Israel bombed armsfactory in Sudan

[cosmicalstorm]

I didn't see any post about this. So that was a nice little excersize for the big show as the army guy says himself: "This was a show of force but it was only a fraction of our capability - and of what the Iranians can expect in the countdown to the spring."

The war seems to come ever closer.

C U R R E N T NEWS
E A R L Y B I R D
October 29, 2012
London Sunday Times
October 28, 2012

Israel Hits Missile Site In Dry Run For Iran



By Uzi Mahmaini and Flora Bagenal



A long-range Israeli bombing raid last week that was seen as a dry
run for a forthcoming attack on Iran's nuclear facilities has destroyed an
Iranianrun plant making rockets and ballistic missiles in Sudan.

Eight Israeli F-15I planes - four carrying two one-ton bombs, escorted by
four fighters - struck the giant Yarmouk factory on the southwestern
outskirts of Khartoum, the capital, in the early hours of Wednesday.

The raid, in which two people died, triggered panic across the city.
Witnesses said they heard a series of loud blasts followed by the sound of
ammunition exploding.

"It was a double impact - the explosion at the factory and then the
ammunition flying into the neighbourhood," said Abd-al Ghadir Mohammed, 31,
a resident. "The ground shook. Some homes were badly damaged."

According to western defence sources, the 2,400-mile return flight took the
Israelis four hours, with the jets flying south along the Red Sea and
crossing into Sudan from the east, bypassing Egypt's air defence system.

"This was a show of force but it was only a fraction of our capability - and
of what the Iranians can expect in the countdown to the spring," said a
defence source, referring to possible airstrikes against Tehran's nuclear
programme.

Preparations for the attack in Sudan began more than two years ago after
Mossad agents suffocated Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, the top weapons buyer for the
Palestinian group Hamas, in his hotel in Dubai.

Before they left Mabhouh's room they removed a number of documents from his
briefcase.

One of them, according to intelligence sources, was a copy of a defence
agreement signed in 2008 by Tehran and Khartoum. It committed Iran to build
weapons in Sudan under full Iranian command.

The Israelis discovered later that a large contingent of Iranian technicians
had been sent to the Yarmouk factory, where Human Rights Watch had reported
in 1998 that chemical weapons were being stored.

Under Revolutionary Guard supervision, the Iranians were building advanced
Shahab ballistic missiles and rockets at a plant in the factory compound.

"The Iranians had been facing growing difficulties in transferring weapons
and munitions to Hamas and their other allies in the region," an Israeli
defence source said.

A British munitions adviser added: "There is a very clear and established
arms smuggling network that goes through eastern Sudan northwards to Sinai
and then on to the Gaza Strip."

The threat of a new source of missiles set off alarm bells in Israel. "These
ballistic missiles could be launched towards Israel from either Sudan or
from the Sinai peninsula," an Israeli security expert said. "They pose a
direct threat."

Major-General Amir Eshel, the new commander of the Israeli air force,
assured Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, that the strike would
succeed. He personally supervised the operation from the air force's command
and control bunker in Tel Aviv.

Training took many weeks, using a model of the factory. At least two
long-haul rehearsals were held. America was alerted and closed its embassy
in Khartoum to avoid any revenge attacks.

It was just before 10pm last Tuesday that the F-15I pilots took off from an
airbase in southern Israel. Several hours earlier, two CH-53 helicopters had
set off, flying low over the Red Sea.

Each carried up to 10 commandos as a rescue team should a pilot be forced to
bale out. They landed in darkness and waited for the jets to arrive.

Radio traffic was muted as the jets raced towards the Red Sea. "There were
two potential obstacles," a military source said. "The first was Djibouti
civil air traffic control. The second was not to 'wake up' Egyptian radar."
The Israelis nevertheless maintained the advantage of surprise.

After 90 minutes, the jets linked up with a Boeing 707 refueling tanker.
Then, with full tanks of fuel, roughly 18 tons each, they crossed into
Sudan.

At this stage a Gulfstream G550 filled with electronic warfare equipment
began to jam the Sudanese air defence system and the radar at Khartoum
airport.

"Sudan's air defence is based on old but lethal Russian SA-2 anti-aircraft
missiles and a squadron of over 20 Russian MiG-29 interceptors," a military
source said.

The F-15I fighters flew high above their comrades, ready to pounce if the
MiGs took off. But they remained grounded throughout the attack.

Immediately afterwards the squadron leader, an Israeli colonel, flew low
over the factory to survey the destruction. Halfway home, he sent a coded
message to his commanders.

In Tel Aviv the chief of the defence staff picked up the phone to Balfour
Street - Netanyahu's Jerusalem home.

"All went well," he said. "The guys are on their way home."

[Simon_Jester]

Israel's casual policy of committing acts of war against its neighbors strikes me as very dangerous in the long run. So far they've gotten away with it because they're fighting fourth-rate militaries that can't mobilize for an effective counterattack. If they try it against someone who can, they may get a truly horrible surprise.

[Slacker]

Right, but the obvious question of who in that neighborhood is going to have the equipment good enough that Israel can't get away with this stuff while also being frothingly insane enough to pull the sort of shit to get Israel's attention like this in the first place?

[Sidewinder]

Israel's casual policy of committing acts of war against its neighbors strikes me as very dangerous in the long run. So far they've gotten away with it because they're fighting fourth-rate militaries that can't mobilize for an effective counterattack. If they try it against someone who can, they may get a truly horrible surprise.

You talk as if Israel is planning to attack Russia.

Right, but the obvious question of who in that neighborhood is going to have the equipment good enough that Israel can't get away with this stuff while also being frothingly insane enough to pull the sort of shit to get Israel's attention like this in the first place?

In the opinion of those with detailed knowledge of such issues (I miss Stuart Slade), does Iran count?

[Blayne]

Part of the problem as I see it from Israel's perspective, is that it won't be that long I think before these various "4th to 3rd rate militaries" purchase S-300's from Russia or China and then they'll make Israel work a bit harder for their 'dry runs'.

[Simon_Jester]

To me, it's not about the weapons, it's the organization. Hardware is meaningless if it isn't used. What matters is having (or not having) a national military with officers trained to react quickly in a crisis, and with plans in place to mobilize the armed forces to do something serious in a hurry.

I don't think it'll happen any time soon, but Israel has a tradition of this kind of pre-emptive strike. If they keep it up for a few decades... it really is possible that someone in the region will put together an organized military that can quickly retaliate for this kind of raid, as opposed to bizarre half-tribalized clusterfucks that serve only as regime security.

[Slacker]

In the opinion of those with detailed knowledge of such issues (I miss Stuart Slade), does Iran count?

Not...really. Israel may actually take casualties penetrating Iran's defense network, but I honestly don't think the Iranians could actually stop an IAF strike conventionally.

[ChaserGrey]

In the opinion of those with detailed knowledge of such issues (I miss Stuart Slade), does Iran count?

Yeah, not really. Their command structure isn't very flexible and most (but not all) of their gear is pretty old. Their system does pose a threat to the Israelis, but that's mostly because the IAF is operating at the very edge of its fuel range. Under those circumstances, even a minor hit that holes a fuel tank may turn into a kill somewhere on the trip back.

[Sea Skimmer]

This dry run nonsense is just that; you don't do a dry run with a fw planes on a single effectively undefended target in a nation with no real air force to train for attacking someone like Iran with a real capability at a half dozen heavily fortified sites. I really don't know who the media gets such pathetic and ridiculous ideas from.

In fact satellite photos are already on the net showing that the Israelis didn't attack the factory specifically, they bombed a group of shipping containers parked within the grounds and all other damage was from raining debris. Odds strongly favor this being an attack on a weapons shipment enroute to Hezbollah, which have been reported to be attacked in Sudan before.

See photos here
http://www.satsentinel.org/sites/defaul ... 102712.pdf

Part of the problem as I see it from Israel's perspective, is that it won't be that long I think before these various "4th to 3rd rate militaries" purchase S-300's from Russia or China and then they'll make Israel work a bit harder for their 'dry runs'.

Third and forth rate militaries are third and forth rate precisely because they do not have actual billions of dollars of spend on a handful of missile batteries. Even if they did so, the Israelis would just launch standoff weapons from outside the engagement envelope if they felt like it, a few SAM sites don't make an air defense system. For Sudan buying a couple S-300 batteries would literally be half the defense budget for a year. This is why only about six nations on theplanet outside of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact states have ever bought that missile system, and several of those have only from 2-6 batteries.

[Irbis]

Part of the problem as I see it from Israel's perspective, is that it won't be that long I think before these various "4th to 3rd rate militaries" purchase S-300's from Russia or China and then they'll make Israel work a bit harder for their 'dry runs'.

And if they purchase it so what? Outside of NATO/regional powers, virtually no one has the money to actually use S-300 even if they bought it. That means training crews to good standard, keeping batteries in perfect readiness, doing trials, etc. Israelis are not going to encounter any resistance from undermanned batteries crewed by barely educated soldiers who just turned them off because it's time for prayer or something. At worst, Mossad will bribe a few operators, or point out that the local X vs Y soccer game when everyone will be glued to TV is good time to attack.

[cosmicalstorm]

This dry run nonsense is just that; you don't do a dry run with a fw planes on a single effectively undefended target in a nation with no real air force to train for attacking someone like Iran with a real capability at a half dozen heavily fortified sites. I really don't know who the media gets such pathetic and ridiculous ideas from.

In fact satellite photos are already on the net showing that the Israelis didn't attack the factory specifically, they bombed a group of shipping containers parked within the grounds and all other damage was from raining debris. Odds strongly favor this being an attack on a weapons shipment enroute to Hezbollah, which have been reported to be attacked in Sudan before.

See photos here
http://www.satsentinel.org/sites/defaul ... 102712.pdf

Part of the problem as I see it from Israel's perspective, is that it won't be that long I think before these various "4th to 3rd rate militaries" purchase S-300's from Russia or China and then they'll make Israel work a bit harder for their 'dry runs'.

Third and forth rate militaries are third and forth rate precisely because they do not have actual billions of dollars of spend on a handful of missile batteries. Even if they did so, the Israelis would just launch standoff weapons from outside the engagement envelope if they felt like it, a few SAM sites don't make an air defense system. For Sudan buying a couple S-300 batteries would literally be half the defense budget for a year. This is why only about six nations on theplanet outside of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact states have ever bought that missile system, and several of those have only from 2-6 batteries.

Thanks for the correction Sea Skimmer, I always appreciate the you're commentary on these matters, they are hard to find elsewhere even in otherwise decent newspapers.

[Arthur_Tuxedo]

@Sea Skimmer: Is the consensus still that the IAF does not have the capability to cause any meaningful setbacks to Iran's nuclear program without direct US assistance?

[PeZook]

Third and forth rate militaries are third and forth rate precisely because they do not have actual billions of dollars of spend on a handful of missile batteries. Even if they did so, the Israelis would just launch standoff weapons from outside the engagement envelope if they felt like it, a few SAM sites don't make an air defense system. For Sudan buying a couple S-300 batteries would literally be half the defense budget for a year. This is why only about six nations on theplanet outside of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact states have ever bought that missile system, and several of those have only from 2-6 batteries.

But even if the poorer military only has el cheapo missile systems, they do complicate a strike at extreme range, don't they? Because every plane you load up with HARM to effortlessly knock out the obsolete air defence radars is one plane you can't load up with bombs ; And at extreme range, you can't carry all that many missiles in the first place, meaning having to send more planes etc.

Isn't that Iran's entire strategy to counter the US, anyways? Get enough capability to make a US attack uneconomical, rather than impossible (which simply can't be done, not by a relatively poor state like Iran), freeing you up strategically to climb the local power hill.

[Blayne]

Third and forth rate militaries are third and forth rate precisely because they do not have actual billions of dollars of spend on a handful of missile batteries. Even if they did so, the Israelis would just launch standoff weapons from outside the engagement envelope if they felt like it, a few SAM sites don't make an air defense system. For Sudan buying a couple S-300 batteries would literally be half the defense budget for a year. This is why only about six nations on theplanet outside of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact states have ever bought that missile system, and several of those have only from 2-6 batteries.

Aha, I had the impression these were becoming more common outside the FSU thanks for the correction.

[Sea Skimmer]

But even if the poorer military only has el cheapo missile systems, they do complicate a strike at extreme range, don't they? Because every plane you load up with HARM to effortlessly knock out the obsolete air defence radars is one plane you can't load up with bombs ; And at extreme range, you can't carry all that many missiles in the first place, meaning having to send more planes etc.

In principle sure, in reality anyone trying to make a long range raid probably has more then enough planes not to care if one or two are defense supression. Also old systems may simply be completely ineffective, particularly against a low flying surprise raid as was the case here. You can't just keep systems like that operating all the time, you need warning to switch them on ect.. assuming they are even capable of engaging, and unless you did major electronic upgrades about everything before S-300, and certain S-300 export models, are physically compromised by the west so they can be jammed with a huge amount of effectiveness.

Also standoff weapons remain an option, and they don't just keep the plane safe, they can also considerably extend the striking radius. Popeye Turbo does 200nm for example, JASSM-ER 500nm. Cheaper stuff like JSOW doesn't much extend your striking radius, but its entirely enough to negate obsolete short range weapons like SA-3. Many older SAMs, as well as S-300 with its masts deployed to counter low level raids, also lack any tactical mobility, so they can be targeted with weapons like SDB and destroyed without even taking up an entire strike plane. Meanwhile most highly mobile SAMs like say SA-8 or SA-15 or Roland have the problem that ceiling is limited, so if the enemy flies high instead of low they can't even try to shoot back. SA-17 is about the best compromise between this, being absurdly mobile (including mobile radar mast on tracks), and yet suffering no meaningful limit in ceiling, and enough range to counter any of the cheaper stand off weapons, but nobody feels like paying for such an advanced system when vehicle costs start approaching that of cheap fighters (same is true of SA-15). Even Russia is sticking to upgrading legacy versions of BUK for the moment.

Now meanwhile Vietnam paid 300 million USD for two batteries of S-300PMU-1, enough money to buy 300 cruise missiles easily, and those two batteries certainly don't have 300 missiles included. Not really a winning buy in isolation. SAMs are highly useful, but as a final layer, not the first, last and only defense. Trying to rely on them as your main air defense is near hopeless unless you can afford a very high density, at which point your certain to have the other elements of a real air defense system too and can actually think about stopping raids rather then making them hard. Look to Russia for what Russia thinks is actually required.. it sure isn't a handful of super missile sites. Heck some S-300 sites around Moscow have as many as four or even five mast mounted radars (making it more like 2 batteries worth of equipment) and huge numbers of missiles, and at least 25 deployment and garrison sites exist. Multiple rings of search radars exist outside the SAM belt, as well as several garrisons holding Army SAMs, and this is besides the Russian air force having a fairly high number of fighters around.

At its peak the Soviet Union had something like 800 SA-2 sites and that was just to fight off more or less lone US bombers.

Isn't that Iran's entire strategy to counter the US, anyways? Get enough capability to make a US attack uneconomical, rather than impossible (which simply can't be done, not by a relatively poor state like Iran), freeing you up strategically to climb the local power hill.

Iran's strategy is political stalling, which is working well so far, nothing they have done militarily would make a real difference against the US, in fact they've managed to cut themselves off from importing weapons which might matter, and the huge amount of money they've thrown at nukes and bunkers has plainly diverted resources away from other domestic military projects. They've got some stuff that would be annoying sure, but none of it has anything to do with air defense. Even the handfuls of SA-15 launchers are merely in the annoying class, fly high and they can't do anything but expend missiles blowing up JDAMs we spent 20,000 dollars on. They can make it very difficult for Israel, but mainly because the Israelis simply have no planes big enough to carry really heavy bombs in the first place, making the total possible success of even an unopposed raid questionable. The USAF doesn't even think MOP can be certain to destroy the biggest bunker they have with one hit, though it would certainly be effective with repeated hits and its not like the bunker can run away and hide. 100 million is being spent now to make a rocket boosted bomb that will destroy it. The biggest issue for the Israelis is Iran actually has an air force of some note against a limited raid. The Israelis would need to bomb a half dozen major sites, Iranian fighters ganging up on any one element of the raid would be a very serious problem, while the targets are dispersed enough that the various raids would not be capable of mutual support. But that's why fighters make the best air defense, they can disperse and concentrate and change altitude at will to counter different sorts of attack.

Aha, I had the impression these were becoming more common outside the FSU thanks for the correction.

Well, really slowly they are, but your talking one new customer every several years, at best, for a small number of weapons. Meanwhile several of the Warsaw Pact users have given them up, or else only operate the radar equipment for training NATO air forces. Plus the buyers are all typically well established military powers, and generally adding the S-300 units on top of a fair bit of existing equipment.