, and also hit the naval supply base and especially the submarine base.

However since the IJN still functionned under the archaic ideas of battleship supremacy, they achieved a victory that lost them the war.

Japan knew very well the importance of the carrier but even had they sank the entirety of the US Pacific Fleet they would've still be ground under the weight of American shipbuilding. Attacking the submarine pens and naval infrastructure is a harder task than it appears.

Stalin began to cry for help from the get go, the Germans came very close to winning the war in the east, and something few people realize is the importance of Richard Sorge who informed Stalin of the condition on which Japan would attack the USSR, which lead them to move troops from the east to provide the USSR with its first victory of the war when they reached Moscow.

Some say it wouldn't have changed anything, Napoleon did conquer Moscow and still lost to the Russian winter. Maybe the Nazi would have faced the same end no matter what.

Germany wasn't "very close to winning the war in the east". Taking Moscow would not have bought them much and they were at the end of their logistics as it was.

[Simon_Jester]

That rases an interesting question to me (and maybe one worthy of another thread). If it looked like Russian as going to fall when would the Allies have invaded in the West (if they would at all).

To what extent did the Allies allow Russia to Bleed or at least take the brunt of the fighting while they prepaired, if they wanted to could a succesful invasion have been mounted earlier (although with higher casualties)?

Not much earlier, and not without much higher casualties.

The big constraints on the decision to invade in the West were:

-Presence of German coast defenses

-Ability of Germans to harass shipping approaching the coast

-Access to ports and good beaches along the coast: it's no use trying to invade a rocky, bare shore with no ports, because even if you get men ashore you won't be able to supply them.

-Availability of sealift and amphibious invasion assets- you need all those little Higgins boats, you need LSTs (LST = Landing Ship, Tank) to carry the needed tanks, halftracks, trucks and jeeps to the armies fighting on the shore. You need them in good, serviceable condition, and you will need their services for many weeks after the invasion actually takes place.

-Ability to put many troops ashore, not just on D-Day, but on D+30 Day and D+60 Day, because that's when the Germans will have rushed their reserves in to oppose the landings and that's when you risk getting bottled up in your beachhead and pounded to bits.

-Presence of the aforesaid German reserves: what do they have, and where, and how far can they move it after how much time?

-Pursuant to that, the ability to disrupt the transportation network, so that you can bring in supplies and reinforcements over the beach and through the ports faster than the Germans can bring them in by road and rail networks from Germany.

-Weather and tides- you need calm seas for the landing, and for moving supplies onto the beach in amphibious vehicles; you need a day of high tides for the landing itself that means the landings must occur during a period of a few days out of each month. Pushing the invasion time to take place a month earlier than planned may be safer than having it happen a week earlier than planned.


A lot of these factors were strongly tilted against the Allies in 1942, so much so that an effective landing would be impossible. The Allies looked at this, it was called Operation Sledgehammer. But what it came down to was that the Allies could only land, say, half a dozen divisions, which meant that the German forces already in the West could mob and crush the beachhead easily. No diversion of German effort from the Russian Front would be needed to defeat Sledgehammer, and if Sledgehammer was tried and failed it would mean a huge loss of resources the Allies would need if they were to stage another invasion later. A complete disaster, much as the Gallipoli landings were.

In 1943 the picture improves slightly; the 1943 invasion was codenamed Roundup. However, a practical 1943 invasion would require the Allies to do nothing but amass troops and ships in Britain for the invasion, and even then it would be a considerably smaller and weaker invasion than the historical 1944 Normandy landings. In reality, the Allied decision to stage the Torch landings in North Africa in 1942 made the spring 1943 landing out of the question due to diversion of effort.

My take on it is that the earliest you could get a serious invasion of Europe without making major changes to Allied policy as early as 1942 would be May 1944. With major changes, you might get a 1943 invasion. Maybe. I think.

Also bear in mind that if the Russian Front ever actually collapsed, any Allied lodgment in Western Europe would get crushed in short order- that was not avoidable, it was just a reality of the situation. As long as the Russians could hold out, it was arguably better to make sure that the invasion of Western Europe was big enough to be decisive rather than being a too-small flash in the pan. If the Russians could not hold out, no invasion of Western Europe could be big enough, and the Allies would just have to wait for the B-29 and the American nuclear arsenal to end the conflict.

[Zinegata]

Dieppe is a pretty stark example of what would happen if the Allies tried a full-scale amphibious assault on Europe in 1942.

[spaceviking]

Dieppe was an important lesson for the Allies in terms of showing the difficulty of invading Europe, but a raid is not analogue for a full scale invasion.

[Patrick Degan]

when Japan hit Pearl Harbour, they could have crippled the pacific fleet had they actually destroyed the four carrier that were supposed to be there, and also hit the naval supply base and especially the submarine base.

However since the IJN still functioned under the archaic ideas of battleship supremacy, they achieved a victory that lost them the war.

Well... not quite.

For a start, the Kido Butai were at the absolute end of their fuel range from Japan. This limited Nagumo's scope of action to achieving the objective of neutralising the striking force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to immediately ensure no interference with the conquest of the East Indies and the Philippines. It was well known to Yamammoto and every officer involved what a huge gamble Operation Z was just in terms of the logistics. Realistically, they could not have achieved much more than what they managed at Pearl. A third-wave strike would have consisted, maybe, of around 120 planes, going to hit a base where the antiaircraft defences were already firming up (heavier casualties were experienced by the second-wave strike than those of the first) and after the element of surprise was long gone, and spending additional time burning fuel which they didn't have to spare cruising at the launch point, and risking detection the longer they remained. Since Nagumo had a primary responsibility to return his task force to Japan intact, he had little choice and no inclination to exceed the planned mission objective. So, he turned about and headed home immediately his second wave was recovered.

Japan's "obsession" with battleship-supremacy went so far as to specifically target the battleships because, at that time, battleships were considered the prestige units of any navy. However, the Japanese admiralty were already well aware that the capital balance was shifting to the aircraft carrier. The very fact that their naval strike operations were primarily based upon the air weapon demonstrates this conclusively, the attitudes of Big Gun admirals notwithstanding.

[PeZook]

For a start, the Kido Butai were at the absolute end of their fuel range from Japan. This limited Nagumo's scope of action to achieving the objective of neutralising the striking force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to immediately ensure no interference with the conquest of the East Indies and the Philippines. It was well known to Yamammoto and every officer involved what a huge gamble Operation Z was just in terms of the logistics. Realistically, they could not have achieved much more than what they managed at Pearl. A third-wave strike would have consisted, maybe, of around 120 planes, going to hit a base where the antiaircraft defences were already firming up (heavier casualties were experienced by the second-wave strike than those of the first) and after the element of surprise was long gone, and spending additional time burning fuel which they didn't have to spare cruising at the launch point, and risking detection the longer they remained. Since Nagumo had a primary responsibility to return his task force to Japan intact, he had little choice and no inclination to exceed the planned mission objective. So, he turned about and headed home immediately his second wave was recovered.

Furthermore, the carriers weren't there. So, picture yourself in Yamamoto's shoes: you are at the end of your logistics tail with the majority of the IJN's striking power with you. You have just finished a major strike, and thus need time to turn your planes around, and there's four enemy carriers...somewhere. You have no idea where, but they haven't been running combat operations so far. Their air wings were completely fresh.

In fact fighters from the Enterprise were already arriving at Pearl. The third wave would've faced far stiffer oppositions than the first two, and if the IJN attack force was detected and attacked by the full weight of airplanes from four carriers, a great victory could've easily turned into a total disaster.