LCS Quick Swap Concept Dead

[Sidewinder]

LCS: Quick Swap Concept Dead

U.S. Navy Revising Ships’ Operational Plans

Jul. 14, 2012 - 12:50PM
By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

The original idea for the littoral combat ship (LCS) envisioned modular mission packages that could be rapidly swapped, so one ship could change missions easily from mine warfare, for example, to anti-submarine warfare over the course of a single deployment.

But instead of taking just days to make the switch, it’s now apparent it could take weeks. An LCS assigned to a particular operation will likely operate in a single “come-as-you-are” configuration, requiring additional ships equipped with other mission modules to provide the flexibility the concept once promised.

That’s one conclusion among many following a series of Navy exercises and reports intended to take stock of LCS. Other conclusions criticize the ship as failing to match capabilities inherent to the ships it would replace. The assessment aims to figure out what the ship can and can’t do, how it should be employed, what kind of support it will need, and what changes must be made to man and fight the ships without wearing out their small crews.

These include a classified study ordered by Adm. Mark Ferguson, the vice chief of naval operations; two war games carried out by U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) in Norfolk, Va.; and the ongoing operating experiences of the two ships already in service.

The assessment comes as LCS transitions from an acquisition and shipbuilding program into a deployable fleet asset. The first two ships are now ensconced at their home port in San Diego, and the third LCS is about to be delivered. A fourth ship arrives in 2013.

The classified study, known as the OPNAV report (referring to staff reporting to the chief of naval operations), was headed by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez. Beginning in January, Perez and a 10-person team looked at all aspects of the fleet’s “readiness to receive, employ and deploy” the LCS.

USFFC in January conducted a “sustainment war game” to understand the issues and risks in manning and supporting an LCS across the Pacific Ocean — a key concern with the Freedom, the first LCS, scheduled to deploy to Singapore in the spring of 2013. It will be the first time an LCS has operated outside the Western Hemisphere.

Another war game, focusing on operations and war fighting, was held in mid-June. The results of that effort are still being analyzed, Navy sources said.

While the Navy would not release the OPNAV report, a number of sources familiar with both LCS and the report said it lays out in greater detail the problems and issues confronting the entire LCS effort, including the concept of operations (CONOPS), manning shortages, maintenance and training concerns, modularity and mission module issues, and commonality problems between the two LCS variants.

It also cites problems with how the LCS is perceived in the fleet, how leadership presents LCS capabilities, and the need to effect changes in virtually every operational area.

“As I looked at some of the draft documentation to say how we’re going to run LCS, what I thought we needed to do was a rebaselining, understanding how much information we’ve generated on how we’re going to operate these ships, and take that and build a foundation,” said Rear Adm. Thomas Rowden, OPNAV’s director of surface warfare, during an interview at the Pentagon. “I will call this a concept of employment, or CONEMP.”

Rowden is leading the work to coordinate and compile the LCS analytical efforts.

“The reality of it is, it’s time to step back and say, what did we get wrong here?”

CONOPS

Planners originally envisaged the LCS as a replacement for the fleet’s frigates, minesweepers and patrol boats, but the new assessments conclude the ships are not equal to today’s frigates or mine countermeasures ships, and they are too large to operate as patrol boats.

The LCS, according to the assessments, is not able to fulfill most of the fleet missions required by the Navy’s primary strategy document, the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” and included in a 2011 revision of the LCS CONOPS document.

Equipped with a surface warfare or maritime security mission package, the ships were judged capable of carrying out theater security cooperation and deterrence missions, and maritime security operations, such as anti-piracy.

But the LCS vessels cannot successfully perform three other core missions envisioned for them — forward presence, sea control or power projection missions — and they can provide only limited humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations, sources said.

The shortcomings are well known in the fleet, prompting a perception that service leaders are looking for missions to fit LCS, rather than the other way around.

A key LCS failure identified by the OPNAV report, sources said, is its inability to effectively defend against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), a weapon carried by hundreds of small, fast-attack craft operated by virtually all potentially hostile navies. These weapons include C-801 and C-802 Chinese missiles, Russian SS-N-2 Styx missiles, European weapons such as the Otomat and Exocet, and U.S.-made Harpoon missiles.

Navies that can launch ASCMs include those of China, North Korea, Iran and Syria. The weapons have taken on an added dimension since 2006, when the Israeli corvette Hanit was hit by a C-802 launched by a Hezbollah shore battery in Lebanon.

The U.S. Navy’s requirements document for the LCS says it must be able to operate offensively in multithreat environments — areas that would include the Arabian Gulf or the Yellow Sea — but until a solution is found, the assessments call for a CONOPS more consistent with the ships’ capabilities, and suggest the need for studies to increase LCS combat power.

The Navy is continuing to look at ways to increase the ship’s weaponry and lethality. A major gap is for a weapon to replace the Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), a surface-to-surface missile program canceled in 2010 that was to have given the LCS a prodigious capability.

“I certainly have asked to take a look at Harpoon, if we can take the weight,” Rowden said. “Also looking at the Griffin,” a small weapon being purchased for a trial installation on the Freedom. “There are some other missiles that we’re looking at, but those are the two I can talk about right now.”

The Harpoon is currently the Navy’s standard surface-to-surface missile, carried on destroyers and cruisers. But adding such a missile would probably mean removing something else to compensate for the additional weight. The Griffin is much smaller, but doesn’t pack the Harpoon’s punch.

Rowden also has asked the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to study replacing the 57mm gun on both LCS designs with a 76mm weapon, similar to the weapon on today’s frigates.

“It’s a larger gun, more range, certainly gives us a better opportunity to engage the enemy,” Rowden said of the 76mm.

The trouble with that weapon is that it can fit on Freedom LCS 1-class ships, but not on the narrow bow of the trimaran Independence LCS 2-class. “I don’t know if we can get it on both hulls,” Rowden acknowledged.

Range is still another concern, because of capacity for both fuel and crew provisions. Although the original CONOPS called for ships to operate at sea for at least 21 days, the ships have storage capacity to only carry enough food for 14 days, according to sources familiar with the classified report.

Module Issues

The sustainment war game and the OPNAV report also discuss serious issues with the exchange of mission modules, detailing the reasons why the quick-change concept isn’t working.

“The logistics of mission package exchanges are more complicated and time-consuming than currently reflected” in the CONOPS, according to an unclassified assessment of the January war game obtained by Defense News.

The modules are considered the primary armament of the LCS. Each of the modules now in development — mine warfare, surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare — includes the module equipment, a 15-person module crew, an MH-60 helicopter with an aviation detachment of 25 people, a mission package exchange team and the ordnance required for the mission.

“Choreographing the preparation and movement of all elements to arrive in theater at the same time is a complex task and subject to potential delays,” said the war game assessment.

The LCS CONOPS calls for the swap-outs to happen OCONUS — outside the continental United States — and requires that planning for a swap needs to begin “anywhere from 30 to 60-plus days depending on the OCONUS destination,” according to the assessment.

“At present, storing mission packages in CONUS and conducting on-demand mission package exchanges OCONUS appears untenable,” the assessment read.

Suggested fixes, such as storing mission packages at a forward operating station or aboard prepositioning ships, help with the time-distance challenges, but manning and infrastructure requirements would increase.

Other problems, according to the assessment, include command-and-control issues over who has the authority to mandate a module exchange, how the request is communicated and how long a request needs to be routed and approved.

Recommendations from the war game include holding a “stand-alone event” to evaluate the exchange processes, refine timeline estimates and explore alternative methodologies.

Other recommendations include: Each mission package needs to be incorporated into the Navy’s Global Force Management planning process, an effort that includes individual ships, squadrons and units; and a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to study forward-basing of mission packages, and the CONOPS should be revised “to more accurately reflect the logistics timeline.”

Eventually, all the effort will be gathered into the concept of employment, or CONEMP, document.

“It is not going to be a static document,” Rowden declared. “We’re going to be inputting things, and as we learn things we’re going to make modifications to keep it relevant and reflect experience.

“We’ve got folks from Fleet Forces Command, Pacific Fleet, Naval Surface Forces, Naval Air Forces, NAVSEA, OPNAV and the manpower assessment team all working together to try and understand what we’ve observed and what we have learned so we can have a good, informed document with respect to this concept of employment,” Rowden said.

“My gut tells me we’ve got to get the manning squared away, then the training, sustainment and maintenance will flow from that as we move forward,” he added. “We’ll get to a better place to say these are the things we need to do to maximize the availability and capability of the ships.”

Does this surprise anyone (other than the idiots who supported the Littoral Combat Ship programs)?

[TimothyC]

ell, If I were in charge I'd keep the current run with maybe a few extras as mine warfare and spec-ops ships while going to both Gibbs & Cox (long term designers for the USN) and Huntington Ingalls (long term shipbuilders for the USN)* and have them justify their Frigate designs and then suck it up and build one of them. But hey, I'm a bit crazy like that.

Edit: Both the time to swap the modules and the limited supplies that can be embarked are rather telling, but displacement is displacement, and at best these ships have 75% of the displacement of a Perry so a certain amount of limited facilities is unavoidable.

*Gibbs & Cox has talked about a CODAD frigate with SM-3 (and therefore TLAM capability) with a 9000 nm range at cruise speed while Huntington-Ingalls has offered a frigate version of the ship they are producing for the National Security Cutter (it's the USCG's large cutter that offers not a lot of space, but a hull that is already in production).

[GrandMasterTerwynn]

Where's the option for "Get rid of the damn things and don't replace them with anything?"

[weemadando]

What are you, some kinda peacenik? Don't you know that the MexiCartel AlQaeda Navy could steam from it's hidden bases in Cuba along the East Coast and bombard cities at will at any moment without a green water fleet to protect you?

[Simon_Jester]

I'm with Tim, basically- or rather, I trust his judgment and it makes sense to me, which isn't quite the same thing I guess.

And GMT:

If we don't replace them with anything, there will come a time when we can't sweep mines, can't chase subs, can't escort civilian shipping, and don't have enough hulls to spare any of them doing random shit like wandering around the Arabian Sea looking for pirates.

Not being able to sweep mines could really come back to kick the US in the ass. I don't think it would be a good idea to give that up. Not having enough ships to secure freighters and protect aircraft carriers at the same time, bad in a war zone. Even if we're not the ones fighting the war: the US had a constant stream of small warships running through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, to protect neutral shipping from getting blown up by the warring parties. Some of those warships got shot at, or shot up.

Now, it's not like our whole country would starve or get conquered if we didn't bother with this capability. But it's really stupid for us to just go "This ship sucks! I don't think we need small ships in our navy anymore. They all suck."

[TimothyC]

Where's the option for "Get rid of the damn things and don't replace them with anything?"

Because that would remove almost all projected mine warfare capability once the Avenger Class MCMs retire?

Remember, the even the youngest of the Avengers are just about old enough to vote.

Edit: They will all be 18 years old by the November election. The last one built - USS Chief was commissioned on 5 November 1994.

The other main feature of keeping a frigate around is that it lets us show the flag without having to send a billion dollar destroyer, and they let us keep the number of escorts for the non-carrier group forces up. This frees Burkes for the carrier groups and ABM missions.

Edit: Simon really beat me to the punch.

[Simon_Jester]

Let's unpack "show the flag" a little, because that sounds like pure jingoism and you can reasonably say "oh, well we don't really need to do that."

"Showing the flag" includes things like discouraging piracy.

"Showing the flag" puts some heart into unwarlike nations that count on US security guarantees, because it shows that the ally they're counting on is actually there. And they may trust that guarantee instead of building up their own large armed forces and getting trigger-happy. Because they no longer feel a need to have a strong, active military in order to be safe from local rivals. Which is good for peace.

"Showing the flag" puts some restraint into warlike countries that might otherwise get grabby with their neighbors.

"Showing the flag" includes humanitarian work.

It's not just about being able to strut up and down and beat our chests about how MIGHTY FREEDOMIZED our fleet is.

[Purple]

What's wrong with just churning out modernized versions of what you already have? You know, same hull but with new computers and maybe engines and stuff. It's not like there is really a need for anything more modern now a days and just building old designs a new saves R&D costs.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

What's wrong with just churning out modernized versions of what you already have? You know, same hull but with new computers and maybe engines and stuff. It's not like there is really a need for anything more modern now a days and just building old designs a new saves R&D costs.

We're already doing that with the one other design we have in production. It costs a billion dollars a pop.

[TimothyC]

What's wrong with just churning out modernized versions of what you already have? You know, same hull but with new computers and maybe engines and stuff. It's not like there is really a need for anything more modern now a days and just building old designs a new saves R&D costs.

To expand on what the Duchess said,

Because procurement doesn't work that way. For example, The US planned for DDG-112 to be the last of the Burke class destroyers. The problems with the pseduo-replacement, the Zumwalt class, have lead to a minimum of a further 4-14 hulls. The costs for these ships have gone up for two main reasons. The first is that there are plans to include new electronics and equipment on them and the second is that the old equipment lines had started to shut down, and restarting those lines costs money and takes time.

The Burke line hadn't finished closing down when they needed to restart it.

The two main classes that LCS will replace (the Avenger Class Mine Warfare ships, and the Perry Class frigates) have been out of production for 18 and 23 years (in the US) respectively. The combat systems on the Perry class is so old, that the US removed the missile launcher arm so that we can use our stockpiles of spare parts to support the navies of our allies (Poland, Australia, Turkey) that still operate the ships. The situation with the Perry class is especially bad as the ships were shrink-wrapped around their combat systems and have very little room for expansion.

Because of these factors, it is literally cheaper over the life of the ships to design something new. Now to that end, I did mention that Huntington-Ingalls proposed a frigate based off of the Coast Guard Cutter that is in production - it's a nice hull, but outfitted to be a frigate wouldn't be any cheaper than the LCSes are being. I wouldn't see a US produced version of the Danish Absalon class ships (which I also like) being any cheaper either.

[Sidewinder]

I did mention that Huntington-Ingalls proposed a frigate based off of the Coast Guard Cutter that is in production - it's a nice hull, but outfitted to be a frigate wouldn't be any cheaper than the LCSes are being. I wouldn't see a US produced version of the Danish Absalon class ships (which I also like) being any cheaper either.

At least the USN will get a larger hull to play with- more room for fuel, provisions, personnel (the LCS has a crew too small to do the job, as this article suggests), radar and other electronics upgrades... in short, more bang for the buck (assuming the Navy reigns in the desire to turn the ship into a magical, all-singing, all-dancing platform).

[Simon_Jester]

There are a lot of fundamental problems with the LCS design. My understanding is that there's one really big one. It's not modularity, it's not the multirole design. It's that they worked very, very hard to make it 30-50% faster than a normal warship. They made a lot of sacrifices and compromises to get there.

A hull of the same size but at a more normal speed might be a lot more capable.

[Sidewinder]

A hull of the same size but at a more normal speed might be a lot more capable.

I think the main problem with the LCS, was that its advocates were too ambitious. They wanted the ship to:

1) Be cheap, so it can be manufactured in large numbers.

2) Be fast, so it can have the tactical advantage of dictating terms of engagement.

3) Perform all tasks required of a warship.

To achieve Number One, they made it very small. That meant the LCS had to be modular, so it could perform all tasks required of it- just not at once. Building and maintaining the necessary modules, cost money, so achieving Number Three meant failing Number One.

Then there's the speed requirement- not a problem in itself (the USN wants fast ships for sealift), but it becomes one when placed ahead of range and endurance (how long a ship can operate without logistic support, and how much damage is survivable). USN ships must cover a large area- with US territorial waters from the Atlantic to the Pacific, allies and enemies from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea- which often requires operating far from friendly shipyards, and with long periods between refuel and resupply. That means a larger (and likely slower) ship is needed, to carry adequate fuel and provisions. Placing such priority on speed, is willfully ignoring what the USN needs.

[Sea Skimmer]

The fact that the Navy had no plans to buy more then one module per ship, actually so far less then 1:1, kind of made the whole idea a non starter anyway. Training was always going to ensure quick swaps didn't happen. The modular idea itself is fine, swapping in service was just dumb. Also a bit pointless since most of the planned capabilities would be desired all the time.

Complaining about self defense and then suggesting a shift to 76mm sure doesn't make any sense though, the 57mm is a vastly more credible for self defense then the OTO gun that never works right. Probably more effective then the entire gun battery on a WW2 Iowa in one mount

[Simon_Jester]

A hull of the same size but at a more normal speed might be a lot more capable.

I think the main problem with the LCS, was that its advocates were too ambitious. They wanted the ship to:

1) Be cheap, so it can be manufactured in large numbers.

2) Be fast, so it can have the tactical advantage of dictating terms of engagement.

3) Perform all tasks required of a warship.

To achieve Number One, they made it very small. That meant the LCS had to be modular, so it could perform all tasks required of it- just not at once. Building and maintaining the necessary modules, cost money, so achieving Number Three meant failing Number One.

Also, well. As far as I can tell, "cheap" just isn't in the cards for modern weapons. It isn't like the '40s and '50s when you could churn out tens of thousands of tanks or jets cheaply on massive assembly lines to relatively modest tolerances. Getting the performance we expect out of modern ships and planes just seems to cost so insanely much more.

You have to back up at least a generation in performance, to the weapons of the '80s and early '90s, before "cheap" becomes even possible.

Then there's the speed requirement- not a problem in itself (the USN wants fast ships for sealift),

I'd say there's a difference- sealift ships tend to be big, and making a big ship fast is actually not so hard. Also, "fast" sealift ships are still at around 30 knots, which is where most modern warships tend to cap out regardless of size, plus or minus a few knots. Whereas LCS was meant to run at 45-50 knots, or thereabouts. It's like the difference between a sedan that tops out at around 90 mph and a sports car that tops out at 140 mph: you pay a huge premium for the extra speed. And the car you get out of it probably won't be as safe, rugged, easy to maintain... and may not be so good for carrying your groceries.

[Sea Skimmer]

Fast sealift has evolved. The old 33 knot sealift is sort of gone, the eight SL-7s that made it up are only rated for 27 knots sustained now because the steam plants are aging, and they only held at a reduced operating status (also sustaining 30 knots was always a bit iffy). The replacement is a combination of big 24 knot medium speed ships, and a few of the Joint High Speed Vessels, though production is being curtailed because of budget cuts. JHSV is a 40 knot platform, but with a fraction of the payload of an SL-7. Part of the logic of the high speed on LCS was so it could run with JHSV as part of a 40 knot amphibious group. The Independence class LCS also has limited sealift capability in its own right, the mission deck has a side hatch + ramp and can take 30 ton armored vehicles including Stryker and had it been built, EFV. I forget if Bradly fits or not. Its likely more useful in a disaster then combat, but it does provide a means of landing vehicles in very small ports around the world that otherwise could only be accomplish by bringing up an LCAC (not much range) or an LCU (painfully slow)

[Sidewinder]

Complaining about self defense and then suggesting a shift to 76mm sure doesn't make any sense though, the 57mm is a vastly more credible for self defense then the OTO gun that never works right.

What problems do the 76mm gun have? Poor reliability? Accuracy? Low rate of fire, or that a high rate is achievable only at the expense of reliability or operational life?

Probably more effective then the entire gun battery on a WW2 Iowa in one mount

How is the 57mm gun more effective than the Iowa's mix of 20mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns, 127mm dual-purpose and 406mm guns? I doubt it's useful for supporting an amphibious landing, or for attacking... say, a Sovremenny class destroyer. (I concede it's more useful against fast attack craft, the LCS's likely opponents, than heavier guns.)

[Sidewinder]

JHSV is a 40 knot platform, but with a fraction of the payload of an SL-7. Part of the logic of the high speed on LCS was so it could run with JHSV as part of a 40 knot amphibious group.

This might be useful for disaster relief (emphasis on the might- I doubt ships this small can carry much in food, water, medical supplies, or other provisions). I wonder what was going through the LCS advocates' heads when they promoted it for amphibious operations, though. Any marine unit "lean and mean" enough for the JHSV to transport, is likely too small to avoid annihilation when... say, "liberating" one of the Spratly Islands from PLA occupational forces.

[Sea Skimmer]

What problems do the 76mm gun have? Poor reliability? Accuracy? Low rate of fire, or that a high rate is achievable only at the expense of reliability or operational life?

Bad reliability, bad accuracy with more then short bursts, claimed ROF never seems to be realistic as a result. The USN/USCG wouldn't have stopped mounting it on new stuff and introduced a new caliber without good reasons. In general the 76mm OTO and 57mm Mk110 are otherwise similar in overall scale and ship impact, the caliber reduction wasn't about saving weight. 57mm advantages are triple the ROF, ability to handle two types of ammunition at a time and generally its an optimal caliber for an automatic anti aircraft gun. The only real 3in advantage is somewhat more range, depending heavily on ammunition type, and greater effect on surface targets, though its hard to see anything 3in can easily destroy surviving a hail of 57mm rounds. USN 3in could be improved if better types of ammo were bought, but the Swedish 57mm with six mode fuse is pretty ideal. As I recall the 57mm also automatically clears missfires, while the 3in doesn't though I may be incorrect on the 57mm end of that.

How is the 57mm gun more effective than the Iowa's mix of 20mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns, 157mm dual-purpose and 406mm guns? I doubt it's useful for supporting an amphibious landing, or for attacking... say, a Sovremenny class destroyer. (I concede it's more useful against fast attack craft, the LCS's likely opponents, than heavier guns.)

I meant for AAW. Its vastly more accurate and has one of the most silly deadly anti aircraft shells you could dream up. A WW2 battleship could be and often were hit by single 350mph aircraft, the range, accuracy and destructiveness of all those weapons just left a lot to be desired. No way would that happen against a single functional 57mm mount. You could say the same about a couple other naval gun mounts too mind you, but that's the kind of scale of improvement we are talking about.

This might be useful for disaster relief (emphasis on the might- I doubt ships this small can carry much in food, water, medical supplies, or other provisions). I wonder what was going through the LCS advocates' heads when they promoted it for amphibious operations, though. Any marine unit "lean and mean" enough for the JHSV to transport, is likely too small to avoid annihilation when... say, "liberating" one of the Spratly Islands from PLA occupational forces.

JHSV is mainly intended to bring up army equipment and then unload into a secured port captured by V-22/C-130 dropped paramarine commando truppen, or else have some LCACs make the trip alongside it and then use those to unload onto a beach, unloading by causeway is also an option as are several other things including use of mobile landing platform. The point was never that one ship would win the war or make an assault, the point is it could rapidly reinforce assault forces without forcing large vulnerable transports to anchor offshore for days at a time unloading as they otherwise must. JHSV provides options for heavy forces to unload in secure areas, and then be ferried to the front in an LST like role. 2000 tons of equipment onboard is not a joke, that means eight trips, or eight vessels operating together can roughly land a US Army heavy brigade with its supplies, which is already enough armored firepower to overrun most islands, and hell, more then a few countries. Since the vessel is small, as well as very agile and not that deep draft, it can load and unload in many ports that are just not plausible for larger amphibious ships.

The entire idea of buying them BTW was largely inspired by actual Australian use of such a ferry to get mechanized troops into Timor, but it has its roots in many short-medium range operations conducted entirely using LSTs in the South West Pacific threat, particularly around New Guinea. Those operations are likely better guides to future amphibious warfare then say, the opposed landings at Tarawa or Omaha beach that aren't bloody well going to happen again.

[Simon_Jester]

This might be useful for disaster relief (emphasis on the might- I doubt ships this small can carry much in food, water, medical supplies, or other provisions). I wonder what was going through the LCS advocates' heads when they promoted it for amphibious operations, though. Any marine unit "lean and mean" enough for the JHSV to transport, is likely too small to avoid annihilation when... say, "liberating" one of the Spratly Islands from PLA occupational forces.

Nonono. It's being promoted to escort an amphibious group (with the very fast amphibious ships they're hoping for).

If you want a forty-knot sealift ship, either to land Marines or to just drop shit off at a port on short notice, you're going to need a forty-knot escort ship. Otherwise, the speed of the sealift ship is mostly pointless. But the escort doesn't have to carry a thing for this to work.

[Sidewinder]

If you want a forty-knot sealift ship, either to land Marines or to just drop shit off at a port on short notice, you're going to need a forty-knot escort ship. Otherwise, the speed of the sealift ship is mostly pointless. But the escort doesn't have to carry a thing for this to work.

What I meant was, the "forty-knot sealift ship" seems too small to be useful; in the absence of the JHSV, the need for a "forty-know escort ship" is also absent. Sea Skimmer believes the JHSV is more useful than I thought, however, so I'll give the concept the benefit of a doubt.

[Sea Skimmer]

Qukc correction, payload is 700 tons, not 2,000, I'm thinking of the LSV, doesn't change anything though, as this is about what a WW2 LST could carry anyway and the point was to keep the things small and as off the shelf as possible.

[someone_else]

Hmm... seems like the most demanding task is the "sealift escort" role, while all other roles don't need so fucking high speeds.

I think I read hulls are optimized depending on cruising speed so using the same hulll with crappier engines to save space... won't save space. So I think making two different kinds of hulls (maybe still as similar as possible in layout and systems to save money) would be the best choice. So you get The Fast Escort With Crappy Endurance and the Multirole Pocket Battleship That goes A Bit Slower.

Otherwise they get the Fast Escort With Crappy Endurance At Slightly Less Price of an Alreigh Burke That is Vastly Better (ok they may be run more cheaply, but hey), if the price of USS Indipendence I find by googling (704 million $) is any indication.

What about designing ship hulls that can become different ships ONCE (when they are built).
That is you design the ship with a "placeholder for stuff here" and design the kinds of stuff you want to put in there separately, so that you can mass-produce the hulls to save costs, and still get all different ships you need.

As for their endurance issues, does it make sense to turn some of the hulls into "store tenders" for the warships with the same hull or when sending a wichita may be overkill or too dangerous (like what Sea Skimmer said with the JHSV, they load from a wichita far from the fight and move the supplies in the war zone fast)? (not if they cost 500 or more millions like the warship)

Sea Skimmer believes the JHSV is more useful than I thought, however, so I'll give the concept the benefit of a doubt.

The point is that the first JHSV rolled out of shipyards and at least a couple are under construction, and plan to buy at least 10, possibly up to 23. So it makes some sense to want some kind of escort for stuff they are making already and plan to have in so large quntities.
On wikipedia they say they can carry an entire Marine company-sized units plus their vehicles or an infantry battallion, not just a few "lean and mean" marines.

They also say the design is 70% common with this ferry (also by the same manufacturer) that carries 800-ish people and 300-ish cars, so it's not a rubber dinghy.

[Sea Skimmer]

Hmm... seems like the most demanding task is the "sealift escort" role, while all other roles don't need so fucking high speeds.

I think I read hulls are optimized depending on cruising speed so using the same hulll with crappier engines to save space... won't save space. So I think making two different kinds of hulls (maybe still as similar as possible in layout and systems to save money) would be the best choice. So you get The Fast Escort With Crappy Endurance and the Multirole Pocket Battleship That goes A Bit Slower.

Yeah, if you wanted a slower ship, you need a completely new design to make sense. Not just because of the hull form but because a fair bit of the cost of LCS is making all the systems shock proof for such high speed operations, no point in paying for that either. It would be silly to accept a compromise, LCS was designed pretty quickly, a replacement could be too, all the more so since lots of basic designs already exist from various companies. I for one suspect this is going to happen in the next few years, though some people are talking about nixing one of the two existing LCS designs, and then building one alongside a slower, high endurance ship, but one that is not likely to be that much better armed.

Otherwise they get the Fast Escort With Crappy Endurance At Slightly Less Price of an Alreigh Burke That is Vastly Better (ok they may be run more cheaply, but hey), if the price of USS Indipendence I find by googling (704 million $) is any indication.

That was lead ship price, including modifications and redesign work, the follow on units are around 460 million without mission module. Module costs are more or less unknown at this point because so few of them work yet but seem to be in the 30-40 million kind of range not counting price of aircraft. In comparison the US is looking at nearly 2.5 billion for Flight III Burkeswarm destroyers, and about another 100-200 million dollars to fill it with missile depending on which missiles you choose. Also plus cost of aircraft. So cost per ton wise... LCS is actually on the cheaper side, but its also basically just a high speed flight deck in capabilities. A flight deck can do a damn lot, but AAW for escort roles is completely lacking and that is a serious problem. LCS with serious AAW has been put on paper, for export, but it also means giving up most of the hanger space which is a huge limitation in its own right.

What about designing ship hulls that can become different ships ONCE (when they are built).

That was how the German MEKO designs worked for decades, and a few other newer modular ships, the USN concluded this was dangerously logical, and thus impossible even though they planned no less then 55 hulls, and demanded swapping in the field instead.

As for their endurance issues, does it make sense to turn some of the hulls into "store tenders" for the warships with the same hull or when sending a wichita may be overkill or too dangerous (like what Sea Skimmer said with the JHSV, they load from a wichita far from the fight and move the supplies in the war zone fast)? (not if they cost 500 or more millions like the warship)

An LCS hull is too small to be a useful tender to another LCS. One of the ideas was high speed allows LCS to get out of the danger zone to refuel somewhere else quickly... a bit questionable but not unworkable. This was one reason why LCS inflated from the original 1000t concept to a 3000t vessel though. 1000t was going to spend literally all its time going in-between fuelings.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

The really basic problem with the situation of course is that we're only going to get 55 Littoral Combat Ships when we really need about 90 ships in that category (in addition to 80 Burkes and 20 - 30 cruisers). The problem is that the world is really big and we cannot simultaneously defend our carriers and keep up the necessary level of patrol, worldwide. Especially when that figure will now include our Mine Countermeasures ships, of which we don't have nearly enough. It would not be an understatement to say that we wouldn't have adequate mine clearing capability (nobody in the world does right now) unless we had 30 of whichever LCS class is better at it, permanently fitted with mine countermeasures modules. They then have the added capability of being two helicopter platforms (which makes them have an ASW capability by definition), and a gun for Operations Other Than War. I can also buy the use of an LCS class permanently fitted as rapid response vessels for the deployment of marines, which in wartime just serve as ASW escorts, again due to the two helicopter capability. Beyond that we need a regular frigate which the modified Coastguard Cutter proposal could provide from a hull already in production.

The problem of course is that we don't have enough money to build 90 light combatants and another 20 Burkes and look into a cruiser replacement, and yet, 200 surface ships is probably what we actually need to conduct world-wide presence and sealane control operations. We need some kind of cheaper platform, but every time the Navy's designers get this problem, they end up adding so many missions and demanding such a high level of capability that it ends up more expensive than what it's replacing, not cheaper. It's a massive structural fault of the way that US procurement takes place, and I am not really sure how it can be solved in the present climate.