Why did China unite and Europe fail to?

[Stark]

It's the definition of 'unified' that people use that interests me. Combined with a poor understanding of the nature of historical societies, people seem to use a kind of alt-history style 'part of map coloured in red' style reasoning to decide how 'much' an organisation 'controls'.

And yeah you could joke and say 'Europe did 'unify', and it kept changing' answer anyway. I mean people might get the impression that historical 'China' is the same as the modern state, but that's just a part of the wierd rationale people use. I mean the OP shows a clear agenda.

[Thanas]

I mean the OP shows a clear agenda.

The book (or the summary of the book, which I assume to be accurate for now) seems like a bit of "TOUGH CENTRAL RUTHLESS STATE(tm) GOOD, SMALL STATES WITH REGIONAL VARIANCES BAD" stuff, yeah.

[ray245]

I mean the OP shows a clear agenda.

The book (or the summary of the book, which I assume to be accurate for now) seems like a bit of "TOUGH CENTRAL RUTHLESS STATE(tm) GOOD, SMALL STATES WITH REGIONAL VARIANCES BAD" stuff, yeah.

Isn't she arguing for the prospect of a democratic China though? Although I am still figuring out why is the Qin dynasty a valid or comparable example with modern day China.

[Thanas]

I cannot say anything about her views or her book as I have read neither, I am going purely based on the OP's summary.

[energiewende]

I mean the OP shows a clear agenda.

The book (or the summary of the book, which I assume to be accurate for now) seems like a bit of "TOUGH CENTRAL RUTHLESS STATE(tm) GOOD, SMALL STATES WITH REGIONAL VARIANCES BAD" stuff, yeah.

I didn't want to say it but this is my impression also. I think we will be seeing a lot more of this as time goes on. It is somewhat awkward for the world's soon to be largest economy and eventually most powerful state that their success has essentially come from imitating institutions of their rivals less effectively but with a much larger population. This is a weak foundational from which to claim moral ascendancy. So it is in their interests to claim that having a large population and dictatorial government is actually a facet of their superior culture and historical development, rather than the traditional reading that their extreme centralism and authoritarianism was largely responsible for failure to develop. China has now a lot of money to invest in the historical revisionism industry.

[Stark]

Your insecurity is showing. They'll be by to ship you off the the reservation in a few hours. Acting like its special or meaningful that people make up silly stories to justify their beliefs is so childish I laughed openly.

The part that I find most amusing is the part where people believe history 'ends': that Qin reached a 'tipping point' where it was unassailable and won the universe the end (tm). And then... history kept going and turns out that wasn't actually the end?

PS I love racism.

[Iracundus]

I mean the OP shows a clear agenda.

The book (or the summary of the book, which I assume to be accurate for now) seems like a bit of "TOUGH CENTRAL RUTHLESS STATE(tm) GOOD, SMALL STATES WITH REGIONAL VARIANCES BAD" stuff, yeah.

The author actually makes no moral pronouncement on either one unifying or an ongoing system of multiple states, just argues that an ongoing balance of power against unification need not be the natural endpoint of a system of multiple states and that if sufficiently knocked off equilibrium the system may slide towards one state accumulating enough advantage to overcome the others. Her main comment on the two is that the ongoing system of multiple states is often assumed to be the normative against which things are measured, and questions why that need be so and that alternatively it could be viewed as the exception and as an unstable equilibrium.

If anything, she makes the point that the cutthroat world of the Warring States multiple state system encouraged legal protection and freedom of expression more than the unified empire as each state sought to gain every advantage possible.

Aside from the usual balancing against the rising or strong power, the other strategy of bandwagoning was addressed and how such a strategy might have been the logical short term one for survival for weaker states even if it meant tipping things even further in favor of the strong state.

After some searching, from the book itself on why the Warring States period and early Europe was chosen:

Indeed, of all historical systems in world history, the ancient Chinese history most closely resembles the stereotypical anarchical international system because it is composed of sovereign territorial states while other systems are constituted by nonstate entities (such as city-states) or dissimilar units (that is, the coexistence of territorial states, city-states, city-leagues, city empires)...

Ancient China resembled early modern Europe not just in interstate relations, but also in state-society relations...The distinction of the state from the reigning ruler, the separation of public offices from officeholders, the selection and promotion of officials on the basis of objective and meritocratic criteria, the universality and impartiality of publicly promulgated laws, the registration and enumeration of populations, the central budgeting of revenues and expenditures, the amassing of statistics and reports, the capacity for direct rule, and other administrative techniques...

The issue of technology isn't really made mention of in the book itself because it focuses on the politics, administrative, and state-state and state-society relations. I am assuming also the issue would have equalized out in that Qin was matched against its peers (i.e. everyone was at late Bronze/early Iron Age capabilities) and similarly for the European states, with nobody achieving decisive technological advantage over rivals.

Yes, it can be argued because apparently nations with no knowledge of the local culture thought it to be more efficient than just building up their own tax apparatus and financial administration until the Romans came and instituted a financial administration so efficient it survived well beyond the fall of the empire, albeit in a somewhat diminished form.

I think you missed the main point of my reply. We know and view tax farming as weakening to the state, but that is hindsight. At the time, it served as quick means of securing funds. That was one of the points the author made about "self-weakening" reforms, that seemed rational at the time or expedient for short term gain but which had longer term negative consequences. They are only "self-weakening" in hindsight.


I do hope people are not suggesting there is bias because the author is of Chinese ethnicity. Her academic creditials show her to be from the University of Notre Dame in Indiana. Or are we to therefore suggest anyone with any trace of English ancestry is automatically biased in favor of Britain or any Italian automatically pro-Roman? I should hope not, and that we can discuss someone's writings without paranoid fears of secret agenda.

[energiewende]

I find that English historians tend to take a much more favourable view of Britain (on average) than historians of other nationalities, possibly excepting English offshoots; of course that does not mean they are wrong. Another thing to bear in mind though is that this is as much internal debate within China as it is debate between China and its rivals. The Communist Party wants to maintain its power but the success of liberal reforms are undermining the case for a strong central autocracy. So it is in their interest to portray central autocracy as "Chinese national characteristic" rather than accident of history that may not be optimal. I haven't read this book and going more on the impression I receive from your statements; the author in fact seems to be pro-democracy.

[Iracundus]

Yes, it can be argued because apparently nations with no knowledge of the local culture thought it to be more efficient than just building up their own tax apparatus and financial administration until the Romans came and instituted a financial administration so efficient it survived well beyond the fall of the empire, albeit in a somewhat diminished form.

I think you missed the main point of my reply. We know and view tax farming and sale of offices as weakening to the state, but that is hindsight. At the time, it served as quick means of securing funds. That was one of the points the author made about "self-weakening" reforms, that seemed rational at the time or expedient for short term gain but which had longer term negative consequences. They are only "self-weakening" in hindsight.

That is funny considering most mercenaries where not hired because pleasant levvies were unavailable (they were) but because mercenaries were so much better.

Well that point is up for discussion too. The author disagreed and cited Machiavelli who said they exhibited "cowardice" and were "useless for they have no reason to stand firm apart from the little bit of pay you give them." "To compound the problem, military entrepreneurs who were not paid surrendered to the enemy, and foreign mercenaries who were not paid deserted, mutinied, and pillaged the countryside" (Footnote cites and gives desertion rate reaching 50-70%).

For example, unpaid troops in the Army of Flanders mutined more than forty times between 1567 and 1609, thus weakening Spanish offense and strengthening Dutch defense.

There is also a little mention of mercenary captains inflating their numbers (or not reporting casualties) and still collecting pay for phantom soldiers. While individually an armed mercenary might be of greater combat value than an armed peasant soldier, the associated risks and costs are argued to outweigh this.

[Iracundus]

Nobody with a grasp of the history of ancient immigration into Thrace would claim the Thracians to be similar to the greeks. There was no idea of a common culture or common identity among Thracians, Greek and Egyptians, nor did it really develop until it was forced on all three of them by the Romans.

And neither was any sense of common identity among the Warring States. Qin was the semi-barbaric outsider on the western fringe. Chu was the exotic southern barbarian state. Zhao was closer to the nomadic peoples of the steppe. The people of the various states were stereotyped in the same way people these days might grumble about "dour Germans" or "lazy Italians". The contention that they were all similar or had unified identity could be seen as retrospective reasoning knowing that they were subsequently unified. The fact they were melded together and now you cannot really say there is a separate Qin or Chu culture is true but that doesn't mean this was the case during the period of the Warring States. The linguistic and writing system differences themselves would have added to feelings of separateness.

Even now, many Chinese dialects are mutually unintelligible when spoken, hence the use of Mandarin and written Chinese as a common means of communication.

Yes, it can be argued because apparently nations with no knowledge of the local culture thought it to be more efficient than just building up their own tax apparatus and financial administration until the Romans came and instituted a financial administration so efficient it survived well beyond the fall of the empire, albeit in a somewhat diminished form.

I think you missed the main point of my reply. We know and view tax farming and sale of offices as weakening to the state, but that is hindsight. At the time, it served as quick means of securing funds. That was one of the points the author made about "self-weakening" reforms, that seemed rational at the time or expedient for short term gain but which had longer term negative consequences. They are only "self-weakening" in hindsight.

That is funny considering most mercenaries where not hired because pleasant levvies were unavailable (they were) but because mercenaries were so much better.

Well that point is up for discussion too. The author disagreed and cited Machiavelli who said they exhibited "cowardice" and were "useless for they have no reason to stand firm apart from the little bit of pay you give them." "To compound the problem, military entrepreneurs who were not paid surrendered to the enemy, and foreign mercenaries who were not paid deserted, mutinied, and pillaged the countryside" (Footnote cites and gives desertion rate reaching 50-70%).

For example, unpaid troops in the Army of Flanders mutined more than forty times between 1567 and 1609, thus weakening Spanish offense and strengthening Dutch defense.

There is also a little mention of mercenary captains inflating their numbers (or not reporting casualties) and still collecting pay for phantom soldiers. While individually an armed mercenary might be of greater combat value than an armed peasant soldier, the associated risks and costs are argued to outweigh this.[/quote]

So it is in their interest to portray central autocracy as "Chinese national characteristic" rather than accident of history that may not be optimal.

Actually I think this is one of the points that the author has issue with: Why must a unification under one centrally organized state be seen as an accident of history rather than the prolonged Westphalian system of Europe being the accident of history?

[Stark]

Since they're two different results of two different chains of events in two different environments, the real question should be 'what motivates people to equate things that are not the same' or 'scifi power ladders: are they useful to history'. :V If it motivated people to learn more about history that'd be fine, but as we can see it only exists so people can beat their nationalism in both directions.

[ray245]

Since they're two different results of two different chains of events in two different environments, the real question should be 'what motivates people to equate things that are not the same' or 'scifi power ladders: are they useful to history'. :V If it motivated people to learn more about history that'd be fine, but as we can see it only exists so people can beat their nationalism in both directions.

Do you really feel there is no historical merit to comparative history?

[Stark]

Without an understanding of the differences between two historical entities you want to compare, what's the point?

Beyond nationalism/racism/tribalism, I mean.

[Iracundus]

The contention made by the author is that there are similarities sufficient for comparison between the two multi-state systems:

As the early mdoern European system did, the Zhongguo system experienced disintegration of feudal hierarchy, prevalence of war, conditions of international anarchy, emergence of sovereign territorial states, configuration of the balance of power, development of the centralized bureaucracy, birth of the balance of power, development of the centralized bureaucracy, birth of state-society bargains, expansion of international trade, and other familiar phenomena of international domestic politics.

History can be viewed more as just knowing what happened before. Since humans have behaved in similar fashions throughout history, modified by individual circumstances, obviously no comparison can be entirely identical. However it can be argued there are enough similarities that one can learn and discuss past patterns in so far as it may be repeated in some variation or be learned so as to not repeat the pattern.


As for the earlier mention about tipping points, I would agree that Qin did pass the tipping point at the Battle of Changping in 260 BC that ended with the massive defeat and slaughter of Zhao's armies by Qin. By that point, Zhao was the only single state with sufficient manpower to challenge Qin militarily. Other states had already been exhausted militarily with their internecine wars with each other while Qin had comparatively escaped the worst of it despite several earlier defeats and setbacks. The other states had already tried multiple times to balance against Qin but failed when their mutual distrust or short term interests split them apart, allowing Qin to play one off the other. By 260 BC, Qin had already taken the Ba and Shu regions (modern Sichuan) and had a lead in food and population over its rivals. By that point, Qin could regenerate its strength faster than its rivals. Even its first failed attempt to destroy Chu only prolonged the end by that point. It would have taken a firm alliance among all the remaining states or Qin to have lost its territory in Sichuan to restore the status quo. The latter course of action was impaired by the flow direction of the rivers and the mountain ranges, and the first course of action had as mentioned been tried and failed.

The reasons for the Qin dynasty's disintegration is a different topic entirely. Although its massacre of Zhao prisoners at Changping probably added to things.

[Thanas]

After some searching, from the book itself on why the Warring States period and early Europe was chosen:

Indeed, of all historical systems in world history, the ancient Chinese history most closely resembles the stereotypical anarchical international system because it is composed of sovereign territorial states while other systems are constituted by nonstate entities (such as city-states) or dissimilar units (that is, the coexistence of territorial states, city-states, city-leagues, city empires)...

Ancient China resembled early modern Europe not just in interstate relations, but also in state-society relations...The distinction of the state from the reigning ruler, the separation of public offices from officeholders, the selection and promotion of officials on the basis of objective and meritocratic criteria, the universality and impartiality of publicly promulgated laws, the registration and enumeration of populations, the central budgeting of revenues and expenditures, the amassing of statistics and reports, the capacity for direct rule, and other administrative techniques...

This fails to explain why antiquity was not chosen as all of that is also present in antiquity.

I suspect it is simply because she wants to highlight the differences between something which "succeeded" and one which "failed" in unifying. In any case, the comparison is rather pointless.

The issue of technology isn't really made mention of in the book itself because it focuses on the politics, administrative, and state-state and state-society relations.

But again, why focus on medieval politics? Surely it would have been more honest to compare systems of their time to each other?

I am assuming also the issue would have equalized out in that Qin was matched against its peers (i.e. everyone was at late Bronze/early Iron Age capabilities) and similarly for the European states, with nobody achieving decisive technological advantage over rivals.

I do not understand what you mean with "equalized out".

Yes, it can be argued because apparently nations with no knowledge of the local culture thought it to be more efficient than just building up their own tax apparatus and financial administration until the Romans came and instituted a financial administration so efficient it survived well beyond the fall of the empire, albeit in a somewhat diminished form.

I think you missed the main point of my reply. We know and view tax farming as weakening to the state, but that is hindsight.

And I think you missed the main point of my reply which is that it is unproven that tax farming is weakening to the state per se. That is an assumption a priori which must be justified according to the specific situations, especially in the context of medieval/ancient societies.

Well that point is up for discussion too. The author disagreed and cited Machiavelli who said they exhibited "cowardice" and were "useless for they have no reason to stand firm apart from the little bit of pay you give them." "To compound the problem, military entrepreneurs who were not paid surrendered to the enemy, and foreign mercenaries who were not paid deserted, mutinied, and pillaged the countryside" (Footnote cites and gives desertion rate reaching 50-70%).

You've got to be shitting me. This author uses Machiavelli as an authoritative source on renaissance mercenaries? Sorry, but her credibility just went into the shitter. Please note that Machiavelli (out of political ideology, not study of warfare) argued for a citizen militia. Guess what happened when a citizen militia formed according to Machiavelli's principles went up against a mercenary army? They got their asses kicked so hard the idea of a citizen army was abandoned for the next 100 years.

Please cite the credentials of the author in the field of renaissance warfare, because if this is the level of "proof" the book uses then the book is worthless. Using Machiavelli as a factual source on the performance of mercenaries?

For example, unpaid troops in the Army of Flanders mutined more than forty times between 1567 and 1609, thus weakening Spanish offense and strengthening Dutch defense.

They mutinied because they were unpaid and starving, not because they were "BAD MERCENARIES". Every army that is starving will mutiny, mercenary or no mercenary.

There is also a little mention of mercenary captains inflating their numbers (or not reporting casualties) and still collecting pay for phantom soldiers. While individually an armed mercenary might be of greater combat value than an armed peasant soldier, the associated risks and costs are argued to outweigh this.

A prediction that is false for every period of history until the french revolution, when the sheer mass of "citizen troops" made their relative inefficiency irrelevant. Mercenaries were always used in every age of warfare. In an era of no professional armies until the advent of the 18th century you really cannot say that mercenaries were inefficient and bad value.

[Stark]

Right, but looking at <differences> and deciding they succeeded or failed due to <merit> requires evidence. If two widely distinct entities do the same thing or even similar things and get widely distinct outcomes, is this because of some kind of merit or because of the differences people ignore to make the comparison? Without really in depth scholarship it just looks like nationalism to me, because the most obvious difference between any two entities is the observers attitude.

[Thanas]

Right, but looking at <differences> and deciding they succeeded or failed due to <merit> requires evidence. If two widely distinct entities do the same thing or even similar things and get widely distinct outcomes, is this because of some kind of merit or because of the differences people ignore to make the comparison? Without really in depth scholarship it just looks like nationalism to me, because the most obvious difference between any two entities is the observers attitude.

And of course there is the problem of creating a single unifying theory on how such complex events happen in the first place.

[ray245]

Without an understanding of the differences between two historical entities you want to compare, what's the point?

Beyond nationalism/racism/tribalism, I mean.

But aren't we already using comparative history on a sub-conscious level every time we judge the success and failure of every modern and historical state? We are constantly comparing say the Roman empire with the Athenian empire to identify how different factors contribute to their rise as an imperial power.

Right, but looking at <differences> and deciding they succeeded or failed due to <merit> requires evidence. If two widely distinct entities do the same thing or even similar things and get widely distinct outcomes, is this because of some kind of merit or because of the differences people ignore to make the comparison? Without really in depth scholarship it just looks like nationalism to me, because the most obvious difference between any two entities is the observers attitude.

Which is why historians from their own respective fields are undertaking collaborative efforts when it comes to writing a comparative studies of different empire.

[Thanas]

Without an understanding of the differences between two historical entities you want to compare, what's the point?

Beyond nationalism/racism/tribalism, I mean.

But aren't we already using comparative history on a sub-conscious level every time we judge the success and failure of every modern and historical state? We are constantly comparing say the Roman empire with the Athenian empire to identify how different factors contribute to their rise as an imperial power.

That is different. Those are contemporary empires with similar cultures, a common language and similar threats to their expansion. Unlike a culture which is on another continent, has different cultural and philosophical values and where there is a 1000 year difference.

[Stark]

And in that specific example it's common to see broad strokes of '<xyz> caused the Greeks to do <JFK> whereas the Romans instead did <abc>' rather than ROME ROOLS TEH NOOBISH GRUKS BECAUSE CENTRALISM. A political and cultural discussion is a bit more involved than the OP shopping lists.

The idea that policies enacted for some short term goal have continuing knock-on effects into the long term that may not be as intended can be seen throughout history.

[Iracundus]

This fails to explain why antiquity was not chosen as all of that is also present in antiquity.

What systems would you have chosen to compare then? Because it seems essentially you are saying you can never examine different cultures alongside each other in any sense because "Duh, they're DIFFERENT". Taken to that extent, one might say it is pointless to examine any history other than the present, because everything in the past is so different.

Similar social constructs and methods of organization have arisen throughout history and some of these are similar enough to be grouped together. Hence why it is even possible to talk about "monarchies", "kingdoms", and other general institutions. Sure there are differences from how the Pharaoh of Egypt of any period ran things compared to Imperial China and so on, but that doesn't mean there cannot be comparisons on the points of similarity, and also the points of difference.

Of course there are broad themes of things like knock-on effects, but the discussion is in the details. Every decision of any polity has knock-on effects for good or ill.

But again, why focus on medieval politics? Surely it would have been more honest to compare systems of their time to each other?

As the quote said earlier, the times were chosen because of the view they were going through similar social and political changes and states despite their separation in time. It isn't a comparison of systems as they were on opposite ends of Eurasia at a single point in time.

I do not understand what you mean with "equalized out".

Equalized out in that no state had significant technological advantage over another. Qin and its peers were about equal technologically, and the European comparison for equal states of the same period. Each state gaining or failing to gain advantage over its peers could not be therefore laid at the feet of technological advantage or disadvantage.

And I think you missed the main point of my reply which is that it is unproven that tax farming is weakening to the state per se. That is an assumption a priori which must be justified according to the specific situations, especially in the context of medieval/ancient societies.

Are you arguing that tax farming isn't weakening to the state in the long run, at least in the form it was conducted historically? It may have been done due to limits of government apparatus to conduct census and assessment or due to issues of saving time and effort, but how is paying interest to private individuals to collect government taxes (or signing away administrative rights to the farmed area) not weakening the state? Quite apart from the financial take, it diluted the state's power over its own territory. It creates regional centers of powers around what could end up as warlords (which is what happened under later Chinese dynasties when military powers were farmed out in addition to fiscal and administrative).

Well that point is up for discussion too. The author disagreed and cited Machiavelli who said they exhibited "cowardice" and were "useless for they have no reason to stand firm apart from the little bit of pay you give them." "To compound the problem, military entrepreneurs who were not paid surrendered to the enemy, and foreign mercenaries who were not paid deserted, mutinied, and pillaged the countryside" (Footnote cites and gives desertion rate reaching 50-70%).

You've got to be shitting me. This author uses Machiavelli as an authoritative source on renaissance mercenaries? Sorry, but her credibility just went into the shitter. Please note that Machiavelli (out of political ideology, not study of warfare) argued for a citizen militia. Guess what happened when a citizen militia formed according to Machiavelli's principles went up against a mercenary army? They got their asses kicked so hard the idea of a citizen army was abandoned for the next 100 years.

Machiavelli was cited to say the words and argue the point. There are a range of other papers cited supporting the idea of high desertion rates among mercenary forces.
As for the high desertion rate, that was from Parrott, David A. 1995 Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War.

They mutinied because they were unpaid and starving, not because they were "BAD MERCENARIES". Every army that is starving will mutiny, mercenary or no mercenary.

While any army will either disband or mutiny with no support, the issue of the revolt was tied into the other issue of fiscal burden, namely that the fiscal burden of mercenaries exceeded the capability of early European rulers to reliably pay them. Would the the fiscal burden of raising a massed levy army have been different? Certainly the effort on the part of the government would have been greater in establishing the logistical infrastructure and capabilities, but would it have paid out financially in the long term?

A prediction that is false for every period of history until the french revolution, when the sheer mass of "citizen troops" made their relative inefficiency irrelevant. Mercenaries were always used in every age of warfare. In an era of no professional armies until the advent of the 18th century you really cannot say that mercenaries were inefficient and bad value.

Sure mercenaries might be the best option in the lack of national armies, but why weren't there national armies until that much later? A mobilized national army of sufficient size be sufficient to achieve the sheer mass you talk about. Granted, this would be an option only for states with sufficient population.

Qin and the Warring States certainly went down that route of mass citizen troops. Certainly there is no mention of mercenary companies on any scale. If they could do that in circa 350 BC, why wasn't the same implemented in post-Roman states?

[ray245]

That is different. Those are contemporary empires with similar cultures, a common language and similar threats to their expansion. Unlike a culture which is on another continent, has different cultural and philosophical values and where there is a 1000 year difference.

Do you see much value in comparing the Tang dynasty with the Byzantine empire then? Comparing contemporary empires with vastly different culture would allow us to easier identify how has culture shaped the organisation and decision making process.

[ray245]

What systems would you have chosen to compare then? Because it seems essentially you are saying you can never examine different cultures alongside each other in any sense because "Duh, they're DIFFERENT". Taken to that extent, one might say it is pointless to examine any history other than the present, because everything in the past is so different.

But you have be aware of how huge a difference is between a bronze age civilisation and a pre-modern civilisation. You would be better off comparing the Ming dynasty to the Hapsburg empire under Charles V than the Qin dynasty with 17th century France.

As the quote said earlier, the times were chosen because of the view they were going through similar social and political changes and states despite their separation in time. It isn't a comparison of systems as they were on opposite ends of Eurasia at a single point in time.

Why not just pick the Roman empire or the empire of Alexander?

Qin and the Warring States certainly went down that route of mass citizen troops. Certainly there is no mention of mercenary companies on any scale. If they could do that in circa 350 BC, why wasn't the same implemented in post-Roman states?

Aren't you forgetting the Byzantine empire? The Islamic caliphate are also example of post Roman state capable of massing huge armies.

[madd0ct0r]

how about size of uniting = random chance?

[ray245]

how about size of uniting = random chance?

Then there is little point to study history don't you think?