LCS Quick Swap Concept Dead

[Sea Skimmer]

I don't see a point to a cruiser replacement, a single uniform surface combattant can do whatever is needed. The US hasn't built a proper cruiser since Long Beach anyway, and the only serious proposal for one since the Strike cruiser was abandon was the 25,000t nuclear powered ABM cruiser, which became pointless when the KEI missile was canceled. It also would have been been affordable in useful numbers for the role, a modern battlecruiser in every respect.

I see little point in blaming the USN for demanding too much capability, everyone's warships have inflated enormously in cost and almost everyone's fleet is shrinking except China, which historically had placed almost no importance on naval power. Making up numbers is going to demand new solutions, and accepting a platform like a high endurance UAV as a surveillance solution instead of a frigate cruising along. In terms of overall combat effectiveness the USN is in most ways about the most potent it has ever been, except in submarine warfare. Even then, for our submarine force to be much stronger you have to go back and be counting a time when many boats were flight I 688s or even older submarines that wouldn't be that effective today. Meanwhile foreign powers are already paying over a half billion dollars just for diesel subs.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

I don't see a point to a cruiser replacement, a single uniform surface combattant can do whatever is needed. The US hasn't built a proper cruiser since Long Beach anyway, and the only serious proposal for one since the Strike cruiser was abandon was the 25,000t nuclear powered ABM cruiser, which became pointless when the KEI missile was canceled. It also would have been been affordable in useful numbers for the role, a modern battlecruiser in every respect.

Then at least there should be even more Burkes ordered to replace the Tico's.

I see little point in blaming the USN for demanding too much capability, everyone's warships have inflated enormously in cost and almost everyone's fleet is shrinking except China, which historically had placed almost no importance on naval power. Making up numbers is going to demand new solutions, and accepting a platform like a high endurance UAV as a surveillance solution instead of a frigate cruising along. In terms of overall combat effectiveness the USN is in most ways about the most potent it has ever been, except in submarine warfare. Even then, for our submarine force to be much stronger you have to go back and be counting a time when many boats were flight I 688s or even older submarines that wouldn't be that effective today. Meanwhile foreign powers are already paying over a half billion dollars just for diesel subs.

The Koreans are able to build ships virtually identical to a Burke for much cheaper. It seems if we made a concerted effort to regain the lead in naval shipbuilding that we could once again do so.

[Sea Skimmer]

About a billion dollars for a Sejong the Great, against 1.2 billion for the last of the original series produced Burkes. But wages in South Korea are much lower then those in the US, and little is known as to the precise quality of the ships produced. Hard to draw much of any conclusion out of that, and I don't know if the South Korean's claimed costs include government furnished equipment or not. If it doesn't then costs would be more or less identical. Meanwhile the Incheon class frigates are smaller and much slower then LCS, and while they have a 5in gun and a few anti ship missile launchers (costs that likely balance vs smaller engines) they go for about 400 million, more or less the same. No doubt America stuff is expensive, but high wages and high materials prices in the US are always going to keep prices high. Meanwhile when you go and try to take out the gold plating for specifications, well LCS was intended to do exactly that and everyone endlessly complains about it not being survivable. But that's how many foreign builds keep ships cheap and low in manning, they build them like civilian ships that also happen to have weapons. This is in particular why foreign amphibious warfare ships are so cheap.

Its worth noting that adjusted to late 2000s dollars, the first Burke actually cost around 2.7 billion. Makes the 3.2 billion for DDG-1000 lead ship not look bad at all considering its thousands of tons bigger with several very complicated heavy guns and two major radar systems instead of one, though now one radar has been deleted. Plus all the automation to reduce operating costs.

What I’d like to see happen, on a realistic basis, is keep producing the Independence class as is, and begin building the Freedom class to something like redesigns devised for Israeli and Saudi sales, with the aircraft capacity cut in half and ESSM and SPY-5 or other radar, but I don’t see this happening. It couldn’t happen anytime soon since it’s a serious redesign, and the Israeli one looked like a SAAR 5 rerun anyway (capsize while docked ect…)

[The Duchess of Zeon]

I've seen the cost quoted as only 923 million per unit, which is a savings of closer to 25%, not insubstantial and probably not just due to labour costs, as I can't imagine that even for three years and a crew of a couple hundred plus reduced parts cost due to reduced wages down the pipeline that more than a few dozen million dollars could be saved. That still leaves a solid 200 million or so that isn't due to wages and I suspect with our huge mass production line that distorts the picture even more in favour of the Koreans.

[Sea Skimmer]

On the other hand a Type 45 costs close to 1.1 billion pounds, with fewer main radar systems and half the armament of a Burke and two thousand tons less weight. Franco-Italy is looking at as much as 750 million for the most capable versions of the FREMM frigates, and those things are much less capable then a Burke. They have for example only a single antenna Herakles air search radar that spins at 60rpm and no other major set. Not bad ships in my mind, but they show how high costs are going. Even India is paying ~650 million for Project 17 frigates right now, and estimating 1.4 billion now for a Project 17A AAW follow on, though this includes R&D costs spread over a 7 ship program. These costs are much higher then earlier estimates though, and its India so god only knows what corruption may or may not be involved. A few years ago cost was estimated at 900 million each.

Note that Project 17 has major systems from Russia, hardly budget smashers, while Project 17A is to use a SAM system designed with Israeli help, Barak 8, also hardly a known for economical products. So they sure aren't gold plating them.

Labor is 30-35% of the cost of a warship, so South Korea having wages around a third cheaper then the US is a very serious difference. Equipment is around 55-60% of the price, which I believe includes all the labor to make that equipment, and basic materials 11%.

I would suspect the ROK saved a fair bit of money by using off the shelf equipment as much as possible on its new destroyer warships. They also saved some by ordering all three ships together, the US has done little in the way of multi year procurement contracts for ships except for LCS and now recently Virginia class submarines. The repeat Burkes are supposed to go ahead under this concept, but thanks to total disruption of the supply and labor chain, as well as numerous modification the cost has basically ended up reset to what the early units cost, far over 2 billion. Never mind Flight III which is probably not going to work and would have hoards of new stuff in it.

Now one pretty unquestioned example of unjustified USN cost is the LPD-17 program, but much of that is to blame on the contract going to the yard with the worst bid for political reasons in the Clinton era. Also the fact that the ships were intended to be equipped like full fledged warships, and while most combat systems were not mounted, all the supporting wiring, power and other kit needed was. This adds up when the ship is 25,000 tons fully loaded. Hey its that cruiser you wanted, minus the speed, usable weapons and a few other minor features.

In general I see little hope to serious cost reductions in the US destroyer fleet, the ships as we want and need them are just going to be highly expensive. The fact is the navy shipbuilding budget does just need more money, or else the fleet has to shrink to something scaled around more like eight aircraft carriers and sixty destroyers as it is now heading. I think the money is going to show up, even if sequestration goes into effect in the long term America can in fact afford a 300 ship conventional fleet, its a matter of what else also gets bought. Though SSBN(X) is a huge open question at the moment. Cost estimates vary so absurdly its hard to even think about planning. Not that anyone has produced a plan to fund it.

[Sidewinder]

More LCS criticism:

Maintenance Hurdles Mount for New USN Ship

Jul. 23, 2012 - 09:15AM
By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS

When the littoral combat ship Freedom needs scheduled maintenance overseas, the workers who step onboard had better be Americans.

U.S. law bars foreign shipyard workers from doing such tasks as preventative and corrective maintenance, deep cleaning and corrosion control — crucial work for a ship manned by only 50 or so sailors, meaning it will rely more on shore-based support than other U.S. Navy ships.

And as more LCS hulls come into service, that foreign-based support will become ever more important. The U.S. plans to base four ships in Singapore — Freedom will sail there next year — and another eight in Bahrain, starting as soon as 2014.

Yet if foreigners aren’t allowed to do the work, the LCS force will need to be supported by U.S.-based “fly-away teams,” a situation that could be unaffordable.

That’s just one of the conclusions reached by participants in a war game earlier this year designed to study LCS sustainment — how the ships would be kept ready for battle while operating from foreign ports. Along with another game and a classified study on the Navy’s readiness to operate the ships, the work is part of a major Navy effort to assess the LCS program and understand its problems and issues.

The sustainment war game was held in January by U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, Va. According to an unclassified assessment of the four-day game, participants were asked to identify a single issue as the chief risk to LCS mission success. The answers were:

• Shore support is directly related to mission readiness and effectiveness, with the San Diego-based LCS Squadron (LCSRON) key to coordinating the process.

• “Adherence to the maintenance schedule will drive operational availability.”

• The legal maintenance restrictions barring foreign workers from many onboard tasks need to be “fully vetted,” and “fly-away teams may be financially unsustainable.”

The game also produced seven major findings:

• “The logistics of mission package exchanges are more complicated and time-consuming than currently reflected in the wholeness CONOPS [concept of operations].”

• “LCS manpower is overtaxed by anti-terrorist/force protection requirements.”

• Facility, supply and logistics systems in the operations area “require investment and improvement” ahead of an LCS arriving on station.

• The permanent support plan and maintenance strategy needs to be better defined in light of the legal restrictions.

• The traditional planned maintenance system strategy “requires significant procedural and organizational revision.”

• Overseas management of LCS ordnance and hazardous materials needs to be defined and refined in host nation agreements and U.S. Navy policies.

• LCSRON distance support is “the critical node.”

The limited ability of the LCS crew to perform onboard maintenance, and the need to return to port for even basic repairs, “negatively impacts” the ships’ availability to operational commanders, according to sources familiar with the classified report.

Further, the contractor teams handling maintenance duties are not performing up to snuff or being held accountable for their work. Many contractors are doing the work twice — the second time to correct problems with their initial work — avoiding penalties and billing the Navy twice for the jobs.

According to some LCS crews, the reliance on contractors actually results in more work for the crew, which is too small to supervise the contractors. Navy sailors often have to fix the problems after the contractors have left.

Extensive contractor services also are required to maintain spare parts inventories for the ships, since each of the two ship designs features a number of non-standard systems and the vessels are too small to carry many spares. Ships will be based on either the Lockheed Martin Freedom-class design or Austal USA’s Independence class.

But the reports note the parts and work requirements need to be identified and ordered well in advance, so they’re available when needed — a situation that severely limits the flexibility of the LCS.

The classified study included the examination of operations aboard the first two LCS vessels, each relatively new. Maintenance requirements generally increase as ships age, and neither LCS has performed an extended overseas deployment.

The classified study was done this year by a team headed by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, reporting to Adm. Mark Ferguson, vice chief of naval operations. Known as the OPNAV report — for the offices reporting directly to the chief of naval operations — the study is the first major examination of the LCS effort from an operational point of view, rather than a study of the program’s concepts or acquisition progress.

The Navy has been reluctant to discuss the OPNAV report, “A Review of the Navy’s Readiness to Receive, Employ and Deploy the LCS Class Vessel.” Like the war games, the report’s intention was to uncover problems, and it does not focus on program successes or accomplishments.

“This review was intended to be critical, to take a hard look at what needs to be addressed before LCS deploys to Singapore, to determine what needs to be studied during the deployment and what issues need a longer-term look,” said Rear Adm. Thomas Rowden, director of surface warfare and chief coordinator of the LCS effort.

The Small Crews

Rowden revealed in late June that 20 berths would be added to the Freedom ahead of next year’s deployment. The revised manning plan has yet to be announced, but most of those racks will be used by sailors added to the current 40-person core crew, although several might be reserved for additional mission package detachment members.

The additions represent a long-awaited reversal of the original minimal-manning construct applied to the entire LCS concept. Heretofore, Navy officials rigidly opposed any crew increases despite widespread acknowledgement of the problems, including statements such as that in the 2009 version of the ships’ concept of operations: “There are no spare sailors or officers assigned to LCS. The unplanned loss of any crewmember may result in major mission degradation.”

According to sources familiar with the OPNAV report, the study reported that while LCS crews are functioning at the current 40-sailor level, safety and readiness are being harmed as a result. Crews tend to be exhausted after only three days of normal operations and soon begin to perform poorly. Navy studies show that the effects of several days of low-tempo LCS operations equate to high-tempo operations for a cruiser crew.

Even when in port, LCS duty sections are limited to three sections, meaning fewer days off and less time off the ship, and underway watches rarely exceed two or three sections — at a time when increased automation on ships with larger crews is seeing increases in many cases to five or six sections.

The manning margins are so thin on an LCS that crew members who need to be off the ship for training, briefings or any other reason may find the request denied if they can’t be even temporarily replaced. If a sailor holding one of 21 critical positions on the ship isn’t available, the ship might not be able to get underway, since there might not be another crew member with the required qualifications.

With only two ships in service, the LCSRON reportedly is meeting the short-term unplanned manning losses. But as the number of ships and crews grows, the problem will get worse, according to sources familiar with the OPNAV report.

The manning studies also point out that the multiple-crew LCS manning scheme places a heavy burden on the need for sailors to be certified before they come on board, since there’s no margin for on-the-job training. But if they miss out on shore-based training, gaps will appear in individual crews’ readiness levels.

The Navy has conducted a number of workload reduction studies and initiatives for the LCS, and at least 40 waivers or deviations have been enacted to ease the situation. But the reports recommend that further work be done.

Recommendations

The OPNAV report, according to sources, concluded that, in light of what the ships can and can’t do, the entire LCS concept of operations needs to be reviewed, along with the minimal-manning requirements and the contractor-based maintenance schemes.

The studies make plain the Navy’s concern with exhaustion and fatigue among LCS crews and the need to improve their quality of life, and cite “the reality of the workload” to bolster those positions.

The review efforts also highlight the extreme complexity of the LCS program — the multiple crews, additional mission module packages and aviation detachments, and two distinct ship classes — as major factors in developing solutions.

“The pieces come together to make a mosaic,” said one participant in the war game. “When you put the mosaic into the theater’s dynamic environment, it becomes a kaleidoscope.”

Anyone have a practical solution to this problem? The one I'm thinking of- "stretch" the ship, so more crewmembers would fit inside- would probably cost more money to implement, than is tolerable. (I did consider an "LCS mother ship"- essentially a mobile dock, where the LCS could be refueled, resupplied, and faulty components repaired with the mother ship's onboard machine shop- but this solution would be too expensive, and vulnerable to enemy attack.)

[Sea Skimmer]

Anyone have a practical solution to this problem?

Aside from the increase in crew which was inevitable, yeah, its called a destroyer/torpedo boat/LCS tender. One of those things the US, and other nations, once had in considerable numbers but have now almost completely vanished. In fact the US built a class of four brand new ones, Yellowstone class, as recently as the early 1980s, only to decommission them with plenty of life left in the mid 1990s when the USN was forced to abandon almost all its forward bases in the world. This most submarine tenders vanished not long after, forcing vessels to travel all the back back to the United States for every single deployment. Its just not very realistic to expect to maintain a constant forward naval presence without tenders or shore base facilities, no matter how well manned and capable the warships themselves are. Most tenders were stricken from the reserve fleet around the year 2000, though not all have been scrapped. They wont and really couldn't come back though because they had steam turbines and the USN had good reason to want everything that isn't nuclear to be powered by gas turbines. As it is, shore installations in Bahrain and Guam are being improved, somewhat, but this doesn't really cut it. The plan for Singapore seems to be more 'use of a pier' then anything remotely like a base.

The need for tenders has been discussed many times in conjunction with LCS, but nobody has ever come up with actual requirements, planning or funding. Such a vessel would not need to be built from the keel up, it might be (likely would be) nothing more then a series of containers holding habitation, storage and workshop units placed on the deck of a small chartered or purchased container ship. The world has plenty of unused ships that could fit the bill. Such containers could even be unloaded and wired back together on land to setup a dry base should we randomly not feel like paying to charter or some minor problem happens like terrorist frogmen sink it in shallow water. The only hard requirement for such a ship would be that it have cranes of suitable lift and reach, which would be easily found on small container ships as they tend to have self unloading capabilities.

The one I'm thinking of- "stretch" the ship, so more crewmembers would fit inside- would probably cost more money to implement, than is tolerable. (I did consider an "LCS mother ship"- essentially a mobile dock, where the LCS could be refueled, resupplied, and faulty components repaired with the mother ship's onboard machine shop- but this solution would be too expensive, and vulnerable to enemy attack.)

More then a few of the early concepts for the intended roles of LCS basically had the ship itself being a ~20-30,000 ton support ship that would service, and in some cases actually carry and and launch several hundred ton missile boats, as well as swarms of various robot weapons.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

We've actually deployed USS Ponce, rebuilt from an amphib into a support vessel, to the Strait of Hormuz, but she's providing support for Cyclone-class PCs deployed there at the moment, which is a lot less intensive than LCS.

[Sea Skimmer]

Yes, the mighty Cyclone armada reclaimed from the Coast Guard, the things could be looked after by a converted LST if we had any surplus ones left, many LSTs served as landing craft and motor torpedo boat tenders in WW2. Fun though how a Cyclone has 75% of the crew of LCS but displace one tenth as much. Meanwhile its not clear they'd beat a Fairmile D 1/3rd the size in turn in a gun action if the British boat got modern sights. But hey, use what random failure programs we have and all that to fight off the Iranian boston whalers.

USS Ponce is really more important though for her role as a home for MH-53 minewarfare helicopters. We have been without a base for them since USS Inchon was decommissioned in 2002 after a boiler room caught fire. However she also only has a fraction of the capability to do so being an LPD instead of a LPH, and Inchon also served as a mothership for various mine warfare vessels. Our glorious navy has actually designated Ponce as an interim ship in her very designation, Afloat Forward Staging Base, Interim AFSB-I. They don't seem to expect her to move much or last past war with Iran. Not surprising since she has a forty year old steam and and every single other ship in the class has decommissioned.

Ideally a new LCS tender would have a serious sized flight deck and hanger, so it could tend to the coming SH-60 based minewarfare helicopters LCS will operate and which will replace the MH-53 squadron. By default it would be taking over the role Inchon as minewarfare vessel tender as LCS takes over all those roles. Of course ideally such a tender would not be a converted cargo ship either, but producion of even further modified LHA-6 type vessels with a squadron of F-35Bs along for the ride, but this would be dangerously effective, and also rather expensive, 2.38 billion dollars for LHA-7 Tripoli and that's before we go and make it more expensive with workshops and cranes. I would suggest an LPD-17 as a cheaper tender, I think this has really been proposed, but the things are so expensive at 1.7 billion and offer so much less air capability (though, they do already have cranes) that it doesn't seem very favorable compared to a austere civilian merchant type hull.

[someone_else]

One of those things the US, and other nations, once had in considerable numbers but have now almost completely vanished.

Since it seems so reasonable to even laypersons to have some kind of tender fleet, what is the official reason none is interested in them anymore?

Assuming it's "people running them cost too much", would turning them into drones solve the issue (in this case the other ship's crew is responsible of operating the equipment when it reaches them).

By default it would be taking over the role Inchon as minewarfare vessel tender as LCS takes over all those roles. Of course ideally such a tender would not be a converted cargo ship either

Ok that cargo ships are crappy, but isn't there something cheaper than modifying a pocket carrier design like the LHA-6?

[Simon_Jester]

If the other ship has a tiny crew, making the tender a drone doesn't solve the problem. Also, there's a huge amount of equipment on the tender that takes different skills to operate than anything on the smaller ship. Like, say, the cranes for lifting the smaller ship.

[Purple]

That and than there is the issue of cost. This thing was meant to be modular so a tender system sounds like a good idea. However to make really good use of it you would have to build a tender that is large enough to carry several modules and the crew for them at once along with the equipment needed to install them and the crew trained to do so. And that would mean one big and expensive ship. A ship that would be a juicy target for any enemy be it conventional or a terrorist with a rubber boat and RPG. So you would need to start supporting them with a surface fleet of escorts. And the costs go up and up and up.

[Sea Skimmer]

Drone tender doesn't even start to make any remote sense, you'd need a damn tender to fix the drone systems breaking all the time. Maybe you could have a drone barge for refueling, but that'd be different and still functionally pointless. Drones seldom save money anyway for any specific role, they let you do things you couldn't before.

Since it seems so reasonable to even laypersons to have some kind of tender fleet, what is the official reason none is interested in them anymore?

Its simply because most navies that ever deployed away from home ports have collapsed in size (also you can count them on one hand), while the individual ships have gotten bigger and more able to look after themselves. A few small random things do exist, like the British still have one small repair ship, though this is not exactly the same as a proper tender. The Chinese and Indian fleets are growing, but neither makes any effort to base ships away from naval bases on home soil.

Also, technology counts. Back in the era of steam and shellfire warships were made of metal, period. I mean sure, they might have wood on the deck and random bits of rubber, but they were metal engineering products. No fiberclass nothing can fix, no plastic. Fleet Repair ships had actual foundries so they could just cast replacement parts, some tenders could do this too, and in general anything short of massive damage or a turbine blowing up could be fixed by a tender sort of vessel and refits were easy to manage given a machine shop. In the cold war ships became highly focused on electronics and engines because focused on gas turbines which can be removed completely for repairs and moved around the world by aircraft. Reliability of systems in general went up. So the advantages of forward repairs and tending went down, and the complexity of making it work went up. Particuarlly as we moved into transistorized electronics you can’t do much to fix anyway other then maybe replacing a blown capacitor. Also like I said, ships tended to just grow bigger and it was always smaller stuff like 1,500 ton era destroyers and 1000 ton diesel submarines that needed tenders the most. So they progressively died off.

But now, LCS is a very austere ship and its most complicated systems are in mission modules actually designed to be removed and replaced. We’ve also seen a major shift away from milspec electronics to commercial off the shelf stuff, so obtaining repair and replacement parts is now easier in some respects. It’s also just small, if still higher displacement then a typical WW2 destroyer, and simply not intended to self sustain, so the logic of a tender is restored.

Now you go back far enough and the Royal Navy once put as much of even its home port base installations onto tender like vessels as formal policy, but this was way back in the day (before WW1 but some lasted into WW2), when it was common to build tenders (RN called them depot ships generally) cheaply out of derelict warships (wooden three deckers with AA guns are fun!) and they thought it desirable to keep men locked up on ships even in port because discipline was better and subversive socialist literature could be kept out. The Cold War Soviets operated in a similar way; mainly because they had some many silly remote submarine bases with no land access and no real shore facilities because building on permafrost sucks. Those sites are now mostly all abandon.

Ok that cargo ships are crappy, but isn't there something cheaper than modifying a pocket carrier design like the LHA-6?

I wouldn’t call it a pocket carrier, the damn thing is 50,000 tons, bigger then any carrier except Shinano that saw action in WW2 and most battleships ever. Its only small compared to a Nimitz.

An in-between option would be one could build a ship with a flight deck to completely civilian specifications and it would be a lot cheaper, this is what the French Mistral class is. Its also what those British CVLs built around the end of WW2 and then operated by many foreign fleets were.

Mistral is a 20,000 ton LHD that costs about 500 million Euros, against 2.3 billion USD for LHD-8 USS Makin Island at 40,000 tons and 2.4 billion for USS Tripoli at 50,000 tons. However you get what you pay for, Mistral was designed to the same specifications of a cruise ship as far as fittings and survivability go. The recent capsizing of Costa Concordia tells you how good those standards are, though I would HOPE the French navy has been conservative then cruise ship designers on the subject of stability. However on the other hand, cruise ships do not transport bulk jet fuel and ammunition. Mistral does, and still would in a minecountermeasure/LCS tender role. Being a US ship we also expect terrorist dolphins to plant mines on it. Typical criticism is LCS won’t survive terror attacks like the one that almost sank USS Cole (horrible design flaw of a ship one third the size right?), but something like a tender that sits for long periods in foreign waters is extra vulnerable to this sort of attack. Course people also tend to forget that in the Nam War the VC sank a number of US ships with non suicidal swimmers (though, they basically took the missions expecting to die) including a CVE with civilian crew in the Mekong river. Some of these attacks actually involved swimming through the Saigon sewers outlets.

Another way to keep down costs is to make the tender military sealift command vessels like almost all other US auxiliaries, with only a small military crew to handle weapons. Historically tenders were all commissioned US warships with naval crews, and few if any civilian contractors only doing special jobs.

Self defense on Mistral limited to a couple of the most elaborate MANPADS launchers ever, against the US ships having an integrated layered defense systems superior to the AAW capability of many frigates (heck almost any built before the last decade). The criticized AAW capability on LCS is superior to have Mistral has. Cutting capability and the naval crewmen needed for it out would save money, but it also means terrorist jet biplanes might drop bioweapons on deck. Wasp/Tripoli had NBC overpressure to stop this dire threat. So civilian crew makes much sense on Mistral or a merchant, but not if we bought a higher end unit. Depends what you want to do, the higher end unit would be able to join in the battle when needed, the low end unit needs an escort or to flee out of enemy range.

Strong argument could be made that the USN should have just built a Mistral like small aircraft carrier for the entire LCS role, but this would not have solved the problem of diminishing fleet numbers, and I doubt the US actually would have been able to buy a ship like that for under a billion dollars. As it is, they’d make a viable tender/mine chopper spammer with the well deck removed or shrunken for more overall interior space, the troop accommodations become accommodations for LCS crews, part of the hanger becomes workshops and we mount cranes along the ends of the superstructure.

With cost being the overwhelming issue, the converted cargo ship is about the only way to go. A couple are already being built mainly to act as staging bases for marines and army preposition forces under the sea basing concept, and will have limited flight decks strong enough to take H-53. However the military seems to change the specifications for these ships on a daily basis, as it much modified the Mobile Landing Platform ships, so it’s not too clear what they’ll do, and it is clear they’ll be heavily over tasked and not available to support permanent peacetime LCS deployments. If LCS is going to get a formal tender we rely upon to make it effective, its going to have to be additional units and money.

[Thanas]

Course people also tend to forget that in the Nam War the VC sank a number of US ships with non suicidal swimmers (though, they basically took the missions expecting to die) including a CVE with civilian crew in the Mekong river. Some of these attacks actually involved swimming through the Saigon sewers outlets.

This is the first I have heard of this but it sounds intriguing. Can you alaborate on these/give a link?

[TimothyC]

I think he's talking about the USNS Card

[Thanas]

That link does not work....

[RogueIce]

That link does not work....

Wikipedia says hello!

Short version is VC swam through sewers, attached two bombs; five aboard killed, ship was refloated 17 days later and returned to service that same December.

This page also lists various Merchant Marine casualties in Vietnam. From a quick scan it looks like four ships or so were (successfully) attacked by enemy frogmen attaching explosives.

[Sea Skimmer]

Ones I know of six sunk or heavily damaged by various mines, planted on the ships and on the bottom, that page above covers a bunch of this but I already did most of this earlier so might as well post it

USNS Card, CVU-11, mined by swimmers and sunk at the Saigon docks May 1964, CVE in use as a civilian crewed aircraft and mechanized equipment transport. Card was also noteable for being the ship that brought the first US helicopters and major US unit to the RVN in 1961. She was raised in a couple weeks while the US swore up and down she was just damaged, pictures from dockside actually do make it hard to tell she was hard on the bottom so it was not the dumbest propaganda move.

USS Westchester County, LST 1167, military crewed, mined and heavily damaged November 1968, while moored in the Mekong as a base ship for the mobile riverine force. VC swimmers attached two bombs of 250lb apiece to the hull, but thanks to US LSTs being absurdly resistant to damage she stayed afloat. Had one bomb been placed slightly differently it would have exploded a room full of mortar ammo and destroyed the ship. She was beached for patching and then left Vietnam under her own power.

USS Sandpumper, YM 24, Navy armored dredge, sucked a VC bottom mine or else possibly a random UXO into her dredge pump, blew up and sank September 1969. Salvage abandon owing to extensive damage and the wreck sinking deeply into the mud.

A couple civilian ships under military charter were also sunk

SS Baton Rouge Victory, Victory ship mined, disabled and run aground in sinking condition in the river approaches to Saigon August 1966. Had a cargo of random civilian stuff plus bulldozers. Raised in late November after an earlier attempt failed. The mine was remote controlled from the river bank… keep that one in mind the next time someone talks about this ‘new’ IED threat. Some believe owing to the nature of the damage that the bomb was actually placed on her hull by a swimmer, and command detonated in an attempt to block the channel at a key point, I'm a little skeptical of this but I've also never seen a formal damage report.

Jamaica Bay, a 2,000 ton armored dredge, mined and sunk by swimmers while working in the Mekong River Jan 6 1967, raised in February.

SS Green Bay, freighter mined by swimmers while docked at Qui Nhon unloading US military supplies and ammunition, partly capsized, August 1971

A whole bunch of other stuff was damaged to lesser varying degrees, and several major RVN ships additionally sunk by mining or swimmers, a damn lot if you count losses to all causes on the run into Cambodia, without counting converted landing craft ect... that aren't really ships. It is also worth noting that a considerable number of VC swimmer attacks were freedomized with extreme prejudice, and the vast majority of bottom mines were defeated by the highly advanced tactic of dragging a chain along the river bottom from two armed boats moving ahead of large ships and river convoys. It took up serious resources to sustain such sweeping efforts.

[Thanas]

Thanks.