The face of melee battles

[LaCroix]

The thing is you are assuming none of the enemies that the Romans faced used similar weapons. The Scutarii and the gladius were all weapons in use by the Iberian tribes. This does not support your view that the weapons used by the Romans were somehow more unique, nor can you justify that other tribes faced by the Romans were lacking in aggression because of the weapon they used.

And upon discovering these designs, Romans immediately adopted them, as they did fit their style. And most other tribes these days used primarily shieldwall&spear formations.

It is still an example of enemy lines not breaking upon contact with the Roman infantry. We are figuring out what happens when the lines did not break.

Conceded...

Um, long swords? I was under impression metallurgy to make good long sword was barely good enough in late Roman times, and then again a millennium later in late Dark Ages. Who exactly used a lot of long swords against Romans? Wasn't Roman Gladius simply the best that could have been economically given to common soldier?

Celtic long sword, for example? Used about everywhere north of Rome? Easily 50% longer than a Gladius, and the ancestor of the Spatha.

The Romans only started to adopt it in early/middle imperial time, when Gaulic/Celtic auxiliaries made them widely known, but they were produced since 500 BC.

And of course, it was a also price question - these things were much more expensive than a shorter Gladius, but the main point is that they are also absolutely ill-suited for fighting in a Roman formation.

[Thanas]

I don't have as much time to spend on this as I would like, but a few thoughts.

a) The use of bravery as laid out by LaCroix is only one part of the medaillon, so to speak. Yes, virtus denotes bravery, but Romans were not famous for their bravery. Nor did they overembellish it. Bravery in itself was found among many nations and the Romans certainly thought the Celts or Germans were brave. The argument to be derived from arena fighting however is pretty pointless and undermines the bravery argument as only defeated nations fought in the arena, but never Roman troops. Hence, if you want to extrapolate values from Arena fights you simply run into the problem that any values displayed in there would be non-Roman ones by design. Virtus also is not only bravery, but also keeping your word and a host of other attributes.

b) What set the Romans apart was discipline. Disciplina, a goddess regularly sacrificed to by commanders etc. Bravery without it turns into furor.

c) I don't think the Romans considered themselves any braver than other nations, for if they did, why did we never see any occurrence of the champion style of fighting, or emulating naked fighting as a mark of honor? Why do Roman stories not emphasize how a great warrior slaughtered many enemies but instead talk about Barbarian hordes descending on well-ordered Roman lines? (Yes, i know there are some occurences of single combat but these almost always happen due to a challenge by the barbarian/non-Roman party). Even the earliest inscriptions I know of do not talk about "I personally slaughtered XXXXX", instead it is "And I waged war on the XXXX and won many victories".

Also, comment on that Korean video - well trained unit. So well, in fact, I started to wonder if they are too well trained for ancient standards, or is there something I don't see.

I doubt any modern training matches the intensity and fierceness of Roman training.

Checkerboard formations seem both too dense (in full spots) and too light (in gaps) to be manoeuvrable, you can easily flank particular squares, and untangling square from combat without losing a lot of soldiers and morale is easier said than done, even with modern command techniques allowing all units to get order at the same time, much less with what ancients could use.

Tl/Dr - to me, in most depictions, "checkerboards" only seem to work well if enemy is perfectly willing to cooperate with you.

The same happens to everyone who tried the checkerboard formation in TW ( that includes me as well). The issue is we do have clear sources that describe the checkerboard formation to us, hence we know that such formation were used by the Romans.

We simply have to figure out how on earth would such a formation make sense. One method would be abandoning the combat model we saw in the Total war games, and see if the one created by others would make better sense.

The Romans were able to communicate individually with sub units through series of calls, signals (audio/visual) and having orderlies around.

Also, you are assuming the checkerboard formation allows units to be isolated. This is I do not understand.

Consider:
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -

You are not going to charge into these gaps. Why? If you do, the first line would take a few steps back and the second line would step up. if you had been charging into these gaps you are dead. Because the Roman square most likely than not would hold and the soldiers on the flanks would turn to the left or right and engage. Congrats, you just face attacks from the front left and right if you had been charging here.

Also, please note that most celtic armies lacked cohesion to attack a particular part of the line in the first place.

Um, long swords? I was under impression metallurgy to make good long sword was barely good enough in late Roman times, and then again a millennium later in late Dark Ages. Who exactly used a lot of long swords against Romans? Wasn't Roman Gladius simply the best that could have been economically given to common soldier?

Everybody except the Romans and Greeks used long swords. The gladius was used because it was good for fighting in close quarters, jammed together etc and do note that what you are referring to the longsword of today is an evolution of the Roman Spatha (cavalry long sword later on used by all armies) in the first place. If the Romans had wanted longswords they would have used them (and later on did).

Their military downfall, after a long phase of expansion, was due to the fact that they became too big. When they came under attack by multiple enemies, they simply lacked the numbers to be everywhere at once with suitably big armies. They needed to split up to cover huge fronts, and due to this, they needed to switch to lighter, more mobile infantry, and more defensive tactics. They also became less willing to accept casualties. You can see this quite well in the change of equipment. (This also led to the barbarization of the army. They needed manpower, and these imported troops fought the way they were used to.)

This is pretty much wrong and has been dealt with before on this board.

I would need some time to mine for quotes of Romans calling other tribes cowards, but I don't think that this isn't necessary, for the doctrine is obviously more agressive than others.

No, it is not. It clearly is not as aggressive as the celtic doctrine which needed a fight to win, nor is it as aggressive as German style of fighting, which too needs a main engagement to win. Roman Doctrine was quite flexible and allowed for the defeat of an enemy without a main engagement or any hand-to-hand engagement at all. Missile troops did the trick for the Romans - for example there are at least three battles against various foes (Germans, Celts and Parthians) which were decided by missile troops and javelin alone.

In fact, the Roman emphasis on well-armored troops suggest a clear importance of force retention (which only makes sense as the soldiers would be the ones voting for and against you, or were your clientele later on). The Roman approach in conquering territories by founding well-defended colonies also suggest that defenisve positions and force conservation was of much importance.

People using 20-22 inch swords need to be really agressive. You can't stand and wait until the spears and long swords of the enemy cut you apart.
Using javelins is the same - you use those to soften up a formation into which you advance immediately afterwards. It would be useless to throw them at people standing apart. They'd hide under their shields, and then rearrange the shield wall. you need to charge them at the same time you throw them, so they must decide wether to block the javelins or the charging enemy.

First of all, you assume that ancient shields would block a pilum. Most of them would not. And even if they did not penetrate, the pila would still cause the shields to be useless. Rearranging the formation is also hard in many formations like the Phalanx or spear walls when you are ony a few dozen meters apart, or when you are under further missile bombardement.

[Stark]

Did ray just use the success of a tactic in Total fucking War in a discussion about actual, non-playground warfare?

My mind is fucking BLOWN. Do people consider the TW games accurate in any way? Why?

Thanas, I'm interested in the idea that force retention was I portent due to the postwar use of soldiers. I understand spoil and land was a motivator at various points in history, but do you think this was a concern for the whole doctrine of the roman army? If individuals had a good chance of surviving and becoming established or rich, that could shape the whole culture of their military.

[Nephtys]

There's a lot of scholarly debate about how a lot of melee battles were fought. The exact system of roman formations in the republican era remains still somewhat ambiguous, as several sources have major gaps, or conflicts. And a few attempts to recreate similar formations during the rennisance resulted in very poor showings during their own edged weapon combats.

Even the greek hoplite way of warfare is disputed. The 'shield protecting the guy on your side shoulder to shoulder' model is an extrapolation, not directly from any period writer.

[ray245]

Did ray just use the success of a tactic in Total fucking War in a discussion about actual, non-playground warfare?

My mind is fucking BLOWN. Do people consider the TW games accurate in any way? Why?

Is anyone here actually arguing that the TW games are accurate battle model? I was pretty much arguing against the model depicted in TW.

[LaCroix]

I concede my argument about Roman aggressiveness in tactics. I obviously lack the verbal skill to bring my point across, or have no point, at all.

First of all, you assume that ancient shields would block a pilum. Most of them would not. And even if they did not penetrate, the pila would still cause the shields to be useless. Rearranging the formation is also hard in many formations like the Phalanx or spear walls when you are ony a few dozen meters apart, or when you are under further missile bombardement.

While not stopping a pilum, it will probably stop it from killing you outright. Given the choice, everyone will raise his shield in hope to deflect an incoming javelin.

That's what makes a javelin attack during the charge especially devastating. Even without actually hitting them, it will cause some of the combatants to open the shieldwall in order to protect themselves.

[Thanas]

I have read Sabin's piece and have one crucial objection to it. The crux of his argument is that he argues that Roman sources portray uneven casualties in battle and then uses that point as basis for his arguments.

The problems with that are quite clear - such Roman superiority can also be explained by other factors, both individually and on a more general level. Such as:
- superiority of equipment
- superiority of training
- picking the ground to fight
- superiority of medical staff and equipment
- superior tactics.
For example, I do not find it that unlikely that a disciplined force of Caesar veterans would take less casualties than the barbarian Gauls they would face.


That being said, I fully agree with his view on the psychological factors and the theory (also used by Goldsworthy) that sheer terror of cold steel was decisive. I think overall his piece is very convincing and worthy of high praise.

Thanas, I'm interested in the idea that force retention was I portent due to the postwar use of soldiers. I understand spoil and land was a motivator at various points in history, but do you think this was a concern for the whole doctrine of the roman army? If individuals had a good chance of surviving and becoming established or rich, that could shape the whole culture of their military.

This will be a pretty longwinded explanation, so be warned.

The Roman model to conquer and assimilate enemy peoples essentially consisted of several elements, the most important ones being the assimilation or supplantion of the enemy local aristocracy, the founding of colonies/cities and battlefield supremacy.

The last two were "invented" by the Romans during the Samnite wars, a series of conflicts from 343-293 which saw the Romans eventually gain control over much of middle lower italy. The Samnite wars are the most important factors in the development of what we call the Roman legion of the Republican era.

The Roman legion before the Samnite wars is generally thought of to have been a variation of Eastern Phalanx-style fighting (the degree of which it actually was Phalanx fighting is disputed and would take too much time to go into detail here). Suffice to say it was close order fighting with emphasis on shield and (non-throwing) spear. The Samnites on the other hand favored a throwing spear, large shields and swordfighting. Sound familiar? The reason for that is that the terrain of the region the Samnite tribes inhabited was very hilly, with the warfare having an emphasis on raiding and skirmishes based out of easily defended villages, which was clearly a superior model considering the terrain.

The Romans got their head bashed in a few times, suffering one of the harshest defeats until Hannibal at the Battle of the Claudine Forks, where the entire Roman army was starved out until they agreed to humiliate themselves under the yoke. It eventually dawned on them during the samnite wars that close order phalanx battle was not a good idea in mountaneous terrain and so they adapted the flexible manipular system we commonly associate with the legion.

However, the main problem still was how to hold on to the land. The Roman army would march out during the campaign season of spring/summer, find nothing to engage as the Samnites would withdraw, fight a few skirmishes and then get back in time for the harvest (recall that at this time there are no professional soldiers, these are all farmer soldiers). The samnites would then just move back in. So the Romans decided to found colonies in Samnite territories to get control of the land and establish a living population there. The army would march in, build a city (or occupy one) and then leave the "civilians" (soldiers with their families or slaves) behind to hold down the fort and serve as a base for subsequent operations. By this tactic they eventually starved the Samnites out and took their lands.

This then became the model to secure all Roman conquests. Either you had dependable allies and/or founded Roman cities populated by Veterans in the territories. These veteran colonies were quite simply a mixture between a city and a military fort rolled into one, inhabited by people who knew how to defend themselves (and who could also provide emergency manpower for an army campaigning in the area).

There is also the political aspect to consider. During Republican times army commanders had to defend their conduct before the assembly of the people (= the assembly where their soldiers would also attend and vote). Thus, not getting all your voters killed was important. Who would vote for somebody who had the reputation of getting his troops killed for nothing? In fact, commanders who acted unwisely (or were simply unlucky) could even be condemned to death, though this was nothing special to the Romans.

Getting rich postwar was also a real chance for soldier and several wars were fought by Rome precisely with that aim in mind. Veterans who settled in conquered territories got the best land and thus were quite well off - this changed in Imperial times in favor of simply getting money as land ran out and the Emperor did not want to offend conquered people in favor of assimilation into the Empire.

So, there you have the reason why force retention was quite simply a must for republican times.

I concede my argument about Roman aggressiveness in tactics. I obviously lack the verbal skill to bring my point across, or have no point, at all.

You do have a point, I just do not think the evidence is there to assume a Roman "sonderweg" when it comes to melee engagements. I do think that you are right in that the aggressive way of engaging in melee is more aggressive than that of most enemies but think discipline is more to thank for that than an innate Roman aggressiveness. And engaging in melee is just one way to win a battle.

While not stopping a pilum, it will probably stop it from killing you outright. Given the choice, everyone will raise his shield in hope to deflect an incoming javelin.

That's what makes a javelin attack during the charge especially devastating. Even without actually hitting them, it will cause some of the combatants to open the shieldwall in order to protect themselves.

True, but raising a shield is really only an option in armies like the celts. In the makedonian phalanx you have a very small shield and cannot raise it due to you having to grip your spear in both hands.

[ray245]

I have read Sabin's piece and have one crucial objection to it. The crux of his argument is that he argues that Roman sources portray uneven casualties in battle and then uses that point as basis for his arguments.

I thought his argument was that most winning side in a conflict did not exceed more than 5 percent causalities in general, and certain battles such as Cannae were exceptional to the rule? Although I do want to see him giving us more sources that argues the Romans suffered less than 5 percent of their men during battles.




Beside talking about the melee battles during the Roman Republican era, I think it would be interesting to discuss another debate brought up by Sabin in his opening, which is whether the Greek Phalanx fought in a Othismos manner (men packed into a shoving match) or fought in a individual one-on-one manner.

Some interesting articles concerning this debate can be found on JSTOR as well.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1192506
Othismos: The Importance of the Mass-Shove in Hoplite Warfare
Robert D. Luginbill

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25010823
The Nature of Hoplite Battle
Peter Krentz

http://www.xlegio.ru/pdfs/othismos.pdf
The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle
Adrian Goldsworthy

[Thanas]

I have read Sabin's piece and have one crucial objection to it. The crux of his argument is that he argues that Roman sources portray uneven casualties in battle and then uses that point as basis for his arguments.

I thought his argument was that most winning side in a conflict did not exceed more than 5 percent causalities in general, and certain battles such as Cannae were exceptional to the rule?

This is what I said?

The problem is there are more ways to achieve that result than necessarily fighting style.

As to the phalanx, I am not getting into that for professional reasons.

[Zinegata]

The last two were "invented" by the Romans during the Samnite wars

...

So, there you have the reason why force retention was quite simply a must for republican times.

Heh, glad to hear this. Been playing a game focused on this specific era of Roman history a lot (Sword of Rome - which also features the Samnites as a playable power), and the game models this exactly - Send in the Roman army, bash a tribe, then build a city using some of the army's troops. The only annoying thing is how battlefield success with little loss does not necessarily result in competent Consuls (i.e. Camilus) getting re-elected .

Also, since we're in this period of Roman history, didn't the Pyrrhic Wars follow the Samnite Wars (and the wars against the other Latin states), which led to further development and refinement of the Roman legions after facing Pyrrhus' forces?

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Going back to his point about phalangite warfare being so favoured because it kept you at a distance from direct melee combat, I also find a problem with that because in combat between two of the Diadochai that it would be impossible for their formations to see localized attacks and retreats... I.E., his theory could be true (but I don't think is) for the Romans, and perhaps for Alexander's army, but it certainly isn't for the 21-foot pikes of the Diadochai. They had to win by direct massed assaults on the lines. Look at the battle of Raphia, for instance, where it's quite clear that on textbook good ground that a mass advance of phalangite infantry settled the battle on a broad frontage. Likewise in early modern sources the term "push of pike" is rather explicit.

Rather, what I think was going on in such situations was that it was very hard to get enough speed up in your advance to drive the pikes through the enemy shields and armour. I.E., the lines marched toward each other at speeds not greater than a double-quick march in virtually all cases, and this was insufficient to force a pike through an enemy shield and armour on direct contact. So you had a situation where the men's bodies basically brought the enemy trying to push a pike into them to a halt without dying. Soon you functionally had a huge interlocked mass of pikes and armoured men shoving at each other, biting their heels down into the soil and pushing. A lot of the casualties in this phase of combat would have been trampling, often by your own side in the din and chaos and confusion, and not by fatal stab wounds. The disintegration of the front line then leads to the usual pursuit butchery which is well attested in archaeological digs of, for instance, renaissance battlefields. As an example of this, take a typical kitchen knife and try to just give yourself a pinprick cut with the tip somewhere safe like an arm, in a straight stabbing motion (straight down with the tip). You'll find that it is essentially impossible to do and you can massively depress your skin without breaking it. Now, hold that same blade a foot above your arm and thrust it down, and it might go clean through and at least hit a bone. Momentum matters, and if you don't have it, formation phalangites can push at each other in the push of pike for hours without a decision.

This resulted in an engagement like Raphia where largely equal groups of men likely killed about equal numbers (set equal to Ptolemaic casualties, which limited to infantry were perhaps a thousand slain at most) during the "push" phase -- and then another nine thousand during the pursuit phase. For one man out of sixty or seventy to be killed during this zero-momentum shoving and pushing phase seems quite plausible.

This brings up a problem with his analysis of Roman combat, too. The Romans fought the Diadochai and they defeated them. If the Diadochai are steadily advancing toward the Romans as they would against other armies of their own type, the Romans can't stand off and send in small groups intermittently. They will have to engage along the whole front--in much smaller groups that can take advantage of flanking maneouvres and broken terrain and formations dispersing on sustained advantages--but still basically they will be brought to battle simultaneously along the front, not in local short combats.

[Thanas]

Going back to his point about phalangite warfare being so favoured because it kept you at a distance from direct melee combat, I also find a problem with that because in combat between two of the Diadochai that it would be impossible for their formations to see localized attacks and retreats... I.E., his theory could be true (but I don't think is) for the Romans, and perhaps for Alexander's army, but it certainly isn't for the 21-foot pikes of the Diadochai. They had to win by direct massed assaults on the lines.

I would take issue with that mainly because there are many battles where the phalanx mainly acted as a large deterrent or held the enemy in place for the more mobile diadochi army elements like cavalry or the hypaspists, or missile elements like peltasts or psiloi to win the battle. Pyrrhus command of his army for once is a case study in which multiple army elements were used together to gain victory, not just the Phalanx. In the same case, while you reference Ralphia, it is important to note that in the decisive victory of the war, Panium, it is much more unclear what exactly happened there and what role - if any - the Phalanx played in it.

Rather, what I think was going on in such situations was that it was very hard to get enough speed up in your advance to drive the pikes through the enemy shields and armour. I.E., the lines marched toward each other at speeds not greater than a double-quick march in virtually all cases, and this was insufficient to force a pike through an enemy shield and armour on direct contact.

To be honest, I never saw anybody advocating they ran at each other.

This brings up a problem with his analysis of Roman combat, too. The Romans fought the Diadochai and they defeated them. If the Diadochai are steadily advancing toward the Romans as they would against other armies of their own type, the Romans can't stand off and send in small groups intermittently.

Why not?

They will have to engage along the whole front--in much smaller groups that can take advantage of flanking maneouvres and broken terrain and formations dispersing on sustained advantages--but still basically they will be brought to battle simultaneously along the front, not in local short combats.

I very much doubt that this is the case. For them to be brought to battle simultaneously assumes the Romans are unable to exploit the terrain, when in fact we know that during the battles with Macedon they did that exactly.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

I would take issue with that mainly because there are many battles where the phalanx mainly acted as a large deterrent or held the enemy in place for the more mobile diadochi army elements like cavalry or the hypaspists, or missile elements like peltasts or psiloi to win the battle. Pyrrhus command of his army for once is a case study in which multiple army elements were used together to gain victory, not just the Phalanx. In the same case, while you reference Ralphia, it is important to note that in the decisive victory of the war, Panium, it is much more unclear what exactly happened there and what role - if any - the Phalanx played in it.

Yes, but in direct infantry combat the phalangites certainly closed with each other, and we have incidences where this took place.

Why not?

Because that force the Romans to retire along the rest of the frontage -- note, I' m referring to a single local infantry line to line facing, which seems to be generally what Sabine is implying since he refers to " missile range" .

I very much doubt that this is the case. For them to be brought to battle simultaneously assumes the Romans are unable to exploit the terrain, when in fact we know that during the battles with Macedon they did that exactly.

No, I think we're reflecting an interest in different levels of the combat. The Romans very much could still exploit the terrain when the phalangites forced them to battle on local fronts--I am saying that it is only practical for phalangites to advance in a group along the practical terrain frontage of that command pursuant to orders, i.e., that a single 3,000-man force of phalangites cannot send out small group advances but will attack along the entire terrain frontage it is posted to, and the Romans in the comparable terrain frontage would either have to flank that command, go in against one portion of it in small groups, or else retire and cede that immediate area of the field.

That is to say that Sabine's principles might describe roughly how the battle would appear on a very large and simplified scale with different brigade-sized formations sometimes advancing and withdrawing from a series of small combats, but they can't be scaled down at least for combat involving phalangites of the diadochai (and hence their encounters with Romans) to groups probably that much smaller than the pike block of a Spanish tercio, and because of that the theory is somewhat useless because it just encapsulates a lot of what we already know, that terrain, separation, and moral factors tend to favour a series of dispersed combats--the proviso I was trying to state being that those combats will be simultaneous to all the troops at the level of the smallest practical formation which can be sent forward, and in combat in antiquity that would be quite large. The Romans made it smaller, which was to their advantage, but sending forward a single century against a massed advancing group of three thousand phalangites would still be idiotic, and not done--the phalangites would need to be engaged at a level proportional (though not necessarily equal) to their own strength.

[Thanas]

I would take issue with that mainly because there are many battles where the phalanx mainly acted as a large deterrent or held the enemy in place for the more mobile diadochi army elements like cavalry or the hypaspists, or missile elements like peltasts or psiloi to win the battle. Pyrrhus command of his army for once is a case study in which multiple army elements were used together to gain victory, not just the Phalanx. In the same case, while you reference Ralphia, it is important to note that in the decisive victory of the war, Panium, it is much more unclear what exactly happened there and what role - if any - the Phalanx played in it.

Yes, but in direct infantry combat the phalangites certainly closed with each other, and we have incidences where this took place.

Yeah, but then again we have a lot of, if not even more incidencences where combat apparently did not even involve the main phalanx. A bit like the chess piece battles of the 18th century I would wager.

Heck, we even have such an instance right before Pydna in the battle of Callinicus.

Because that force the Romans to retire along the rest of the frontage -- note, I' m referring to a single local infantry line to line facing, which seems to be generally what Sabine is implying since he refers to " missile range" .

But retiring along the frontage would not be that much of a bad thing for the Romans, who could always fall back behind ditches if need be or simply redeploy. Or lead the Phalanx into rough terrain, which is exactly what happened at Pydna.

No, I think we're reflecting an interest in different levels of the combat. The Romans very much could still exploit the terrain when the phalangites forced them to battle on local fronts--I am saying that it is only practical for phalangites to advance in a group along the practical terrain frontage of that command pursuant to orders, i.e., that a single 3,000-man force of phalangites cannot send out small group advances but will attack along the entire terrain frontage it is posted to,

That is wrong. If need be, small group advances and attacks could be made by both Hypaspists and other light forces attached to the Phalanx. You are thinking of the Phalanx as only a mass of spearmen, but in actuality it was a combined arms formation of different tactical elements, of which the heavy infantry was just one such element.

and the Romans in the comparable terrain frontage would either have to flank that command, go in against one portion of it in small groups, or else retire and cede that immediate area of the field.

That is to say that Sabine's principles might describe roughly how the battle would appear on a very large and simplified scale with different brigade-sized formations sometimes advancing and withdrawing from a series of small combats, but they can't be scaled down at least for combat involving phalangites of the diadochai (and hence their encounters with Romans)

Callinicus begs to differ.

to groups probably that much smaller than the pike block of a Spanish tercio, and because of that the theory is somewhat useless because it just encapsulates a lot of what we already know, that terrain, separation, and moral factors tend to favour a series of dispersed combats--the proviso I was trying to state being that those combats will be simultaneous to all the troops at the level of the smallest practical formation which can be sent forward, and in combat in antiquity that would be quite large. The Romans made it smaller, which was to their advantage, but sending forward a single century against a massed advancing group of three thousand phalangites would still be idiotic, and not done--the phalangites would need to be engaged at a level proportional (though not necessarily equal) to their own strength.

Why? In fact, engaging with small groups is exactly what the Romans did at Pydna. According to Livius:

The most probable explanation of the victory is that several separate engagements were going on all over the field, which first shook the phalanx out of its formation and then broke it up. As long as it was compact, its front bristling with levelled spears, its strength was irresistible. If by attacking them at various points you compel them to bring round their spears, which owing to their length and weight are cumbersome and unwieldy, they become a confused and involved mass, but if any sudden and tumultuous attack is made on their flank or rear, they go to pieces like a falling house. In this way they were forced to meet the repeated charges of small bodies of Roman troops with their front dislocated in many places, and wherever there were gaps the Romans worked their way amongst their ranks. If the whole line had made a general charge against the phalanx while still unbroken, as the Paeligni did at the beginning of the action against the "caetrati," they would have spitted themselves upon their spears and have been powerless against their massed attack.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Thanas, I was arguing against the idea of the combat being low intensity, not of dispersed small-unit formations being a preferred Roman method of fighting. I.e., simultaneous action by large numbers of small groups would be required in many ancient battles to explain the course of the action and the fitting of tactics with weapons involved, so the idea of two lines just facing each other with intermittent groups pushing forward into short battles is incorrect. Most combat would take place involving relatively small units, I'm not disputing that at all--honestly I'm not sure we precisely disagree as such, just we're looking at it from different perspectives.

[Zinegata]

Rather, what I think was going on in such situations was that it was very hard to get enough speed up in your advance to drive the pikes through the enemy shields and armour. I.E., the lines marched toward each other at speeds not greater than a double-quick march in virtually all cases, and this was insufficient to force a pike through an enemy shield and armour on direct contact.

To be honest, I never saw anybody advocating they ran at each other.

Yeah. Since the musket and pike discussions I've been rereading the stuff on the Swiss Pikemen, and they never charged in formation at a full run either. They advanced swiftly, but they had the added advantage of wearing only very light armor (only the front rankers had half or 3/4s armor) and no shield. The Phalanxes by contrast had more armor and a shield.

I don't think it's really possible to maintain a pike formation if everyone is running / charging in the first place. The advance has to proceed at a very deliberate and disciplined pace or else there is going to be a great deal of people running into one another (or their pikes).

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In fact, I think Thanas' quote from Livius demonstrates the difficulty in maintaining a pike formation - see how the Romans apparently infiltrated gaps in the Greek lines.

These gaps in the Greek lines seem to be "unforced errors" - meaning that they emerged simply because of the difficulty of keeping the whole line moving together as one. The strength of the Roman system is that they were much more able to exploit these mistakes.

[Thanas]

Thanas, I was arguing against the idea of the combat being low intensity, not of dispersed small-unit formations being a preferred Roman method of fighting. I.e., simultaneous action by large numbers of small groups would be required in many ancient battles to explain the course of the action and the fitting of tactics with weapons involved, so the idea of two lines just facing each other with intermittent groups pushing forward into short battles is incorrect. Most combat would take place involving relatively small units, I'm not disputing that at all--honestly I'm not sure we precisely disagree as such, just we're looking at it from different perspectives.

But I disagree with the notion that combat could not consist of two lines (or checkerboard formations) facing each other, considering the emphasis placed on missile attacks by the Romans. It is worth noting that at time went on and Romans were facing more and more similarly equipped armies the answer was not only "more armor" but also "more missiles".

I personally believe it varied from case to case and any generalized model is useless considering how flexible the Legion was and the different fighting formations we know of (oh and the fact that such a model would cover over 8 centuries of Roman armed combat), but that does not mean that a part or a large percentage could not have happened the way he envisions it. I also do not see how your argument "it just has to be that way because that is how the battles went" is in any way, shape or form convincing considering you have not supported it with evidence.

In fact, I think Thanas' quote from Livius demonstrates the difficulty in maintaining a pike formation - see how the Romans apparently infiltrated gaps in the Greek lines.

These gaps in the Greek lines seem to be "unforced errors" - meaning that they emerged simply because of the difficulty of keeping the whole line moving together as one. The strength of the Roman system is that they were much more able to exploit these mistakes.

Terrain. The romans drew the Greeks into mountaneous terrain with plenty of obstacles so maintaining a complete line became impossible.

I don't think it's really possible to maintain a pike formation if everyone is running / charging in the first place. The advance has to proceed at a very deliberate and disciplined pace or else there is going to be a great deal of people running into one another (or their pikes).

Hoplites and Hypaspists could do so, but certainly nobody with a spear larger than 8m.

[Abacus]

Something that I do not believe has been touched upon, regarding the casualty reports of battles, is that practically every Roman generals during the Republican era was using his military career to facilitate his political career. The prestige of winning a massive victory with smaller numbers than your foe would garner you respect from the general populace, not to mention that if you killed enough enemy troops you could qualify for a triumph through the streets of Rome itself. No better way to promote yourself in such a capital than to have the entire city have its attention centered on you.

This is actually backed up by historical fact, since the Senate at one point had to set a requirement (I forget the exact number at the moment) that at least 20,000 enemy combatants had to be killed before any general could be given a triumph.

As such you had generals that would count all of the camp followers and children in an enemy camp as well as the enemy warriors as casualties. It is also hard to discern the number of warriors in a shield wall formation like that employed by the Celts, Gauls and Germans. So it was relatively easy for Romans to inflate the numbers when they were reporting back to the Senate of their battles.

That is one, and I believe primary, reason that you had such outlandish casualty figures from Roman times.

[Thanas]

That might (note I said might) explain casualty skewing through the Late Roman Republic. It does not explain skewed numbers during the Punic or Macedonian wars, which is the time period we are currently talking about.