Genetically altered H5N1 and Scientific censorship

[SpaceMarine93]

Courtesy of BBC:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/health-16275946

When should science be censored?
20 December 11 17:30 GMT

By Fergus Walsh
Medical correspondent

In a darkened conference room in Malta in September, a Dutch scientist announced to a virology meeting that he had created a mutated strain of H5N1 bird flu which had the potential to spread between humans.

Dr Ron Fouchier, from the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, said his team had introduced a number of genetic variations - around five - which had enabled the virus to pass between ferrets - the best animal model we have for testing whether the virus will infect humans.

So while it is not certain that the Dutch team had created a deadly human strain of bird flu, it seems to be a real possibility.

This story made headlines today but has been around for some time. The Erasmus Medical Center issued a press statement last month in which Fouchier said the discovery could help prevent a pandemic: "We now know which mutations to watch for in the case of an outbreak and we can then stop the outbreak before it is too late. Furthermore, the finding will help in the timely development of vaccinations and medication."

The assembled virologists in Malta were told the full data would be published in due course in the journal Science. But it is being held up by a review being undertaken by the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB).

The concern is that the details of the research could be misused in the wrong hands. The NSABB has asked Science to publish only an abbreviated version.

The journal's editor-in-chief Dr Bruce Alberts said they were considering what to do: "Science has concerns about withholding potentially important public‐health information from responsible influenza researchers. Many scientists within the influenza community have a bona fide need to know the details of this research in order to protect the public, especially if they currently are working with related strains of the virus."

At present H5N1 is almost exclusively an avian disease. But it is still killing people, with fatalities this year in Egypt, Iraq and Vietnam. The latest figures from the WHO show that 573 people have been infected since 2003, after close contact with diseased birds. 336 of them died, which gives it a mortality rate of more than 50%.

Compare that with the 1918 flu pandemic, which killed tens of millions of people. It had a mortality rate of perhaps 1%.

Fortunately the H5N1 virus does not spread between humans, but you can see why scientists remain worried about its potential.

The idea of a deadly virus sweeping the planet was the subject of a recent film, 'Contagion'. It was packed with star actors, including Kate Winslet and Jude Law. At one stage a scientist, played by Laurence Fishburne, is asked by the Pentagon if someone could have weaponised bird flu. "There's no need," replies Fishburne, "the birds are doing that".

So should the research be published in full? Definitely, according to two influenza experts I spoke to.

Professor Wendy Barclay from Imperial College London said: "This is important scientific information which researchers need to know about. It needs to be scrutinised by all of those working in the field. Rather like those experts at CERN who said they had measured neutrinos travelling faster than the speed of light and then asked other scientists to check their approach."

Bio terrorism


Professor John Oxford from Barts and the London School of Medicine agrees. "They should definitely publish. The biggest risk with bird flu is from the virus itself. We should forget about bio terrorism and concentrate on Mother Nature."

Both scientists agree that the influenza virus would make a pretty poor bio terrorist weapon, unless your aim was to spread the infection across the world. Influenza has no respect for borders, so introducing a virus in one country would inevitably spread it globally.

Professor Oxford said there was no scientific data he could think of that should be censored. "Scientists should not be looking over their shoulders. This is about human endeavour - pressing ahead and transferring knowledge to the wider world. That is the culture of science."

But Michael Parker, Professor of Bioethics and Director of the Ethox Centre at the University of Oxford, disagrees.

"The position that everything should be published is not tenable. There must be some scientific information which contains an immediate threat to public safety if it fell into the wrong hands."

Censorship

This problem was recognised in the early days of atomic physics, with scientists well aware that research into nuclear fission could be used for good or ill.

Professor Parker is not in favour of strict regulations or censorship, but supports the concept of building ethics into the work of scientists, and relying on journal editors to exercise caution.

Some of those following this blog have been doing so since its first incarnation as "Fergus on flu". I'd welcome your thoughts on the H5N1 research and on the censorship of scientific research.

Whatever else it does, this latest research reminds us that H5N1 is a virus which still has a deadly potential.

[madd0ct0r]

just like anything, you have to assume the risk and consequence of an idiot getting hold of something they shouldn't.

in this case, the consequence is high enough it might not be worth it.

[SpaceMarine93]

According to the Independent (UK), all it took was an alteration in 5 bases in the virus' genetic code in order for the strain to become airbourne. I suppose it meant that a natural mutation leading to a catastrophic worldwide pandemic would had easily happened anyway. It was only a matter of time.

[Eframepilot]

According to the Independent (UK), all it took was an alteration in 5 bases in the virus' genetic code in order for the strain to become airbourne. I suppose it meant that a natural mutation leading to a catastrophic worldwide pandemic would had easily happened anyway. It was only a matter of time.

That's a weird way of putting it. You make it sound as if the engineered virus has already escaped and killed half of humanity.

[someone_else]

Given how error-prone virus replication systems are and how fast they reproduce... that's a risk not worth ignoring.

I'd say spread the info. So that we can do researches on how to fuck it if the natural strain mutates, and keep an eye on what strains are getting dangerous.

Bio-terrorism is already a high-budget and high-skill job even without creating a new virus from scratch, and manufactuing a virus isn't something you can do casually in your kitchen after a quick look at the net, like say making fucktons of explosives.

And high-budget parties (nations mainly) likely have already their own favourite bio-weapon anyway, that is more controllable.

The assembled virologists in Malta were told the full data would be published in due course in the journal Science. But it is being held up by a review being undertaken by the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). The concern is that the details of the research could be misused in the wrong hands. The NSABB has asked Science to publish only an abbreviated version.

It has to contain at least something that explains what and where the mutations are, otherwise it's a waste of paper. That would be enough to find out how to make a copy, for good (research purposes) or bad (taking over the world).

Besides, if NSABB fucks this article I hope they pubblish it in Europe adding a FUCK AMERICA before the title.

Both scientists agree that the influenza virus would make a pretty poor bio terrorist weapon, unless your aim was to spread the infection across the world. Influenza has no respect for borders, so introducing a virus in one country would inevitably spread it globally.

Yeah, a good point. Albeit (leadership) ingorance can play a significant role in its use by bioterrorists. If they have the money and the skills to do it anyway.

I mean, this is something that would require 9/11 levels of planning, dedication and funding. Once you get to that level, you either have a decent intelligence agency that roots them out or you are screwed no matter how.

"The position that everything should be published is not tenable. There must be some scientific information which contains an immediate threat to public safety if it fell into the wrong hands."

I'd be more ready to censor psychology discoveries that will be used for marketing purposes (selling inane unhealthy crap) than this.

[Singular Intellect]

It's not even a question, of course publish the knowledge. For every wanna be bio terrorist out there, there's ten thousand good scientists more than willing to do good work and fight potential misuse of such technology. Censoring the information merely aids those who would want to abuse it, because the number of informed and experienced experts to fight them are kept in the dark.

One may as well insist on shutting down street lights because it'll make it harder for criminals to see and get around.

[Alyrium Denryle]

just like anything, you have to assume the risk and consequence of an idiot getting hold of something they shouldn't.

in this case, the consequence is high enough it might not be worth it.

I have never had much respect for the bundle of nerves you call your brain. This is an example of why.

An H5N1 pandemic is a near certainty at this point. Literally millions of domestic ducks and chickens living in close proximity to people, in crowded conditions. Both in small domestic farms, and large factory operations. It spreads from bird to bird, creating billion after billion copies of itself in every animal, each new strain getting exposed to the selective filter of the human immune system every time someone comes into contact with those birds.

it WILL happen. It is just a matter of when. Having the minimum mutations required on hand and known is a huge step up, we almost never have that with an emergent disease, instead having to race a pathogen that already has a head start of a few million generations and try to reverse engineer what the changes were from the base strain, and design vaccines and medications accordingly. The flu shot you get every year is based on educated guesses regarding possible changes from the previous year's strains.

With this, we have the template for the virus BEFORE it goes pandemic. We can test to see if stockpiles of Tamiflu will be effective, we can design vaccines and run evolutionary simulations in advance and designed different vaccine permutations, in advance. We can be caught prepared for once, instead of it being 1917, and watching hundreds of millions die.

Bio-terrorism by contrast is a fucking boogeyman in the closet. There is almost no legitimate danger from it, especially with influenza. Not only is it (pathogen engineering) a high skill and high resource job, restricted for the most part to the scientific establishments of first world and some second world nation states, but even if a rogue state were to try, all they would end up doing is devastate their own populations. Why? Because rogue states are not exactly known for their good nutrition, modern sanitation systems, and public health service.

Hell, remember the Anthraz mailings back in the early oughts? That was a rogue actor inside a national laboratory. He took his own life before he could be charged (and may not be guilty), but the only person with access to the strains was not the third world islamofascist that people are afraid of. It was a lone person who had legitimate access to the disease who went fucking nuts. If that is what we are afraid of, we might as well shut down all virology and bacterial pathology research, because one scientist MIGHT go insane. Clearly, this is not a course of action any sane society--especially one as densely populated as our own--wants to take. Unless of course we want Eric Pianka to be right. "We need to control our population, or pathogens will do it for us"

[Lagmonster]

An H5N1 pandemic is a near certainty at this point. Literally millions of domestic ducks and chickens living in close proximity to people, in crowded conditions. Both in small domestic farms, and large factory operations. It spreads from bird to bird, creating billion after billion copies of itself in every animal, each new strain getting exposed to the selective filter of the human immune system every time someone comes into contact with those birds.

Domestic and livestock, at least in North America, isn't what I'd be worried about. Domestic livestock is, in my opinion, sensibly monitored. But you can always review the processes for yourself - in Canada, at least, the CFIA maintains reports on identified livestock outbreaks. While you're on the public site, you can also reference import and handling regulations, contingency plans, and even brush up on the intra-provincial wild bird surveillance programs for fun. It's necessary and important that people understand what is being done to protect them, not just be bombarded with the scariest figures biology has to offer.

[evilsoup]

Even if Canada and the USA and most of the EU have good regulation and enforcement to prevent this stuff... that still leaves plenty of people exposed to the eventual mutation in the rest of the world. So the benefits to humanity of publishing research into it still drastically outweigh the (tiny) potential risk. Plus, in the age of cheap travel, someone from an affected country could easily come to a large 'safe' city and spread the infection around.

[Vehrec]

I'm reminded of a line from the recent disease movie-Contagion. It went something like this. "Terrorists don't need to weaponize the Bird Flu. The Birds are already doing it." And yes, it is being done. Censoring the mutations out of fear that someone would create this thing and release it into the wield is pointless fear mongering. Seriously, do they think that bio-terrorists don't have better sense than to pick a fast spreading airborne virus? It's a horrible choice of a weapon, unless you don't care who you're killing.

[madd0ct0r]

An H5N1 pandemic is a near certainty at this point. Literally millions of domestic ducks and chickens living in close proximity to people, in crowded conditions. Both in small domestic farms, and large factory operations. It spreads from bird to bird, creating billion after billion copies of itself in every animal, each new strain getting exposed to the selective filter of the human immune system every time someone comes into contact with those birds.

it WILL happen. It is just a matter of when.

...

It was a lone person who had legitimate access to the disease who went fucking nuts. If that is what we are afraid of, we might as well shut down all virology and bacterial pathology research, because one scientist MIGHT go insane. Clearly, this is not a course of action any sane society--especially one as densely populated as our own--wants to take. Unless of course we want Eric Pianka to be right. "We need to control our population, or pathogens will do it for us"

you wound me

I'd also remind you I currently live in the bleeding center of H5N1, central Vietnam.
When the pandemic starts, i might not be posting anymore.
My fears weren't of the islamonazi idiot angle - more either the lone mad man, or just the curious amateur who accidentally cooks it up.

(That phrase should tell you how little I know about virus mutation and how hard or easy it is to get those magic 5 mutations.)

I'm also worried that those 5 aren't the only combination, and if too much focus is spent on them, then other vectors or possibilites will be neglected
(Not that it matters, since i just said the research shouldn't be published, doh)

Ok. I overstate the risks and did not understand the importance of the find.
conceded.

[Adam Reynolds]

Seriously, do they think that bio-terrorists don't have better sense than to pick a fast spreading airborne virus? It's a horrible choice of a weapon, unless you don't care who you're killing.

While I don't disagree with your main point and agree that censorship in this case is useless , this argument is not really valid. If you read Biohazard by Ken Alibek, one of the things he mentions is that most of the attempts to develop viruses were meant to be used in the airborne form, although not generally as virulent as the flu. In addition, regarding the issue of sensible terrorists, the fact that many of these terrorists genuinely don't care whether they live or die is enough of a factor to be concerned about the use by a rouge group. Stuart also once commented on this issue here:
http://bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic. ... 0&start=75

Secondly, your point would be correct if the likely users of these weapons actually believed that back-infection would take place. They don't. They believe that their God will protect them. I have been told, quite seriously, by a senior Saudi Arabian officer that they do not fear attack by Russian or American missiles because Allah would not allow the "holy places" to be destroyed. We are not dealing with people who have a rational mindset here. They honestly believe that they will be protected from the consequences of their actions. In any case, such groups have no compunction about killing large numbers of their own people if it means killing their enemies as well. Hence the term "involuntary martyrs".

[Vehrec]

To your first point, sure you want you bioweapon to perhaps be delivered this way, but do you want it to spread that way? Do you want it to remain infectious for up to eight hours after touching a surface? Because there's no way to contain it. Nothing except quarantine will stop it once you release it. Your troops will get it as easily as theirs. And it won't stop a war, or even slow it down much. It's the flu-bird or otherwise, most people don't die from it. Yes, it will cause massive disruption, but how do you exploit that when it applies to you as well?

I'm more than a little dubious of that other point. Oh, they might say such things, but do they really believe it? Do they act as though they genuinely believe that there are no consequences and god will protect them from anything? The care and caution exhibited by Obama in his living arrangements suggests otherwise. Terrorists don't mail bombs to random or nonsensical addresses, they don't steer planes into random points on the planet. They like targetable weapons, the same as anyone. Ultimately, they have some rationality to their actions. And of course, even if they are willing to trade lives for lives, exactly how much benefit do they expect to reap by cutting off their own arm along with their enemies? Now they're both crippled, hardly a win for anyone. What exactly do they stand to gain by this? Their enemies will remain. A lot of people will be dead for nothing accomplished. So where is the benefit to creating a pandemic?

[Simon_Jester]

I bet if you went digging through Christian fundamentalists in the US, you could find people (perhaps even senior military officers) who refuse to believe that God would allow Jerusalem (or Rome, or whatever) to be destroyed by a nuclear attack. You would find more if Jerusalem (or Rome, or whatever) were more central to the Christian faith (as Mecca is to Islam).

That doesn't mean the US, or even a Christian fundie administration running the US, would be stupid enough to think itself nuke-proof or bioweapon-proof.

[Alyrium Denryle]

you wound me

May you die 1000 deaths, each of 1000 tiny cuts

I'd also remind you I currently live in the bleeding center of H5N1, central Vietnam.
When the pandemic starts, i might not be posting anymore.

Then you should be REALLY happy that someone came up with the minimum required mutations

My fears weren't of the islamonazi idiot angle - more either the lone mad man, or just the curious amateur who accidentally cooks it up.

Fears of a lone mad man apply to any and all diseases everywhere. By that logic, we should stop training people in microbiology to make sure no one ever has the necessary skills. As for a curious amateur... that is has a probability of occurrence along the lines of quantum tunneling. An amateur does not have the necessary skills and equipment to get the job done. This sort of shit takes multiple people with PhDs, and labs filled with millions of USD worth of equipment. The reagents are also not something you can just go out to Te Olde Chemical Supply Shoppe and buy, either. They are expensive and many of them are restricted, and require special handling and storage.

(That phrase should tell you how little I know about virus mutation and how hard or easy it is to get those magic 5 mutations.)

Yes. They tell me a lot. It is very very hard to do in the lab. Easy in nature. It is easy in nature not because there is a high chance of it happening in an individual virus replication, but because there are billion after billion such replications in each infected animal, and the virus has a large number of hosts due to volume of domestic fowl in close quarters. Lots of people in asia live in close contact with domestic fowl, and sanitation is often not as good, which given that avian flu (until it evolves the ability to spread in aerosol) is transmitted by direct contact with contaminated bodily secretions... yeah.

But see above. Engineering a pathogenic strain is NOT easy. It requires in depth knowledge of the viral genome and how it uses its surface proteins to gain entry into a cell etc. This is not something an amateur, or even one insane expert can know. It requires teams of people and modern facilities.

I'm also worried that those 5 aren't the only combination, and if too much focus is spent on them, then other vectors or possibilites will be neglected

Flu vaccines are made by using the previous year's prevailing strains and a lot of hope. The new year's strains are closely related to the prior years and a vaccine should at least be partially effective. An emergent flu strain is a different matter. Without this data, which gives virologists an idea about what to look for, they will always be a few steps behind a virus that can evolve faster than they can counter it. While these mutations are not the ONLY combinations, they are likely ones, and there are only so many surface antigen combinations that the virus can use to gain entry into human cells... so... it is far better than the alternative

(Not that it matters, since i just said the research shouldn't be published, doh)

And your reasons are complete horseshit.

Good to see your concession

Domestic and livestock, at least in North America, isn't what I'd be worried about. Domestic livestock is, in my opinion, sensibly monitored. But you can always review the processes for yourself - in Canada, at least, the CFIA maintains reports on identified livestock outbreaks.

The US is not nearly so... progressive. Almost all of our regulation is reliant on self reports, which as you can imagine, given the fully captured nature of the USDA, is pretty much worthless. The worst that shows up in the USDA reports are "minor problems with e coli infection", which if you are familiar with the nature of US factory farms, is a complete load of bull. The places are cesspools of animal ill-health, but there is no independent testing... So companies like Tyson are permitted to, pardon the pun, feather their own nest. The data we have is just not reliable.

Think about it. 0% of farms reported issues with avian influenza in 2010, and that is just not the emergent H5N1 strain, but the prevalent strains. It is not at all credible.

Even so, the issue is not with the disease emerging in the US, but in Asia, and then spreading person to person from there. All it takes is for one sick person to cough on a plane back to NYC from Bangkok,

[someone_else]

It is very very hard to do in the lab. Easy in nature. It is easy in nature not because there is a high chance of it happening in an individual virus replication, but because there are billion after billion such replications in each infected animal, and the virus has a large number of hosts due to volume of domestic fowl in close quarters.

Also because influenza's virus (as most RNA virus anyway) use ludicrously error-prone replication systems (and for a fucking good evolutionary reason). Hey, when you have nearly one mutation per replication and every infection there are zillions of replications, reaching the "magic five" does not look so hard.
From wikipedia
Because of the absence of RNA proofreading enzymes, the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase that copies the viral genome makes an error roughly every 10 thousand nucleotides, which is the approximate length of the influenza vRNA. Hence, the majority of newly manufactured influenza viruses are mutants; this causes antigenic drift, which is a slow change in the antigens on the viral surface over time.

For comparison, human cells do accumulate around one mutation per replication too, but on a genome that overall is around 6 billion nucleotides long (diploid genome).