Thanas wrote:Simon_Jester wrote:Even if it's not a private bank, this still boils down to the German finance minister demanding that the Greeks give him personally control of all their money.
To be fair, his track record with managing money has been far superior than any recent Greek finance minister. All sarcasm aside, how is this any different from the situation that will now happen, which is that the fund will be subject to European control...so Schäuble still sits at the table.
The difficulty then raised is, well.
Since I'm not sure you've been reading the previous posts that pointed this out, I will repeat:
There is good reason to think the Greek debt is already impossible for Greece to repay,
even if Greece reforms its economy, for a variety of reasons. Even the IMF itself has thought so for some time.
If you know that a country is unable to repay its debts, there is no logical reason to loan it further money
without enacting debt forgiveness.
By analogy- If I loan aerius money, and for whatever reason he can't pay it back
no matter what he does, I would be a fool to respond by loaning him more money "to get back on his feet." I would be even more of a fool to waste my time by volunteering to manage his finances, when literally
nothing will result in his finances turning around and me getting my money back.
The only reason I would volunteer to do that is if my intention is to use my position of financial power for personal gain. To engage in asset-stripping or other unethical actions. Or at the very least to 'legally' extract large fees from a person who is already in a bad financial situation.
Then
and only then do I have any real chance of profiting from going to the trouble of exercising control over his disastrous finances.
So it is reasonable, if you are a
de facto bankrupt person with no ability to repay your debts, to think "this person's generous offer to take control of my finances to help me fix things... sounds suspicious. I don't trust them and don't want to put them in charge."
Similar logic may apply to bankrupt countries.
...
Now, the bailout will temporarily ease Greece's problems, while a Greek exit from the Eurozone would temporarily worsen those problems. This may explain Tsipras' actions.
But even so, he has every reason NOT to trust Greece's foreign creditors with "control of Greek finances" during the crisis. And every reason to think that this control will be used to plunder Greece. And every reason to oppose this control, and to limit the degree of foreign control.
Giving the
KfW control over this was most probably the best solution because they got a decent track record of rebuilding economies - the German one from the 40s-50s and the East German economy from 1990s. It probably is
the institution one should put in charge of rebuilding ones economy. There is no equivalent institution with that kind of experience and track record. And unlike the Greek agencies, they do not have a reputation for being corrupt.
Indeed, I do not doubt that the KfW is a faithful and honorable German public institution. I am quite sure that putting the KfW in control of Greek finances will result in the KfW faithfully and honorably doing what is best... for Germany.
This isn't a condemnation of Germans as such, either. Putting in another organization
like the KfW, controlled by any other set of nations, will likewise result in the new organization doing what is best for that other set of nations.
No foreign agency be fully credible in promising to repair the Greek economy... at a time when the country or countries that agency comes from are large creditors every who have reason to strip Greece of assets and auction them off to foreign owners.
Steve wrote:What I want to know is... what's preventing a simple deal of debt forgiveness and debt payments being deferred in exchange for definite Greek tax reforms?
Because the last time there was a debt forgiveness deal in exchange for reforms, the greek gov took the debt forgiveness and did none of the reforms they agreed to. Most of what is demanded now is something they agreed to earlier as well. The fear in most European nations is that they will simply take the money and run - again. That is why there are such strict demands for "implement before we give you anything".
This would be sensible except that even if the Greeks carry out the reforms, they will not gain the ability to repay the debt. Therefore, the debts might as well be forgiven, because they will never be repaid in any event.
There are two possible goals: to repair Greece, and to get the money back.
1) If the goal is to repair Greece, forgiving the debt will vastly simplify the problem of carrying out repairs, because a sum of money equal to 3% of the Greek GDP will suddenly be available to invest in the repair process. Imagine all that money, or even a fraction of it, being used to fund anti-corruption investigations.
If the fear is that the Greeks will take the forgiveness and not repair themselves... simply refuse to loan them more money for any reason. That is all that will be necessary- stop trying to fix a thing that will not fix itself. Granted that the attempt to repair Greece will then fail, but it would have failed anyway, so you would lose nothing.
2) If the goal is to get the money back, then the goal is doomed no matter what happens, and only a fool would knowingly pursue such a pointless goal... Unless, of course, the real plan is to strip Greece of assets. Which is the exact opposite of the stated objective of "repairing Greece," and in which case it honestly doesn't matter whether the Greeks reform their legal system or not. An honest man is no easier to rob at gunpoint than a corrupt and sleazy man is.
So I conclude that if the goal is to repair Greece, there is no reason to make the Greeks reform
before forgiving the debts.
If the goal is to get the money back, then there is no reason to make the Greeks reform at all. And demands that the Greeks reform are a pure exercise in window-dressing to make the public support the plan to strip Greece of assets.