Consequentialism - is it ultimately flawed ethical idea

[Alerik the Fortunate]

What are these other considerations of primary and secondary moral importance?

[K. A. Pital]

Perhaps I do not understand you. You propose that because an ethical system does not work when the person applying it considers some people less than human, the ethical system which is flawed?

You're only getting half of it. What I am saying, in a nutshell, is that any consequentialist approach to ethics will inevitably leave certain groups out of consideration. It's not the person applying it that's the problem, per se, it's that the system forces blinders on the person.

Why? Universalist [or internationalist if we're talking about specifics of racial-national relations] consequentialism should simply include all people. Yes it leaves a huge gap with animal welfare, but frankly, even human welfare objectives are not yet universally solved.

[Straha]

What are these other considerations of primary and secondary moral importance?

For a start challenging the dominant institutions of repression and control that prevent an idea of universalist ethics in the first place (Racism, Heteronormativity, Sexism, Nationalism, etc.).

Why? Universalist [or internationalist if we're talking about specifics of racial-national relations] consequentialism should simply include all people. Yes it leaves a huge gap with animal welfare, but frankly, even human welfare objectives are not yet universally solved.

Because of the huge gap that you deem to be acceptable. Once you start saying "We can't help X group" you create a category of beings whose welfare doesn't matter, and who have protection from maltreatment. Not only is the creation of this category in itself problematic, but other groups whose needs are difficult, or impossible, to asses will inevitably be placed into that category.

More practically under the internationalist system you talk about the Berber nomads of North Africa, illegal immigrants in North America, Gypsies in Europe, and many more groups simply wouldn't be protected because no nation would claim, or count, them and with this category of "it's alright because we have bigger things to worry about" that becomes acceptable.

Finally, this sort of inclusion/exclusion paradigm frames things in a false dichotomous way. For instance there's absolutely no need for animal rights to come second to human reform, but when we start viewing the world with intent to ethically prioritize we'll inevitably start placing groups like animals second, for no reason other than that's what we've set out to do. That's not a good thing in my book, nor should it be in anyone's.

(Which is to say nothing of how your devaluation of animals links in to my third point in my first post in this thread.)

All of these objections can be solved by using a broader, wider, system of ethics that does not necessarily accept any given boundaries and doesn't prioritize against fighting forms of ethical oppression. To use a crude analogy Stas, imagine if someone said that we ought to prioritize fighting for human welfare objectives over opposing capitalism's various nasty attributes. You and I both know that when you step back and look at it with a wider vantage point doing both is an absolute necessity to fight for human welfare and for human rights. What I'm saying is that we need to keep on stepping backwards and not stop, only then can a truly universal system of ethics become even remotely conceivable.

[Alerik the Fortunate]

I really, really, don't see how creating excluded groups is a necessary result of adopting a consequentialist view, rather than a glitch that would create really bad problems if a utilitarian system were implemented with the faults in place. How does utilitarianism require non-considered groups?

[K. A. Pital]

Because of the huge gap that you deem to be acceptable. Once you start saying "We can't help X group" you create a category of beings whose welfare doesn't matter, and who have protection from maltreatment. Not only is the creation of this category in itself problematic, but other groups whose needs are difficult, or impossible, to asses will inevitably be placed into that category.

Um... why? And if this group does not include humans at all, is it that problematic?

More practically under the internationalist system you talk about the Berber nomads of North Africa, illegal immigrants in North America, Gypsies in Europe, and many more groups simply wouldn't be protected because no nation would claim, or count, them and with this category of "it's alright because we have bigger things to worry about" that becomes acceptable.

Internationalism does not mean "nation-states count" but rather every nation no matter how small counts. Even a Berber tribe.

Finally, this sort of inclusion/exclusion paradigm frames things in a false dichotomous way. For instance there's absolutely no need for animal rights to come second to human reform, but when we start viewing the world with intent to ethically prioritize we'll inevitably start placing groups like animals second, for no reason other than that's what we've set out to do. That's not a good thing in my book, nor should it be in anyone's.

There is a reason, namely, humans have intelligence. Animals do not. The rest is just rationalizing it in a myriad different ways.

To use a crude analogy Stas, imagine if someone said that we ought to prioritize fighting for human welfare objectives over opposing capitalism's various nasty attributes. You and I both know that when you step back and look at it with a wider vantage point doing both is an absolute necessity to fight for human welfare and for human rights. What I'm saying is that we need to keep on stepping backwards and not stop, only then can a truly universal system of ethics become even remotely conceivable.

Um... I'm not sure I'd be so keen to frame it that way, since the whole situation is dependent on the material circumstances. Imagine saying that we should oppose capitalism's nasty attributes ca. 1820 in some feudal nation with no capitalist structures even in place! We'd put a brake on the industrialization which would result in slowing down the industrial and scientific progress with consequences that might simply be incalculable. On the other hand, when we clearly see that the material circumstances favor a different system, we can step forward and call for it. Not to mention that "human welfare objectives" in utilitarianism are generally related to the elimination of suffering, and you can hardly do that if you decide to ignore certain forms of suffering; so universal utilitarianism would still be able to pinpoint a problem with capitalism.

In essence, I'm not seeing what "wider system" you're proposing. How would it evaluate the situation and make the necessary choices?

[K. A. Pital]

There is a reason, namely, humans have intelligence. Animals do not.

Neither do stupid people or babies or small children.

I'm all for putting myself before the children, but a lot of people call me a heartless monster for it.

It is a tad different with the children, since animal intelligence will never be there, while a child born with the brain capacity of a cat grows and eventually becomes a human, an intelligent mind. Children should have greater protection to be able to become humans, not just because they are children. In essence, if children never become adults (i.e. reach the intellectual capabilities of an adult), one might legitimately ask what is the difference between these children and animals?

[Bakustra]

There is a reason, namely, humans have intelligence. Animals do not.

Neither do stupid people or babies or small children.

I'm all for putting myself before the children, but a lot of people call me a heartless monster for it.

It is a tad different with the children, since animal intelligence will never be there, while a child born with the brain capacity of a cat grows and eventually becomes a human, an intelligent mind. Children should have greater protection to be able to become humans, not just because they are children. In essence, if children never become adults (i.e. reach the intellectual capabilities of an adult), one might legitimately ask what is the difference between these children and animals?

This is exactly what Straha was talking about. By prioritizing based on intelligence as a way to render animals subordinate in our moral obligations, you have created a situation where mentally handicapped children are fundamentally "animals" and of secondary moral importance, which leads us to some very disquieting conclusions. While I'm not versed enough in ethical philosophy to construct a general proof of this, I can say that prioritizing creates a lot of unseen problems with "edge cases" between categories.

For example, if we fixed the problem of treating the mentally handicapped like animals in a moral sense by prioritizing the human form as well, then we inevitably run into problems with cetaceans, corvids, and all the other highly intelligent yet morphologically diverse animals of the Earth. Are we to say that they are inevitably second to all the primates?

That's why Straha is talking about a truly universal ethics- one that doesn't need awkward categories and which is applicable anywhere. Such an ethics may or may not be possible, but at the very least it would be better than a clumsy network of categories designed to avoid consternation.

[K. A. Pital]

The conclusions may be disquieting, Bakustra, but should we shun to make them just because they could seem "icky" on a fundamental level? I mean, some people say gays are icky cause their gut tells them so. Should we base morality on gut feelings?

A truly universal system would tend towards absolutism. Needless to say this is hardly a good feature.

[Bakustra]

The conclusions may be disquieting, Bakustra, but should we shun to make them just because they could seem "icky" on a fundamental level? I mean, some people say gays are icky cause their gut tells them so. Should we base morality on gut feelings?

A truly universal system would tend towards absolutism. Needless to say this is hardly a good feature.

Well, as an example of disquieting conclusions, going by intelligence alone leads us to the conclusion that cannibalism is not inherently immoral if the person is only as intelligent as an animal we eat for food. That is, if there were man with the intelligence of a cow or a sheep, it would be no more immoral to kill and devour him than it is to kill and devour a cow or sheep. That's disquieting to the point of repugnance, but this extends as you create nests and chains of categories to deal with these edge cases.

[Straha]

Um... why? And if this group does not include humans at all, is it that problematic?

Yes, it is. Because the second you create the possibility for anything to be placed outside the grouping of what matters, people will start being placed there and it will be used as a justification for all sorts of horrific wrongs. You've already, in part, proven the point by making the leap yourself in your very next post, but you can't look anywhere in history without stumbling on this. Colonialism and western chattel slavery were both based on the idea, in part, that subjugated populaces were sub-human. This still rears its head today; in the Rwandan genocide where both Hutus and Tutsis declare the other to sub-human and thus eligible to be slaughtered, a couple weeks ago when I heard a satellite radio host declare that putting Afghani prisoners in Guantanamo was good for them because they didn't know about basic human needs like sanitation, or my copy of J. Edgar Hoover's book on Communism where he talks about how people raised in the Soviet Union will be lacking in understandings of certain basic human emotions and will forever be damaged.

The answer to this problem isn't to keep using the broken system of ethics that created it or to adopt a convoluted system of categories and partial definitions that will always be on unstable ground, but rather to adopt a system of ethics which doesn't allow any being to be mistreated like this, one which knows no limits or boundaries.

EDIT: Another way to look at this question is to turn it on its head. Why is it ethically preferable for us to create a class of beings who will never be given any ethical consideration whatsoever?

Internationalism does not mean "nation-states count" but rather every nation no matter how small counts. Even a Berber tribe.

The example of the berbers is an example of people outside of a nation, most North African states have done everything they can to obliterate them and their legal standing. The point is a generic one, there so many groups, refugees and others, who exist across the world without a nation to claim membership in. The only world in which you can, conceivably, cover them all is one wherein you prescribe a system that avoids these sorts of distinctions and barriers and instead embraces a more universal standard.

Finally, this sort of inclusion/exclusion paradigm frames things in a false dichotomous way. For instance there's absolutely no need for animal rights to come second to human reform, but when we start viewing the world with intent to ethically prioritize we'll inevitably start placing groups like animals second, for no reason other than that's what we've set out to do. That's not a good thing in my book, nor should it be in anyone's.

There is a reason, namely, humans have intelligence. Animals do not. The rest is just rationalizing it in a myriad different ways.

That's a basis for judging inclusion/exclusion, but not answering what I said which is why does this paradigm need to exist? Why do Animal Rights necessarily need to come after human rights? It seems obvious to me that are mutually beneficial and mutually supporting goals and ideals (with a number of practical benefits), so why is it necessary to keep animals out of ethics?

In essence, I'm not seeing what "wider system" you're proposing. How would it evaluate the situation and make the necessary choices?

I have come to like, more and more, the Levinasian idea that we ought like we have an unlimited moral obligation towards each other and towards 'the Other' in general. An ethical system in which we act ought of an obligation to do the least harm (without necessity), and perhaps the most good, towards every other living being. For a number of reasons I'm not quite comfortable with this definition of ethics, but I am a huge fan of the idea that the biggest potential problem for being ethical is when we are comfortable with our ethical system and when we think we are right. I would much prefer we live in a state of constant questioning of our ethics than one wherein we have a prescribed ethical system which we know to be 'right'.

In order to answer this question more fully I need to know what you mean by 'necessary choices' (and this is, I think, a discussion worth having.)

The conclusions may be disquieting, Bakustra, but should we shun to make them just because they could seem "icky" on a fundamental level? I mean, some people say gays are icky cause their gut tells them so. Should we base morality on gut feelings?

The problem here is your definitions are going to be just subjective as the gut feelings you decry. So for instance you ask:

"if children never become adults (i.e. reach the intellectual capabilities of an adult), one might legitimately ask what is the difference between these children and animals?"

The problem that lies here is what it means to have "the intellectual capabilities of an adult", and what rubrics do we use to measure this? Put another way, what is it to be neurologically normative and how do you judge whether or not someone meets this standard? Does an adult who suffers from Down Syndrome have these capabilities? How about someone from Aspergers who cannot function in a social setting of any sort? How about someone who was traumatized at an early age? In the hopes of avoiding morality via gut feeling you institute a facade of objectivity, but it's always going to be based on very subjective standards.

(A sort of meta-question above even this is why does being neurologically normative mean you should be protected? If your system is going to make other categories of people prove that they ought be protected then it follows that it should also prove that the norm has a reason to be protected as well, a benchmark to be set, so to speak.)

The 'universalist' system of ethics solves for this problem in a very neat and tidy way.

[K. A. Pital]

Well, as an example of disquieting conclusions, going by intelligence alone leads us to the conclusion that cannibalism is not inherently immoral if the person is only as intelligent as an animal we eat for food. That is, if there were man with the intelligence of a cow or a sheep, it would be no more immoral to kill and devour him than it is to kill and devour a cow or sheep. That's disquieting to the point of repugnance, but this extends as you create nests and chains of categories to deal with these edge cases.

Would it really be more immoral if the man has an intelligence of a cow or a sheep? Is he really a homo sapiens still if he has that level of intelligence (or rather lack of it)? If this is a result of trauma or genetic disorder, though, we would appeal to the fact that this person would effectively be a homo sapiens if not for X. A cow or a sheep would never be a homo sapiens or intelligent at all, regardless of what happens. So obviously the categories are non-equivalent. If you breed a species of non-intelligent humans for slaughter, how would that be different from breeding cows?

Yes, it is. Because the second you create the possibility for anything to be placed outside the grouping of what matters, people will start being placed there and it will be used as a justification for all sorts of horrific wrongs. You've already, in part, proven the point by making the leap yourself in your very next post, but you can't look anywhere in history without stumbling on this. Colonialism and western chattel slavery were both based on the idea, in part, that subjugated populaces were sub-human. This still rears its head today; in the Rwandan genocide where both Hutus and Tutsis declare the other to sub-human and thus eligible to be slaughtered, a couple weeks ago when I heard a satellite radio host declare that putting Afghani prisoners in Guantanamo was good for them because they didn't know about basic human needs like sanitation, or my copy of J. Edgar Hoover's book on Communism where he talks about how people raised in the Soviet Union will be lacking in understandings of certain basic human emotions and will forever be damaged.

The answer to this problem isn't to keep using the broken system of ethics that created it or to adopt a convoluted system of categories and partial definitions that will always be on unstable ground, but rather to adopt a system of ethics which doesn't allow any being to be mistreated like this, one which knows no limits or boundaries.

EDIT: Another way to look at this question is to turn it on its head. Why is it ethically preferable for us to create a class of beings who will never be given any ethical consideration whatsoever?

The obvious answer to that would be: the "subhuman natives" ideas were bullshit (natives were homo sapiens, so the justification does not fly), as are the rest of your examples. Why it is preferrable to avoid spending resources on non-intelligent beings? Because intelligent beings have not yet solved the problem of mistreatment of other intelligent beings. A matter of limited resources I guess.

The example of the berbers is an example of people outside of a nation, most North African states have done everything they can to obliterate them and their legal standing. The point is a generic one, there so many groups, refugees and others, who exist across the world without a nation to claim membership in. The only world in which you can, conceivably, cover them all is one wherein you prescribe a system that avoids these sorts of distinctions and barriers and instead embraces a more universal standard.

Homo sapiens is universal enough. I do not understand the necessity of concentrating too much on the well-being of other beings (unless that is directly impacting homo sapiens par se, like overfishing). This can be a secondary objective at most. Intelligence comes first. You could argue, actually, that plants deserve as much care as animals do. Why don't you?

That's a basis for judging inclusion/exclusion, but not answering what I said which is why does this paradigm need to exist? Why do Animal Rights necessarily need to come after human rights? It seems obvious to me that are mutually beneficial and mutually supporting goals and ideals (with a number of practical benefits), so why is it necessary to keep animals out of ethics?

This paradigm allows us to concentrate on intelligent beings first. Your paradigm (complete universalism) would have a hard time distinguishing between a plant and an animal.

I would much prefer we live in a state of constant questioning of our ethics than one wherein we have a prescribed ethical system which we know to be 'right'.

A system which can optionally include more and more beings seems to be more of an evolutionary ethical framework than a fixed system wherein all living beings regardless of intelligence are granted similar rights. The problem of necessary choices always arises in ethnics since resources are limited. How are we going to distribute them? Why?

The problem that lies here is what it means to have "the intellectual capabilities of an adult", and what rubrics do we use to measure this? Put another way, what is it to be neurologically normative and how do you judge whether or not someone meets this standard? Does an adult who suffers from Down Syndrome have these capabilities? How about someone from Aspergers who cannot function in a social setting of any sort? How about someone who was traumatized at an early age? In the hopes of avoiding morality via gut feeling you institute a facade of objectivity, but it's always going to be based on very subjective standards.

(A sort of meta-question above even this is why does being neurologically normative mean you should be protected? If your system is going to make other categories of people prove that they ought be protected then it follows that it should also prove that the norm has a reason to be protected as well, a benchmark to be set, so to speak.)

The 'universalist' system of ethics solves for this problem in a very neat and tidy way.

Trauma is obviously nothing but damage to the intelligence of a homo sapiens. We usually acknowledge this because it is still a homo sapiens, but traumatized. On the other hand, if we're talking about a cow or a sheep, no matter what happens, they are bounded by their species and cannot exceed the higher nervous activity potential they have. The norm (or rather, the species) of intelligent beings should be protected since intelligence is the source of knowledge, without which further improvement of the material world is downright impossible. Once we start prioritizing the needs of intelligent beings lower or same as the needs of non-intelligent beings, we enter a dangerous slippery slope which "solves" the problems in a neat and tidy way, but creates more problems than it solves. Like I said, are plants same as animals? Why do we think we can brutally chop up plants? If intelligence is not a qualifier (whereas the closer one is to an intelligent lifeform, the more care it should get), your system is broken in a terrible way. Why do microorganisms not get same rights as humans? They're alive after all.

[evilsoup]

Is that just a smarmy way of saying you don't believe in animal rights?

[evilsoup]

You're in a burning building.
There's a hamster trapped in a cage in one room, and two houseplants in another.
You only have time to save one.
What do you do?

I do agree with you about being against rampant use-and-discard consumerism, and actually I do think plants are worthy of some inherent moral consideration... but it's quite a lot less than the consideration I would pay to an animal, and almost infinitesimal compared to the consideration I would pay to a human (or hypothetical sapient alien/AI/whatever).

[K. A. Pital]

Destructionator, sad fact is we measure suffering by the ability to experience it. A plant is less intelligent than a hamster and thus without question we'd do it.

That's also why we can imagine support for euthanasia of humans in PVS - they're brain dead, if the body is still alive like a plant. No intelligence - no capability to experience suffering - end of line.

[Straha]

The obvious answer to that would be: the "subhuman natives" ideas were bullshit (natives were homo sapiens, so the justification does not fly), as are the rest of your examples.

This isn't responsive to the argument. Of course the reasoning these people are using is bullshit. No one is saying otherwise. What I am saying is that your system of categorization makes this bullshit happen, again and again and again and that the only way to avoid this sort of bullshit is to abolish these categories.

Why it is preferrable to avoid spending resources on non-intelligent beings? Because intelligent beings have not yet solved the problem of mistreatment of other intelligent beings. A matter of limited resources I guess.

You're asking a different question and then a providing a (lackluster) answer to the new question. The question I posed is more nuanced, why is it good for us to have a category of beings who receive no ethical consideration or protection? Why is it good to create the category of 'non-being' beings?

Homo sapiens is universal enough. I do not understand the necessity of concentrating too much on the well-being of other beings (unless that is directly impacting homo sapiens par se, like overfishing). This can be a secondary objective at most. Intelligence comes first. You could argue, actually, that plants deserve as much care as animals do. Why don't you?

To the plants thing: I don't think I've said anything contradictory to the claims of plants. The baseline ethical claim I'm making is that we should strive to never infringe on the lives of other beings except through absolute necessity. That's something that's pretty easy to extend toward plants, and all sorts of other living creatures, and the Jains are proof that that sort of life is attainable (and have been proof of it for upwards of 2,000 years), and I see no downside to that.

To the greater argument: For one thing you're not claiming to enclose all Homo Sapiens, your responses to Bakustra and me make it very clear that it's not Homo Sapiens that matter but other, secondary, attributes. This categorization process of yours, where you have to prove that you belong to the protected class of beings, lends itself to anyone who wants to create a new category of people excluded from rights for whatever reason with the worst possible results. Even if I were to spot you that it doesn't necessarily lead to this process (and this read is all the proof that I need that this is, really, inevitable) the risk still remains. A universalist system of ethics solves for that risk, and retains any benefit your system might have. In other words, a universalist system of ethics solves for everything bad with your system, while keeping everything good. In that world, why should we not embrace a universal system of ethics?

This paradigm allows us to concentrate on intelligent beings first. Your paradigm (complete universalism) would have a hard time distinguishing between a plant and an animal.

Yes. What's the impact of this?

I would much prefer we live in a state of constant questioning of our ethics than one wherein we have a prescribed ethical system which we know to be 'right'.

A system which can optionally include more and more beings seems to be more of an evolutionary ethical framework than a fixed system wherein all living beings regardless of intelligence are granted similar rights. The problem of necessary choices always arises in ethnics since resources are limited. How are we going to distribute them? Why?

A system which can optionally include more and more beings means, as a pre-requisite, that there are probably beings worthy of ethical consideration being excluded and subject to the most heinous acts until we might notice them for inclusion. That's problematic on so many levels I'm not even sure where to begin. Moreover, any system which allows for the progressive inclusion of beings into its framework to correct previous oversights will also allow, by the flipside of the coin, for the progressive exclusion of beings to correct for their inclusion. The thought of allowing that possibility to exist is disturbing to the extreme. Rather than make ethical inclusion subject to the whim of majority consensus or the will of people with the greatest access to levers of power we ought protect everyone possible and minimize the amount of harm possible. That system means one which presupposes everyone is included.

As to your question, it's incredibly nebulous and vague and doesn't lend itself to any but the vaguest of answers, like "In such a way to minimize the suffering for all involved", but not only is that hardly satisfying it's no different than any other system offered could give for that. Do you have some specific examples/ideas you'd like to explore?

The norm (or rather, the species) of intelligent beings should be protected since intelligence is the source of knowledge, without which further improvement of the material world is downright impossible. Once we start prioritizing the needs of intelligent beings lower or same as the needs of non-intelligent beings, we enter a dangerous slippery slope which "solves" the problems in a neat and tidy way, but creates more problems than it solves.

A. You're not protecting intelligence. You're protecting intelligible species, which is to say you're not protecting intelligent creatures you're protecting creatures who can communicate any intelligence they might have in a way we can understand. There is all sorts of information about how dolphins, whales, great apes, birds, and so many more creatures have intelligent understanding of the world around them and can communicate that understanding to each other but in ways so alien to us that we cannot understand how this process happens. Why should we punish them for their failure to be able to communicate to us, or for our failure to understand?

B. What are the problems you say the universalist system creates? You've referred to them vaguely a few times but you haven't pinned any down, while we've pointed out more than a few systemic harms with nasty impacts (genocide, war, slavery, etc.) with the consequentialist/utilitarian way of looking at the world.

Why do microorganisms not get same rights as humans?

Who says they shouldn't? If a microrganism is going to kill me I surely have the right to vaccinate myself against it/eradicate it from my body, just like if I know there's a person with a gun trying to kill me I have the right to harm them (and maybe even kill them) to prevent that.

Yes, this line is open to flexible understanding and negotiation and should probably be explored at some length, but what's the harm of enclosing them as well?

(As an aside, your argument is remarkably analogous to the Gay Marriage debate in the States. 'If you give the gays the right to marry it'll devalue straight marriage!' and 'If you give animals rights it'll devalue human rights!' both follow the exact same logical train of thought. I'll gladly spot you that you have some more nuance to your argument, but this thought just occured to me at the end of this post and it's an interesting line of thought to explore.)

[evilsoup]

Destructionator, sad fact is we measure suffering by the ability to experience it. A plant is less intelligent than a hamster and thus without question we'd do it.

That's also why we can imagine support for euthanasia of humans in PVS - they're brain dead, if the body is still alive like a plant. No intelligence - no capability to experience suffering - end of line.

You keep using 'intelligence' and 'capability to experience suffering' as if they are synonyms. Would you argue that someone with Down's syndrome is less capable of suffering than a rocket scientist?

I think 'capability of suffering' is a much better measure of moral worth than 'intelligence'. Obviously that brings in additional problems - a pig or a dog would be as deserving, morally, as a human; and that feels wrong to me. If I had to choose between saving a human or a dog from a fire, I'd choose the human every time.

Straha: do you honestly not see the problem with having plants on the same level as humans? With my 'fire in a house' example, lets say there's half a dozen houseplants in one room, and a human in another. You can only save the plants, or the human; the house is already heating up, it'll be a blazing inferno just after you reach the front door. What do you do?

[Straha]

Straha: do you honestly not see the problem with having plants on the same level as humans? With my 'fire in a house' example, lets say there's half a dozen houseplants in one room, and a human in another. You can only save the plants, or the human; the house is already heating up, it'll be a blazing inferno just after you reach the front door. What do you do?

I go get a beer from the fridge and walk out.

It's a stupid hypothetical scenario and I feel pretty comfortable asserting that nobody on this board will ever be in that position. It's a question that serves no actual utility in morally exploring the reasoning behind our ethics, nor does it explore the question of 'do plants deserve ethical consideration' at a level beyond a gut reaction. It's not worth the time of either one of us.

To answer your first question, I see a number of difficulties in embracing this sort of ethics in the modern world, largely due to societal conditioning (the same sort of conditioning that makes you say suffering is, logically, what matters but then feel that protecting a pig from suffering is somehow problematic) but I see no direct problems that come as a result of them. Moreover, as I said before, the Jains have lived for thousands of years without actively killing any plants or animals and they're still going strong, which is all the empirical proof I need that the problems here are illusory at best.

So what are the problems you see coming from this, and why do they outweigh the harms that a universal system of ethics solves?

[Bakustra]

Minor correction- Jains accept that plants must be actively killed for human survival but they minimize it and minimize the harm done to plants. As it is, it's quite possible that groups of Jains will move towards eating solely bacterial foods as those become available too.

[Straha]

Minor correction- Jains accept that plants must be actively killed for human survival but they minimize it and minimize the harm done to plants. As it is, it's quite possible that groups of Jains will move towards eating solely bacterial foods as those become available too.

They accept that some plants must be actively killed for our survival, but more devout Jains tend to only eat fruits, berries, and annual plants (that is plants that die in a year, as opposed to perennial plants which they avoid killing except where absolutely necessary.)

This is a sort of ethics that I can get behind, one that accepts that some amount of inflicted suffering is inevitable but does whatever it can to reduce it to the barest minimum.

[Grandmaster Jogurt]

Perhaps I'm missing something, but how does embracing universalist ethics preclude consequentialism? The language being used here (some suffering is inevitable to prevent greater damage but we try to reduce it as much as possible) sounds a lot like utilitarianism at least on a surface level.

[Bakustra]

Perhaps I'm missing something, but how does embracing universalist ethics preclude consequentialism? The language being used here (some suffering is inevitable to prevent greater damage but we try to reduce it as much as possible) sounds a lot like utilitarianism at least on a surface level.

The problem is that the common framing relies on a set of categories with different rules for each. It is not acceptable to do x harm to humans, but you can do y harm to animals though z harm is only permissible against plants. So this leads to its own problems of which Straha (and I) have presented a few.

[K. A. Pital]

This isn't responsive to the argument. Of course the reasoning these people are using is bullshit. No one is saying otherwise. What I am saying is that your system of categorization makes this bullshit happen, again and again and again and that the only way to avoid this sort of bullshit is to abolish these categories.

Then you're left with a nonsensical system which cannot weigh utility according to intelligence, and the microorganism would get as much protection necessity as a human. That's really unreasonable.

You're asking a different question and then a providing a (lackluster) answer to the new question. The question I posed is more nuanced, why is it good for us to have a category of beings who receive no ethical consideration or protection? Why is it good to create the category of 'non-being' beings?

Because wasting resources on protection of non-intelligent beings when intelligence beings still suffer is a preposterous idea. I'm not sure why that is hard to understand. The plant-hamster example was good enough.

The baseline ethical claim I'm making is that we should strive to never infringe on the lives of other beings except through absolute necessity. That's something that's pretty easy to extend toward plants, and all sorts of other living creatures, and the Jains are proof that that sort of life is attainable (and have been proof of it for upwards of 2,000 years), and I see no downside to that.

There's no downward side to claiming that you cannot kill plants or insects, etc. without absolute necessity? What's the objective and universal definition absolute necessity? Tell me. I would want to know. Because otherwise we'd run into the argument that one person considers burning wood an absolute necessity, whereas the other will rather live in the woods without burning anything. And both will claim that their position is correct. Your system would not be able to make any distinction at all.

A universalist system of ethics solves for that risk, and retains any benefit your system might have. In other words, a universalist system of ethics solves for everything bad with your system, while keeping everything good. In that world, why should we not embrace a universal system of ethics?

See above. Because it is not really "universalist" when it will come to infringement of plant rights. Because under your system a body with a dead brain in PVS state would get as much rights as a fully capable intelligent human with a non-damaged brain. Do you seriously see no problem with that?

Yes. What's the impact of this?

As resources are scarce, this system will strive to distribute them in a non-discriminatory fashion (plants getting as much protection as animals, animals as much as people, brain-dead people as much as living minds - etc.). This would result in massive increase of suffering of intelligent beings, since their share of resources consumed will drastically drop. As they're the most capable of experiencing suffering, they will also feel it better than other beings and, being sentient, will revolt against such a system in a very short order.

Moreover, any system which allows for the progressive inclusion of beings into its framework to correct previous oversights will also allow, by the flipside of the coin, for the progressive exclusion of beings to correct for their inclusion. The thought of allowing that possibility to exist is disturbing to the extreme. Rather than make ethical inclusion subject to the whim of majority consensus or the will of people with the greatest access to levers of power we ought protect everyone possible and minimize the amount of harm possible. That system means one which presupposes everyone is included.

That system won't survive for long. Seeing how resources would be wasted to protect beings which lack even higher nervous activity (say, single-cell organisms), it will collapse on itself immediately.

As to your question, it's incredibly nebulous and vague and doesn't lend itself to any but the vaguest of answers, like "In such a way to minimize the suffering for all involved", but not only is that hardly satisfying it's no different than any other system offered could give for that. Do you have some specific examples/ideas you'd like to explore?

Yes. A person has a 50% chance of dying if he doesn't burn the tree next to his earth-pit. Does he have a right to do it? The tree has a 100% chance of dying if he does it and will survive if he does not. Your system's answer?

A. You're not protecting intelligence. You're protecting intelligible species, which is to say you're not protecting intelligent creatures you're protecting creatures who can communicate any intelligence they might have in a way we can understand. There is all sorts of information about how dolphins, whales, great apes, birds, and so many more creatures have intelligent understanding of the world around them and can communicate that understanding to each other but in ways so alien to us that we cannot understand how this process happens. Why should we punish them for their failure to be able to communicate to us, or for our failure to understand?

The higher nervous activity of animals is explored sufficiently well to say that none of them possess the human level of intelligent and it is highly unlikely any are capable of abstract thinking on our level. But like I said, animals are at least capable of higher nervous activity. That puts them before plants. In your system, they have the same value as infusoria. So why would I care about killing a dolphin any more than I care about killing infusoria when I disinfect the surface of a road or ram a ship into a dolphin in the sea? Both have the same value.

B. What are the problems you say the universalist system creates? You've referred to them vaguely a few times but you haven't pinned any down, while we've pointed out more than a few systemic harms with nasty impacts (genocide, war, slavery, etc.) with the consequentialist/utilitarian way of looking at the world.

See above. Your system would make humans equivalent to other lifeforms if it would be truly universal. The consequences of that would be horrific and cause an explosion of suffering on a magnitude unseen. For example, humans won't be able to kill animals or plants for food. They would have the same value. So what are they supposed to eat, if algae has same value as a human? You removed intelligence as a barrier down to the lowest level, and in your system nothing can justify the genocide of algae. By the way, should humans kill whales since they eat living beings? Should humans kill predators for the evil act of killing other living beings?

If a microrganism is going to kill me I surely have the right to vaccinate myself against it/eradicate it from my body, just like if I know there's a person with a gun trying to kill me I have the right to harm them (and maybe even kill them) to prevent that.

What if you also have to eradicate the microorganism from a certain place? It might not necessarily 100% infect you, but you take the precaution even with a 1% chance of deadly infection. You kill it with no remorse. Genocide!

Yes, this line is open to flexible understanding and negotiation and should probably be explored at some length, but what's the harm of enclosing them as well?

See above the tree-man example.

(As an aside, your argument is remarkably analogous to the Gay Marriage debate in the States. 'If you give the gays the right to marry it'll devalue straight marriage!' and 'If you give animals rights it'll devalue human rights!' both follow the exact same logical train of thought. I'll gladly spot you that you have some more nuance to your argument, but this thought just occured to me at the end of this post and it's an interesting line of thought to explore.)

It is not even remotely close. Gay marriage does not waste any additional resources to implement. None. Nada nil. Not to mention that gays aren't less intelligent than straights, often moreso.

The criterion is not that it will "devalue human rights", it is that intelligence will get confused with biological life, making ethical choice downright impossible and resources will get wasted on non-intelligent organisms without any criteria.

It's a stupid hypothetical scenario and I feel pretty comfortable asserting that nobody on this board will ever be in that position.

It is not stupid, Straha. We kill billions of bacteria when we start up a nuclear plant. Should we stop starting up nuclear plants for the sake of billions of bacteria? That's not fucking hypothetical. Why do you hate bacteria so much you're willing to massacre them for electricity? Not to mention the grass, trees and many other things we murder - yes, even slaughter I would say - to build said powerplant.

The choice is made every day.

[Bakustra]

So I guess you don't make a habit of reading threads all the way through, then, Stas? First of all, the Jain ethics being used as an example do not forbid killing, they require that you act to minimize harm through avoiding unnecessary killing, and they fully allow killing in self-defense and even in times of war (though not all Jains agree on that). So no, there wouldn't be people "converting wolves to vegetarianism" or anything like that, because that is killing that is essential to their survival in practical terms. Jains fully allow the killing of plants in order to survive, but a number of Jains subsist solely on fruits, nuts, and annual plants to avoid unnecessary killing.

But here's a central problem with using intelligence. Let us presume that the Bell Curve or some other piece of racist literature was true- that intelligence does differ among racial subgroups of humanity noticeably. Your ethics would therefore lead to the conclusion that the dumber subgroups would be inferior to the average in moral calculations, and that the smarter subgroups would be superior to the average. In other words, your ethics rely on certain fundamental assumptions to avoid racial discrimination, and those can be undermined (not that they are likely to, thankfully).

[evilsoup]

Wait. Bakustra. So your problem with Stas' position is 'if the world was fundamentally different, your morality would fall down'?

[evilsoup]

I have my own problems with using intelligence to determine moral worth (Down's syndrome guy vs rocket scientist), but I just think that Bakustra's objection is a little bit silly. Maybe if certain groups were fundamentally less intelligent than others, they would get less moral consideration - but that's not the case, so the point is kind of moot. My ridiculous hypothetical was an exaggeration of moral choices that are made all the time - only enough resources to go around between two different groups, how do you choose? - whereas this is 'imagine that reality is fundamentally different'.

WRT your Star Trek example: for all that they go on about Data not feeling emotions etc., he actually clearly does. Of course he'd get more moral consideration than a gerbil. I'd put him on the same level as a human (and given his unique abilities I could think of many situations where I'd save him in preference to a human).