electronic implants and death

[WATCH-MAN]

 
 
 
Imagine, in a future not far away, mankind has the technology to replace brain cells with nanites.

Those nanintes are able to take over all the functions of the brain cell they replace.

For all the surrounding cells, all the cells that interacted with the replaced cell, there is no difference.

The person does not notice any differences. It does not feel anything.

And nobody else can observe any differences in the person.
 
 
 
I'm sure that we can agree that the person is not dead only because a few brain cells are replaced by nanites.

But is there a limit?

How many brain cells have to be replaced by nanites that one can say that the original person does not exist any more - especially when the brain cells are replaced gradually over a long time?
 
 
 
Does it change anything if these nanites "improve" the brain of a person - e.g. enable the person to do complex calculations without a calculator, remember anything ...?

I'm sure that we can agree that a person with a memory chip in his head is not dead.

But again: Where is the limit?

How much has to change that one can say that the original person does not exist any more - especially when the brain cells are replaced gradually over a long time and the "improvements" are coming gradually too?
 
 
 
What is the qualitative difference to the changes in a brain that occur naturally in a lifespan?

The brain of an adult has many differences from the brain the adult had when it was still a baby.

The adult has gained many abilities the baby had not.

Nevertheless we assume that the baby and the adult are one person - although after many years of metabolism in the adult person is probably no matter any more that was once in the baby.
 
 
 
To be honest: I have no answers to these questions.

It has something to do with the continuity of a person.

Is an adult the same person as the baby it once was?

Is a 90 year old person the same person as it was when it was 19?

Can you punish a 90 year old person for something it has done when it was 19?

How much has to change that one can say that a person is not the person it was once?

And do make artificial changes a difference?
 
 
 

[Jub]

This is the standard ship of Theseus stuff.

The first thing is that as long as there isn't a disruption of function you can replace things as fast or as slow as you like and the person never died. They might be different depending on how emulation works on a fully inorganic brain, but they aren't dead. I'd imagine some people getting their head meat replaced might want to opt for a capacity upgrade while they're at it if such is possible but even then it's still them.

Upgrades of a larger degree, adding new capability aren't any different than giving a profoundly deaf person an implant the restores some level of function. It changes how they experience the world, it upgrades their capacity, but we don't even question if they're the same person. The same goes for those who enhance their capacity via medication we don't say that somebody with ADHD taking some attention drugs is a new person even if they get a big productivity jump from the meds.

None of your scenarios here change who the person is any more than upgrading their body to a machine would change them. Hell, the more we look into our own heads the more we find that personality is just a post hoc explanation for a complicated bundle of instincts and that intelligence is just an emergent property of these behaviors and the capacity such. We may just research ourselves out of even caring about this question in the next hundred or so year.

[Formless]

FYI, we've known for a little while now that brain cells do actually replace themselves over time, just like any other cell in the human body. They just get replaced slower than most other cells, such that it was hard to prove and that lead to a long time misconception that they don't get replaced at all. But now, we even know where the reservoir of brain stem cells is in the body, and we're pretty sure that the brain cells you are born with are different cells than the ones you die with. And yet, despite the Ship of Theseus paradox, we assume that we are the same person we are at death that we are at birth, more or less. Yet not one cell in our body is the same-- hell, probably not even one molecule is the same. A person appears to be less of an object sitting in space and more of a pattern of information moving-- and evolving!-- through time.

If its hard to visualize the concept, look up Sid Conway's Game of Life some time. Its just a cellular automata, with dots on a board turning from white to black with every turn, and yet because of the rules patterns can appear that are easily distinguished and identified. Its even turning complete, so if you wanted to you could make a computer within the ruleset.

Applying this to the thought experiment, I think most people informed on the subject would agree that the person in thought experiment never actually dies, at least until the moment that their consciousness stops functioning, which could happen in either the biological or non-biological substrate. Thermodynamics and all that. Even most religious people would agree on this point, since most (though not all) believe in some form of dualism where the body and soul are separate entities.

[Ziggy Stardust]

Great answers by the previous two posts. But yeah, I think it's impossible to ask a question like this without the context becoming completely irrelevant because it ends up just being a question of how exactly we define "consciousness" and the notion of "identity". Not that those aren't interesting topics to discuss, but it very quickly has nothing to do with the original scenario.

[EmilyJohnston]

This is more a subject about what defines as as individuals, the brain or the soul) This is my answer to the thing with replacing the person or not. I think our actions depend on previous experiences, plus a bit of logic and some hormones. But I think this technology could be revolutionary. I look at my grandfather who went through a cerebral stroke. The person changes in one night. I would like him to be again who he used to be before the stroke. If these nanites would recreate the vital functions, it is amazing.

[Cykeisme]

"This is more a subject about what defines as as individuals, the brain or the soul) This is my answer to the thing with replacing the person or not.

I do not personally subscribe to the concept of a metaphysical soul, yet even so, I can see a case being made that gradually replacing brain cells with functionally identical artificial replacements still preserves the soul.
I.e. the body is replaced, but the soul remains in a new vessel.

[Broomstick]

I think there's something to be said for continuity. I am not the same person I was 50 years ago, and yet there is such a strong connection and continuity over time that I am still perceived as owning the same identity. Gradual replacement as the OP proposes - yes, I think that would constitute the "same person" in the same sense that I'm the "same person" I was a half century ago.

[Solauren]

Especially if the replacement was set up in a way that it simply replaced and took over for cells that died or were damaged.

[WATCH-MAN]

Okay, now imagine that the whole organic matter in a body of a person is replaced by nanites and the information saved into these nanites are copied into another body build out of nanites.

The original body build out of nanites is regarded as the same person it once was.

But what is with the body build out of nanites, that was created by simply copying the information from the first body?

Is the second body alive?

Is it the same person?

If the person - before a new body was created by copying all information - maybe even before the organic matter was replaced by those nanites - had done a crime, should all bodies that were created by copying the crime including information be punished?

[Solauren]

You are of course speaking of the concept of post-organic conscious transhumanism. The idea of a human being eventually being 'upgraded' to be a machine.

There is no clear answer to that at this time.

Side Tangent: This was actually the plotline of the first season of Altered Carbon, and a sticking point at the conclusion.

Short summary - The technology exists to both move and copy consciousness between bodies. (We later learn you can even do it into machines, but it's tricky). It's used by people to live longer lives, including backing themselves up at fixed intervals so if something happens to the primary copy, the back-up copy is only missing a few hours of time.

One of the primary characters, a wealthy industrialist, hires another of the characters to solve his own murder. It's eventually revealed that the industrialist killed himself right before 'back-up', because someone has messed with his mind, and he didn't want that remaining. He killed himself so his 'back-up' would be clean.

However, during the time between the 'back-up' having originally been created (he backed himself up every 24 hours), and his death, because of someone messing with his mind, his usual 'rough' sex-play with paid-sex-workers went to far and he murdered her.

When he was arrested, his argument was 'but I destroyed that person'. And law enforcments reply was 'but not the act'.

It's never revealed what happened to the industrialist beyond that. That might have been planned for later seasons, but the series was cancelled after Season 2.

(End of Tangent)

Now my personal thoughts on the matter is this -
IF consciousness is shown to continue from the organic human, to the nanotech entity (same person, new body), then yes, the crime transfers, no matter how long it's been.
Currently If someone commits a murder when they're 20, and it's not solved until they're 70, barring statute of limitations laws, they should still be arrested and tried. That should apply for transhumanism if consciousness transfers.

If consciousness does NOT continue from the organic to nanotech, then no, the crime does not transfer.

[bilateralrope]

Solauren, I agree with you fully in the case where only one copy of the person remains.

But I think WATCH-MAN was asking about what happens if there are two copies of a person ?
That is always going to be a complicated scenario, even without the addition of criminal activity. Altered Carbon dealt with that by saying that if there are two copies of a person running around, both must die. Unless the authorities really like you, then they might let one live. But never both.

[EnterpriseSovereign]

All this sounds like the plot of the film Gamer which has self-replicating nanites that replace brain tissue.

[Solauren]

In the case of two copies, I think it would depend.

Any copies AFTER a crime, that remember the crime, bare the responsibility of the crime.

Copies from prior to the crime, do not.

Now, in the case of copies the same age, one creates a crime, one does not, that might as be twins with near identical life experiences. Similiar but ultimately seperate.