Basic rules of war neglected?

Post by **Darth Wong** » 2003-03-28 04:43pm

Is it just me, or does it appear as if the American military's leaders have been woefully negligent of extremely basic rules of war? Their overwhelming technological superiority will presumably win the day regardless, but as time passes, it appears that the people in charge planned this war on 4 assumptions:

The Iraqis will not fight.
The Iraqis will change sides readily.
Saddam's regime and his military organization will not change their tactics in any way after the 1991 defeat.
There is no need to conceal any of our troop movements from the enemy (hell, we'll broadcast them and announce them in advance; there will be no repeat of Schwarzkopf's feint and "left hook").

Leaving aside specific tactical issues such as the decision to rush to Baghdad rather than moving in and securing territory gradually, their general mindset is disturbing. Since when has anyone ever been successful by relying on the assumption of stupidity, passivity, and disloyalty on the part of his enemy, or by making no attempt whatsoever to conceal his movements and plans?

Post by **The Yosemite Bear** » 2003-03-28 04:48pm

err, Sorry to get on the topic of the Board in such a way but.

Voyager!

Great this means Bush and Colin Powel's brains have been freid by Berman and Bragga...

Glocksman · Post by **Glocksman** » 2003-03-28 04:50pm

Since when has anyone ever been successful by relying on the assumption of stupidity, passivity, and disloyalty on the part of his enemy, or by making no attempt whatsoever to conceal his movements and plans?

Unless there's more to the US warplan than I've seen so far, I'm wondering these things myself.

If I didn't know better, I would almost swear that McNamara and Westmoreland were running this war.

Lord Poe · Post by **Lord Poe** » 2003-03-28 04:59pm

Returning G.I.s have said that they were told there would be "little or no resistance" by their C.Os. Apparantly this stems from the massive surrenders of the Iraqis in the first Gulf War. But a military commentator on NBC the other night summed it up quite well: The first time, the Iraqis were being kicked out of Kuwait (sp?), but now, they HAVE nowhere to run back to, they are fighting on their home turf.

Journalists arewarned about what the can and can't broadcast, and have even sined affidavits to this effect. The "embedded" reporters (for the most part) abide by this, and even state that they had to wait on breaking certain stories until they get an ok.

So far the only jounalist to be kicked out for divulging too much information is a freelancer for the Christian Science Monitor.

Post by **The Yosemite Bear** » 2003-03-28 05:00pm

No if Macnamara and Westmoreland were running it, We would be using bioweapons* and not throughly proofed prototypes** as well. Grrr. don't bring those two fuckers up again, will you.

* Agent Orange (Or What gave my little sister cancer before she was born)
** Bad barrels, Not nearly enough cleaning kits, and dirty burning powder on M16s first run cost a LOT of human misery.

Warspite · Post by **Warspite** » 2003-03-28 05:05pm

That feeling is starting to pervade througout several analysts. Of course, the american planners were relying on technology to win the whole campaign, and basically sold this war by the premise of speed, that this operation would be over in an instant, the Iraqis wouold be "shocked and awed" by the American war machine.

There was arrogance by the planners, the "unrealistic" assumptions made (the Iraqis wouldn't fight, they would rise up against Saddam's regime, blah, blah, blah) may have given a sort of distancing from reality, much like a war game, where rules can be "bent".
That can be clearly seen in recent CentCom briefings, where the reporters are starting to get annoyed by the optimism of the military leaders regarding the operations (everything is on schedule, no problems with the logistical columns, we have the Iraqis where we want them, the weather is not a problem, etc.), when we all see that things at the frontline are totally different, in a way, the war in Quatar is diferent from the war in Iraq (or even in Washigton).

Of course, military planners say their plan is flexible, and that's true, thanks to modern technology, plans can be changed very rapidly (sp?), but that doesn't alter the fact that the operation isn't what military planners expected. (The claims from several news agencies, about a military official stating that the war isn't what they "wargamed", is a strong evidence of this).

Stravo · Post by **Stravo** » 2003-03-28 05:08pm

SEe my thread on Are we fighting the last war to see my views on this. I just wanted to add that a general recently admitted that they did not war game the Iraqis to fight like this. WTF?! I thought the point of wargames was to explore all alternatives and scenarios???

http://bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic.php?t=16013

phongn · Post by **phongn** » 2003-03-28 05:11pm

The Yosemite Bear wrote:No if Macnamara and Westmoreland were running it, We would be using bioweapons* and not throughly proofed prototypes** as well. Grrr. don't bring those two fuckers up again, will you.

* Agent Orange (Or What gave my little sister cancer before she was born)
** Bad barrels, Not nearly enough cleaning kits, and dirty burning powder on M16s first run cost a LOT of human misery.

Agent Orange was a contaminated chemical agent [defoliant], not a bioweapon.

Post by **Darth Wong** » 2003-03-28 05:13pm

Stravo wrote:I just wanted to add that a general recently admitted that they did not war game the Iraqis to fight like this. WTF?! I thought the point of wargames was to explore all alternatives and scenarios???

Perhaps we should call Saddam and complain that he's not playing by the script

Post by **NecronLord** » 2003-03-28 05:13pm

Answer: If Iraq were suddenly replaced with a technologically equivalent equal numbered force (The eternal Babylonian Empire

) the americans would be completely fucked. As it is they'll win through being the big guys.

I wouldn't like to be in the US when that hegemony falls. Making enemies is the #1 skill of the US leadership of late.

Warspite · Post by **Warspite** » 2003-03-28 05:21pm

Stravo wrote:I just wanted to add that a general recently admitted that they did not war game the Iraqis to fight like this. WTF?! I thought the point of wargames was to explore all alternatives and scenarios???

Quite true, it shows that the US military preparation for this operation was seriously flawed, but, the military planners were counting on a conventional engagement against Iraqi regular forces (Army, and all flavours of Republican Guards), maybe even into urban combat.
I think they didn't took into acount the guerrila warfare the Iraqis are undertaking.

Much of this flaw is also attributable to the "Shock and Awe" propaganda, which didn't work.

Warspite · Post by **Warspite** » 2003-03-28 05:24pm

Darth Wong wrote: Perhaps we should call Saddam and complain that he's not playing by the script

Funny thing is, one US Marine said the Iraqis weren't playing by the rules!

(Of course, he was refering to using civilians as human shields, or the irregulars hiding amongst the civilian population, but still... Onw of the rules is that there are no rules! (Except the Geneva Convention, that is.))

Crayz9000 · Post by **Crayz9000** » 2003-03-28 06:13pm

The funny thing is that the general who was running the Iraqi side of the last Pentagon wargame used highly unorthodox tactics like motorcycle and bicycle couriers to get around ELINT. He was told by the wargame officials to play by the rules, and at that point he quit the game...

Post by **The Yosemite Bear** » 2003-03-28 06:18pm

I remember that Crazy

You have to love disgruntaled Vietnam era military Commanders.

Crayz9000 · Post by **Crayz9000** » 2003-03-28 07:14pm

See, this is the problem with the American military right now:

Sun-Tzu wrote:The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few
calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It
is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to
win or lose.

Sun-Tzu wrote:Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If
you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you
will also suffer a defeat.

Post by **Steve** » 2003-03-28 07:33pm

Okay, so who wants to be first to smack Shrubby in the head with a copy of Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War"?

Stormbringer · Post by **Stormbringer** » 2003-03-28 07:36pm

Steve wrote:Okay, so who wants to be first to smack Shrubby in the head with a copy of Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War"?

I'd rather cram it up his and Don Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks' ass. I agree whole heartedly with Mike and Stravo here. Some one fucked up and we based our whole offensive on the wrong assumptions.

SirNitram · Post by **SirNitram** » 2003-03-28 07:38pm

Stormbringer wrote:
Steve wrote:Okay, so who wants to be first to smack Shrubby in the head with a copy of Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War"?
I'd rather cram it up his and Don Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks' ass. I agree whole heartedly with Mike and Stravo here. Some one fucked up and we based our whole offensive on the wrong assumptions.

It's not a small book. You'd need alot of lubricant.

Stormbringer · Post by **Stormbringer** » 2003-03-28 07:39pm

SirNitram wrote:
Stormbringer wrote:
Steve wrote:Okay, so who wants to be first to smack Shrubby in the head with a copy of Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War"?
I'd rather cram it up his and Don Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks' ass. I agree whole heartedly with Mike and Stravo here. Some one fucked up and we based our whole offensive on the wrong assumptions.
It's not a small book. You'd need alot of lubricant.

Forget it, they don't deserve lube.

Post by **Sea Skimmer** » 2003-03-28 07:54pm

Part of the problem is last time the US expected to need to heavy corps in action for 21 days just to clear out Kuwait and southern Iraq. In reality it took four days and a single corps would have been enough that also would have allowed for a successful low causalities invasion months earlier.

Another problem was simply that Kuwait couldn't hold any more troops; Third infantry was having to add more cots in its tents just to fit in the 101. To tens of thousands of men forth infantry and its support units would have bought would not have fit without training areas that would be under even greater demand.

Post by **Sea Skimmer** » 2003-03-28 07:57pm

Steve wrote:Okay, so who wants to be first to smack Shrubby in the head with a copy of Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War"?

Why, because with less then half the forces his invasion has taken more territory with fewer losses while fighting against a more determined enemy in worse terrain for a longer period then all of Desert Saber?

Andrew J. · Post by **Andrew J.** » 2003-03-28 08:07pm

Stormbringer wrote:
Steve wrote:Okay, so who wants to be first to smack Shrubby in the head with a copy of Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War"?
I'd rather cram it up his and Don Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks' ass. I agree whole heartedly with Mike and Stravo here. Some one fucked up and we based our whole offensive on the wrong assumptions.

How about we do the same thing with the complete works of Clausewitz instead?

jegs2 · Post by **jegs2** » 2003-03-28 08:08pm

It would appear that in the first Gulf War, US intelligence overestimated Iraqi capabilities, which led to a massive softening-up bombing campaign and committment of a very large ground invasion force. As a result of how easily the victory came, US planners apparently thought the Iraqis were less of a threat this time around and would immediately join US forces against Saddam. Two mistakes in that theory follow:

1. During the first Gulf War, Coalition forces were expelling Iraqi forces that had invaded Kuwait. This time, Coalition forces are invading Iraq proper, so Saddam is playing for keeps, instead of risking the loss of a recently conquered territory -- thus a much greater will to sustain the fight exists. Saddam cannot win militarily, so he is hoping to gain political victories that force a premature end to the war, thus maintaining his position in power.

2. Many in Iraq did rise up against Saddam after the first Gulf War, but Coalition forces left after completing the UN-mandated objective, leaving those who dared raise a hand against the regime to a weakened, but still sufficiently powerful enough to crush revolt, Saddam. His vengeance on the usurpers was fierce and brutal. As a result, many in Iraq now fear that Coalition forces will just do the same thing again. Saddam will come back and ruthlessly hunt down all who opposed him, for he cannot die and knows everything (in the sight of the Iraqi people).

The question has been asked, "Did not US military planners see any of this coming?" Yes, they saw the possibility of this happening, but it was considered an unlikely enemy course of action -- the most dangerous being the widespread and immediate use of chemical weapons and possibly an attack on US forces before they had built sufficient combat power within the region. In all military analyses on the enemy, the following are considered:

1. Enemy Most Dangerous Course of Action (EMDCOA): What is the worst the enemy can do? Examples: Immediate use of chemical weapons on Coalition forces during RSOI in order to prevent building of combat power and an assault/invasion on neighbors.

2. Enemy Most Likely Course of Action (EMLCOA): Based upon analysis of what the enemy has done in the past, his order of battle (OB), the leadership of the enemy, and forces available, what is the enemy most likely to do?

3. Other COA's, which are grouped into unlikely courses of action.

All of those COA's are "wargamed" by military staffs in order to determine which friendly COA's are necessary to defeat any given ECOA. From that, we can assume that what is now happening was indeed foreseen, but it was not determined to be the EMLCOA. We can also see that Coalition planners are flexing accordingly to counter the enemy's chosen COA. In the end, all of the plans derived from "wargaming" survive only until the first round is fired. After that, the process of IPB (initial preparation of the battlefield) is an ever-continuing and ever-evolving process, based on careful and detailed analysis of the enemy. In that way, the commanders can ensure they fight the enemy instead of the plan.

Post by **Vympel** » 2003-03-28 11:31pm

They are going to double the ground combat forces from 30,000 to 60,000, aren't they- the 4th Infantry Division (supposed to be hi-tech- maybe M2A3 Bradlets, M1A2SEP tanks, though I wouldn't know). However, their deployment will take weeks.

One question I have- of the 6 Republican Guard divisions- I've only heard three mentioned during the war:

The total number is:

Al Nida Division (Armored)
Medina Division (Armored)
Adnan Division (Motorized)
Nebuchadnezzar Division (Mechanized)
Baghdad Division (Mechanized)
Hammurabi Division (Armored)

The Tawakalna Division (Mechanized) was disbanded.
The Al-Faw Division (Motorized) was disbanded.
The Al-Abed Division (Motorized) was disbanded.

So where are they all?

Stuart Mackey · Post by **Stuart Mackey** » 2003-03-28 11:41pm

Dont forget the impact of the enemy on logistics mike.
What you have said can be summed up in the well worn phrase "No plan survives first contact with the enemy."