The problem is you keep using Tobruk before it is available. Tobruk is only a viable Axis port after the British have been driven out of the East Med. Rommel cannot be supplied out of it until the Axis have Suez. Before then the British will sink anything that comes near Tobruk.Perinquus wrote:I'm well aware of the problems of logistics. And you are right as far as the port facilties of Tripoli are concerned. They are limited in what they could bring in. But you seem to be neglecting to mention that that was not the only port available to the Afrika Korps by the time it was in a position to make a thrust toward Egypt. Tobruk, which fell to the Germans, was several hundred miles further to the east, closer to the objectives of Alexandria and the Suez canal. This will rather seriously shorten the German supply lines, and alleviate those problems of transport. Rommel understood this, which is why he did not doubt his ability to take these objectives, given reinforcements and more regular supplies.
The problem is when Rommel reached El Alamein he had roughly 2,000 infantry and 65 operational tanks, all of which grossly needed significant maintenance work. All of his forces were operating on food, munitions and fuel which had been plundered from the British supply depot at Tobruk and he had nearly run through that. Quite literally even if he had won at El Alamein he didn't have enough fuel to finish the drive to Alexandria. Had he pressed the attack on the 30th, Rommel would have used up all his remaining stores. Then he would have been stuck at El Alamein until reinforcements and resupply came anyway. He would have been stuck there without food, munitions and fuel. And opposing him, as you so kindly pointed out, was a force that out matched him in tanks, aircraft, guns and troops.Perinquus wrote:If Alexandria can be captured, however, the RN has to abandon the eastern Med, as they have no other base. This will also sever the supply line to Malta, assuring its capitulation or abandonment. With the British stranglehold on his supply lines gone, and with Tobruk and Alexandria in his hands, Rommel could bring in ample supplies with which to seize the Egyptian Delta, Palestine, and Syria.
The crucial battle was El Alamein. After the loss of Tobruk, General Ritchie had lost the confidence to lead the 8th Army, so Auchinleck took direct command, and withdrew to El Alamein, which was only 60 miles from Alexandria. El Alamein was literally the last ditch defense for Egypt and the Middle East.
It was crucial for the Axis. The British were close to their supply sources, and had many more tanks, auircraft, guns and troops. Rommel, on the other hand, was at the extreme end of a long and tenuous supply line, and the Italians did not dare sens convoys to Mersa Matruh for fear of the Royal Navy. In other words, Rommel had to sieze El Alamein at once, or he had lost the campaign.
After capturing Mersa Matruh on 26 June, Rommel reached El Alamein on the 30th. Rommel believed Auchinleck had concentrated his tanks north of the Qattara Depression. He hadn't. They were still in the desert to the southwest, trying desperately to reach El Alamein. In the meantime, the British defenses consisted of four boxes of infantry between the sea and the depression, with the intervals covered by small, mobile columns. Had Rommel struck at once, he could have rushed into Alexandria and the Nile Delta. He didn't, and thus lost the campaign.
Sure if somehow they capture Alexandria then Palestine and Trans-Jordan can be taken. But then what about Iraq? That is your stated goal right? The problem is your German divisions end up at the end of just as long of a supply line in Iraq as they were in Libya. And this time they don't have a convenient port to capture. The British are going to be on interior lines, with good supply, and a solid rail system. The Germans are going to running low on everything, and as the roads in Trans-Jordan are no better than in Libya they still won't be able to supply more than 8-9 divisions. And none of this delivers a blow that will knock the British out of the war. Which means pretty soon they will be dealing with the Americans and possibly the Soviets as well.Perinquus wrote:Once again... it is not a few supply starved divisions. With Tripoli, Tobruk, and Alexandria in German hands, the port and road situation is not nearly so bad, thus it becomes possible to supply a larger force, which is available, because the Germans don't have any troops tied down on a Russian front.
Well the South African divisions for one. As you may remember they refused to allow their troops to be used outside of Africa. So there are a couple of divisions right there. And I can think of a half dozen other divisions floating around the Commonwealth that could be freed up for action in Upper Egypt. And all of these could be supplied from the Red Sea ports in SudanPerinquus wrote:And just what large forces are the British going to put on the Germans' flank on the Upper Nile? The British forces in Palestine, Syria and Libya numbered only 7 divisions. The British had no other substantial forces in the Middle East. They're not going to be moving divisions in from Iraq, when Rasid Ali raised his revolt, the British had to move troops into Iraq from the Transjordan to oppose it.
Of course they were. They didn't have the information we do. They didn't know what the German supply situation was actually like. All they knew was Rommel kept pulling miracles out of his hat. They played it safe and assumed this was because the supply issues had been resolved. Churchill also ordered the invasion of Madagascar to prevent the Japanese using it as a submarine base. Never mind the fact that today we know that it was an impossibility.Perinquus wrote: Auchinleck and Churchill were both sweating Alamein. They understood the possible consequences if the British had lost there.
Why not. The weakest point of German planning was always logistics. From the OKW on down whenever inconvenient logistical facts raised their heads, they were frequently ignored. Some times ad hoc solutions were made by local commanders, such as the capture of enemy dumps in France and Libya. And sometimes their lack of planning came around and bit them on their asses, like in Stalingrad.Perinquus wrote:Well seeing as most of his staff, a large number of senior officers in OKW, and Rommel himself also believed in this strategy, I would not be so quick to dismiss it so sneeringly.
