Why did China unite and Europe fail to?

[Stark]

Do you see much value in comparing the Tang dynasty with the Byzantine empire then? Comparing contemporary empires with vastly different culture would allow us to easier identify how has culture shaped the organisation and decision making process.

What if there are other differences, such as geography, demographics, political structure, international and trade situation, etc? Your statement seems to be implying 'everything was different except culture' which, if untrue, makes the whole argument meaningless.

And to me given Byzantium's very specific organisational and political makeup, I find it very unlikely the Tang were in a si liar situation with similar pressures and goals.

[Iracundus]

But you have be aware of how huge a difference is between a bronze age civilisation and a pre-modern civilisation. You would be better off comparing the Ming dynasty to the Hapsburg empire under Charles V than the Qin dynasty with 17th century France.

From the author's reasoning, the circumstances were different then. Ming dynasty was unified, and even during its initial founding period, there were no longer any separate state identities to the same extent that there were during the Warring States. The technological differences are only existent between the times, not between the peers of the individual time period. Whether someone is being killed with bronze swords or iron or steel swords doesn't factor into how the states interacted politically or fiscally. The magnitude of the productivity or the killed in battle as a factor of technology might change, but the unspoken assumption is that the politics don't change at the fundamental level (details might).

The author focused on multi-state systems going through particular social changes which were viewed as similar despite separation in time and technology. That seems to be the main point of disagreement here. The author is contending that you can compare similar systems despite time separation and technology based on their social and political systems (and because their success and failure was measured against their peers not vs. each other). It seems the opposing view is that time and distance makes things impossible to compare. But as I said earlier, taken to its logical extreme, this would mean you can never compare anything in history since one could always argue circumstances are different enough despite any similarities. No empires or states in history were ever entirely identical to others even in individual aspects.

And it is not even just the social sciences. Even in things like medical trials, it will always be impossible to entirely say things were identical between patients or hospitals, yet these differences are either eliminated (where possible), controlled for in the analysis, or discussed at least when not able to be controlled for. The fact things were never identical doesn't mean conclusions can't be drawn.

Why not just pick the Roman empire or the empire of Alexander?

Because again this isn't Qin dynasty vs. Roman empire or Alexander's empire. The comparison sought was a comparison of a divided political system with no superpower. Again I don't know why the united empires get dragged into this, because the book restricts its comparison to the time of division not the time after unification.

Aren't you forgetting the Byzantine empire? The Islamic caliphate are also example of post Roman state capable of massing huge armies.

Ok, let me be more specific: post-Roman European states, leaning more towards the western end.

The Islamic caliphate and the Byzantine Empire were unified empires (until their ultimate fracturing) and not therefore the focus of the comparison in the first place, which focused on multi-state systems with no clear superpower initially.

[ray245]

From the author's reasoning, the circumstances were different then. Ming dynasty was unified, and even during its initial founding period, there were no longer any separate state identities to the same extent that there were during the Warring States.

The author focused on multi-state systems going through particular social changes which were viewed as similar despite separation in time and technology. That seems to be the main point of disagreement here. The author is contending that you can compare similar systems despite time separation and technology based on their social and political systems (and because their success and failure was measured against their peers not vs. each other). It seems the opposing view is that time and distance makes things impossible to compare. But as I said earlier, taken to its logical extreme, this would mean you can never compare anything in history since one could always argue circumstances are different enough despite any similarities. No empires or states in history were ever entirely identical to others even in individual aspects.

And it is not even just the social sciences. Even in things like medical trials, it will always be impossible to entirely say things were identical between patients or hospitals, yet these differences are either eliminated (where possible), controlled for in the analysis, or discussed at least when not able to be controlled for. The fact things were never identical doesn't mean conclusions can't be drawn.

Because again this isn't Qin dynasty vs. Roman empire or Alexander's empire. The comparison sought was a comparison of a divided political system with no superpower. Again I don't know why the united empires get dragged into this, because the book restricts its comparison to the time of division not the time after unification.

If you are deliberately avoiding comparing the Qin with a superpower in the west, then shouldn't you have an answer as to why no state can unify Europe? Especially when the state of Qin was very much a superpower during the warring states period.

Ok, let me be more specific: post-Roman European states, leaning more towards the western end.

The Islamic caliphate and the Byzantine Empire were unified empires (until their ultimate fracturing) and not therefore the focus of the comparison in the first place, which focused on multi-state systems with no clear superpower initially.

That is a pretty unfair comparison don't you think? Unless you can really prove that the Qin is no a superpower, I don't see any point in leaving out the Byzantine empire and the Islamic caliphate.

[madd0ct0r]

how about size of uniting = random chance?

Then there is little point to study history don't you think?

You said it, not me

Seriously though, we're trying to shift through the variables involved to explain the outcomes. In this case we have a massively complicated huge number of variables, and very few data points to pin them to.

If you are looking at something much more specific, common and reliant on less factors than study has a good chance of unravelling the puzzle, otherwise it's as worthless as blogs pontificating on 'What to learn from Microsoft/Buffet/Trump"

[Iracundus]

If you are deliberately avoiding comparing the Qin with a superpower in the west, then shouldn't you have an answer as to why no state can unify Europe? Especially when the state of Qin was very much a superpower during the warring states period.

That is a pretty unfair comparison don't you think? Unless you can really prove that the Qin is no a superpower, I don't see any point in leaving out the Byzantine empire and the Islamic caliphate.

Qin wasn't. Qin was actually weak prior to the Shang Yang reforms and was one power among many. Qin suffered territorial losses at the hands of Wei, particularly along the western Yellow River. It wasn't until after those reforms and subsequent victories and retaking of territory that the other states started to take it more seriously. That was when there began to be talk of "vertical alliances" to band together against Qin.

The image of Qin as some all conquering juggernaut is either from retrospective hindsight in knowing it was the ultimate victor, or in the final stages before it became victor.

During the early Warring States Period, as its neighbours in east and central China began rapidly developing, Qin was still in a state of underdevelopment and decline. The population of Qin comprised a large proportion of Sinicized semi-tribal peoples, believed to be descendants of the Rong. This was believed to be a major cause of distinct unease and discrimination towards Qin from other states. The Wei state, formed from the Partition of Jin, became the most powerful state on Qin's eastern border. Qin was equipped with natural defenses, with Hangu Pass (函谷關; northeast of present-day Lingbao, Henan province) in the east and Tong Pass (潼關; present-day Tongguan County, Shaanxi province) in the west. Between 413 and 409 BC during the reign of Duke Jian of Qin, the Wei army led by Wu Qi, with support from Zhao and Han, attacked Qin and conquered Qin territories west of the Yellow River.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qin_(state ... tes_Period

From 656 to 357 BC Qin initiated only 11 of 160 "wars involving great powers"... In the Spring and Autumn period, it may be said that Qin performed the role of "the balancer": Qin was courted by both Jin and Chu during their prolonged rivalry from 632 to 546 BC...At the height of Wei's hegemony, Qin suffered from protracted succession struggles and lost to Wei large tracts of strategic territory on the west bank of the Yellow River.

Qin was a fringe power for most of the period. There were a succession of hegemons (commonly stated to be 5) and though 1 Qin ruler was among them, Qin declined in strength afterwards.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Hegemons

[Thanas]

What systems would you have chosen to compare then? Because it seems essentially you are saying you can never examine different cultures alongside each other in any sense because "Duh, they're DIFFERENT". Taken to that extent, one might say it is pointless to examine any history other than the present, because everything in the past is so different.

I have never seen a better strawman and reductio ad absurdum in my life. Good job.

Similar social constructs and methods of organization have arisen throughout history and some of these are similar enough to be grouped together. Hence why it is even possible to talk about "monarchies", "kingdoms", and other general institutions. Sure there are differences from how the Pharaoh of Egypt of any period ran things compared to Imperial China and so on, but that doesn't mean there cannot be comparisons on the points of similarity, and also the points of difference.

My isssue is that ancient kingdoms and medieval kingdoms and renaissance stater are so dissimilar that comparing them is already a pain. It makes no sense to me to compare vastly different cultures in vastly different times.

Of course there are broad themes of things like knock-on effects, but the discussion is in the details. Every decision of any polity has knock-on effects for good or ill.

Seems like details are being ignored here though for the sake of broad strokes designs. Broad stroke theories almost always fail in history.

As the quote said earlier, the times were chosen because of the view they were going through similar social and political changes and states despite their separation in time. It isn't a comparison of systems as they were on opposite ends of Eurasia at a single point in time.

This is bullshit, do you think the ancient world had no similar social and political changes? How is a comparison of the Diadochi states not vastly better here, given they were large warring states that spanned huge territories?

Equalized out in that no state had significant technological advantage over another. Qin and its peers were about equal technologically, and the European comparison for equal states of the same period. Each state gaining or failing to gain advantage over its peers could not be therefore laid at the feet of technological advantage or disadvantage.

That depends. There are vast technological differences between European states of the same time. I doubt any serious historian would argue that during the renaissance, say, a city like Krakow is in any way the technological equal to, say, the city of Milan.

Are you arguing that tax farming isn't weakening to the state in the long run, at least in the form it was conducted historically? It may have been done due to limits of government apparatus to conduct census and assessment or due to issues of saving time and effort, but how is paying interest to private individuals to collect government taxes (or signing away administrative rights to the farmed area) not weakening the state? Quite apart from the financial take, it diluted the state's power over its own territory. It creates regional centers of powers around what could end up as warlords (which is what happened under later Chinese dynasties when military powers were farmed out in addition to fiscal and administrative).

This argument is easily diffused by the simple fact that the Roman republic did exist for several hundreds of years without tax farming weakening it in the long run or creating local centers of resistance, nor did it put the Republic behind its competitors. In fact, one may easily make the argument that localized sub-contracting and localized administration allowed the Roman Republic to have a great deal of flexibility in terms of crisis management and a great amount of integration and assimilation of the local elites, which in turn directly fueled the Roman rise to power. In fact, this is one of the leading theories behind the rise of Rome in the first place - they were so successful because they allowed the local people to keep their traditions and culture and rulers as long as they adhered to certain conditions.

Machiavelli was cited to say the words and argue the point. There are a range of other papers cited supporting the idea of high desertion rates among mercenary forces.
As for the high desertion rate, that was from Parrott, David A. 1995 Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War.

You are still missing the point. Even if the author only used machiavelli as a prop, the truth remains that she badly slanders over 2 millennia of mercenary tradition. The Thirty Years war is also a bad example due to the extraordinary circumstances of that time.

At this point I have to conclude that anybody who says that mercenaries are inherently weaker than citizen forces is ignorant of the historical facts.

While any army will either disband or mutiny with no support, the issue of the revolt was tied into the other issue of fiscal burden, namely that the fiscal burden of mercenaries exceeded the capability of early European rulers to reliably pay them. Would the the fiscal burden of raising a massed levy army have been different? Certainly the effort on the part of the government would have been greater in establishing the logistical infrastructure and capabilities, but would it have paid out financially in the long term?

Failure to pay is nothing new to history. Raising massed levy armies is both impractical as financially ruinous in itself. If you conscript your peasants, you are weakening yourself. BTW, raising levvies was used en masse during the Thirty Years war to little effect. As long as firearms remained primitive and thereby weaponry training involved a great deal of skill and effort (effort no non-professional can make) citizen levvies cannot stand up to professional soldiers.

Sure mercenaries might be the best option in the lack of national armies, but why weren't there national armies until that much later?

There were some, see for example Maurice of Nassau. But national armies still are not superior to mercenaries due to the aforementioned difficulties.

Qin and the Warring States certainly went down that route of mass citizen troops. Certainly there is no mention of mercenary companies on any scale. If they could do that in circa 350 BC, why wasn't the same implemented in post-Roman states?

.....

Did you somehow miss the fact that mass citizen/tribe member levvies is exactly the way the Germanic tribes and Roman successor states fought? They still lost to the mercenary/professional armies of Byzantium. Anyway, up until the age of Karl Martell mass levvies was exactly the way warfare was done in post-Roman Europe. Thing is, this proved to be inferior to the specialized professional soldiers of Martell and Charlemagne.

That is different. Those are contemporary empires with similar cultures, a common language and similar threats to their expansion. Unlike a culture which is on another continent, has different cultural and philosophical values and where there is a 1000 year difference.

Do you see much value in comparing the Tang dynasty with the Byzantine empire then? Comparing contemporary empires with vastly different culture would allow us to easier identify how has culture shaped the organisation and decision making process.

I am not much of a fan of comparative history in General, but I would agree that it can be useful when comparing empires in the same period and in similar situations. However, IMO only the comparison between the Roman Empire and the Qin or Han Empire is a valid one (especially considering trade between the nations etc.)

Why not just pick the Roman empire or the empire of Alexander?

Because again this isn't Qin dynasty vs. Roman empire or Alexander's empire. The comparison sought was a comparison of a divided political system with no superpower. Again I don't know why the united empires get dragged into this, because the book restricts its comparison to the time of division not the time after unification.

Then the age of the diadochi would be the perfect comparison, since it has similar levels of technology and no clear superpower as well. Much better than using the middle ages and the renaissance.

[ray245]

What if there are other differences, such as geography, demographics, political structure, international and trade situation, etc? Your statement seems to be implying 'everything was different except culture' which, if untrue, makes the whole argument meaningless.

And to me given Byzantium's very specific organisational and political makeup, I find it very unlikely the Tang were in a si liar situation with similar pressures and goals.

That would be a problem if you are comparing the whole of the Tang dynasty with the whole of the Byzantine empire. You can undertake an isolated study in some areas, such as the organisation of the different armies for example. This can give us some insight into the various decisions the two empires made in response to their enemies.

From the author's reasoning, the circumstances were different then. Ming dynasty was unified, and even during its initial founding period, there were no longer any separate state identities to the same extent that there were during the Warring States.

The author focused on multi-state systems going through particular social changes which were viewed as similar despite separation in time and technology. That seems to be the main point of disagreement here. The author is contending that you can compare similar systems despite time separation and technology based on their social and political systems (and because their success and failure was measured against their peers not vs. each other). It seems the opposing view is that time and distance makes things impossible to compare. But as I said earlier, taken to its logical extreme, this would mean you can never compare anything in history since one could always argue circumstances are different enough despite any similarities. No empires or states in history were ever entirely identical to others even in individual aspects.

And it is not even just the social sciences. Even in things like medical trials, it will always be impossible to entirely say things were identical between patients or hospitals, yet these differences are either eliminated (where possible), controlled for in the analysis, or discussed at least when not able to be controlled for. The fact things were never identical doesn't mean conclusions can't be drawn.

There are so many other factors to consider if you are not going to compare contemporary states. It's one thing to compare and contrast two different region/states from a similar period of history. It is another thing altogether to synthesis a political theory by comparing a bronze age civilisation with a gunpowder age civilisation.

Qin wasn't. Qin was actually weak prior to the Shang Yang reforms and was one power among many. Qin suffered territorial losses at the hands of Wei, particularly along the western Yellow River. It wasn't until after those reforms and subsequent victories and retaking of territory that the other states started to take it more seriously. That was when there began to be talk of "vertical alliances" to band together against Qin.

The image of Qin as some all conquering juggernaut is either from retrospective hindsight in knowing it was the ultimate victor, or in the final stages before it became victor.

I would appreciate if you use sources other than wikiepedia, but even then you are talking about the early warring state period.

The state of Qin that conquered the 6 states was a vastly different animal from the state of Qin in 413 BC. Given that the numerous other state constantly tried to build alliances in order to fend off the Qin, you have to consider it as a superpower.

Seriously though, we're trying to shift through the variables involved to explain the outcomes. In this case we have a massively complicated huge number of variables, and very few data points to pin them to.

If you are looking at something much more specific, common and reliant on less factors than study has a good chance of unravelling the puzzle, otherwise it's as worthless as blogs pontificating on 'What to learn from Microsoft/Buffet/Trump"

I concur, sadly a number of political scientist seems to have a poor understanding of how to make use of history.

[Iracundus]

My isssue is that ancient kingdoms and medieval kingdoms and renaissance stater are so dissimilar that comparing them is already a pain. It makes no sense to me to compare vastly different cultures in vastly different times.

In what way would you argue that their cultures played a role in the differing political outcomes of two systems of division? Other than just being different, can you elaborate please on specifics?

Again, it is rather dismissive to conclude the Chinese states were similar culturally so of course they united eventually. Sima Qian's history has sections on how Qin was looked down upon by other states. The suggestion that someone from Qi, on the coast, and highly developed with emphasis on cultural and literary development, had much in common with the warlike semi-barbaric Qin would not doubt have been greeted with indignation had this been proposed to them in 350 BC. The cultural blending and destruction of the state identities occurred after the unification, and even then there was a brief attempt to resurrect the old system and revive Chu right before the establishment of the Han dynasty. One might as well say the differences between France and Spain were "similar enough" that they should have united.

This is bullshit, do you think the ancient world had no similar social and political changes? How is a comparison of the Diadochi states not vastly better here, given they were large warring states that spanned huge territories?

Take that up with the author, as she is the one that chose those periods.

That depends. There are vast technological differences between European states of the same time. I doubt any serious historian would argue that during the renaissance, say, a city like Krakow is in any way the technological equal to, say, the city of Milan.

Was Milan in direct military conflict with Krakow? You'll have to enlighten me on this point.

This argument is easily diffused by the simple fact that the Roman republic did exist for several hundreds of years without tax farming weakening it in the long run or creating local centers of resistance, nor did it put the Republic behind its competitors. In fact, one may easily make the argument that localized sub-contracting and localized administration allowed the Roman Republic to have a great deal of flexibility in terms of crisis and a great amount of integration and assimilation of the local elites, which in turn directly fueled the Roman rise to power. In fact, this is one of the leading theories behind the rise of Rome in the first place - they were so successful because they allowed the local people to keep their traditions and culture and rulers as long as they adhered to certain conditions.

Yet despite you arguing how it was such a good thing, the tax farming was dispensed with eventually. It is possible for states to still succeed if any flaws are not major enough to be critical.

Also, what you describe about local administration being such a great thing doesn't hold true if you look at later Chinese dynasties. Despite having centrally appointed administration, local culture and traditions never died out and are still extant in modern China. Central administration doesn't mean obliteration of local stuff necessarily. The collapse of Eastern Han and Tang could and is attributed at least in part to the sub-contracting out of services to either locals or original central officials that were granted vast autonomy. Eventually things were so flexible they decided they didn't need to listen any more to any government directives.

The Thirty Years war is also a bad example due to the extraordinary circumstances of that time.

What extraordinary circumstances of that particular period are you referring to that make the mercenary behavior a bad example?

Failure to pay is nothing new to history. Raising massed levy armies is both impractical as financially ruinous in itself. If you conscript your peasants, you are weakening yourself.

It didn't seem to materially weaken Qin or any of its peers. All of them resorted to mass conscription and the size of armies ballooned up from the original small armies used when it was still mostly nobles skirmishing with their lackeys. Quantity has a quality of its own.

There were some, see for example Maurice of Nassau. But national armies still are not superior to mercenaries due to the aforementioned difficulties.

What is your thinking then on the noticeable lack of mercenaries during the Warring States period then? Of all periods in China, the Warring States was the one where wars were fought by mass conscription. The professional soldier in China ironically didn't arise til after the period of unification.

Then the age of the diadochi would be the perfect comparison, since it has similar levels of technology and no clear superpower as well. Much better than using the middle ages and the renaissance.

Since you have mentioned the Diadochi twice now, how would you compare that with the Warring States then and the differing outcomes?

[Iracundus]

I would appreciate if you use sources other than wikiepedia, but even then you are talking about the early warring state period.

The state of Qin that conquered the 6 states was a vastly different animal from the state of Qin in 413 BC. Given that the numerous other state constantly tried to build alliances in order to fend off the Qin, you have to consider it as a superpower.

Any Warring States history book will give that same information about Qin's relative weakness prior to its reforms or about the things like the succession of hegemons and their eventual fates. Try a Cambridge History of China Vol 1: The Ch'in and Han Empires for a brief distillation. I suppose you could also go to Sima Qian. These facts of what happened are not controversial or widely disputed.

Qin as late as 361 was remarked upon by Sima Qian in his history to have been viewed as inferior by the other states. The campaigns by the other 6 states by that period were more against each other and Qin was ignored.

The chronology is important particularly in regard to the alliance building: Numerous states built alliances against Qin to check its rise after it started to retake territory from Wei. Qin had become a major power, not a superpower then. The alliances were to check its rise, and combined they had more than enough to beat Qin in numbers and resources. And in fact they did briefly check its expansion when it had to resort to diplomacy and subterfuge to break apart the alliances that it could not directly defeat through immediate military means.

The issue the author looked at originally was why Qin succeeded in not only transforming itself from its position of weakness to one of strength and ultimate success in conquest. Other Warring States were engaged in the same sort of struggle so why did Qin succeed and they didn't? Or why did their balancing against Qin fail despite it clearly being in the other kingdoms' interests to beat down a competitor that was growing too strong? This sort of checking was what had happened to previous hegemons like Wei, which had the crap beat out of it by the other states after its initial brief period of hegemony.

[ray245]

The issue the author looked at originally was why Qin succeeded in not only transforming itself from its position of weakness to one of strength and ultimate success in conquest. Other Warring States were engaged in the same sort of struggle so why did Qin succeed and they didn't? Or why did their balancing against Qin fail despite it clearly being in the other kingdoms' interests to beat down a competitor that was growing too strong? This sort of checking was what had happened to previous hegemons like Wei, which had the crap beat out of it by the other states after its initial brief period of hegemony.

Then shouldn't the author compare the Qin with all the other states to identify the reason why Qin was able/willingly to embark on all those reforms?

[Thanas]

The issue the author looked at originally was why Qin succeeded in not only transforming itself from its position of weakness to one of strength and ultimate success in conquest. Other Warring States were engaged in the same sort of struggle so why did Qin succeed and they didn't? Or why did their balancing against Qin fail despite it clearly being in the other kingdoms' interests to beat down a competitor that was growing too strong? This sort of checking was what had happened to previous hegemons like Wei, which had the crap beat out of it by the other states after its initial brief period of hegemony.

Then shouldn't the author compare the Qin with all the other states to identify the reason why Qin was able/willingly to embark on all those reforms?

I agree, that seems way more sensible.

My isssue is that ancient kingdoms and medieval kingdoms and renaissance stater are so dissimilar that comparing them is already a pain. It makes no sense to me to compare vastly different cultures in vastly different times.

In what way would you argue that their cultures played a role in the differing political outcomes of two systems of division? Other than just being different, can you elaborate please on specifics?

Oh boy. Where to start. The list is endless.

But ok, one teeny tiny bit: Political systems. Just look at Italy and you'll have several different fiefdoms and city states. You got theocracies (Rome), Republics (Venice), noble republics (Florence), duchys (Milan), Kingdoms (Naples) etc. And that is just the tip of the iceberg.

But wait, the fun gets more and more complex. The Republic of Venice in the 16th century is completely different from the Republic of Venice in the 12th. Same way the Kingdom of Naples is different to the states preceding or succeeding it. Heck, even the papacy of the Borgias is completely different than the papacy under Gregor VII. There are way too many variables involved to make comparisons between such widely differing systems and fit them into a unifying theory.

Again, it is rather dismissive to conclude the Chinese states were similar culturally so of course they united eventually.

Good thing that nobody claimed that then.

Take that up with the author, as she is the one that chose those periods.

No, I am taking this up with you, as you brought up the topic.

That depends. There are vast technological differences between European states of the same time. I doubt any serious historian would argue that during the renaissance, say, a city like Krakow is in any way the technological equal to, say, the city of Milan.

Was Milan in direct military conflict with Krakow? You'll have to enlighten me on this point.

Why does direct military conflict matter? But anyway, even cities in military conflict (like, say, the Reichsstädte with Milan) are hardly on the same technological basis.

Yet despite you arguing how it was such a good thing, the tax farming was dispensed with eventually. It is possible for states to still succeed if any flaws are not major enough to be critical.

....Are you serious? How is a system that worked very well for four-hundred years a flaw?

I repeat: Are you freaking serious?

Followup: Do you know the meaning of "relative benefits"?

Also, what you describe about local administration being such a great thing doesn't hold true if you look at later Chinese dynasties. Despite having centrally appointed administration, local culture and traditions never died out and are still extant in modern China. Central administration doesn't mean obliteration of local stuff necessarily. The collapse of Eastern Han and Tang could and is attributed at least in part to the sub-contracting out of services to either locals or original central officials that were granted vast autonomy. Eventually things were so flexible they decided they didn't need to listen any more to any government directives.

Proving once more that comparisons between the states is just nonsense due to different prerequisites.

What extraordinary circumstances of that particular period are you referring to that make the mercenary behavior a bad example?

I don't know, the near-constant warfare for thirty years, the depopulation of the strongest country in Europe at that point, the free-for-all warfare that was present on all continents, the religious divide of christendom....take your pick.

It didn't seem to materially weaken Qin or any of its peers.

Again, different circumstances.

All of them resorted to mass conscription and the size of armies ballooned up from the original small armies used when it was still mostly nobles skirmishing with their lackeys. Quantity has a quality of its own.

No, it doesn't. Quantity has a quality of its own only if the circumstances favor it. If it does not, you get the battle of Alesia.

What is your thinking then on the noticeable lack of mercenaries during the Warring States period then? Of all periods in China, the Warring States was the one where wars were fought by mass conscription. The professional soldier in China ironically didn't arise til after the period of unification.

Because the circumstances in that time favored mass conscription due to the relatively low production of metals in China, which was poorer than the western counterparts. Also, circumstances such as lack of regional city states which favored specialization and had a small population base. Etc. The reasons can be endless in number.

Since you have mentioned the Diadochi twice now, how would you compare that with the Warring States then and the differing outcomes?

Why is the outcome different? Both the warring states and the diadochi were eventually unified into one nation, oftentimes against their will.

[Iracundus]

The issue the author looked at originally was why Qin succeeded in not only transforming itself from its position of weakness to one of strength and ultimate success in conquest. Other Warring States were engaged in the same sort of struggle so why did Qin succeed and they didn't? Or why did their balancing against Qin fail despite it clearly being in the other kingdoms' interests to beat down a competitor that was growing too strong? This sort of checking was what had happened to previous hegemons like Wei, which had the crap beat out of it by the other states after its initial brief period of hegemony.

Then shouldn't the author compare the Qin with all the other states to identify the reason why Qin was able/willingly to embark on all those reforms?

The author does (and so have many others all the way back to Sima Qian). The comparison then is made with a system in Europe. The point was to compare and contrast why one multi-state system unified while another didn't. The assumption presumably to see if there are any generalizable lessons or things that can be stated.

One of the few things that the author does appear to take a personal stand on is the multi-state system in general. Rather than just the Warring State one being some isolated freak case of unification with equilibrium being the norm (which she asserts is a normative assumption driven by the European experience), she argues that one could just as easily view it the opposite way or that either are equally valid assumptions to make, and therefore to not assume that "balance of power" will necessarily prevail in the modern world given its failure in previous systems in the past. She does not argue any specifics nor does she argue for any sort of world domination by any power, merely that if balance of power can fail among supposed self interested state actors locked in a life or death struggle then there is no reason why it cannot fail again.

[Iracundus]

Good thing that nobody claimed that then.

Actually someone did in a fashion:

I don't believe that China's subdivisions were equivalent to the European nationalisms of 1700, just as the local parochialisms of the late Roman Empire were not equivalent to the European nationalisms of the same places in 1700

Considering as previously mentioned how individual states had stereotypes associated with them, and how an attempt at resurrecting the old states was made after Qin's fall, some people certainly had a strong sense of national identity associated with their particular kingdom. Far more than can just be written off as "parochialisms".

....Are you serious? How is a system that worked very well for four-hundred years a flaw?

The old system Qin and its peers had with nobles prior to centralization reforms worked well enough for its time and had worked for centuries. Nonetheless they were dispensed with because there were still better ways, ways that would lead to greater productivity and less waste. There is always room for improvement. Just because a system has been working in the past is not evidence that it was not flawed. Authoritarian monarchy has been with humanity for thousands of years, and worked with some hiccups, but we have since moved on. The Ptolomaic astronomical system worked well enough for many centuries, but doesn't mean it wasn't a flawed system and one that was dispensed with when better became available.

I don't know, the near-constant warfare for thirty years, the depopulation of the strongest country in Europe at that point, the free-for-all warfare that was present on all continents, the religious divide of christendom....take your pick.

Aside from the christendom thing, the same conditions were present during the Warring States particularly from 350 BC onwards to the final unification in 221 BC. Wars were nearly constant somewhere in the system and both Wei then later Zhao suffered vast casualties. While the exact count of the Battle of Changping is debated among historians with Sima Qian stating 400,000 surrendered Zhao troops being massacred and Qin general Bai Qi stating half the Qin forces were lost, what isn't debated is that Zhao declined precipitously in strength. It was the ancient equivalent of the bloodbaths of WWI.

Yet the conduct of the wars were very different. No mercenary forces were in evidence, and there were no examples of Chinese states being bankrupted by their military forces. Again it delves back into the economic aspect of why Qin and its peers could sustain such wars (with no mentions of mass mutiny or desertion), as compared to the previously mentioned struggles of the European states. The campaign that culminated in the Battle of Changping for example lasted 2 years, albeit in a series of low intensity battles, but which nonetheless involved both states keeping armies supplied in the field for 2 years.

It didn't seem to materially weaken Qin or any of its peers.

Again, different circumstances.

Again you cite differences without elaboration. What makes mass citizen conscription for Qin different?

Also, circumstances such as lack of regional city states which favored specialization and had a small population base. Etc. The reasons can be endless in number.

There were certainly minor states other than the big ones, and they would have fit the role of city states in the sense of having a small population base. Of all states, they would have been the ones most likely to have to resort to mercenaries given their lack of population with which to raise levies. However there is still a noticeable silence on anything about mercenaries in the primary sources.

The author does posit a difference in the stages of monetization as a factor, with Warring States China not being heavily monetized. There may have been no mercenary market for that reason.

Since you have mentioned the Diadochi twice now, how would you compare that with the Warring States then and the differing outcomes?

Why is the outcome different? Both the warring states and the diadochi were eventually unified into one nation, oftentimes against their will.

None of the diadochi ultimately won and accomplished the unification themselves. One of the Warring States survived and did it themselves.

[Thanas]

Considering as previously mentioned how individual states had stereotypes associated with them, and how an attempt at resurrecting the old states was made after Qin's fall, some people certainly had a strong sense of national identity associated with their particular kingdom. Far more than can just be written off as "parochialisms".

Stereotypes do not equal nationalism.

The old system Qin and its peers had with nobles prior to centralization reforms worked well enough for its time and had worked for centuries. Nonetheless they were dispensed with because there were still better ways, ways that would lead to greater productivity and less waste. There is always room for improvement. Just because a system has been working in the past is not evidence that it was not flawed. Authoritarian monarchy has been with humanity for thousands of years, and worked with some hiccups, but we have since moved on. The Ptolomaic astronomical system worked well enough for many centuries, but doesn't mean it wasn't a flawed system and one that was dispensed with when better became available.

Flawed system is an odd way to describe something that worked perfectly and helped build empires for several centuries. It became flawed only when a better alternative was introduced. Said better alternative being inferior for centuries before.

Aside from the christendom thing, the same conditions were present during the Warring States particularly from 350 BC onwards to the final unification in 221 BC. Wars were nearly constant somewhere in the system and both Wei then later Zhao suffered vast casualties. While the exact count of the Battle of Changping is debated among historians with Sima Qian stating 400,000 surrendered Zhao troops being massacred and Qin general Bai Qi stating half the Qin forces were lost, what isn't debated is that Zhao declined precipitously in strength. It was the ancient equivalent of the bloodbaths of WWI.

Did it kill a third of the population? If not, the scale is vastly different.

Yet the conduct of the wars were very different. No mercenary forces were in evidence, and there were no examples of Chinese states being bankrupted by their military forces. Again it delves back into the economic aspect of why Qin and its peers could sustain such wars (with no mentions of mass mutiny or desertion), as compared to the previously mentioned struggles of the European states. The campaign that culminated in the Battle of Changping for example lasted 2 years, albeit in a series of low intensity battles, but which nonetheless involved both states keeping armies supplied in the field for 2 years.

This just speaks to a lower intensity conflict with less of a skill and equipment gap between professional and occasional soldiers.

Again you cite differences without elaboration. What makes mass citizen conscription for Qin different?

Less expensive equipment resulting in less of a skill gap between professional and occasional warrior. That the levvies were replaced by professional troops later on is just another indication that levvies were employed only as a means to an end and not regarded as an ideal form of army organization.

There were certainly minor states other than the big ones, and they would have fit the role of city states in the sense of having a small population base. Of all states, they would have been the ones most likely to have to resort to mercenaries given their lack of population with which to raise levies. However there is still a noticeable silence on anything about mercenaries in the primary sources.

Silence in the sources does not mean they did not exist. Also, the minor states - did they keep their independence from bigger states by military means for centuries? If not, the situations are again not comparable.

None of the diadochi ultimately won and accomplished the unification themselves. One of the Warring States survived and did it themselves.

Why should it matter whether one of the parties were originally part of one? The same objection can be levied with much greater force against any medieval "state".

[Iracundus]

Stereotypes do not equal nationalism.

You ignored the following bit, that there was enough support to attempt a revival of the old states after Qin's fall. The Qin Emperor before had tried to eliminate national identity by forced mass migration of commoners and nobles. All this attests to an understanding by those people that people had real loyalties to their destroyed states and a sense of themselves as separate people, prior to being assimilated by Qin and subsequent Han.

Some have expressed opinions that one of the reasons Han succeeded was because it did not represent a continuation of one of the original Warring States, and that its ruler had cast off any old state/regional loyalties, and thus this was a more palatable domination for the peoples of the old defeated states than being ruled by Qin.

Aside from the christendom thing, the same conditions were present during the Warring States particularly from 350 BC onwards to the final unification in 221 BC. Wars were nearly constant somewhere in the system and both Wei then later Zhao suffered vast casualties. While the exact count of the Battle of Changping is debated among historians with Sima Qian stating 400,000 surrendered Zhao troops being massacred and Qin general Bai Qi stating half the Qin forces were lost, what isn't debated is that Zhao declined precipitously in strength. It was the ancient equivalent of the bloodbaths of WWI.

Did it kill a third of the population? If not, the scale is vastly different.

Estimate of 300 BC total population in China is 29-40 million (Gang Zhao. 1986. Man and land in Chinese history: an economic analysis). The distribution among the states is not entirely nailed down but the order of size was known with Chu, and Wei the most populous. One claim for 342 BC put Chu at 11 million and Wei at 4 and Qin at 3. Chaping was in 260 BC. Now assuming the casualty figures given by Sima Qian are right, that is 400,000 Zhao troops massacred with another 50,000 casualties in the two year fighting period before that. 450,000 casualties is still going to clock in upward of 10-15% even accounting for some population growth between 342 and 260. Nothing said about the civilian casualties in Zhao, which was where the battle took place, from any of the military operations over that 2 year period. While it may not be explicitly a third, it is still a massive death toll, and since they would be peasant levies, those casualties would ultimately have also weakened Zhao's economy.

This just speaks to a lower intensity conflict with less of a skill and equipment gap between professional and occasional soldiers.

It doesn't address the logistical burden of having to keep them armed and fed in the field for 2 years before the climactic battle. We know these were state armies supplied from state armories with standardized weaponry and equipment, and people are still people and need a certain amount of food regardless of whether they are professional or peasant levy. The issue still becomes one of why the Warring States seemed able to do this while early European states struggled.

Less expensive equipment resulting in less of a skill gap between professional and occasional warrior. That the levvies were replaced by professional troops later on is just another indication that levvies were employed only as a means to an end and not regarded as an ideal form of army organization.

The replacement had partly to do with political and geographical reasons. For unified Chinese empires, the main enemies were on the distant frontiers with the main central core of the Empire being essentially de-militarized. The possibility of standing peasant armies would have meant the risk of internal revolts by other centers of power, as well as the logistical hassles of shipping levies all the way to the frontier and back on a regular basis. During the Warring States, the smaller sizes of the states meant the distance from border to heartland was much less.

Silence in the sources does not mean they did not exist. Also, the minor states - did they keep their independence from bigger states by military means for centuries? If not, the situations are again not comparable.

They kept their independence through playing the balance of power and diplomacy, and when that failed they were swallowed up. Which means they had no military options available to them, such as mercenaries at least not enough to make a difference to state policy.

While silence from the primary sources doesn't mean there were absolutely no mercenaries, but if they did exist they were apparently never significant enough to the point where they were a big enough part of the armies or the battles that they were worthy of mention. It still comes down to that fact of no significant mercenary activity in the Warring States period that has survived to make itself known to us despite the relative wealth of data and artifacts on national armies.

Why should it matter whether one of the parties were originally part of one? The same objection can be levied with much greater force against any medieval "state".

It matters in so far as the original author was examining within the system and trying to see if anything was applicable to the modern world, where the system encompasses the world and there are no outsiders pending discovery of aliens. Other Chinese examples instead of the Warring States could have been chosen if it were about outsiders overrunning the system.

[Thanas]

You ignored the following bit, that there was enough support to attempt a revival of the old states after Qin's fall. The Qin Emperor before had tried to eliminate national identity by forced mass migration of commoners and nobles. All this attests to an understanding by those people that people had real loyalties to their destroyed states and a sense of themselves as separate people, prior to being assimilated by Qin and subsequent Han.

This doesn't mean a lot either, because nationalism =/= revolts and attempted continuation of the past.

Did it kill a third of the population? If not, the scale is vastly different.

Estimate of 300 BC total population in China is 29-40 million (Gang Zhao. 1986. Man and land in Chinese history: an economic analysis). The distribution among the states is not entirely nailed down but the order of size was known with Chu, and Wei the most populous. One claim for 342 BC put Chu at 11 million and Wei at 4 and Qin at 3. Chaping was in 260 BC. Now assuming the casualty figures given by Sima Qian are right, that is 400,000 Zhao troops massacred with another 50,000 casualties in the two year fighting period before that. 450,000 casualties is still going to clock in upward of 10-15% even accounting for some population growth between 342 and 260. Nothing said about the civilian casualties in Zhao, which was where the battle took place, from any of the military operations over that 2 year period. While it may not be explicitly a third, it is still a massive death toll, and since they would be peasant levies, those casualties would ultimately have also weakened Zhao's economy.

Still on a vastly different scale. Also, there is no reason to assume the numbers to be correct unless they are corroborated by archeological evidence.

It doesn't address the logistical burden of having to keep them armed and fed in the field for 2 years before the climactic battle. We know these were state armies supplied from state armories with standardized weaponry and equipment, and people are still people and need a certain amount of food regardless of whether they are professional or peasant levy. The issue still becomes one of why the Warring States seemed able to do this while early European states struggled.

Europe did not struggle, considering the Roman Empire was able to supply similar levels of troops for much larger time and with much more supply intensive types of troops as well.

After the fall individual states struggled but that is due to the enormous cost of the knights. There is no equivalent for the knight, his horse and his armor in China.

The replacement had partly to do with political and geographical reasons. For unified Chinese empires, the main enemies were on the distant frontiers with the main central core of the Empire being essentially de-militarized. The possibility of standing peasant armies would have meant the risk of internal revolts by other centers of power, as well as the logistical hassles of shipping levies all the way to the frontier and back on a regular basis. During the Warring States, the smaller sizes of the states meant the distance from border to heartland was much less.

Which does nothing to dissuade me from the presumption that Chinese did not consider levies to be the superior army man for man.

They kept their independence through playing the balance of power and diplomacy, and when that failed they were swallowed up. Which means they had no military options available to them, such as mercenaries at least not enough to make a difference to state policy.

While silence from the primary sources doesn't mean there were absolutely no mercenaries, but if they did exist they were apparently never significant enough to the point where they were a big enough part of the armies or the battles that they were worthy of mention. It still comes down to that fact of no significant mercenary activity in the Warring States period that has survived to make itself known to us despite the relative wealth of data and artifacts on national armies.

So mercenary soldiers never caught on - that again does not mean mercenaries were inferior, just that the Chinese army thought them less desirable to be employed wholescale.

It matters in so far as the original author was examining within the system and trying to see if anything was applicable to the modern world, where the system encompasses the world and there are no outsiders pending discovery of aliens. Other Chinese examples instead of the Warring States could have been chosen if it were about outsiders overrunning the system.

But the Romans are only outsiders to the mediterranean world in the same sense that Qin were outsiders to the warring states.

[Iracundus]

This doesn't mean a lot either, because nationalism =/= revolts and attempted continuation of the past.

The attempted resurrection of their old states is evidence of nationalism. People saw themselves as different from Qin and wanted their old independence and nations back. The hatred towards Qin people in particular (especially by Chu) was one reason for the revenge massacre conducted by the Chu descended Xiang Yu when he was fighting against Qin. Chu and Qin people clearly saw themselves as separate people, one might say ethnicities.

Still on a vastly different scale. Also, there is no reason to assume the numbers to be correct unless they are corroborated by archeological evidence.

There isn't any doubt as to the fact a huge battle occurred there considering massed numbers of human remains were dug up in the Tang dynasty and which the Tang empreror Xuanzong built a temple for, and which even now are being found in the modern era.

The exact numbers are debated but then so are the numbers for Roman battles. The practical effect of Changping isn't though. Zhao was gutted as a state, hit by famine and an earthquake in the decades subsequent, and wouldn't recover in time to fend off the last round of Qin attacks several decades later.

Europe did not struggle, considering the Roman Empire was able to supply similar levels of troops for much larger time and with much more supply intensive types of troops as well.

The states mentioned earlier as struggling were the Habsburgs and France, not Rome! Again what is with this constant bringing in of the unified empire. This has never been about Qin dynasty or Rome but pre-unification era states. Trying to compare Roman Empire to the kingdom of Qin, not the dynasty, is also an unfair comparison. Of course a united empire will have more resources and would find it no struggle. Repeatedly bringing in your Roman Empire idolization fetish isn't relevant when the topic of discussion was eras of division.

And in the particulars of those 2, it appears they did struggle financially, else there would have been no need for bankruptcy and repudiation of debts. Assuming for the moment they had tried the national army route, would they have struggled to keep large armies in the field?

After the fall individual states struggled but that is due to the enormous cost of the knights. There is no equivalent for the knight, his horse and his armor in China.

There was for the Warring State era. If you make allowances for the relative abilities of the pre-stirrup bronze era (and thus no shock cavalry forces), the chariot forces used by the Warring States filled the role of shock troops and each chariot needed multiple horses, as well as the drivers being at least semi-professional and having additional training. Maintaining a supply of horses for a chariot corps would have been high maintenance for a Bronze Age state.

So mercenary soldiers never caught on - that again does not mean mercenaries were inferior, just that the Chinese army thought them less desirable to be employed wholescale.

Or the fact that maybe they could very well have been inferior given the states had centralized control of armories and weapons. How was a mercenary band supposed to equip themselves in such a system to be at the point of both being numerous and equipped enough to rival the state's armies? Even the tiny revolts that peppered the histories of the era were either peasant revolts with improvised weapons or revolts by nobles with retainers armed with essentially state weapons they already had or could confiscate. There are references to generals and advisors that acted in a sort of mercenary manner (though mercenary for high office with the salaries entailed rather than direct cash payments) but no mercenary companies.

But the Romans are only outsiders to the mediterranean world in the same sense that Qin were outsiders to the warring states.

What about the Parthians? They were outsiders to the system that took over at least part of the area.

[ray245]

The states mentioned earlier as struggling were the Habsburgs and France, not Rome! Again what is with this constant bringing in of the unified empire. This has never been about Qin dynasty or Rome but pre-unification era states. Trying to compare Roman Empire to the kingdom of Qin, not the dynasty, is also an unfair comparison. Of course a united empire will have more resources and would find it no struggle. Repeatedly bringing in your Roman Empire idolization fetish isn't relevant when the topic of discussion was eras of division.

Your question ask why didn't Europe unify. The most direct response anyone can give is Europe was unified under the Roman empire.

Furthermore, the Romans before the Punic wars is comparable to the kingdom of Qin. Both states faced bigger kingdoms and empires and managed to conquer them.

[Iracundus]

The states mentioned earlier as struggling were the Habsburgs and France, not Rome! Again what is with this constant bringing in of the unified empire. This has never been about Qin dynasty or Rome but pre-unification era states. Trying to compare Roman Empire to the kingdom of Qin, not the dynasty, is also an unfair comparison. Of course a united empire will have more resources and would find it no struggle. Repeatedly bringing in your Roman Empire idolization fetish isn't relevant when the topic of discussion was eras of division.

Your question ask why didn't Europe unify. The most direct response anyone can give is Europe was unified under the Roman empire.

Furthermore, the Romans before the Punic wars is comparable to the kingdom of Qin. Both states faced bigger kingdoms and empires and managed to conquer them.

The book chose its periods due to the social changes of emerging from a previously feudal era and the growth of centralizing government, and then how a state under such circumstances was able (or not) to conquer those around it. In the author's view, the two periods she chose met these similar social circumstances even though they were separated by time and space. If those were the main criteria for choice of comparison, then a similar period of emergence from feudalism would need to be chosen. If people disagree on the suitability of social conditions as a criteria for choice of comparison between any historical states then the debate is more about the issue of comparative history in general such as any validity to it or what criteria then should be the basis of comparison.

[Thanas]

If "transitioning from a feudal system" into another one is the only criteria then a) one would have to define "feudal system" and b) one would have to explain why one would chose the Qin instead of more closer systems, like for example the Chinese civil war.

[Thanas]

This doesn't mean a lot either, because nationalism =/= revolts and attempted continuation of the past.

The attempted resurrection of their old states is evidence of nationalism. People saw themselves as different from Qin and wanted their old independence and nations back. The hatred towards Qin people in particular (especially by Chu) was one reason for the revenge massacre conducted by the Chu descended Xiang Yu when he was fighting against Qin. Chu and Qin people clearly saw themselves as separate people, one might say ethnicities.

In that context the rebellions of the Jews, celts etc. were all evidence of nationalism. Which is preposterous.

There isn't any doubt as to the fact a huge battle occurred there considering massed numbers of human remains were dug up in the Tang dynasty and which the Tang empreror Xuanzong built a temple for, and which even now are being found in the modern era.

Yes. And we find massed human remains at Chalons as well. Doesn't mean half a million men fought there.

The exact numbers are debated but then so are the numbers for Roman battles.

However, the general number of soldiers in the High Empire is not.

The practical effect of Changping isn't though. Zhao was gutted as a state, hit by famine and an earthquake in the decades subsequent, and wouldn't recover in time to fend off the last round of Qin attacks several decades later.

Again, which says nothing about the scale.

The states mentioned earlier as struggling were the Habsburgs and France, not Rome! Again what is with this constant bringing in of the unified empire. This has never been about Qin dynasty or Rome but pre-unification era states. Trying to compare Roman Empire to the kingdom of Qin, not the dynasty, is also an unfair comparison. Of course a united empire will have more resources and would find it no struggle. Repeatedly bringing in your Roman Empire idolization fetish isn't relevant when the topic of discussion was eras of division.

The Roman Republic fits the bill. I don't know why you refuse to recognize this.

Assuming for the moment they had tried the national army route, would they have struggled to keep large armies in the field?

That depends. If ill-equipped levies, then not. However, we also know what ill-equipped levies are worth.

There was for the Warring State era. If you make allowances for the relative abilities of the pre-stirrup bronze era (and thus no shock cavalry forces), the chariot forces used by the Warring States filled the role of shock troops and each chariot needed multiple horses, as well as the drivers being at least semi-professional and having additional training. Maintaining a supply of horses for a chariot corps would have been high maintenance for a Bronze Age state.

Really, there is nothing to be said here. I am debating against an ignoramus. Do you know the comparable cost to equip a single Knight with the most basic of equipment? It was the same cost as an entire village (not their production, no the entire village as is). Maintaining chariots is trivial in comparison.

[Iracundus]

If "transitioning from a feudal system" into another one is the only criteria then a) one would have to define "feudal system" and b) one would have to explain why one would chose the Qin instead of more closer systems, like for example the Chinese civil war.

Which Chinese civil war? You mean the period of warlordism in the 20th century? The warlord domains weren't permanent states with histories and existing separate identities as states. The whole affair lasted a couple decades or so depending on where you draw the start and end lines.

Feudalism as practiced in ancient China pre-Warring States and early Warring States (which will obviously not mesh exactly upon the European system): nominal ruler held only a small area under direct control, and gave out hereditary fiefs of various sizes and titles of varying seniority to followers who were also often bound by ties of blood or marriage. These lords then had rights to the land and its produce, though peasants were not formally bound to the land. These followers ruled their fiefs independently, collected taxes, minted currency, and had implied obligations to come to the aid of the ruler militarily, though there were not specific explicit obligations laid out. There were ritualistic expectations of homage and respect from the lord to the ruler. Administrative positions were given on the basis of birth or connections rather than purely merit. Fighting was originally the province of the nobility. In theory, these titles and fiefs could be revoked, but this became impossible in practice particularly as the power of the Zhou royal house waned. Nonetheless there was still lip service paid to the idea of serving Zhou even during the Warring States, until Qin wiped out Zhou.

[Iracundus]

In that context the rebellions of the Jews, celts etc. were all evidence of nationalism. Which is preposterous.

When the rebellion is aimed at the creation or re-creation of their own ethnic state, then yes it is a form of nationalism. It is acknowledgement of their ethnic identity with their nation. If you recall, the original point under contention was the supposed "similarity" of the Warring States and therefore why unity wasn't that big a deal. The cultural divisions among the Warring States were not as superficial as the other poster had claimed if the post-Qin revolts were aimed at re-creation of the old nationalities and states.

Yes. And we find massed human remains at Chalons as well. Doesn't mean half a million men fought there.

And as with any sufficiently ancient battle, you will not find purely physical evidence that would yield the body count or the participant count as much will have been lost to time. At some point reference to textual documents will be necessary. If you question all the texts as being unreliable, then nothing can be ascertained about the battle size at all.

However, the general number of soldiers in the High Empire is not.

The general number of soldiers mobilized by Qin in its final state destroying campaigns was 1 million if you tally up the counts in the individual campaigns. Granted some of these might have been emergency short term levies that were then demobilized after the war as there is textual evidence of an emergency levy of all able bodied men over the age of 15 as reinforcements for Changping.

Again, which says nothing about the scale.

Gutting an agrarian state that measured its population in the low millions is an idea of the scale. Whether the total casualty count was 450,000 or 440,000 is a bit immaterial to the final effect, which is what is relevant for practical considerations of the level of devastation suffered by Zhao. Even so it did put up some fight in the end and managed to scrape together an army of levies. No resort to any (possibly non-existent) mercenaries.

The states mentioned earlier as struggling were the Habsburgs and France, not Rome! Again what is with this constant bringing in of the unified empire. This has never been about Qin dynasty or Rome but pre-unification era states. Trying to compare Roman Empire to the kingdom of Qin, not the dynasty, is also an unfair comparison. Of course a united empire will have more resources and would find it no struggle. Repeatedly bringing in your Roman Empire idolization fetish isn't relevant when the topic of discussion was eras of division.

The Roman Republic fits the bill. I don't know why you refuse to recognize this.

That depends. If ill-equipped levies, then not. However, we also know what ill-equipped levies are worth.

I think you are still persistently underestimating the effectiveness of peasant levies, especially in the Warring States given the existence of the Qin crossbow which archeological evidence has shown was mass produced. In mass numbers the killing power of such a weapon outstripped armor technology of the period and could make the armed peasant more dangerous than one might think.

Really, there is nothing to be said here. I am debating against an ignoramus. Do you know the comparable cost to equip a single Knight with the most basic of equipment? It was the same cost as an entire village (not their production, no the entire village as is). Maintaining chariots is trivial in comparison.

Not when you are talking a Bronze Age civilization. A correction to my earlier point, chariots would have fit the role in the Spring & Autumn period preceding the Warring States, when the costs of war chariots meant they were raised and maintained only by nobles by the resources of their fief in a role analogous to the knight. When it was still the realm of nobles and their retainers doing the fighting on a small scale, a chariot force of 500 could constitute an "army" (as in the use of what is now the modern Chinese character for it). The role of the chariot fills the same niche sociologically, with the costs of war raised so that only a few could afford to fight in such a manner.

And like the armored knight, eventually the chariot was obsoleted by its decreasing military usefulness, cost, and vulnerabilities relative to the rise of massed infantry and massed ranged troops.

[Stark]

I clearly hissed the horror, but I want to ask ray why he thinks you can compare the results of pressures, attitudes, culture, and needs with another while ignoring what produced them. If you 'compared' Byzantium in 1099 to the first year of the Tang Dynasty without saying 'because of trouble with their neighbours' or 'due to the internal political structure', what exactly are you comparing? Some kind of role playing game stats sheet? Some kind of imaginary snapshot of legions and stacks of rice and scrolls and trade routes? A fucking Rome TW map?

This is why I think 'comparative history' is only valuable if it encourages people to gain a deeper understanding than that, and that it thus requires involved scholarship. It's meaningless to try to perform some kind of scifi vs debate between things you barely understand, especially if you explicitly remove consideration of the reasons that 'snapshot' occurred and why.

[Spoonist]

Here is the companion article to the book;
http://eastasia.huji.ac.il/segel/course ... 0guoji.pdf
The whole thing is a dig against eurocentrism. As such the specific selection of the periods is not to have two who compare well, it is to have two that fits the narrative of what the author is trying to sell the book on.

Here is a bit in the article about the mercenaries thingie which I find very strange reasoning.

First, mercenaries are often prohibitively expensive+
Second, reliance on military entrepreneurs makes it impossible for the state to centralize military command and to monopolize the means of coercion+
Third, mercenary troops tend to have serious discipline problems+

1-nope. Its not intrinsic to mercenaries to be expensive. Just like hiring consultants is not necessarily expensive. Instead its specialist mercenaries/consultants, or when market demand increases above availability.
There where lots of cheap mercenaries available to the roman empire for instance, many times it was cheaper to hire a local tribe to fight another local tribe than to go through the whole thing with your own troops
Then in lots of wars the crappy mercenaries was dirt cheap. Some literally could be bought with bread.
2-nope, lots of nations did both and effectively too. Does the author think that the modern US lacks power projection because it now hires more mercenaries than ever in its history?
3-nope, such generic statements doesn't work unless you are very specific. Lots of regular nation troops had some serious discipline problem as well. Especially levvied troops. As is evident in the very same period of china that the author is talking about. As well as lots of fameous mercenary companies had much much higher discipline and morale then their nationstate counterparts. I also think the author is misquoting the source's conclusions to more fit the narrative.

etc

Read the article - its trying to apply soft science on hard science to drive a narative. Works for sales and works for the narrative, doesn't work when looking at the claimed facts.