Alyrium Denryle wrote:Give me a minute. I have to process the stupidity.
Oh dear. You know that when you start a rebuttal this way, it's only asking for me to fire back, right? Have it your way.
1) Shared evolutionary history and the conservation of basic processes leads us logically to that inference, provided the processes are the same
2) Said processes are the same.
3) Therefore, stabbing a chicken causes the same sort of distress to the chicken that stabbing a human does, to the extent that their brains are capable of processing the information. Pain yes. Long term physiological distress, yes. Existential angst, probably not etc.
I'm really not sure whether I'm supposed to take this seriously. Human beings can't even relate to the subjective experience of
other human beings, much less other
animals. You can yammer all you want about irrelevancies like "shared evolutionary history" and "conservation of basic processes" (might want to work on that over-writing, by the way), but the basic problem here is the gap between one person's subjective experience and another's. It's entirely possible that certain people experience the same biochemicals in radically different ways.
Probability arguments are useless here, by the way, because we can't form probability statements without some sizable data. Any kind of subjectivity-tally is always going to end up at exactly one (and maybe not even one, depending on how you understand the self).
And neuroscience disproves pretty much all of Descartes. Sorry. But you fail both biology and philosophy. Come back when your brain finds its cognitive ability.
Forgive me; I haven't been keeping up with the scientific literature as much as you have. When did science overcome the Cartesian epistemological bubble?
And you fail miserably to justify this rule. In fact, it is inconsistent with your premises. If you are a dualist, you must accept the proposition that you cannot know if anyone other than you exists. If this is the case, we could all just be illusions. So please, go torture a six year old and get back to me. Afterall, you cannot be sure the six year old exists, let alone has a mind.
1) I'm not a dualist, but was rather offering up Descartes as a way to potentially approach this problem.
2) In his
Meditations, Descartes goes on to solve (in his view) the problem of justifying the external world. Maybe you should read some undergradaute philosophy before getting pedantic.
As for a quantitative model, in practice, that would be rather difficult. Weighting however, is not, and more than suits most circumstances for which we may need such an evaluation. For example, stabbing a human activates the exact same parts of the brain that it does in a rat.
This is correct.
The physical sensation of pain is exactly the same (you know, that whole neuroscience thing).
This, however, is not. The "sensation of pain" is not a neuroscience thing; in fact, to claim such a senseless thing is a contradiction in terms. Science, as an empirical study, approaches the world from the outside-in, while subjective experience occurs from the inside-out. No amount of data on biochemical release is going to let us
feel as the rat does.
I'm sorry in advance that I don't subscribe to your wholly inconsistent, entirely unoriginal scientism (that's "science-as-religion," by the way; I wouldn't explain this, but then you haven't even read Descartes, so I'm trying to be charitable). I await your personal attacks with open arms.