What caused the industrial revolution?

[Iron Bridge]

You can of course withdraw from a debate whenever you wish; you can't make other people give you the last word.

What do you by "specialisation"? You got a degree in it? I am interested then that you don't agree that free market institutions aren't the key driver of industrial development.

Yes, a degree, and no, I do not expect to have "the last word", I was just baffled by you still asking me questions. They won't be answered.

Ah, usually when people try to back out of debates they do end up answering. Anyway, it is there for other readers to see how I would have continued if they are interested. Also, you're answering my questions now.

I have already said that market institutions by and large predate industrial capitalism - even as far as to the Roman Empire - and thus cannot, alone, explain industrialization. I obviously consider capitalism a driver of industrial development, but capitalism is not just "free market", not to mention the fact that after primary industrialization has commenced, even non-capitalist nations have been able to execute industrialization. From the very primary step, which is the creation of domestic industrial production.

Depends on what you mean by Rome. First, the late Rome was simply not a free market by any reasonable definition; Diocletian turned it into something more like War Communism, and he probably only regularised what had been de-facto policy for a long time.

Perhaps the early Republic was more of a free market. Of course it was a slave economy, in that regard not necessarily better than feudal serfdom, which is why I find your stark claim that Roman Empire is comparable to 18th century Britain in market institutions to be very strange.

Nonetheless, I don't think it's disputed that the Late Republic and Early Empire were more economically developed than what came after for a long time. Division of labour, range and complexity of products, and Mediterranean trade all collapsed along with the Empire.

In short, I find your thesis simplistic and unsubstantiated. Your theory should be able to make meaningful predictions and also be falsifiable. It fails to do so - protectionist or alter-globalisation policies may coincide with industrial development and even a major shift from agrarian to industrial production (NZ in 1950-1960, the post-war USSR, et cetera). On the other hand, the laissez-faire experiment in Latin America of the 1980s and 1990s by and large has been a failure. Which again - if we were talking about falsifiable theories, would mean that your theory is falsified, since laissez-faire did not cause an industrial upsurge. You say that Marxism has been falsified - this is because Marxism as originally conceived made meaningful predictions and the theory was falsifiable, the evolution of XX century capitalism in advanced nations and the rise of fascism made most of the Marxist predictions false.

You seem to lack a quantitative sense.

New Zealand did not dramatically shift away from Western policy norms. It became somewhat less of a free market and somewhat poorer.

The USSR, as I've already demonstrated, did not much improve on Tsarist Russia's relative levels of economic development, remaining much poorer than the West.

Latin America did not adopt Western economic policy norms in the 1980s or 1990s. It sat in the middle, between PRC or USSR full socialist institutions, and proper market institutions in US and EU. It also remained middle income. Within Latin America, the countries that adopted closest to Western institutions (Chile, Argentina) are the wealthiest.

I don't see what any of these examples have falsified my theory, rather, the support it, which perhaps is why you withdrew from the debate on those.

[PainRack]

I wonder if the need to produce better guns and canons were one of the main influence in building more machinery. The desire to mass produce matchlocks and flintlocks would most probably necessitate the need for more wrought iron and machines to facilitate the production process.

Japan, despite being one of the country with the world largest arsenal prior to the samurai banning it wasn't industrialised. Ming China, with more extant trade links with the west, importing cannons and the like, didn't industrialise. Granted, Ming China was probably the..... closest competitor to being an industrial nation, since the Qing was much more isolationist and technologically conservative than the Ming.


It probably was a major influence, since the need to import and maintain a modern arsenal would helped drove industrialisation, indeed, it was one of the major factors driving Soviet industrialisation, but I can't help feeling that its more secondary than anything else.

[ray245]

I wonder if the need to produce better guns and canons were one of the main influence in building more machinery. The desire to mass produce matchlocks and flintlocks would most probably necessitate the need for more wrought iron and machines to facilitate the production process.

Japan, despite being one of the country with the world largest arsenal prior to the samurai banning it wasn't industrialised. Ming China, with more extant trade links with the west, importing cannons and the like, didn't industrialise. Granted, Ming China was probably the..... closest competitor to being an industrial nation, since the Qing was much more isolationist and technologically conservative than the Ming.

However, weren't things like matchlocks and flintlocks in China and Japan pretty much imported from the Europeans rather than produced in their own backyard?

Even when the Japanese and the Chinese adopted European firearm technology, the majority of their armies still weren't well equipped with guns if I recall. Traditional weapons like swords and bows were still quite common compared to the European armies.

[ryacko]

This is just a theory of mine: there never was an industrial revolution? At what point does organization of manufacture becomes so efficient as to go from proto-industry to industry? Perhaps what we call an industrial revolution is a natural byproduct of market institutions continually refining production, improving precision, efficiency, and quality over time?

[ray245]

This is just a theory of mine: there never was an industrial revolution? At what point does organization of manufacture becomes so efficient as to go from proto-industry to industry? Perhaps what we call an industrial revolution is a natural byproduct of market institutions continually refining production, improving precision, efficiency, and quality over time?

If that is the case, then pretty much every rich and wealthy civilisation will be able to industrialise on their own.

[Zinegata]

However, weren't things like matchlocks and flintlocks in China and Japan pretty much imported from the Europeans rather than produced in their own backyard?

Nope. The Japanese and Chinese always had their own gun makers. They might have copied some European designs, or imported some European guns, but the ability to manufacture them locally existed.

Even when the Japanese and the Chinese adopted European firearm technology, the majority of their armies still weren't well equipped with guns if I recall. Traditional weapons like swords and bows were still quite common compared to the European armies.

The Japanese had a very advanced firearms industry starting the 1500s (no surprise, since all that skill in making good steel for samurai swords could be applied to firearms), which was eventually banned by the feudal lords to maintain their power. When Japan was reopened to Western trade and it was clear that their choices boiled down to "industrialize or be colonized", Japan rapidly undertook a massive reorganization of their armies so that everyone became equipped with Western-style firearms. Most of these firearms would eventually be produced locally as opposed to simply being imported.

The Chinese never quite adopted firearms on an army-wide scale until much later, butthe Qing had already setup armories to produce guns before they were finally toppled. It's probably truer to say that while the Qing tried to emulate the Japanese transformation of their military, various factors (including political infighting, the huge size of the army, the turmoil of the time period, etc) prevented this. One of these factors however was not the inability to manufacture firearms locally.

[ray245]

However, weren't things like matchlocks and flintlocks in China and Japan pretty much imported from the Europeans rather than produced in their own backyard?

Nope. The Japanese and Chinese always had their own gun makers. They might have copied some European designs, or imported some European guns, but the ability to manufacture them locally existed.

But wasn't some of the more modern guns, such as flintlocks largely bought rather than produce locally? The Japanese army were still using matchlocks rather than flintlocks before the westerners force open the Japanese borders and trade market.

[Zinegata]

But wasn't some of the more modern guns, such as flintlocks largely bought rather than produce locally? The Japanese army were still using matchlocks rather than flintlocks before the westerners force open the Japanese borders and trade market.

First of all, your claims are so nebulous and all over the place with regard to time period that they're basically useless claims. For instance neither the Japanese nor the Chinese ever bothered much with flintlocks, which is why it's strange that you even mentioned them. The Japanese didn't because they banned firearms when flintlocks were big in Europe, and the Chinese because they faced no real enemies that used firearms in a big way.

What actually happens is this: The Japanese or Chinese buy some European guns initially, but quickly start mass-producing them once the need arises along with the political will needed to modernize the armies.

The Japanese in the 1500s started off by buying a small number of Portugese matchlocks, and from this tiny number of guns they built an entire indigenous gun-making industry. Pretty silly to think that the Japanese wouldn't be able to mass-produce matchlocks when they're making high-quality steel for swords (and most of their gunsmiths were recruited from swordsmiths).

While Europe was bothering with Flintlocks, Japan and China never really bothered with them. The Japanese because they chose isolation, the Chinese because they saw no real need. Seriously, while Europe was off fighting it various wars to keep France from taking over all of Europe (see Louis XIV to Napoleon), China was relatively stable under the Qing dynasty, whose enemies were almost exclusively domestic rebellions (who, by definition, used the same guns the government did).

When we get to the late 1800s, when Japan was opened up again and China found itself with a pressing need for modern firearms due to the advances of colonial powers, they both simply skipped over the flintlocks, bought some modern guns (like the Dreyfuss, Chassepot, or Minie Guns), and copied them to be produced in their own newly-built armories by the 1880s/90s. While both Japan and China did buy a large number of guns from outside sources, these foreign purchases were likely driven more by pressing military needs (e.g. the Japanese were basically in the middle of a Civil War, with both sides buying Western guns) and the fact that the armories and its support industries were still being built / modernized.

Hence, the idea that Japan / China was incapable of making their own rifles does not hold any water. A gun-making industry is frankly not that hard to set up. The Meiji era for instance started in 1868, and by 1880 the Japanese had their own rifle (the Murata) which was essentially a match for any Western equivalent.

[ray245]

First of all, your claims are so nebulous and all over the place with regard to time period that they're basically useless claims. For instance neither the Japanese nor the Chinese ever bothered much with flintlocks, which is why it's strange that you even mentioned them.

Well, I was mainly looking at what were the main divergence between the east Asian states and the European states just before the age of industrialisation.

The Japanese in the 1500s started off by buying a small number of Portugese matchlocks, and from this tiny number of guns they built an entire indigenous gun-making industry. Pretty silly to think that the Japanese wouldn't be able to mass-produce matchlocks when they're making high-quality steel for swords (and most of their gunsmiths were recruited from swordsmiths).

I never said the Japanese or the Qing dynasty were not able to mass produce guns.

We know that the pudding process was crucial in mass producing steel and iron, so we should look at some of the reason why the British need to increase their production of iron in the first place. I think it is legitimate to ask if gunpowder technology were one of the key driving forces to produce iron in vast quantites.

[PainRack]

However, weren't things like matchlocks and flintlocks in China and Japan pretty much imported from the Europeans rather than produced in their own backyard?

Even when the Japanese and the Chinese adopted European firearm technology, the majority of their armies still weren't well equipped with guns if I recall. Traditional weapons like swords and bows were still quite common compared to the European armies.

There's a myth that Japan had the world largest musket armed army, prior to the samurai crackdown.

While this probably isn't true, the existence of such a myth does show the prevalence of muskets in her armies.

Similarly, the Ming had a very large musket formation, to the extent that there were entire units armed entirely with muskets, something revolutionary for that era(The Spainish for example used muskets as a secondary weapon in their conquest of Peru). Granted, the Ming probably didn't buy their weapons from the Franks, as opposed to the Fo Lang Ji cannons, but rather, they copied the Japanese musket design(which was in turn copied from Portugeuse) wholesale.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musketeer# ... s_in_China
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huolongjing

I would point out that Zinneganata is wrong. The Qing Empire certainly did face enemies with guns, for example, the land war with Russia which they won repeatedly. Hell, even for rebels, the Taiping Rebels used liberal amounts of canon and firearms, which is exactly why it was an even more bloody war than the American Civil War.

More importantly, we can trace the evolution of guns back to the Ming invasion of Vietnam.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1jExd6ayPs
It wasn't alone. The Ming fought against the Japanese which had muskets, the Koreans as Chinese allies also had muskets. The list goes on and on, but primarily, as I said again, the Ming did build a large gun arsenal and they BUILT it. Of course, being Chinese, they stole and reverse engineered all their designs from other people but it was built in China.

The real problem was what Zinnegata expounded on. Chinese muskets languished behind Westerns and the Qing never took to firearms as liberally as the Ming did. As such, their main weapons would remain stagnant just as Western technology took another great leap forward.

[PainRack]

Errata: I did not mean to imply that the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom used more firearms relative to Western armies, or even anywhere an equivalent amount.

[Zinegata]

I would point out that Zinneganata is wrong. The Qing Empire certainly did face enemies with guns, for example, the land war with Russia which they won repeatedly. Hell, even for rebels, the Taiping Rebels used liberal amounts of canon and firearms, which is exactly why it was an even more bloody war than the American Civil War.

I didn't mean to say they all didn't have guns when I said China had no real need for Flintlocks. What I meant was that China wasn't importing western Flintlocks (ray's claim, which as I pointed out was strange), because they were facing enemies on a relatively equal level of technology as their own armies, especially since the biggest threats were internal (i.e. the Taiping rebellion which I'm well aware of - and those rebels were basically using stolen Qing or locally produced guns) and not external.

Moreover, looking it up, the Qing-Russia wars you pointed out predated mass use of Flintlocks in Europe anyway. Which again makes ray's idea that China was importing Western flintlocks even stranger.

The real problem was what Zinnegata expounded on. Chinese muskets languished behind Westerns and the Qing never took to firearms as liberally as the Ming did. As such, their main weapons would remain stagnant just as Western technology took another great leap forward.

Yep. I'd even argue that it was the industrial revolution that actually allowed the production of more advanced firearms, as opposed to firearms spurring the revolution. Flintlocks lasted for over a hundred years in Europe (1700-1800) with very little change. But as soon as the Industrial Revolution starts chugging along we suddenly get a huge amount of new guns that finally replace the flintlock musket - you simply need machine tools if you want to make thousands of guns like the Chassepot.

As soon as Japan and China were able to import machine tools technology, both were able to mass-produce their own modern rifles very quickly.

Ray->

We know that the pudding process was crucial in mass producing steel and iron, so we should look at some of the reason why the British need to increase their production of iron in the first place. I think it is legitimate to ask if gunpowder technology were one of the key driving forces to produce iron in vast quantites.

I would say it is much less about small arms (where the British were never really a leader; the Americans, the French, and the Germans developed rifles with much greater gusto due to pressing war needs) and more about naval artillery and, much more importantly, shipbuilding.

There is a much stronger correlation between shipbuilding and industrialization, especially when you consider ships have a vital peacetime use (maritime trade) whereas guns just sit there doing nothing unless a war breaks out.

Well, I was mainly looking at what were the main divergence between the east Asian states and the European states just before the age of industrialisation.

As mentioned by other folks earlier, Europe had a lot of wars and falling behind meant you might cease to exist as a nation. In the East, there was much less of this especially with Japan. How else could a nation that voluntarily relinquished firearms survive, if the situation in the East wasn't as hostile and warlike as Europe?

[ray245]

I would say it is much less about small arms (where the British were never really a leader; the Americans, the French, and the Germans developed rifles with much greater gusto due to pressing war needs) and more about naval artillery and, much more importantly, shipbuilding.

There is a much stronger correlation between shipbuilding and industrialization, especially when you consider ships have a vital peacetime use (maritime trade) whereas guns just sit there doing nothing unless a war breaks out.

If maritime trade and shipbuilding were one of the driving issues for industrialisation, then shouldn't Spain be one of the few countries that drive the process of industrialisation?

[madd0ct0r]

Spain screwed over her economy with South American adventures.

[Zinegata]

Ray->

I said correlation, not causation. Meaning that powers with a strong shipbuilding industry tended to be industrialized or became a leading industrialized nation in the "industrial Age" period. These nations include (but are not limited to) England, Germany (soon to have the world's 1st or 2nd largest merchant marine by World War 1), the United States, and Japan. Spain of the industrial age period was notably no longer a major shipbuilder.

Whether it's the ships that spurred industrialization or the other way around is hard to say (hence again why I only mention they have a correlation), but the development of large fleets of steamships basically ensured that a nation could import and export goods with a great degree of consistency and stability. Railroads have a similar effect (although railroads tend to revolve more around transporting goods within a country), and there's also a strong correlation between countries that industrialized and laid down railroad tracks (US, England, Germany, France, and Japan all come to mind)

Also, again you're confusing the timelines. Spain was very prosperous during the period when she was still a major naval power, thanks to the enormous wealth brought home by her treasure fleets. That they didn't industrialize at this point probably owed more to the way the Spanish economy was structured and the simple lack of sufficiently advanced technology in the 1500s.

[Vehrec]

Advanced means of transportation were the effects, not the cause of the Industrial revolution though. Canals were a major form of transportation that probably overshadowed Railroads in their efficiency, but the case of cargo ships is a bit more interesting. Remember, the Great Eastern was built in 1858, and was too big for it's time. Iron steamers-or steamers of any kind, are far more symptomatic than causative of the Industrial revolution. After all, a steam ship needs a steam engine, with sensative safety valves, big boilers, industrial quantities of coal, all sorts of things you can't get easily from a pre-industrial nation. Railroads by the very nature of their iron and steel rails are extremely creatures of the age rather than it's creators. They drove and empowered the transformation to a degree, but were by no means it's primary agents.

[Zinegata]

Again, correlation, not causation.

It can also be argued for instance that iron steamers would not have been developed by anyone but a major shipbuilding power (such as England), or that nations that were essentially starting from scratch (such as Japan) who focused on steam ships and railroads tended to be much more successful than those that did not.

[K. A. Pital]

Also, you're answering my questions now.

Not the ones asked before, but sure. The problem is the backpedal mode you use - when I point out that India did not have industry and you should't make statements that infrastructure equals industry (since it says nothing about where the manufacturing complex is located), you say you meant something different; not "had industry". When I say that NZ was not "much poorer" than Australia or Canada, you immediately backpedal and say that it became slightly poorer during the period (which I think is pretty much irrelevant; I was talking about NZ's transition to industry from agriculture, the fact that they managed to execute this transition smoothly, only slightly falling behind other Western offshoots in growth tempoes, is just a tangent). So you ignore the points, frame your statements incorrectly, then correct them post-facto without admitting that you were wrong. See a problem?

So please do answer the points that are raised without concentrating on tangents, if we want to have a discussion.

Latin America did not adopt Western economic policy norms in the 1980s or 1990s. It sat in the middle, between PRC or USSR full socialist institutions, and proper market institutions in US and EU. It also remained middle income.

Why then did Latin America perform worse than the USSR throughout the XX century, despite having a massive head start or being on par, if it had a mixed economy while the USSR had a complete command economy?

This example seems to flat-out contradict the theory - a full command economy is the most remote thing from laissez-faire, while Latin America had a regulated, but market economy. Or is your theory is a bit more complex and a full command economy performs better than something "inbetween", as you sought to describe it?

The USSR, as I've already demonstrated, did not much improve on Tsarist Russia's relative levels of economic development, remaining much poorer than the West.

Sure, but it became an industrial nation nonetheless. Which entailed certain consequences for employment. And then what to think of Latin America? They actively degraded - not just improved a little on the performance levels they had in the XIX century, but consistently performed worse and worse.

Of course it was a slave economy, in that regard not necessarily better than feudal serfdom, which is why I find your stark claim that Roman Empire is comparable to 18th century Britain in market institutions to be very strange.

The institutions certainly are comparable; the technologies are not. Slavery as-is usually is concentrated primarily within agriculture and only adversely impacts the development of industry if there is no other source for hired manpower than liberated slaves. Since the Roman civilization had hired labourers, differentiated wages and an advanced labour market - all of which coexisted with slavery - I see no reason to exclude Rome from pre-industrial societies with market institutions and private industries. The labour market of Rome was certainly comparable to some of the XVIII century pre-industrial societies which we now consider possible start points for an industrial revolution. Problem is, institutions do not automatically make technology.

New Zealand did not dramatically shift away from Western policy norms.

Latin America's mixed economies weren't exactly a dramatic shift from market institutions which were transplanted by colonial administrations. In fact, the US for quite a while directly administered the conquered Philippines and introduced a carbon copy of their institutions (with a "+ third world corruption" mark), but this did not help the Philippines to become an industrial nation, neither a wealthy industrial one.

* - not that this is necessarily the case; I'm just once again at the use of GDP as an indicator for industrialization. The destruction of India's proto-industry entailed a reduction in GDP and reduction in India's share of industrial manufactures; but it did not, by and large, allow or disallow modern industrialization as it is.

[Thanas]

Spain screwed over her economy with South American adventures.

Nope, those happened a couple centuries later on.

[Iron Bridge]

Also, you're answering my questions now.

Not the ones asked before, but sure. The problem is the backpedal mode you use - when I point out that India did not have industry and you should't make statements that infrastructure equals industry (since it says nothing about where the manufacturing complex is located), you say you meant something different; not "had industry". When I say that NZ was not "much poorer" than Australia or Canada, you immediately backpedal and say that it became slightly poorer during the period (which I think is pretty much irrelevant; I was talking about NZ's transition to industry from agriculture, the fact that they managed to execute this transition smoothly, only slightly falling behind other Western offshoots in growth tempoes, is just a tangent). So you ignore the points, frame your statements incorrectly, then correct them post-facto without admitting that you were wrong. See a problem?

I had never claimed that India was industrialised, rather my entire point was that despite having some small pieces of industrial technology, it was not industrialised. My point was that the fundamentally important process behind "industrialisation" was the increase in productivity of an economy, not the presence or not of particular technologies. There's no backpedaling; rather, you did not read or correctly understand the post you were replying to. We weren't even disagreeing at all!

Similarly, in the case of NZ, you start off claiming that NZ is an example of a western offshoot that adopted "Peronism" (or something you thought was close to it) and yet still industrialised, meaning, I guess, that industrialisation happens because you're part of the World Anglo Conspiracy rather than because you have free market institutions. When it's pointed out that NZ 1. did not adopt anything like Peronism 2. by its more modest leftward shift, did in fact lose ground against all the other Anglo off-shoots and became the poorest of them, you ignore these two below-the-waterline holes in your argument and instead nitpick about my use of the word "much". Even if I'm wrong to say NZ was much poorer than Australia, and should instead have said "somewhat" or something, it doesn't make a blindest bit of difference to the debate and doesn't do anything to save your argument!

So never mind my alleged backpeddling; I rather am not impressed with your turning to deflection whenever you can't answer the salient point. Thanas, while still not ultimately correct, made a much more credible critique than you have.

The USSR, as I've already demonstrated, did not much improve on Tsarist Russia's relative levels of economic development, remaining much poorer than the West.

Sure, but it became an industrial nation nonetheless.

Only by convergence with other industrial economies; this is not an improvement, it's just what is expected even if the institutions do not change.

Of course it was a slave economy, in that regard not necessarily better than feudal serfdom, which is why I find your stark claim that Roman Empire is comparable to 18th century Britain in market institutions to be very strange.

The institutions certainly are comparable; the technologies are not. Slavery as-is usually is concentrated primarily within agriculture and only adversely impacts the development of industry if there is no other source for hired manpower than liberated slaves. Since the Roman civilization had hired labourers, differentiated wages and an advanced labour market - all of which coexisted with slavery - I see no reason to exclude Rome from pre-industrial societies with market institutions and private industries. The labour market of Rome was certainly comparable to some of the XVIII century pre-industrial societies which we now consider possible start points for an industrial revolution. Problem is, institutions do not automatically make technology.

That's like saying "serfdom is usually concentrated within agriculture and only adversely affects...". Of course these people are all trapped in working in agriculture, with no capital of their own or freedom to discuss and invent! That's why serfdom and slavery impede economic development. The Roman Empire did have a monetary economy and a sophisticated division of labour; it was also the richest large empire seen to that point, and for a long time after. This is comparing to states that had all its same flaws or worse. But is it surprising that Rome didn't grow GDPPC at 1%/year? Not at all! If you put the Roman Empire in today's world it would be close to the bottom of the Economic Freedom Index; the only country in the world today with anything close to Rome's slave plantation economy is North Korea. If you compare it to 1800 Europe, it most resembles Tsarist Russia ("The Third Rome"!), not Britain. Those countries can get convergence growth, if they exist in a world with other industrialised countries. If they're the best on offer, there's nothing to converge with.

Latin America did not adopt Western economic policy norms in the 1980s or 1990s. It sat in the middle, between PRC or USSR full socialist institutions, and proper market institutions in US and EU. It also remained middle income.

Why then did Latin America perform worse than the USSR throughout the XX century, despite having a massive head start or being on par, if it had a mixed economy while the USSR had a complete command economy?

This example seems to flat-out contradict the theory - a full command economy is the most remote thing from laissez-faire, while Latin America had a regulated, but market economy. Or is your theory is a bit more complex and a full command economy performs better than something "inbetween", as you sought to describe it?

I said Latin America "in the 80s and 90s", ie. after the Washington Consensus reforms (and, probably more importantly, the fall of most of the left and right wing military governments, with the exception of the one in Cuba) you were talking about, the result of which we're seeing today, not in the early 80s. Latin American institutions from the war to and (in different places to different extents) including much of the 80s were awful: although more in the 'chaos and civil war' sense than an actual consistent system of socio-economic organisation that is bad.

New Zealand did not dramatically shift away from Western policy norms.

Latin America's mixed economies weren't exactly a dramatic shift from market institutions which were transplanted by colonial administrations. In fact, the US for quite a while directly administered the conquered Philippines and introduced a carbon copy of their institutions (with a "+ third world corruption" mark), but this did not help the Philippines to become an industrial nation, neither a wealthy industrial one.

* - not that this is necessarily the case; I'm just once again at the use of GDP as an indicator for industrialization. The destruction of India's proto-industry entailed a reduction in GDP and reduction in India's share of industrial manufactures; but it did not, by and large, allow or disallow modern industrialization as it is.

You've got to be very careful what you're comparing here. Latin America inherited "European" institutions from its colonial masters but not "market" institutions. Latin America was controlled by Spain and Portugal which were some of the last European nations to develop; as recently as the 1970s they were dramatically behind the European core. Their institutions back in the late 1700s and early 1800s were nothing like those of Britain or the Netherlands. Argentina was unique in adopting very good market institutions and becoming highly developed rather than just moderately so - that's why I said it was interesting.

fwiw, the richest country in Latin America is Puerto Rico, a US colony. The richest polities in South America are the Falkland Islands and French Guyana.

[Ziggy Stardust]

fwiw, the richest country in Latin America is Puerto Rico, a US colony. The richest polities in South America are the Falkland Islands and French Guyana.

I don't really want to wade into this discussion, but I feel the need to correct you on this point. Obviously "richest" is subjective, and there are a variety of measures which you can use to measure a nation's wealth. However, I cannot find one that ranks them as you claim.

Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina are richest in the sense of largest economic output. Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay are richest in terms of income, education, and human development.

In terms of GDP per capita, the top 3 are the Bahamas, Trinidad & Tobago, and Barbados (according to the World Bank; according to the CIA, the top 3 are Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, and the Cayman Islands). The Latin Business Chronicle lists Chile, Argentina, and Mexico at the top. If we just look at poverty rates, Chile, Barbados, and Jamaica are on top (i.e. lowest poverty rates).

Basically, I cannot find a single ranking of "wealth" that supports what you claim. The only country you list that shows up at the top of any ranking I have found is the Falkland Islands.

EDIT: Oh, I see, you change from talking about "Latin America" to "South America" mid sentence for some bizarre reason. Still, you are wrong. French Guiana has the highest GDP per capita at market exchange rates in South America. However, by literally every other measure of economic strength (including GDP by nominal values and PPP), French Guiana is significantly lower on the list. Also, still can't find any evidence of Puerto Rico being as high as you claim. The absolute highest ranking I can find for it is 4th in the Caribbean alone, and lower for Latin America as a whole.

[madd0ct0r]

Spain screwed over her economy with South American adventures.

Nope, those happened a couple centuries later on.

I was replying to Ray's query about why Spain didn't industrialise (zinegata's reply next post down was much better).
It's a slight tangent, but I was going to argue that Age of Sail Spain got itself into the position where it couldn't industrialise - it's economy was reliant on the treasure ships, which also drove inflation and none of the gold stayed in spain for long. "bad money drives out good"

I kinda imagine the spanish economy at the end of this period to be a little like a junkie going through withdrawal, in my usual highly academic thought process

[Ziggy Stardust]

The major problems with Spain's economy were more structural than anything to do with South America adventures per se. It was more due to terrible mismanagement that they didn't get wealthy off of their colonies (the insane quest for precious metals, while largely ignoring the other natural resources of the New World). In addition, the combination of high taxes, a rigid and outdated social structure (especially with regards to property rights), and generally incompetent/corrupt bureaucrats really stalled economic growth. The plague didn't help, either. IIRC, towards the middle and end of the 18th century, the Spanish government was starting to reform, but a series of expensive wars, the French invasion, and standard stubborn nobility nipped any progress there in the bud.

[Thanas]

Spain actually had to wage near-constant war against the greatest powers of the day, including nearly always two-three front wars. That they did not crumble there is really more of a testament to spanish power than anything else. As for why they did not industrialize, with what and where?

[Iron Bridge]

fwiw, the richest country in Latin America is Puerto Rico, a US colony. The richest polities in South America are the Falkland Islands and French Guyana.

I don't really want to wade into this discussion, but I feel the need to correct you on this point. Obviously "richest" is subjective, and there are a variety of measures which you can use to measure a nation's wealth. However, I cannot find one that ranks them as you claim.

Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina are richest in the sense of largest economic output. Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay are richest in terms of income, education, and human development.

GDP per capita - the standard measure. Brazil has the largest total output because it has the largest population, not because it is more economically developed than Pureto Rico. I don't know how you are measuring education and "human development"; either way, they're not the same as economic development.

In terms of GDP per capita, the top 3 are the Bahamas, Trinidad & Tobago, and Barbados (according to the World Bank; according to the CIA, the top 3 are Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, and the Cayman Islands).

Bahamas, Trinidad & Tobago and Barbados are English-speaking Carribean countries so they're neither in Latin America nor South America. They're rich because they inherited good institutions from Britain.

French Guiana has the highest GDP per capita at market exchange rates in South America. However, by literally every other measure of economic strength (including GDP by nominal values and PPP), French Guiana is significantly lower on the list.

Yes, by the correct measure I was actually talking about it is the highest, by some random measure you choose to use instead it may not be. As I said, total GDP is just a ranking of population in this context. The fact Brazil has a huge amount more land for people to live on doesn't tell us anything about how good its economic institutions are.

Also, still can't find any evidence of Puerto Rico being as high as you claim. The absolute highest ranking I can find for it is 4th in the Caribbean alone, and lower for Latin America as a whole.

Type 'List of countries by GDP per capita' or something into Google. I am using the source data not a list assembled by a newspaper. Puerto Rico has a GDP per capita of $27,384 by PPP.