What caused the industrial revolution?

[K. A. Pital]

We weren't even disagreeing at all!

Consider me a grammar nazi; if you can't frame your statements correctly, you will be called on it. The point was that New Zealand made the transition from pure agriculture to a diverse industry which Argentina failed to do. You ignored the argument and spouted more irrelevant bullshit, which of course was quite dumb.

Only by convergence with other industrial economies; this is not an improvement, it's just what is expected even if the institutions do not change.

You contradict yourself. Divergence with industrial economies is expected when institutions do not change - like the 'great divergence' between the First and Third World. If the gap between the leading industrial economy and another economy is actively contracting, this means the other economy is industrializing. It can also mean that the leading economy is collapsing or growing slowly, but that is definetely not the case with the United States.

Those countries can get convergence growth, if they exist in a world with other industrialised countries. If they're the best on offer, there's nothing to converge with.

Convergence is simply impossible without running industry. Rome did not have the necessary technologies for such industry. Otherwise industrial development can proceed together with slavery. Like it did in the United States of America. Of course, slavery will be a hindrance if there is no alternative labour supply; however, if there is - like the Northern part of America where cheap immigrant labour was available to die digging canals and railways - then slavery would only slow down but not prevent industrialization. Some major industrial feats might even require vast amounts of forced labour, like the Suez Canal.

Latin American institutions from the war to and (in different places to different extents) including much of the 80s were awful: although more in the 'chaos and civil war' sense than an actual consistent system of socio-economic organisation that is bad.

So Latin America from 1950 to 1990 was in a state of constant war? That looks like bullshit, and it is. Of course to a racist supremacist all these "mud people" are always in chaos and war and they can't have anything else. I understand that you don't really even want to know the actual history of the place; the myth of it being some war-torn hell filled with worthless mud people who can't comprehend the glorious gifts of Western colonial opression is much more comfortable for a Western racist than the actual reality.

Argentina was unique in adopting very good market institutions and becoming highly developed rather than just moderately so - that's why I said it was interesting.

Argentina became "highly developed"? Let's see. In 1928, the USSR had a GDP/capita of 1370, Argentina had a GDP/capita of 4291. By 1990, the USSR had a GDP capita of 6 894, Argentina had a GDP/capita of 6433. So Argentina with "very good market institutions" had thrice the GDP/capita of the USSR when it started building up its command economy. At the end, Argentina had a GDP/capita lower than the USSR. Are you sure that Argentina's advanced market institutions made it "highly developed"?

[Surlethe]

Rome did not have the necessary technologies for such industry.

Is that strictly true? I have had the impression, from long-ago discussions with classics professors about this subject, that the classical world had sufficient innovation to industrialize if other conditions had been right, but that because of widespread slave labor and non-cheap fossil fuels, return to capital was not sufficient to spark industrialization. Examples cited include steam engines and water mills. Perhaps I do not understand what you mean by "running industry."

[Iron Bridge]

We weren't even disagreeing at all!

Consider me a grammar nazi; if you can't frame your statements correctly, you will be called on it.

The problem isn't that you argued about it, the problem is you implied it had something to do with your point about the causation industrial revolution. Which it didn't. Worse, you dropped your actual arguments, presumably because they didn't stand up. Consider yourself called.

The point was that New Zealand made the transition from pure agriculture to a diverse industry which Argentina failed to do. You ignored the argument and spouted more irrelevant bullshit, which of course was quite dumb.

And incredibly you are now just restating your conclusion and ignoring all my rebuttal, and now even implying I was the one who dropped it from the discussion, rather than you? New Zealand made this transition because it had better institutions than Argentina. You were trying to imply that NZ was Personist and therefore should have the same outcomes as Argentina by my theory, which it was not.

Only by convergence with other industrial economies; this is not an improvement, it's just what is expected even if the institutions do not change.

You contradict yourself. Divergence with industrial economies is expected when institutions do not change - like the 'great divergence' between the First and Third World. If the gap between the leading industrial economy and another economy is actively contracting, this means the other economy is industrializing. It can also mean that the leading economy is collapsing or growing slowly, but that is definetely not the case with the United States.

Conditional convergence (which is a mainstream theory, not something I just made up for this thread) is explained here. You do not expect growth rates to be permanently different, since it is much easier to copy long-established tech and processes than to invent new ones. Rather, you expect levels of economic development to diverge, given fixed institutions. This can mean temporary diverging growth rates if the two countries start at the same level, but not permanent.

Those countries can get convergence growth, if they exist in a world with other industrialised countries. If they're the best on offer, there's nothing to converge with.

Convergence is simply impossible without running industry. Rome did not have the necessary technologies for such industry. Otherwise industrial development can proceed together with slavery. Like it did in the United States of America. Of course, slavery will be a hindrance if there is no alternative labour supply; however, if there is - like the Northern part of America where cheap immigrant labour was available to die digging canals and railways - then slavery would only slow down but not prevent industrialization. Some major industrial feats might even require vast amounts of forced labour, like the Suez Canal.

Industrial development in the US was overwhelmingly in the parts that outlawed slavery (or had de-facto abolished it). Early US can't really be considered one country for economic institutions.

Anyway, you totally ignored my point that what we consider "revolutions" just means having about 1% GDPPC growth per year. The particular technological avenue is incidental; supposing Rome had British institutions in 0AD, it was still quite a long way behind even 1300 AD levels of production because technology didn't entirely sit still then, it just advanced at too slow a rate for people to see a big difference in their lifetimes. The first developments would be improved agricultural tools, watermills, windmills, better and larger ships, etc. - in fact Rome did slowly develop such things. Could such a Rome have developed industry in 200-300 years? Sure.

Latin American institutions from the war to and (in different places to different extents) including much of the 80s were awful: although more in the 'chaos and civil war' sense than an actual consistent system of socio-economic organisation that is bad.

So Latin America from 1950 to 1990 was in a state of constant war? That looks like bullshit, and it is.

"Constant war," no, but constant political turmoil. Countries shifted either hard left or hard right (both of these had anti-market economic policies), then the other side attempted coups with US/USSR backing.

Of course to a racist supremacist all these "mud people" are always in chaos and war and they can't have anything else. I understand that you don't really even want to know the actual history of the place; the myth of it being some war-torn hell filled with worthless mud people who can't comprehend the glorious gifts of Western colonial opression is much more comfortable for a Western racist than the actual reality.

This shit is the Godwin's Law of this board; I consider it basically to be a concession. Though if you're interested (I am sure you are not), Argentina for one is almost entirely a white transplanted population yet of all the Latin American countries it crashed the hardest in relative terms between 1900 and 1980. Come back when you have a clue.

Argentina was unique in adopting very good market institutions and becoming highly developed rather than just moderately so - that's why I said it was interesting.

Argentina became "highly developed"? Let's see. In 1928, the USSR had a GDP/capita of 1370, Argentina had a GDP/capita of 4291. By 1990, the USSR had a GDP capita of 6 894, Argentina had a GDP/capita of 6433. So Argentina with "very good market institutions" had thrice the GDP/capita of the USSR when it started building up its command economy. At the end, Argentina had a GDP/capita lower than the USSR. Are you sure that Argentina's advanced market institutions made it "highly developed"?

Did you read the posts from before you joined the thread? The 1910s and 20s is when Argentina had advanced market institutions was highly developed. Argentina's shift away from market institutions began in 1916 and took a few decades to complete. That 6.5k put it up with the European powers, at that time. Let's ignore WWI, which was not a result of Argentine economic policy. In 1913, Maddison lists Argentina at $3,797, richer than France ($3,485) and Germany ($3,648), although poorer than UK and US, just below and above $5k respectively. btw, Maddison lists Argentina GDP per capita in 1928 as $4,291, so I'm not sure where your figure is from.

---

Look, I don't mean to be rude, but it's getting a bit stale. Your arguments are either based on claims or assumptions that are flat out factually wrong, or else would be correct except they're based on you misreading or misinterpreted what I have written. I argue for enlightenment and enjoyment, but this is getting pretty tedious for me. What I propose is instead of quoting every sentence again and getting yourself confused responding to references to references to posts addressed to other people on page 2, just write a brief argument (2-3 paragraphs) about either 1. why you think conditional convergence theory based on having free market institutions is wrong or 2. what theory you would propose instead and why it is better than mine. I will then post a response.

[K. A. Pital]

So wait, let me get this straight: shifting a bit away from pure laissez-faire policies results in falling from the level of France and Germany to below-Russian levels. Shifting to a complete command economy in Russia results in overtaking a nation which was above France and Germany at the time. Can you still not see why almost everyone thinks you are an idiot here? And that obviously the precise nature of the industries developed instead of the amorphous GDP explain the rise and fall of certain economies much better.

Anyway, you totally ignored my point that what we consider "revolutions" just means having about 1% GDPPC growth per year.

I am not sure where you got this from. Revolutions may not even entail GDP growth; it may come much later after the production methods have been fully implemented. The scope and importance of certain events is realized post-facto. So how can one ignore a point which means nothing and has no explanatory power?

Conditional convergence (which is a mainstream theory, not something I just made up for this thread) is explained here.

It is obviously a theory which you fail to comprehend, since it puts a lot more stress on the particulars of a given situation (availability of technology or capital for example) than you ever did here, screaming instead that British institutions alone are responsible for everything and then some. Not to mention that your bullshit is nowhere to be found in the theory itself.

I'm sorry, but how can one argue with a person who is not capable of reading?

[Thanas]

Rome did not have the necessary technologies for such industry.

Is that strictly true? I have had the impression, from long-ago discussions with classics professors about this subject, that the classical world had sufficient innovation to industrialize if other conditions had been right, but that because of widespread slave labor and non-cheap fossil fuels, return to capital was not sufficient to spark industrialization. Examples cited include steam engines and water mills. Perhaps I do not understand what you mean by "running industry."

While they had the greatest water mills the world has ever seen, the Romans also lacked the necessity (due to freely available iron and coal) and technology to ever build anything like the steam pump or steam engine. They also lacked the forges necessary to produce mass railroads even if they had the technology.

[Iron Bridge]

So wait, let me get this straight: shifting a bit away from pure laissez-faire policies results in falling from the level of France and Germany to below-Russian levels. Shifting to a complete command economy in Russia results in overtaking a nation which was above France and Germany at the time. Can you still not see why almost everyone thinks you are an idiot here? And that obviously the precise nature of the industries developed instead of the amorphous GDP explain the rise and fall of certain economies much better.

The difference is USSR only had to maintain the Tsarist levels, and after WWII was pretty stable. Argentina started off much better but was really unstable. It is actually possible to be worse than a stable planned economy - you can have a planned economy that actively destroys wealth. These did exist, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge is a good example. Argentina didn't sit with middle of the road institutions and somehow end up worse than an extreme planner; it had huge nationalisations, capital flight, extensive regulation of industry and then power jolted back and forth between left and right wing demagogues.

Anyway, you totally ignored my point that what we consider "revolutions" just means having about 1% GDPPC growth per year.

I am not sure where you got this from. Revolutions may not even entail GDP growth; it may come much later after the production methods have been fully implemented. The scope and importance of certain events is realized post-facto. So how can one ignore a point which means nothing and has no explanatory power?

I think it's 'revolutions' that dont explain the facts. Ecomomic growth isn't a few discrete revolutions that cause massive jumps; it's a slow and steady process. At the time the invention of the steam engine didn't mean much because early steam engines were very inefficient. Partly that was design but partly it was engineering and construction limitations. It was only gradually that they became a lot more cost effective than wage labour.

There is actually a book about this too, called Shock of the Old.

Conditional convergence (which is a mainstream theory, not something I just made up for this thread) is explained here.

It is obviously a theory which you fail to comprehend, since it puts a lot more stress on the particulars of a given situation (availability of technology or capital for example) than you ever did here, screaming instead that British institutions alone are responsible for everything and then some. Not to mention that your bullshit is nowhere to be found in the theory itself.

I'm sorry, but how can one argue with a person who is not capable of reading?

As far as I am aware quality of institutions is the dominant factor in conditional convergence. It's not like Hong Kong or Singapore would be massive wealthy states naturally; they're islands of good institutions on fairly mediocre/cramped land.

If you've got some academic source that differs Im happy to discuss it.

[Zwinmar]

Necessity really is a major factor in any sort of a revolution, industrial, technological or political. What comparative need did the Roman Empire have for railroads even if they could produce them?

Do not forget the rich bastards, the patricians in the Roman example. They had no need for such advancements and were perfectly happy with the status quo. Remember, innovation requires funding, not only did the average plebe not have this funding but he was also too busy enjoying his bread and circuses.

[Simon_Jester]

The difference is USSR only had to maintain the Tsarist levels, and after WWII was pretty stable. Argentina started off much better but was really unstable. It is actually possible to be worse than a stable planned economy - you can have a planned economy that actively destroys wealth. These did exist, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge is a good example. Argentina didn't sit with middle of the road institutions and somehow end up worse than an extreme planner; it had huge nationalisations, capital flight, extensive regulation of industry and then power jolted back and forth between left and right wing demagogues.

Question:

Why do you think it's all about institutions and GDP, and not about the details?

The USSR got its growth by developing all kinds of different industries and infrastructure. They had heavy industry, light consumer goods, and an educated workforce that was reasonably flexible and could be tasked to do things other than brute manual labor. They lagged well behind the West in some of those areas, but they had them. Their economic portfolio was, so to speak, diversified.

The Argentines got much of their growth by 'comparative advantage' methods: agriculture. Lots and lots of agriculture, very profitable beef and grain exports to the industrial cities of Europe, and so on. When agriculture became less of an easy source of profits to the Argentines as the 20th century rolled on, that would hurt their growth no matter how good their institutions were.

Being a one-trick pony isn't a good way to secure long-term viability for your economy. Especially not if your country fails to cultivate a backup plan for how to remain strong and prosperous when their one trick stops being profitable.

Whereas being economically diversified... that has something to do with what you call "institutions," but it's not as simple as saying "free market is good for this." A free market does not guarantee that a nation will have an educated workforce or heavy industry that can adapt to produce capital goods for new industries, for example.

[Iron Bridge]

The "one trick" as you call it is the one trick because it gives you the most cash. This cash can then be traded for other things, like machine tools. Early USSR was also a mainly agrarian economy: they tried to shift everything into industry artificially and ended causing a huge famine. This is ignoring the famines during the civil war which are at least partly attributable to their policies.

I would agree with you that it's better to be a planned economy with a well-educated workforce, or a planned economy with lots of oil (as I've conceded, you can do ok even with terrible institutions if you have lots of oil, but then the bulk of the population doesn't see most of it anyway), than a planned economy without those things. But to the first approximation, institutions 1. are the most powerful factor - see USSR not really improving on Tsarism despite vast improvements in education etc. 2. are the most widely applicable factor. I can't magic oil out of the ground and even educating people takes a long time. But put someone who can't read in a field picking fruit in the US and they'll earn a hell of a lot more than they will in Africa or India. So if poor countries want to know how to develop, the best answer is adopt market institutions.

[Grandmaster Jogurt]

You keep using the term, so what are "institutions" besides a way for you to say that anyone who succeeded did so because they are from or were ruled by the UK?

Edit: I'm not just trying to put that jab in, actually. I'm curious how you'd define it since it's key to so much of your arguments.

[Zinegata]

The "one trick" as you call it is the one trick because it gives you the most cash. This cash can then be traded for other things, like machine tools.

Except that is patently not the case in many situations, which is why looking at only GDP figures is silly.

For instance, there's been studies that show that the Confederate States of America technically had greater wealth than the Union.

But a close examination of the South's wealth reveals that this is simply based on the highly inflated dollar value of its slaves. Its industry was almost non-existent with only a tiny number of actual steelworks and other factories that define an industrial nation.

Attempting to correlate wealth with industrialization - and all in a pretty silly attempt to pretend that "FREEDOM LEADS TO PROSPERITY" - is very poor and short-sighted analysis that ignores that some states can get rich without industrialization by merely possesing highly valuable resources.

For instance Saudi Arabia cannot be seriously considered as "industrialized", and yet has a per capital income of $25K, close to the Western industrialized nations. Saudi Arabia has no real exports beside oil, and virtually all manufactured goods must be imported.

So, again, attempting to bring up the GDP of Argentina as being proof of Argentina's industrialization is silly. Saudi Arabia beats Argentina simply because oil is worth more than beef; "freedom" has nothing to do with it, along with the industrialization level of either country (Argentina having a so-so industry and Saudis having very little)

[Thanas]

Necessity really is a major factor in any sort of a revolution, industrial, technological or political. What comparative need did the Roman Empire have for railroads even if they could produce them?

Do not forget the rich bastards, the patricians in the Roman example. They had no need for such advancements and were perfectly happy with the status quo. Remember, innovation requires funding, not only did the average plebe not have this funding but he was also too busy enjoying his bread and circuses.

That post is filled with a lot of clichees. Innovation was actively encouraged by the state and if they had the technology they would really enjoy having railroads, especially since fast traffic was the imperative of Imperial strategy.

[K. A. Pital]

I would agree with you that it's better to be a planned economy with a well-educated workforce, or a planned economy with lots of oil (as I've conceded, you can do ok even with terrible institutions if you have lots of oil, but then the bulk of the population doesn't see most of it anyway), than a planned economy without those things. But to the first approximation, institutions 1. are the most powerful factor - see USSR not really improving on Tsarism despite vast improvements in education etc. 2. are the most widely applicable factor. I can't magic oil out of the ground and even educating people takes a long time. But put someone who can't read in a field picking fruit in the US and they'll earn a hell of a lot more than they will in Africa or India. So if poor countries want to know how to develop, the best answer is adopt market institutions.

I'm deeply puzzled by the lack of knowledge.

Before 1965, Soviet oil exports were neglible. Incidentally, 1928-1965 is the period of convergence, when the USSR was improving relative to the US and the rest of the world. This despite the devastation caused by World War II running directly through the most developed Western regions of the nation, the Nazis killing like 10% of the inhabitants of occupied territories and leaving thousands of factories destroyed and thousands of villages burned down to the ground.

And on the other hand, when the USSR started exporting oil en masse, it started losing steam as well - the GDP/capita relative to the world average was decreasing.


Educating people takes a long time, but illiterate slaves never earn much - if you put an illiterate man into the US, he will get more simply because literate men - engineers and scientists - have already invented the machines, and literate (sic!) capitalists have already implemented these machines in their production chain, improving society's overall wealth. If you create a market in a nation of illiterates, it will do jack and shit - the conditions will be even worse than those of Industrial Revolution-times Britain. De-facto most deep Third World markets have proven this time and again - since the bulk of the workforce is illiterate, it falls into the poverty trap and a niche for very cheap unskilled labour is then filled by the population. Which slows down progress and keeps the population poor.

For instance, there's been studies that show that the Confederate States of America technically had greater wealth than the Union.

Not only that; agricultural productivity of labour in the CSA has been higher than that of the Union, according to recognized research, or so I heard. Obviously in the industry-agriculture conflict this is a detrimental factor, but it shows that the idea of a one-trick nation is silly in the extreme. Cotton with slave agriculture was giving the CSA "the most money" as it was. However, it did not save it. Non-diversified industries are not conducive to becoming a real economic power. One-good export economies are inherently unstable and crisis-prone unless they diversify.

It's not like Hong Kong or Singapore would be massive wealthy states naturally; they're islands of good institutions on fairly mediocre/cramped land.

Are you seriously that stupid as to be unable to comprehend capital flows? Is Shanghai also an island of "good institutions" on mediocre overpopulated land? Is Moscow having better institutions than the rest of Russia, since Moscow's GDP/capita is $40 000 - just a little lower than that of the USA? Are you seriously that stupid and how much of the lessons devoted to the movement of capital did you flunk? Hong Kong or Singapore would never be massively wealthy if they were not major capital inflow-outflow points. Those are cities, and they follow the general rule for cities - a capital transit point city would be naturally wealthier than other cities. For example, New York is the wealthiest point in the US, but it does not mean it has "good institutions" where the rest of the USA has bad ones. Or you think "there's no way New York would be a massively wealthy state naturally"? I think that you don't have any education in economics. Not even a mediocre one.

[Kane Starkiller]

And on the other hand, when the USSR started exporting oil en masse, it started losing steam as well - the GDP/capita relative to the world average was decreasing.

Are you saying that USSR started loosing steam because it started exporting oil? I would say that it's the other way around: because USSR started loosing steam its economy didn't keep pace with its own oil extraction and so it had more surplus oil to export.

As for the discussion while I would agree with Iron Bridge that institutions are indeed important I think he is greatly underestimating the importance of geography as well. Availability of arable land, navigable rivers and natural oceanic ports decreases transportaion costs and enables capital surpluses to form. Center of European economy and population: South England, Northern France, Netherlands, West Germany are all low lying regions with abundance of arable land, dense navigable river and canal networks and a large number of deep water oceanic ports.

Similarly eastern half of US has a huge swath of arable land overlapped with Missisippi-Missouri-Ohio navigable river system as well as a large number of huge natural harbors facilitating trade.

Or being placed at the strategic strait like Singapore.

[K. A. Pital]

Are you saying that USSR started loosing steam because it started exporting oil? I would say that it's the other way around: because USSR started loosing steam its economy didn't keep pace with its own oil extraction and so it had more surplus oil to export.

The USSR in the 1970s acquired vast quantities of oil to export - so massive that they could not have been consumed domestically. Even if the USSR's own industry developed at twice the pace, it couldn't realistically consume the enormous amounts of oil extracted in the 1970s and 1980s. This was an event similar in nature, if not entirely in scope, to a sudden discovery of oil in a petrostate. Oil extraction expanded rapidly and to the detriment of other sectors of the economy. Not just that, but the oil price shock made oil exports a temporarily preferrable way to raise incomes, since it was easier. In essence, the abililty to achieve income gains by large oil exports led to a massive Dutch disease bubble and the stalling of progress in other sectors, since oil incomes were thought secured. Oil is a false blessing, just look at Venezuela from the 1950s to now.

As for the discussion while I would agree with Iron Bridge that institutions are indeed important I think he is greatly underestimating the importance of geography as well.

He is not just ignoring geography, but everything else: capital flows, education, technologies, availability of labour inputs and geography. And history itself, comprised of all these elements. He's so stupid that he's comparing the GDP of pure megacities with the GDP of nations that still have sizeable rural populations. That's a travesty which leads to failing the economic geography test in any sane educational institution.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Kane, it's called Dutch Disease, and it is a debated economic occurrence of some real merit.

[Zinegata]

Not only that; agricultural productivity of labour in the CSA has been higher than that of the Union, according to recognized research, or so I heard.

Slavery issues aside (I think I've covered them in the previous post), it probably has to do with the fact that Southern agriculture was actually highly concentrated into a handful of plantations focused on growing cash crops. Whereas Union farms tended to be smaller, family-owned farms growing foodstuffs for local consumption.

[bellatroll]

Why did the industrial revolution begin in England? Why is Northern Europe, Northern Germany and Switzerland some of the richest parts of the world?

It's rather simple: the practice of primogeniture.

Northern Europe widely practiced primogeniture. Contrast this with the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world. Islam strictly prohibits the practice of primogeniture on benign grounds; even empowering women to receive a share of the inheritence, which was rather progressive in the medieval world. In the long run, it meant that businesses were dissolved after the first generation. Families during the middle ages tended to be larger, and successful businessmen faced the added preasure to practice polygamy, which meant they had even more children. Once he died, his sons, daughters and wives and others would start bickering over their share of the loot, and nothing was exempted: working capital was sold off, properties were sold, employees were fired, all partnerships were dissolved. All in order to extract as much inheritable loot as possible. Of course, this totally demolished the business and decades of work, but law is law.

During medieval times, all of the partnerships were formed with the person of the businessman (there was no conception of "corporate personhood"). So in England, where primogeniture prevailed, there was stability and certainty. Once the businessman died, everyone knew that his eldest son would inherit all of his property, wealth, workers and partnerships. Therefore long term, complicated partnerships made sense, because if one of the partners died, not all of their work would be blown to pieces. They'd just have a younger member to welcome into their partnership. Additionally the businessmen knew from the get go that their firstborn son was going to be their heir, so they had every incentive to secure him the best available training and conditioning.

The younger sons weren't so lucky, of course, and their future was less certain. Sometimes they became bandits even; medieval English countryside was ravaged by gangs of aristocratic bandits, who had little but their sword with them. These ganges were later romanticized in the "Robin hood" legend. In Finland in the 1800s, the countryside was ravaged by gangs of knife men. In Switzerland, many of the younger sons became mercenaries and went all around the Europe to fight other people's wars. But more commonly, you joined the army, became a worker for someone else, joined the church, or lived off the mercy of your wealthier brother, whatever. Daughters were married off as soon as possible.

Primogeniture was harsh, but it did have the advantage of keeping businesses intact. Small merchants could sire a huge commercial dynasty and had every incentive to expand and grow wealthier. Once the industrial revolution arrived, these large commercial dynasties had the resources to implement the new capital intensive technologies like the steam engine.

In the muslim world, no such incentive existed and no great commercial dynasties ever formed. Almost all muslim partnerships lasted for about a week or two and were generally between two or three people. We know this because the Ottomans had extensive records. A partnership of two camel merchants is not going to have the capital to import a steam engine from england or fund the development of a natively built steam engine. It just isn't going to happen and didn't. Add to this, the religious ulema that had banned the printing press and other innovations and you have a receipe for disaster.

China, also, didn't practice primogeniture from my understanding. And China too, was a rather closed society.

Nowdays, none of this should be a problem. We have joint stock companies and other organizations that can protect working capital while still being owned by a multidute of people. The people don't own the working capital, and sell it off for their short term gain, they instead own shares in the company. So, nowdays, Islamic inheritence laws -- or even more egalitarian laws -- are no longer detrimental to progress.

[Ziggy Stardust]

It's rather simple: the practice of primogeniture.

You know, if you had read the rest of this thread you would realize that it ISN'T "rather simple." The entire point is that the industrial revolution necessitated the confluence of a wide variety of social, economic, geographic, political, and technological factors, that for a variety of reasons occurred in the time and place that it did.

While primogeniture to some degree could be one of the many social influences that helped lead to the prevailing conditions that allowed the industrial revolution, claiming that the entire revolution was "simply" the result of primogeniture is really stretching.

If what you say were 100% accurate, then why did the ancient Jewish people, who practiced primogeniture, not "discover" industrialization? What about the Romans? While they did not practice strict primogeniture in the sense you mean, they had well-established inheritance laws and an appropriate economic infrastructure. What about Russia? Japan?

In fact, I could argue that strict primogeniture as you describe didn't even exist widely in Europe; many feudal societies had more complicated succession rites, based on proximity of blood and/or tanistry. Many of the major European wars of the time were fought as a result of unclear succession, after all, which certainly casts some doubt on your claim that primogeniture simplified things.

[bellatroll]

You know, if you had read the rest of this thread you would realize that it ISN'T "rather simple." The entire point is that the industrial revolution necessitated the confluence of a wide variety of social, economic, geographic, political, and technological factors, that for a variety of reasons occurred in the time and place that it did.

No. It doesn't HAVE to be a massive, incomprehensible confluence of factors: sometimes the answer can be less complicated. I don't say that primogeniture law is the sole reason for the industrial revolution, but rather that it was a necessary institution. We know from the Ottoman records that there were almost no partnerships in their empire with more than a handful of participants, and these were usually short lived. To implement the capital intensive technologies of the industrial age you need institutions (often powerful commercial dynasties) with suffiecent pooled capital, skilled workers, several partners, investors and confidence in the long term stability of the enterprise. Primogeniture provided all of these in the ways I described.

One or two merchants in a week long partnership isn't going to have the capital to import or construct a steam engine. A engineering innvator won't be able to raise enough funds for a risky project from such small merchants. All the while the state in both China and the Muslim world was almost entirely concerned with providing security, and erecting the occasional hero project (like big dams, canals, walls etc), so the state wasn't going to give the innovator his funding either. You need institutions that can provide such capital, i.e. commercial dynasties, and later corporations, to get started with your industrial thing.

oh, none of this has anything whatsoever to do with any reasonable concept of the free market. We're talking about elementary, foundational institutions. Any one who says that the free market gave birth to industrialization is putting the cart before the horse.

While primogeniture to some degree could be one of the many social influences that helped lead to the prevailing conditions that allowed the industrial revolution, claiming that the entire revolution was "simply" the result of primogeniture is really stretching.

I don't think so.

If what you say were 100% accurate, then why did the ancient Jewish people, who practiced primogeniture, not "discover" industrialization?

Perhaps they never had the oppoturnity to do so; I mean, of course, I doubt that the primitive ancient world could have given birth to industrialization; obviously you need to have discovered some technologies before you can start developing a steam engine. So, ancient world didn't really have the advances that the world in 1500 did. There's no reason, except the lack of primogeniture I think, why China or the Ottoman Empire couldn't have industrialized in the early modern times.

What about the Romans? While they did not practice strict primogeniture in the sense you mean, they had well-established inheritance laws and an appropriate economic infrastructure.

What about Russia?

Well, Russia did industrialize, just not as rapidly as the rest of Europe.

Japan?

Japan when?

In fact, I remember Japan copying European technology quite quickly (when they wanted). Perhaps indicating an institutional capability.

In fact, I could argue that strict primogeniture as you describe didn't even exist widely in Europe;

Yes it existed widely in northern Europe, england, germany, and switzerland. Some polities in the HRE had even more egalitarian systems than the Muslims at the time.

many feudal societies had more complicated succession rites, based on proximity of blood and/or tanistry. Many of the major European wars of the time were fought as a result of unclear succession, after all, which certainly casts some doubt on your claim that primogeniture simplified things.

Many Feudals followed primogeniture, many didn't, but we're not talking about feudal lords or the state. We're talking about burghers and peasants for the most part.

[K. A. Pital]

Primogeniture among the peasants - before the collapse of communal agriculture? Or after? In this case we're talking about a consequence at best. The reasons lie deeper.

Well, Russia did industrialize, just not as rapidly as the rest of Europe.

Up to 1890 the production processes used in Russia were clearly proto-industrial as opposed to industrial. I'm not saying your points are without merit, merely that the picture is a bit more complex than just "primogeniture=win".

[Dr. Trainwreck]

Primogeniture might cause accumulation of capital, but it won't cause natural resources to just up and spawn, nor just bring on the stability, trade routes, safety from foreign invaders, etc. I understand what you mean, but a couple or three other reasons are just as important.

[K. A. Pital]

Natural resources - in quantities necessary for industrial production to sprawl - existed in several places, but one became a start. Like I said before, how you use the resources is more important than just having them. Coal mining was available to many civilizations; blast furnaces that could make use of coal - to a scant few.

I'd say safety from foreign invaders is an important point which is not guaranteed by anything but nice geography - islands get the best card here.

[Ziggy Stardust]

I don't say that primogeniture law is the sole reason for the industrial revolution, but rather that it was a necessary institution.

Then why did not all nations with primogeniture-based law develop industry, and why did some nations without it develop industry?

We know from the Ottoman records that there were almost no partnerships in their empire with more than a handful of participants, and these were usually short lived.

What kind of partnerships are you talking about?

To implement the capital intensive technologies of the industrial age you need institutions (often powerful commercial dynasties) with suffiecent pooled capital, skilled workers, several partners, investors and confidence in the long term stability of the enterprise. Primogeniture provided all of these in the ways I described.

How does primogeniture provide these in a way that other social institutions inherently do not?

One or two merchants in a week long partnership isn't going to have the capital to import or construct a steam engine. A engineering innvator won't be able to raise enough funds for a risky project from such small merchants. All the while the state in both China and the Muslim world was almost entirely concerned with providing security, and erecting the occasional hero project (like big dams, canals, walls etc), so the state wasn't going to give the innovator his funding either. You need institutions that can provide such capital, i.e. commercial dynasties, and later corporations, to get started with your industrial thing.

Okay ... and what does this have to do with primogeniture? Why do you consider inheritance practices to be the decided factor, and what evidence do you have that primogeniture is not only superior to other forms of inheritance, but is actually responsible for the CREATION of the socioeconomic environment that made the Industrial Revolution possible?

Perhaps they never had the oppoturnity to do so; I mean, of course, I doubt that the primitive ancient world could have given birth to industrialization; obviously you need to have discovered some technologies before you can start developing a steam engine. So, ancient world didn't really have the advances that the world in 1500 did.

The world in 1500? When exactly do you think the industrial revolution started?

There's no reason, except the lack of primogeniture I think, why China or the Ottoman Empire couldn't have industrialized in the early modern times.

Really? Primogeniture is the only reason the Ottomans didn't industrialize? The lack of primogeniture was responsible for the aggressive military expansionism, broken financial system, poor roads and internal transportation networks, a large nomadic population, scarce labour and capital, etc. etc.?

Well, Russia did industrialize, just not as rapidly as the rest of Europe.

First of all, don't think I didn't notice your dodge of the Roman question.

Second of all, as Stas said, Russia was not an industrial nation until the very late 19th/early 20th centuries.

Japan when?

Anytime during the 18th or early 19th century. They had primogeniture during the time period that industrialization was first beginning, yet they did not develop it. Why?

Yes it existed widely in northern Europe, england, germany, and switzerland. Some polities in the HRE had even more egalitarian systems than the Muslims at the time.

You completely ignored what I said just to restate your original point. If primogeniture was the prevailing system, then why did Ulrika Eleonora claim the Swedish throne in 1718, instead of Charles Frederick? In England, primogeniture was only really used for the inheritance of land, and even then the system was far from omnipresent (and women could and did inherit land as well). What about Salic law, which was prominent in central and northern Europe?

Many Feudals followed primogeniture, many didn't, but we're not talking about feudal lords or the state. We're talking about burghers and peasants for the most part.

Why? Why are the inheritance laws of the peasants more important than those of the nobility?

First of all, you need to provide some evidence that primogeniture was as universal as you claim in societies that industrialized (when nothing I can find supports that notion; indeed, England and Germany especially had far more complicated social structures than you give them credit for). Second, you need to provide some evidence that it was because of primogeniture that industrialization was possible, and explain how some nations with primogeniture did not industrialize.

[Dr. Trainwreck]

Natural resources - in quantities necessary for industrial production to sprawl - existed in several places, but one became a start. Like I said before, how you use the resources is more important than just having them. Coal mining was available to many civilizations; blast furnaces that could make use of coal - to a scant few.

I'd say safety from foreign invaders is an important point which is not guaranteed by anything but nice geography - islands get the best card here.

I think I can tie my points together by saying that without stability and safety from enemies, you don't get to exploit your natural resources.