The quality of the various elite troops in history

[Zinegata]

Soldiers do what they're damn well ordered to do. Sometimes someone screws up and a lot of them get killed. That is true of both elite and non-elite units.

The point is that you cannot pretend that the quality of individual soldiers alone dictates the quality of the unit. Rangers can all be body builders with bulging biceps, but if their Sergeants, Captains, and Colonels (who are all part of the unit, so they can't blame some nebulous higher-ups) are incompetent then it's not the Army's problem. It's not the General's problem. It's the problem with the "elite" unit itself.

Again, what you are describing are essential qualities of shock units, or suicide units, but not elite units. If eliteness stemmed purely from a unit's ability to endure suffering (and mainly by its troops), then again the entire IJA should be classified as "elite" despite the gross incompetence of its leadership for ordering all of those Banzai Charges.

One, from the sound of it, it is questionable whether he "knew it wasn't there," as opposed to "wasn't sure if it was there or not."

He did know. On-ground intel had already told them the guns weren't there.

Second, I'm not clear on what you expect to have happened. Was the colonel commanding the Rangers supposed to refuse to carry out the assault altogether? Or are you saying that he was solely responsible for planning it and got to decide where his troops would go at Normandy all by himself?

The official version: Rangers heroically assault a cliffside redoubt, taking out several Nazi guns and saving countless lives!

The reality: The Rangers attacked a decoy - knowing it was a decoy - and wasted three companies. The rest of the Rangers were supposed to follow into PDH (further compounding the mistake), but because of a signalling mistake they went for Plan B instead - which was to land at Omaha.

Zine's point: The Colonel was an idiot for attacking a decoy (and knowing it was a decoy) and should have just gone with Plan B from the start with all his Rangers.

As a further point, I would argue that even if the Rangers didn't have a Plan B in this case, it was the Colonel's responsibility to tell his superiors that they should call off the assault. Colonels aren't automatons whose only job is to say "Yes" to their Generals.

Is "all our officers always make the right choices" a requirement for elite status?

Of course not. But again you seem to like pretending that only troop quality matters; not leadership or institutions.

his part I'm not going to argue one way or the other- save that this is the same organization fifty years later, so trying to generalize sounds pretty foolish.

Except of course that the Rangers are not just individual soldiers; they are an institution. And when your institution takes pride in attacking pointless decoy targets (PDH being their most famous action) just because it was a "hard" action as opposed to a "smart" one, what do you expect of their performance in current wars?

When a Ranger commander makes a decision, do you seriously think he isn't affected by all the hype? That he wouldn't ask himself "What would the great Colonel Rudder, victor of Pointe Du Hoc, do in this situation?".

If anything, the fact that Rangers still end up charging headlong into situations without looking before they leap fifty years after World War 2 shows how little they actually learned.

Seriously, it's a good point, but you were meandering all over the map by criticizing the Rangers in a vague, general way for just being in the wrong place. Or at least that's how it sounded to me.

My initial example in PDH showed a competent Ranger Major getting sacked because he had the gall to say "This operation is useless and stupid! We know the guns aren't there!". I've been saying this point over and over again.

[Thanas]

I think one point in all this haggling over wether the decision of one single officer means the unit is elite or not is one central point - did the Rangers perform in a superior manner compared to troops with similar training and equipment or compared to units from other nations which had the same role?

[Zinegata]

I think one point in all this haggling over wether the decision of one single officer means the unit is elite or not is one central point - did the Rangers perform in a superior manner compared to troops with similar training and equipment or compared to units from other nations which had the same role?

I pointed to the only real "successes" of the Rangers being Omaha and Cabanatuan (with Cabanatuan being the stand out operation), and Skimmer adding Merill's and Salerno. Skimmer further adds that the Rangers were mainly wasted fighting as regular infantry but without heavy weapons support.

In comparison... the US Airborne did very well in Normandy. The Rangers at PDH lost three companies to take out five guns which weren't even manned. The 506th sent two squads to destroy four guns and suffered only two dead. In this case little can be said about a disparity in armament - the Airborne didn't really have a lot of heavy weapons either - so in everything but deep raids the Rangers didn't do better than other "elite" infantry outfits.

As for other countries with special Ops specifically... the British Commandos had considerably more successes, the big one being Operation Chariot. They had other failures too of course, but British casualties tended to be lighter because they were generally infiltrating smaller units (often just squads) instead of three companies.

Interestingly, the Commandos apparently had some Rangers fighting under them during the Dieppe Raid - and this part of the operation succeeded.

Not so sure about the Brandenburgers in comparison though.

[Thanas]

The Fallschirmjäger might be a better comparison to the Rangers than the Brandenburger.

[Zinegata]

The Fallschirmjäger might be a better comparison to the Rangers than the Brandenburger.

Well, the early record is mixed. They did good in Belgium (Eben-Emael comes to mind), but Crete was a bloodbath (albeit ultimately a successful one). Overall I'd say that's still more than what the Rangers accomplished, for all the losses they suffered Crete was nonetheless a German victory with actual far-reaching consequences. They at least were as important as the Allied airborne in Normandy.

After that they fought mainly as regular infantry Divisions, that performed extremely well. The 1st Fallschirmjaeger was one of the major participants at Monte Cassino. The 3rd Fallschirmjaeger - with only bits and pieces of several other German Divisions in support (352nd, 353rd, and some scattered units) - basically held off an entire American Corps in the St. Lo front. But by this point they weren't really a light infantry formation anymore like the Rangers.

[Sea Skimmer]

Eben Emael was also really badly designed, and the small hand picked assault team was backed up by regular army engineers,also hand picked for the role. Not really an example of typical Nazi paratroopers. The fighting in Holland brought mixed results, including several surrenders, and that was with total surprise behind the entire concept of mass parachute and air landing in action.

As for ground fighting in general, the Germans were smart enough to augment the Fallschirmjaeger divisional firepower for sustained ground combat; though this is no surprise since from 1943 on most of them had no jump training. More and more such divisions will formed because Gorings first attempt to counter balance the Waffen SS, with the Luftwaffe Field Divisions had failed so badly. The 3rd Fallschirmjaeger was a pretty high end example of this, being formed specifically for regular ground combat and heavily over strength in all categories of men and material. It was some 50% larger then typical German infantry divisions of the period.

As for Brandenburgers, they did field large companies at a fairly early point that are reasonable comparisons to Ranger and Commando Units. Later they became a complete division and fought conventionally because the German intelligence service totally needed this capability.

BTW did later form a division, later upgraded to a Panzer Grenaider division

[Zinegata]

The 3rd Fallschirmjaeger was a pretty high end example of this, being formed specifically for regular ground combat and heavily over strength in all categories of men and material. It was some 50% larger then typical German infantry divisions of the period.

It was also supposed to be fully motorized and had a Stug company, which really drops all pretense of being an airborne unit. It was only really lacking in artillery (one battalion in Nomandy, with another attached to it from the Army reserve), but that was due to shortages in available tubes rather than the intention; on paper it ws supposed to be equal to a regular German infantry Division in artillery strength.

Later they became a complete division and fought conventionally because the German intelligence service totally needed this capability.

I'm assuming you're being sarcastic here?

[Simon_Jester]

Soldiers do what they're damn well ordered to do. Sometimes someone screws up and a lot of them get killed. That is true of both elite and non-elite units.

The point is that you cannot pretend that the quality of individual soldiers alone dictates the quality of the unit. Rangers can all be body builders with bulging biceps, but if their Sergeants, Captains, and Colonels (who are all part of the unit, so they can't blame some nebulous higher-ups) are incompetent then it's not the Army's problem. It's not the General's problem. It's the problem with the "elite" unit itself.

Again, what you are describing are essential qualities of shock units, or suicide units, but not elite units. If eliteness stemmed purely from a unit's ability to endure suffering (and mainly by its troops), then again the entire IJA should be classified as "elite" despite the gross incompetence of its leadership for ordering all of those Banzai Charges.

Er... no.

The quality of "attacks what they are told to attack" is not unique to suicide troops. Good senior officers will avoid telling troops to attack the wrong targets, or to attack in the wrong way. But this is something that happens to regular units too- sometimes they get told to do something risky and a lot of them die. Or they're left in an overexposed position and a lot of them die. Or (Normandy) their landing craft ends up in the wrong place, they attack whatever target they're in front of instead of the one they were supposed to hit.

So there are two important questions. One is: did the Rangers have officers with good judgment? Here, the quality of their colonel matters, and his involvement in the Pointe du Hoc decision matters.

But the second question is still: did the Rangers have a real choice in the matter? A lot of units, both 'elite' and 'normal,' have gotten chewed up because someone else sent them to do something dangerous and inadvisable. Most of them don't get to refuse to do it just because they don't think it's safe. That's called "insubordination," and it gets you sent to a special place the army has, called a "brig."

[Also, in English, military ranks are not capitalized. Please try to remember.]

Now, yes a relatively senior officer should be making a judgment call here. But if he is replaced (a decision that can only be made by more senior officers), then it's out of his hands. If he's told "well, yeah, maybe the guns aren't there, we're sending you in anyway because we can't take the chance," his only lawful response is "yes, sir."

Do you understand this?

He did know. On-ground intel had already told them the guns weren't there.

Had it told them they were not there? Or that they might have been moved, which is not the same thing?

If you were looking for a prize, surely you wouldn't take risks to get it if there was a 0% chance of finding it. And you'd take the chance if there was a 100% chance (within reason). But what if there was an 80% chance? A 50% chance? Much harder judgment call to make.

his part I'm not going to argue one way or the other- save that this is the same organization fifty years later, so trying to generalize sounds pretty foolish.

Except of course that the Rangers are not just individual soldiers; they are an institution. And when your institution takes pride in attacking pointless decoy targets (PDH being their most famous action) just because it was a "hard" action as opposed to a "smart" one, what do you expect of their performance in current wars?

When a Ranger commander makes a decision, do you seriously think he isn't affected by all the hype? That he wouldn't ask himself "What would the great Colonel Rudder, victor of Pointe Du Hoc, do in this situation?".

If anything, the fact that Rangers still end up charging headlong into situations without looking before they leap fifty years after World War 2 shows how little they actually learned.

Yes, and you might want to double-check the record instead of cherrypicking isolated combats fifty years apart.

My initial example in PDH showed a competent Ranger Major getting sacked because he had the gall to say "This operation is useless and stupid! We know the guns aren't there!". I've been saying this point over and over again.

How did he say it? What did he do? Again, there really are limits in a military on how much a subordinate CAN do to resist orders from above to do something stupid. That is how armies work. If soldiers could routinely refuse to do anything that looked too dangerous, especially after volunteering for a unit they knew damn well would be doing dangerous things, then armies would never do anything at all.

I think one point in all this haggling over wether the decision of one single officer means the unit is elite or not is one central point - did the Rangers perform in a superior manner compared to troops with similar training and equipment or compared to units from other nations which had the same role?

I pointed to the only real "successes" of the Rangers being Omaha and Cabanatuan (with Cabanatuan being the stand out operation), and Skimmer adding Merill's and Salerno. Skimmer further adds that the Rangers were mainly wasted fighting as regular infantry but without heavy weapons support.

In comparison... the US Airborne did very well in Normandy. The Rangers at PDH lost three companies to take out five guns which weren't even manned. The 506th sent two squads to destroy four guns and suffered only two dead. In this case little can be said about a disparity in armament - the Airborne didn't really have a lot of heavy weapons either - so in everything but deep raids the Rangers didn't do better than other "elite" infantry outfits.

You're cherrypicking again: the airborne units weren't having to fight their way through a line of fortresses to get to their targets. The Rangers would probably have done a lot better too if they'd had to confront the same level of defenses.

As for other countries with special Ops specifically... the British Commandos had considerably more successes, the big one being Operation Chariot. They had other failures too of course, but British casualties tended to be lighter because they were generally infiltrating smaller units (often just squads) instead of three companies.

Here, yes- but as Skimmer notes, the Commandos really were what we would now call special forces, so they used entirely different tactics against entirely different targets. The whole Normandy invasion was full of frontal assaults on heavily defended pillboxes. This was the one thing you could almost guarantee a Commando would never end up doing, so low Commando casualties would not be a surprise.

I totally agree that the WWII Rangers (and Rangers for most of the time since) were being used as assault troops. I just don't think it's very relevant to say "a lot of them died fighting as assault troops, therefore they are inferior." It's true, but it's actually very difficult to create a unit that can assault a dangerous position, take heavy losses doing so, and still hold on long enough to accomplish anything at all.

[LaCroix]

The official version: Rangers heroically assault a cliffside redoubt, taking out several Nazi guns and saving countless lives!

The reality: The Rangers attacked a decoy - knowing it was a decoy - and wasted three companies. The rest of the Rangers were supposed to follow into PDH (further compounding the mistake), but because of a signalling mistake they went for Plan B instead - which was to land at Omaha.

Actually, they took PDH with almost no losses, only the fact that thy weren't relieved in time made them accumulate such high losses.
Holding out for so long, they managed to bind the 916th grenadier regiment that frantically tried to win PDH back.

[Zinegata]

Holding out for so long, they managed to bind the 916th grenadier regiment that frantically tried to win PDH back.

Yeah, and sending three companies to hold out against an entire regiment was real smart, ain't it?

That being said, it didn't actually bind very many forces. Only one battalion of the 916th was actually sent to deal with the PDH raiding group, and on June 7th this battalion was driven away by the 29th Division. It really didn't affect the battle for the beaches at all; if anything the Rangers needed to be rescued.

=======

The quality of "attacks what they are told to attack" is not unique to suicide troops

Soldiers are meant to follow orders. But following orders without regard for the consequences or the actual operational situation is again not the action of a competent military. Much less an elite army. It's Warhammer 40K "Send in the next wave!" thinking.

This is why the German army put so much emphasis on officers with the "operativ" quality - which are officers who can follow orders to follow a strategic direction but understand they must be adapted to actual tactical conditions.

Again, if you're going to judge units by their ability to follow orders no matter how stupid, then the IJA wins hands down for all the Banzai charges.

Moreover, notice one thing in common with all of the successful "commando" and Ranger ops? They were either 1) Very lucky (like in Omaha, where they landed away from the big guns), or 2) They spent an enormous amount of time on prep work and cooperated closely with on-ground assets in order to gather intelligence (i.e. Cabanatuan).

They did none of this at PDH. Hell, they were so stupid they proceeded with the assault even though they knew the guns weren't there despite having the option not to!

But naaaah... mythology and "daring" assaults are more important than military competence. The lesson of PDH for the Rangers isn't "Look before you leap". Which is why Rangers still apparently force their present-day candidates to re-enact the grappling hook assault (which hasn't been used again ever) instead of having the importance of recon and intel pressed on their heads.

But the second question is still: did the Rangers have a real choice in the matter?

They did. There was a discretionary option to land at Omaha instead. Plan A was to land most of 2 battalions at PDH. Plan B was to land the two battalions at Omaha. I have literally mentioned this four times already.

What happened was that they went with Plan A (despite knowing the guns weren't there), but got the wrong signal from the PDH landing group and switched mid-stream to Plan B. Which turned out to have been the "correct" decision all along.

Again: This was NOT some General telling the Rangers "take PDH at all costs!". That is why the discretionary option to go to OMaha instead existed. As Skimmer said it wasn't a target that absolutely needed to be taken by Rangers - it could have been taken out by naval or air bombardment (it was very exposed). It was less than one day's march from the beaches and was in fact really "captured" by the 29th Division (largely because 3 companies can't hold jackshit against an enemy battalion)

Now, yes a relatively senior officer should be making a judgment call here. But if he is replaced

Again, because you cannot get it through your head despite it being mentioned FOUR time already:

The decision to replace the PDH assault commander (for saying "this is stupid! We know the guns aren't there!") wasn't made by any General.

It was made by Colonel Rudder. The guy who was actually leading the two battalions!

Every mistake made in the chain of events leading to this fiasco (which Ranger propaganda has turned into a "victory against daring odds" ever since) was made within the Rangers, by the Rangers, without any input from high command.

Nobody forced the Rangers to attack PDH except the Rangers themselves.

========

Had it told them they were not there?

The story's been muddled over the years. The reality is that there were no guns AT ALL at PDH. The naval guns that were supposedly there were telephone poles. The French resistance reported this.

However, the Rangers lucked out and encountered a battery of unmanned 88s and destroyed it. And the Rangers ever since have been claiming they destroyed the guns which had been "moved inland".

========

Yes, and you might want to double-check the record instead of cherrypicking isolated combats fifty years apart.

Yes, and you may want to note that the Rangers haven't exactly pulled off anything except "getting themselves into a fiasco where a larger unit had to extricate them" in almost every fight they got into since WW2.

I just don't think it's very relevant to say "a lot of them died fighting as assault troops, therefore they are inferior."

That's not my only point. My first point is that they overblew their own reputation (which is succeeding given you think they actually accomplished anything of note at PDH, when it did almost nothing to help Omaha. The Brecourt Manor assault was far more relevant).

My second point is that their performance was marginal, which it is considering they're supposed to be the US version of the Commandos (And again, the big difference? Commandos actually look before they leap). They have nothing that matches what the Commandos did at Operation Chariot. Hell, they don't even have anything that matches what the Airborne did at Brecourt ("We learned early on that heroics didn't get the job done, and that getting the job done was more important").

It is only my third point that they get wiped out in every single battle they fought in. Skimmer points out because it's because they were employed as infantry without heavy weapons - fair enough - but that still doesn't change their overblown reputation and marginal record; or that they actually aren't that much better than line infantry units when faced with actual heavy weapons.

[Spoonist]

This is too thick headed to enter properly but, why? Just why?
I think that all can agree that the rangers then and now are special but not elite as per the OP.
However Z you are really making a mess of arguing why that should be so when it really should be simple.

Your points in just a simple sweep.
1 - overblown reputation = true for all special units, especially so in patroitic countries, its part of the recruiting process, doesn't mean diddlysquat whether or not they are elite as per the OP.
2 - They were modeled after the british commandos but were never used for what the commandos did best ie raids (in the euro theater) of course they wont compare. The brits had three years of war experience when they formed theirs, they used them for sabotage and their upper leadership recognized when to use such a resource. ie they saw a need, filled the specs and utilitzed it, the US just said lets copy&paste that without understanding the need in the first place. The US failed their rangers on all accounts in europe. (With the exception of the 6th in the pacific theater, for instance Cabanatuan)
3 - As per the OP, of course they are overblown see 1. But you are simply wrong on the not better than ordinary infantry. The average rangers unit was more cohesive after losses than the average infantry unit. They had better training, it is that simple.
Yes, it was stupid to use light infantry vs heavy installations, there is no element of suprise in a frontal assault. But that also means diddlysquat in the context of the OP.

The "operativ" thingie is flawed as well as Hitler and the nazis stomped that out whenever possible. By barbarossa such leeway was almost gone and most things had to go through the leadership for approval.This because their stupid ideology said that top down management is a good thing.

[thejester]

As it also points out, the cliff was sheltering them from enemy fire, and as this landing was the extreme right flank of the beach they wouldn't have faced the worst of the mortar and artillery concentrations either, nor the direct fire from German 75mm casemates further east. Not to mention the German defenses had more depth in the center. Doubtful they've have looked any better then anyone else if they'd be thrust into the dead center of the force.

Not sure what you mean by the 'dead center of the force'. Yes, Company C was on the right flank but that was still directly opposite the Vierville defences:

Perhaps the worst area on the beach was Dog Green, directly in front of strongpoints guarding the Vierville draw and under heavy flanking fire from emplacements to the west, near Pointe de la Percee. Company A of the 116th was due to land on this sector with Company C of the 2d Rangers on its right flank, and both units came in on their targets...The smaller Ranger company (64 men), carried in two LCA's, came in at H+15 minutes to the right of Vierville draw. Shells from an antitank gun bracketed Capt. Ralph E. Goranson's craft, killing a dozen men and shaking up others. An enemy machine gun ranged in on the ramps of the second LCA and hit 15 Rangers as they debarked. Without waiting to organize, survivors of the boat sections set out immediately across 250 yards of sand toward the base of the cliff. Too tired to run, the men took three or four minutes to get there, and more casualties resulted from machine guns and mortars. Wounded men crawled behind them, and a few made it. When the Rangers got to shelter at the base of the cliff, they had lost 35 men.

Other companies across the beach either experienced similar casualties (ie half to two thirds) crossing the sand or were significantly better off (elements of Company G, Company L). The difference is that despite the casualties the Rangers retained unit cohesiveness and moved off almost immediately - which would seem to be a logical extension of their training and selection criteria.

[Zinegata]

As it also points out, the cliff was sheltering them from enemy fire, and as this landing was the extreme right flank of the beach they wouldn't have faced the worst of the mortar and artillery concentrations either, nor the direct fire from German 75mm casemates further east. Not to mention the German defenses had more depth in the center. Doubtful they've have looked any better then anyone else if they'd be thrust into the dead center of the force.

Not sure what you mean by the 'dead center of the force'.

Company A of the 116th (29th Division) essentially suffered 100% losses the moment they stepped off the landing craft, which is more or less "dead center" of the assault. Nobody is gonna get up from that. Not even the Rangers.

Moreover, while I don't have the exact figures for the rest of the assaulting troops, getting 50-75% losses wasn't uncommon for the other non-Ranger assault units at Omaha too, and the Rangers weren't the only ones to breakthrough the defenses. The main determinant of whether you broke through at Omaha or not really stemmed more on whether you got lucky and landed in a more lightly defended part of the beach - not motivation or physical conditioning - because it really was a battering ram assault.

======

2 - They were modeled after the british commandos but were never used for what the commandos did best ie raids (in the euro theater) of course they wont compare. The brits had three years of war experience when they formed theirs, they used them for sabotage and their upper leadership recognized when to use such a resource. ie they saw a need, filled the specs and utilitzed it, the US just said lets copy&paste that without understanding the need in the first place. The US failed their rangers on all accounts in europe. (With the exception of the 6th in the pacific theater, for instance Cabanatuan)

And yet again I've never really seen the Rangers learn from their mistakes. Contrast with the Airborne - the Normandy drop was a mess, but the next one (Market-Garden) went off perfectly and incorporated all the lessons learned from Normandy.

You can sure try to excuse the Rangers by saying the Commandos had three years worth of experience (even though a lot of Commando succeses came much earlier); but it's worth noting that most German Generals draw a sharp contrast between the ability of American units (even regular line infantry) to learn much faster than their British counterparts.

But you are simply wrong on the not better than ordinary infantry. The average rangers unit was more cohesive after losses than the average infantry unit. They had better training, it is that simple.

Again, great physical conditioning is not being denied. Courage is not being denied. What's being questioned is how all of these positive qualities are squandered due to lack of effective leadership not just by the higher-ups, but also by the unit commanders themselves. You can certainly blame Eisenhower for using the Rangers as infantry. But the Rangers only have themselves to blame for the Pointe Du Hoc debacle.

[thejester]

As it also points out, the cliff was sheltering them from enemy fire, and as this landing was the extreme right flank of the beach they wouldn't have faced the worst of the mortar and artillery concentrations either, nor the direct fire from German 75mm casemates further east. Not to mention the German defenses had more depth in the center. Doubtful they've have looked any better then anyone else if they'd be thrust into the dead center of the force.

Not sure what you mean by the 'dead center of the force'.

Company A of the 116th (29th Division) essentially suffered 100% losses the moment they stepped off the landing craft, which is more or less "dead center" of the assault. Nobody is gonna get up from that. Not even the Rangers.

Moreover, while I don't have the exact figures for the rest of the assaulting troops, getting 50-75% losses wasn't uncommon for the other non-Ranger assault units at Omaha too, and the Rangers weren't the only ones to breakthrough the defenses. The main determinant of whether you broke through at Omaha or not really stemmed more on whether you got lucky and landed in a more lightly defended part of the beach - not motivation or physical conditioning - because it really was a battering ram assault.

For starters, Company A did not take 100% casualties straight out of the gate. It's generally accepted that it took around 60-70% casualties in the act of landing and crossing the sand. At this point I'm basically repeating not only myself but Omaha Beachhead, which I've linked to repeatedly. Company C landed next to Company A and was subject to fire from the same defences as Company A. One of the reasons the Rangers took less casualties is unlike Company A most of the unit pushed hard for the cliff rather than seek shelter amongst the obstacles and coming in with the tide. The ability to move through weapons fire rather than getting pinned is an obvious example of the Rangers being elite - reflecting the pre-existing aptitude of those selected and their training. Teaching infantry to move hard through fire was a major problem for the US Army in the ETO (see Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, pp. 256-257).

Secondly, yes other units pushed into the defences - obviously, for Company C's actions pretty quickly became bogged down and were not in themselves decisive. But the big pushes off the beach by organised units were accomplished by those companies of the 16th and 116th (and the entire 5th Ranger Battalion) that had landed in the second wave and were relatively unharmed. As far as I can tell the survivors of Company C were the only unit that kept integrity from the first wave in the face of punishing casualties, and pushed off the beach.

I'm not even sure what were arguing about, TBH. I don't disagree that no unit, no matter how elite, can dodge bullets or exploding shells - something that seems to be lost in portrayals of elite forces. But that equally demonstrates that casualties as a measurement of a unit's elite status is stupid. The Rangers were selected and trained to be better than line US units (ie elite) and it showed in their cohesiveness under fire on Omaha.

[Spoonist]

Again, why? Just why?
You having a personal beef with the rangers is one thing, but why do you want to drag the rest of the topic down with you?

Moreover, while I don't have the exact figures for the rest of the assaulting troops, getting 50-75% losses wasn't uncommon for the other non-Ranger assault units at Omaha too, and the Rangers weren't the only ones to breakthrough the defenses.

Again, diddlysquat. Whether or not someone else broke through means nothing. The only thing would be if rangers, line infantry, or whatever performed consistently better in the line of fire. Its a relative comparison, without a baseline you are just projecting your own bias.

The main determinant of whether you broke through at Omaha or not really stemmed more on whether you got lucky and landed in a more lightly defended part of the beach - not motivation or physical conditioning - because it really was a battering ram assault.

Are you really arguing that better training/selection and lighter equipment meant nothing in the face of fire? That is one big assumption that is not consistent with the data. If you are not arguing that then your above statement makes no sense.
If people from antiquity onwards could have sayings like "luck favors the prepared" how come you don't agree?

2 - They were modeled after the british commandos but were never used for what the commandos did best ie raids (in the euro theater) of course they wont compare. The brits had three years of war experience when they formed theirs, they used them for sabotage and their upper leadership recognized when to use such a resource. ie they saw a need, filled the specs and utilitzed it, the US just said lets copy&paste that without understanding the need in the first place. The US failed their rangers on all accounts in europe. (With the exception of the 6th in the pacific theater, for instance Cabanatuan)

And yet again I've never really seen the Rangers learn from their mistakes. Contrast with the Airborne - the Normandy drop was a mess, but the next one (Market-Garden) went off perfectly and incorporated all the lessons learned from Normandy.

You are missing it, aren't you?
Lets reverse this thought process. In your opinion, why was the rangers in the euro theater not used in the same manner as their template the british commandos? Idiocy is not a valid answer, while "don't know" is. A hint lies in why the 6th were successful were the rest wasn't.

The brits had three years of war experience when they formed theirs

You can sure try to excuse the Rangers by saying the Commandos had three years worth of experience (even though a lot of Commando succeses came much earlier);

Earlier?
You must have misunderstood what I was saying.
War started in 39. The rangers formed in 1942. Hence three years of war experience.
If you wanted to know how much war experience the brits had when forming the commandos that is 1 year as the British commandos formed ruffly at the same time as Dunkirk.
If you wanted to know how long the commandos had operated when the rangers formed, then that is 2 years.
Here is a FunQ4U, how many british commandos was involved in training the american rangers?

but it's worth noting that most German Generals draw a sharp contrast between the ability of American units (even regular line infantry) to learn much faster than their British counterparts.

Cite please. I'm curious of the context. But are you really using that as proof of rangers=dumb? That german generals thought they adapted faster than brits, while you think that the rangers didn't adapt?
What happened, did a ranger take your girlfriend?

But you are simply wrong on the not better than ordinary infantry. The average rangers unit was more cohesive after losses than the average infantry unit. They had better training, it is that simple.

Again, great physical conditioning is not being denied. Courage is not being denied. What's being questioned is how all of these positive qualities are squandered due to lack of effective leadership not just by the higher-ups, but also by the unit commanders themselves. You can certainly blame Eisenhower for using the Rangers as infantry. But the Rangers only have themselves to blame for the Pointe Du Hoc debacle.

So when you said "that they actually aren't that much better than line infantry" you actually meant something completely different? Come on. You are just making emotional arguments without any rational reasoning behind it.
This had zilch relevance as a counter argument vs what I said. You are just using your arguments in a circle.

I'd disagree with The Jester on the elite thing as per the OP as there were better units, but we'd be arguing about difference in greyscale. With you on this topic it's only black or white. Its tedious and of little worth.

[Zinegata]

thejester->

I invite you to read some of the firsthand accounts of A Company here:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2 ... magazine37

A Company was taking fire even before it landed, causing casualties and destroying landing craft. Its men were often trying to swim to shore even before they could think of running towards the shingle. This is not an issue of soldiers needing motivation to get to cover. This was simply men dying because the defenses in that sector were too strong.

Courage and physical conditioning amount for very little when you're wading (and sometimes swimming) to the beach while under 75mm fire. It was essentially rendered combat-ineffective before it could even fight.

Secondly, looking through some accounts it seems the Rangers weren't even in the first wave alongside A Company. They landed a little later, after the 116th had already cleared some of the defenses. In particular, C Company of the 116th had apparently already gotten off the beach and taken out some of the defenses where most of the Rangers were landing, and they were the first organized unit off the beach (not the Rangers).

Hence, pretending that C Company of the Rangers was subject to the same kind of fire as A Company (116th) is therefore highly suspect; and it was certainly NOT the experience of most of the rest of the Ranger companies who were already landing on beaches whose defenses had been partially cleared by the 116th already. Moreover, it ignores the fact that other non-Ranger assault units went through similar losses and cracked the defenses anyway.

My main point is that Omaha was a battering ram assault. If you encounted heavy defenses, you died no matter how eager or well-conditioned you are simply because none of that matters in the face of artillery shooting directly at you. The Rangers were honestly just more bodies at Omaha and their success there owed more to luck (landing in an area already partly cleared with less defenses).

Could the Rangers have been employed better? Yes, and for those you need to point at Cabanatuan and Merrill. But the mythology of the Rangers derives its reputation largely from Omaha / Pointe Du Hoc, which are again in reality both riddled with mistakes of their own making which points poorly to their ability to objectively evaluate their own abilities.

========

You having a personal beef with the rangers is one thing, but why do you want to drag the rest of the topic down with you?

I really have no idea what you're getting at now. It's bad to point out Rangers make MAJOR mistakes in their most celebrated operation (Pointe Du Hoc is rightly classified as an intelligence fuck up at best) in support of the argument that they tried to overblow their own reputation - which you don't disagree with anyway?

Really, who's the one being pointless now?

It's boiling down to this: Everyone is saying (including me) that high command wasted a lot of good and eager soldiers with the Rangers, because they didn't know what the Rangers were good for.

I'm also pointing out though that the officers of the unit itself (with some exceptions) were just as guilty of this and therefore you can't lay all the blame on Bradley, Eisenhower, et all. It had leadership issues within the unit itself.

But no, sure, keep pretending it's just a personal beef.

Earlier?
You must have misunderstood what I was saying.
War started in 39. The rangers formed in 1942. Hence three years of war experience.

The first big Commando success was in March of '41 in Norway. The Commandos were scoring successes after just 2 years since the war started. It didn't take "three years of war experience" for the Commandos to become successful. Hell, given the Rangers were fighting in '43, they ought to have had the whole "experience" thing done and over with by 1944.

So again, really, fuck off with the "OHOHOHOHOH I know so much better than you". If you want to make the argument about the 6th Rangers being better for a specific reason, don't speak in riddles and speak plainly (and if the answer doesn't include "Because most of the fighting was done by Filipino guerillas, who provides over twice the number of men the Rangers did for Cabanatuan" I will not be impressed).

[thejester]

thejester->

I invite you to read some of the firsthand accounts of A Company here:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2 ... magazine37

A Company was taking fire even before it landed, causing casualties and destroying landing craft. Its men were often trying to swim to shore even before they could think of running towards the shingle. This is not an issue of soldiers needing motivation to get to cover. This was simply men dying because the defenses in that sector were too strong.

Courage and physical conditioning amount for very little when you're wading (and sometimes swimming) to the beach while under 75mm fire. It was essentially rendered combat-ineffective before it could even fight.

Secondly, looking through some accounts it seems the Rangers weren't even in the first wave alongside A Company. They landed a little later, after the 116th had already cleared some of the defenses. In particular, C Company of the 116th had apparently already gotten off the beach and taken out some of the defenses where most of the Rangers were landing, and they were the first organized unit off the beach (not the Rangers).

Hence, pretending that C Company of the Rangers was subject to the same kind of fire as A Company (116th) is therefore highly suspect; and it was certainly NOT the experience of most of the rest of the Ranger companies who were already landing on beaches whose defenses had been partially cleared by the 116th already. Moreover, it ignores the fact that other non-Ranger assault units went through similar losses and cracked the defenses anyway.

My main point is that Omaha was a battering ram assault. If you encounted heavy defenses, you died no matter how eager or well-conditioned you are simply because none of that matters in the face of artillery shooting directly at you. The Rangers were honestly just more bodies at Omaha and their success there owed more to luck (landing in an area already partly cleared with less defenses).

Could the Rangers have been employed better? Yes, and for those you need to point at Cabanatuan and Merrill. But the mythology of the Rangers derives its reputation largely from Omaha / Pointe Du Hoc, which are again in reality both riddled with mistakes of their own making which points poorly to their ability to objectively evaluate their own abilities.

Fuck me dead, you are either illiterate or extraordinarily stupid or quite possibly both. This is what I wrote on the previous page:

It's not hard to say at all. Company C 2d Rangers landed next to Company A of the 116th on the edge of Dog Green (facing the Vierville exit) and lost more than half it's strength (34 out of 65) crossing the beach. Unlike other units on the beach, they immediately rallied and began to move out - specifically by climbing up a cliff face. The Official History records that Company C 'was probably the first assault unit to reach the high ground (beach sector Charlie)'.

Beyond that, it does get more difficult because Ranger units either became intermingled with with the remnants of the 116th on Dog Green (Companies A and B of the 2d) or came in intact (as the 5th did) almost totally intact. In general, the Rangers displayed more cohesiveness than their line counterparts and more initiative in getting off the beach. Which is an obvious product of their superior training and selection process.

Thank you for bringing your argument full circle. Yes, other Ranger units - two other companies of the 2d and the entirety of the 5th - landed essentially intact behind elements of the 116th. Company C did not. If you had bothered to read what I quoted to you in the previous post, or had looked at a map of the landing, you'll note that Company C's boats came in alongside those of Company A. Quoting the official history yet again:

Perhaps the worst area on the beach was Dog Green, directly in front of strongpoints guarding the Vierville draw and under heavy flanking fire from emplacements to the west, near Pointe de la Percee. Company A of the 116th was due to land on this sector with Company C of the 2d Rangers on its right flank, and both units came in on their targets. One of the six LCA's carrying Company A foundered about a thousand yards o shore, and passing Rangers saw men jumping overboard and being dragged down by their loads. At H+6 minutes the remaining craft grounded in water 4 to 6 feet deep, about 30 yards short of the outward band of obstacles. Starting off the craft in three files, center file first and the flank files peeling right and left, the men were enveloped in accurate and intense fire from automatic weapons. Order was quickly lost as the troops attempted to dive under water or dropped over the sides into surf over their heads. Mortar fire scored four direct hits on one LCA, which "disintegrated." Casualties were suffered all the way to the sand, but when the survivors got there, some found they could not hold and came back into the water for cover, while others took refuge behind the nearest obstacles. Remnants of one boat team on the right flank organized a small firing line on the first yards of sand, in full exposure to the enemy. In short order every officer of the company, including Capt. Taylor N. Fellers, was a casualty, and most of the sergeants were killed or wounded. The leaderless men gave up any attempt to move forward and confined their efforts to saving the wounded, many of whom drowned in the rising tide. Some troops were later able to make the sea wall by staying in the edge of the water and going up the beach with the tide. Fifteen minutes after landing, Company A was out of action for the day. Estimates of its casualties range as high as twothirds.

The smaller Ranger company (64 men), carried in two LCA's, came in at H+15 minutes to the right of Vierville draw. Shells from an antitank gun bracketed Capt. Ralph E. Goranson's craft, killing a dozen men and shaking up others. An enemy machine gun ranged in on the ramps of the second LCA and hit 15 Rangers as they debarked. Without waiting to organize, survivors of the boat sections set out immediately across 250 yards of sand toward the base of the cliff. Too tired to run, the men took three or four minutes to get there, and more casualties resulted from machine guns and mortars. Wounded men crawled behind them, and a few made it. When the Rangers got to shelter at the base of the cliff, they had lost 35 men..

So in summation, not only did the Rangers come in alongside Company A, they also came under direct fire from German anti-tank guns and machine-gun fire while still in the boats. Unlike Company A, they were able to continue functioning as a unit - precisely because they had the training and the fortitude to push off the beach immediately.

As to your other points - I seriously cannot be fucked rebutting them again, and I'm not sure I see the point anyway. If you read the OH, or detailed oral testimonies like those found in Ambrose's D-Day, you will note that the formations that cracked the defences did not take anywhere near the casualties of units like Company A, that your characterisation of the assault as a 'battering ram' is totally false, and that Company C clearly demonstrated greater cohesiveness, discipline and initiative under fire than other units in the first wave despite 50% casualties. But so far you've proved totally resistant to doing so and that's probably not going to change.

[Spoonist]

You having a personal beef with the rangers is one thing, but why do you want to drag the rest of the topic down with you?

I really have no idea what you're getting at now. It's bad to point out Rangers make MAJOR mistakes in their most celebrated operation (Pointe Du Hoc is rightly classified as an intelligence fuck up at best) in support of the argument that they tried to overblow their own reputation - which you don't disagree with anyway?

Really, who's the one being pointless now?

It's boiling down to this: Everyone is saying (including me) that high command wasted a lot of good and eager soldiers with the Rangers, because they didn't know what the Rangers were good for.

I'm also pointing out though that the officers of the unit itself (with some exceptions) were just as guilty of this and therefore you can't lay all the blame on Bradley, Eisenhower, et all. It had leadership issues within the unit itself.

But no, sure, keep pretending it's just a personal beef.

This is tiresome. I already told you, this should be easy but you are making a spectactle of it by bad arguments.
Yes its a bad argument to say that they are exaggerating their own accomplishment. Because it has NOTHING ZILCH NADA to do with them being elite or not as per the OP. That is just your pet peeve.
So you pointing out that their propaganda is claiming that Pointe Du Hoc was a success when you personally think it should be seen as a failure also means NOTHING ZILCH NADA. We are not looking at bragging rights here.
Pointing out specifc mistakes also means NOTHING ZILCH NADA, unless you compare it to a baseline. Where is that baseline in your argument?

A good argument would be a positive argument for the british commandos in WWII to be elite as per the OP because of their track record when compared to other units like the american rangers. Thus infering that the rangers wasn't elite by a clearly defined baseline. That could have resulted in a productive dialog. Your weak attempt at goalshifting vs not better than line infantry is counter-productive. See how that works out?
So if I could in one sentance make a better argument for your side than your whole deranged shitfest, then yes you are making pretty pointless arguments.

Earlier?
You must have misunderstood what I was saying.
War started in 39. The rangers formed in 1942. Hence three years of war experience.

The first big Commando success was in March of '41 in Norway. The Commandos were scoring successes after just 2 years since the war started. It didn't take "three years of war experience" for the Commandos to become successful. Hell, given the Rangers were fighting in '43, they ought to have had the whole "experience" thing done and over with by 1944.

So again, really, fuck off with the "OHOHOHOHOH I know so much better than you". If you want to make the argument about the 6th Rangers being better for a specific reason, don't speak in riddles and speak plainly (and if the answer doesn't include "Because most of the fighting was done by Filipino guerillas, who provides over twice the number of men the Rangers did for Cabanatuan" I will not be impressed).

Now you are just being an ass. This isn't N&P or SLAM, this is history. I already pointed out that there must have been a misunderstanding.

Then snipping out large parts of what I said to make it look like I said something different is just plain stupid. Quoting properly isn't hard. Here is what I said:

Earlier?
You must have misunderstood what I was saying.
War started in 39. The rangers formed in 1942. Hence three years of war experience.
If you wanted to know how much war experience the brits had when forming the commandos that is 1 year as the British commandos formed ruffly at the same time as Dunkirk.
If you wanted to know how long the commandos had operated when the rangers formed, then that is 2 years.
Here is a FunQ4U, how many british commandos was involved in training the american rangers?

So how the fuck do you think you would get away with snipping out "If you wanted to know how much war experience the brits had when forming the commandos that is 1 year as the British commandos formed ruffly at the same time as Dunkirk." and then repeat what I already had said in other words so that you can say it again?
Fuck your attempt at egosaving. What do you think you are accomplishing?

Then ignoring direct questions or WHEN I ASKED FOR A CITE, that's just lame.

So let me be specific in accordance with the board rules I hereby demand that you give me a cite for "but it's worth noting that most German Generals draw a sharp contrast between the ability of American units (even regular line infantry) to learn much faster than their British counterparts." and please could you even try to come up with a reason why that would even register as relevant to your argument?

Again I ask why? Why cherrypick my response? Why the attempt at ego saving? You are just making it worse by repeating what has already been said as if it becomes more relevant the second time around.

Then what's up with the "know better" comment? It's ironic that after trying to lecture four different posters you try to shift this to me. You behave like you kow better, THAT is why you are being shot down, because it doesn't hold up. Like, when I ask you "why was the rangers in the euro theater not used in the same manner as their template the british commandos?" by not being able to answer that you show that you don't know the reason behind the exact thing that you are criticising them for. That kinda undermines your whole argument don't you think?

[PainRack]

Frankly, I think Zinegata is confusing the definition of elite and shock troops. Elite simply refers to a military unit being "better", designated as the cream of the crop at its role. It doesn't prevent elite forces from remaining as shock troops.

[Zinegata]

This is tiresome. I already told you, this should be easy but you are making a spectactle of it by bad arguments.
Yes its a bad argument to say that they are exaggerating their own accomplishment. Because it has NOTHING ZILCH NADA to do with them being elite or not as per the OP. That is just your pet peeve.

Oh I see. It is okay to say "The SS exaggerated their own eliteness because of their political connections" (one of the OP's argument) and it's not okay to say "Some units do that themselves too!"

But hey, keep on screaming like a blithering idiot.

A good argument would be a positive argument for the british commandos in WWII to be elite as per the OP because of their track record when compared to other units like the american rangers.

Which I did thanks to Thanas' guidance. Wherein I noted British Commandos had far more successes, such as Operation Chariot.

Did you contest this? No. You just went on some unrelated tanged about Commando training without bothering to be specific.

Now you are just being an ass. This isn't N&P or SLAM, this is history. I already pointed out that there must have been a misunderstanding.

If it was a misunderstanding, you aren't doing anything to fix it. Instead, what you're doing is this:

Fuck your attempt at egosaving. What do you think you are accomplishing?

So no, you know what? Fuck off and look for some other chew toy. I've had enough of people claiming to be high-and mighty with their attempts to "clarify" when all their really waiting on is for an excuse to go "Haha! Look at the egosaver!"

Who fucking cares?

BTW...

Then ignoring direct questions or WHEN I ASKED FOR A CITE, that's just lame.

Actually, I missed you asking for a citation. Sorry, but when you do the quote-post-thing sometimes parts get missed.

I'll look for the specific book wherein I read that, but I believe it was Bayerlein (from an Ambrose book) who was quoted as saying "You (The Americans) profitted much more from your experiences than the British".

=====

Thank you for bringing your argument full circle.

Fuck off too, find your own new chew toy. Nobody gives a shit about what Company C Rangers did, because they didn't actually fucking land where Company A 116th did. "Next to Company A" is not "Where Company A is"

Did Company C get shot up even before they landed? No mention. No acknowledgement. No, you just repeat the same thing you said - Company C did awesome despite 50%+ losses (ignoring other units on the beach suffered the same), but "they maintained cohesiveness better!" (also ignoring how C Company 116th was the first cohesive unit of the beach.).

And yet you accuse me of going full circle with my argument? Again, fuck off with the ad-hominem.

[Zinegata]

Frankly, I think Zinegata is confusing the definition of elite and shock troops. Elite simply refers to a military unit being "better", designated as the cream of the crop at its role. It doesn't prevent elite forces from remaining as shock troops.

I'm really just going to restate what I said:

The point is that you cannot pretend that the quality of individual soldiers alone dictates the quality of the unit. Rangers can all be body builders with bulging biceps, but if their Sergeants, Captains, and Colonels (who are all part of the unit, so they can't blame some nebulous higher-ups) are incompetent then it's not the Army's problem. It's not the General's problem. It's the problem with the "elite" unit itself.

Again, what you are describing are essential qualities of shock units, or suicide units, but not elite units. If eliteness stemmed purely from a unit's ability to endure suffering (and mainly by its troops), then again the entire IJA should be classified as "elite" despite the gross incompetence of its leadership for ordering all of those Banzai Charges.

And...

Soldiers are meant to follow orders. But following orders without regard for the consequences or the actual operational situation is again not the action of a competent military. Much less an elite army. It's Warhammer 40K "Send in the next wave!" thinking.

This is why the German army put so much emphasis on officers with the "operativ" quality - which are officers who can follow orders to follow a strategic direction but understand they must be adapted to actual tactical conditions.

Again, if you're going to judge units by their ability to follow orders no matter how stupid, then the IJA wins hands down for all the Banzai charges.

Can "shock troops" be elite? Sure, see Merill's Marauders. My point though is that what's more important is sound leadership. Good troops are wasted with bad leaders. A unit with good troops but bad leaders are not "elite" because the bad leadership invalidates troop quality. Hell, I preceded all of the above with the quote "There are no bad regiments, only bad regimental commanders!"

Which I think is an insanely easy point to grasp. But frankly I'm really tired of even trying when it's all apparently just "Ranger bashing".

[Zinegata]

Did Company C get shot up even before they landed? No mention. No acknowledgement.

I withdraw this statement as being typed in the heat of the moment and for being erroneous.

I was supposed to say "Did Compay C actually get shot up as badly?". thejester did at least talk about how C Company got some casualties before landing.

But point remains of how C Company's experience is not the same as A Company - particularly how A Company had lost all of its officers.

[PainRack]

Can "shock troops" be elite? Sure, see Merill's Marauders. My point though is that what's more important is sound leadership. Good troops are wasted with bad leaders. A unit with good troops but bad leaders are not "elite" because the bad leadership invalidates troop quality. Hell, I preceded all of the above with the quote "There are no bad regiments, only bad regimental commanders!"

Which I think is an insanely easy point to grasp. But frankly I'm really tired of even trying when it's all apparently just "Ranger bashing".

Merill's Marauders aren't shock troops.

You're getting hit for Ranger Bashing because your points aren't really coherent. It really boils down to you having a different definition of elite than the rest of us. The US Army Rangers were "elite", in the sense that they had better training, performed better as shock troops than the regular infantry and had a selection process that gave t hem soldiers that were fitter than normal.


You could argue that they aren't as good as other elite formations, but that's not how you parsed your argument. You seem to want to say they don't befit their status as elite, because of DPH and other failings.

[Simon_Jester]

Does anyone still have any desire to talk about ANY elite unit in the history of civilization EXCEPT the US Army Rangers? Because this has gotten really tiresome, dull, and obtuse as a subject of conversation.

[Block]

Does anyone still have any desire to talk about ANY elite unit in the history of civilization EXCEPT the US Army Rangers? Because this has gotten really tiresome, dull, and obtuse as a subject of conversation.

Let's talk about E Company of the 506th PIR, those were some tough bastards.