Adamskywalker007 wrote:
That is obviously rather massively true. One of the biggest issues that I see is that of range. I don't know of any examples of proper BVR air combat shown in film.
Air Force One; F-15s fire AMRAAMs at long range and only kill two of the six MiGs they are engaging. IIRC some of the MiGs escape after a mildly realistic close fight too, rather then USA freedom making a clean sweep of the Kazakhistani terror planes.
But in fairness actual BVR is pretty rare in real life so far, though its certainly be done enough to prove it works and make people who cite stuff from the Vietnam War fools. The first combat use of AMRAAM though at something comically close like 3nm range, but one battle in the Gulf War saw three Iraqi planes destroyed almost simultaneously by Sparrow shots. Indeed Sparrow was the biggest killer in the war, but not always at BVR ranges. Keeping in mind visual range can be as high as 20nm depending on the weather and aircraft types (older ones made a lot of smoke), and that some IR guided missiles can go well beyond visual range in a head on engagement. The DAS system on the F-35 also kinda raises questions about what BVR even means, since it can display stuff directly on the pilots helmet he'd never see on his own. The older IRST systems on say the MiG-29 had much less range, IIRC the Russians cited a 8nm lock on range for the 1980s versions vs a fighter, though they've no doubt improved on that by now. More or less it was an aid to a dogfight and not a passive search sensor the way it was often made out to be.
That really would have been a clever solution. This was mostly done in the movie The Peacemaker with Geroge Clooney and Nicole Kidman. Instead of disarming the nuke entirely they simply let it explode after removing part of the explosive lens from it.
In Broken Arrow the NEST team that finds the first bomb has a guy who immediately says its procedure to destroy the bomb rather then risk its capture. He then gets shot by an infilitrator in the team. That movie also had someone behind it who clearly knew more then average about nuclear effects, since they have the EMP effect (actually source region effects) of the nuke that goes off affect stuff through the ground as it can at close ranges, and the bad guys protect their stuff simply by turning it off which also has a high probability of working. Still wasn't fully realistic, but I think the people fully knew this rather then just ignoring the tech advisor completely or having dumb ones.
I was just thinking about this when you posted it. Wasn't this also a potential issue with the American ABM system? That it could make the ICBM's it was defending useless?
If you fired enough nuclear ABMs yeah you can't launch, however the assumption back then was that nuclear silo missiles would not be fired immediately, they would wait out an enemy first strike and then launch later, its not like the enemy cities can run away and hide. This was a major part of the point of a silo based force and its very expensive silos and hardened command and control system, because launch on warning (fire while you only see missiles coming) is extremely dangerous least it be an accident, perhaps run into an enemy pindown attack, and was just generally very inflexible. As long as the silos were reasonably protected against direct attacks delaying launch was perfectly good planning. The problems cropped up when more accurate ICBMs and MIRV warheads made massed anti silo strikes plausible, and the US never actually resolved that issue with the insanity that was the MX basing strategy debate. Mind you reliable satellite warning only appeared in the late 1970s, before that ground based BMEWS radar based systems could only provide 10-15 minutes warning time which was just not enough for useful decision making. And warning of an SLBM attack could be even less for some targets, which is why ultimately all US ICBM silos were clustered in the mid west away from water. Originally some were much more spread out, including some in New York and a couple active Atlas pads were right on the coast at Vandenberg for a while, as well as coffin launchers elsewhere in California.
The US did have an insane forward scatter radar from the early 60s onward, with antennas in Europe and Asia, which could sorta try to warn of an attack launch, by detection ionization trails of massed ICBMs, but it was super unreliable and could really only be a 'heads up' to look at other sources of information. And really even the satellite systems were the same thing, just rather more dependable about it and much more resistant to possible communist interference. Only the first latest warning satellites deployed in the past decade can actually track missiles and warheads in flight and thus confirm they are real objects, and not say, conventional explosions on the ground. The 80s satellites could mistake suddenly appearing stuff like afterburners and B-52 bomber strikes as missile launches, software filtering being a rather limited thing back then.
So yeah, in the era nuclear ABM was a big thing it wasn't a big deal for the ICBM force. The big deal was how to get past enemy nuclear ABM, and nobody ever had a good solution to that one if the enemy employed high yield warheads. The nuclear blackout of the warheads would progressively blind the defensive radars, but enemy warheads would still have a real chance of being killed by the same blackout radiation blobs, and networking radars together provided a way to see 'around' the spots. And that was also why the ultimate US system had large numbers of Sprint point defense missiles as a lower tier defense. A further tier below that was supposed to come out of HIBEX-UPSTAGE to defend the radar sites themselves from possible crazy commie superhardened saturation attacks. 400 G linear and 300 G lateral acceleration. Might get the job done! Also makes most Sci Fi look like an utter joke.
Simon_Jester wrote:
Not sure how to dramatize the use of an ECM pod...
Yeah that'd be why movies mostly just use chaff and flares, if any such thing occurs. But much of value of chaff in the present day is as a means of reflecting jamming. Pure chaff is too easy to filter out. Actually we also have had ejectable jamming cartridges for planes since the early 1980s, but those generally only work against very specific threats. Probably possible to make a modern one that is tuneable though given how much MMIC chips have improved on cost though.
Flight of the Intruder sorta managed to get across basic RWR-ECM stuff, along with the 'golden BB' killing the bombardier without wrecking the plane and other tidbits of realism. Not a very good movie overall but not because of that. It seems to just often be the case that movies that get anywhere with technical accuracy then also have basic storytelling problems that make them unappealing. Some of them are just not made to appeal to a wide audience, which doesn't always mean bad either, but well, it's nice to get both. And I'm not convinced its impossible, because people are pretty interested in this whole 'real life' thing too.
"This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it should be expected to climb a tree"
— Field Marshal William Slim 1956