Afghanistan: Street fighting rages as Taliban attack key city

[Broomstick]

Again, the Taliban are not as arbitrary as you seem to wish them to be, and there are certain groups who have much more reason to fear direct and brutal persecution than others. Because those groups are so wide, removing as many of their members from the situation as both wish to escape it and who you can accomodate limits the number of people who will be targeted. It is only if the Taliban are simply killing and brutalizing random people, entirely without rhyme or reason and with a set number to fill regardless of how many people are actually present, that your logic works. In the absence of that, your position is bluntly moral cowardice. You are saying 'we cannot save everyone, so let's not save anyone (except the pool of victims I personally endorse, despite arguing that this will only transfer their suffering to others)'.

I don't think they're arbitrary. I think their will to do harm and their pool of available people they would harm far exceeds their immediate term capacity to do it, and that will remain true in all achievable cases of evacuation.

The population of Afghanistan and the population of California are roughly equal.

Let's assume 2/3 of those in Afghanistan are Taliban supporters - why that number? Just a wild ass guess, nobody knows for sure how many people are really supporters of the Taliban vs. meekly going along with them so they don't get shot/tortured/whatever. That leaves a pool of about 13 million who might need a rescue (because I don't give a fuck at this point if the Taliban decide to kill each other). We've got 5 states with more people than that in them, and hell, New York City is pushing 10 million so against the entire US population the number needing shelter starts to fade into the background. No doubt some of that 13 million will choose to go elsewhere - Pakistan (which already has 3 million Afghani refugees), the UK, somewhere in Europe, Australia, wherever. So, basically, let's say the population equivalent of NYC needs relocating.

That IS a difficult proposition - I don't think anyone has ever organized an airlift for 10 million before. Nope, I think it unlikely we can save all of those people.

But I don't see it as an argument to give up on saving as many as we can. We relocated a quarter million Hmong to the US, I'd like to think we could relocate a quarter million Afghans if we wanted to do that. I'd like to see us try. We sure as hell have room for them, whether they want to live in an urban area or set up shop in some of the less populated parts of the US.

But the political will isn't there, people are pre-occupied with an on-going pandemic, climate disasters that are starting to hit everywhere, and years of Republican propaganda has poisoned the well regarding ANY immigrants, with the four years of Trump just icing on the cake.

I find it very sad and depressing all around. As I said, I don't have any answers for the current mess the world is in, or the mess that is Afghanistan. But for damn sure if the US can't find a way to fix that shit in 20 years (and I've always doubted that we could do that anyway) then it's long past time we pulled out, because adding more blood and treasure to the morass is not helping anyone.

[Soontir C'boath]

It was never going to end well in Afghanistan. Our defense budget has ballooned to over $700 billion now and how much of it has actually went into Afghan infrastructure such as schools, sewers, drinking water, etc, and military hardware and training? What efforts have we done besides indiscriminate airstrikes to curb people from joining the Taliban (also killing civilians in those strikes is counterintuitive!)?

Our priorities were never to help the Afghani people. We are pulling out and nothing else except for a few thousand more interpreters.

[Broomstick]

Afghanistan never ends well for foreigners - not the US, not the USSR, not the British in the 19th Century.... not that well for Alexander the Great a couple thousand years ago although the city now known as Kandahar was named for him back in the day (the label has mutated somewhat in the ensuing millennia).

Which history I knew even in 2001 and one of several reasons I was opposed the US involvement there - so very, very, very unlikely to end well for anyone.

[Solauren]

This was always going to be a shit-storm end to a shit-storm show. Period.

The only thing that could have avoided this would have been diplomatic skill on the behalf of George Bush after the 9-11 attacks.

i.e "Hand over Bin Laden, release all non-Afghan citizens back to their home countries, and we'll recognize you as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and ban our citizens from traveling to your territory"

Toss on a bunch of conditions that can get it revoked, wait 6 months, and then claim the Taliban violated them and withdraw that recognition.

Didn't happen, and since then, the people of Afghanistan have paid the price, and continue to pay the price.

And now the Taliban is going to extract a price, with interest.

[Darth Yan]

They should have stayed in just afghanistan and focused on making sure the Taliban were actually crushed (and built a government that wasn't corrupt. A major weakness was that many of their allies were in some ways WORSE than the Taliban).

[Darth Yan]

They should have stayed in just afghanistan and focused on making sure the Taliban were actually crushed (and built a government that wasn't corrupt. A major weakness was that many of their allies were in some ways WORSE than the Taliban).

[Solauren]

They should have stayed in just afghanistan and focused on making sure the Taliban were actually crushed (and built a government that wasn't corrupt. A major weakness was that many of their allies were in some ways WORSE than the Taliban).

Problem - that's what they did. After nearly 2 decades, they were still failing miserably.

[loomer]

Mazar-i-Sharif has fallen. For those unaware of the importance, it's not just the last stronghold of the government in the North, it's also the stronghold of the Hazara, and the last time the Taliban took Mazar, they murdered 5-20,000 of them as well as the local Tajiks and Uzbeks (with systematic executions of young men alongside the killing of women and children) in an act of genocide. There is a reason there are so many Hazara in Australia.

Again, the Taliban are not as arbitrary as you seem to wish them to be, and there are certain groups who have much more reason to fear direct and brutal persecution than others. Because those groups are so wide, removing as many of their members from the situation as both wish to escape it and who you can accomodate limits the number of people who will be targeted. It is only if the Taliban are simply killing and brutalizing random people, entirely without rhyme or reason and with a set number to fill regardless of how many people are actually present, that your logic works. In the absence of that, your position is bluntly moral cowardice. You are saying 'we cannot save everyone, so let's not save anyone (except the pool of victims I personally endorse, despite arguing that this will only transfer their suffering to others)'.

I don't think they're arbitrary. I think their will to do harm and their pool of available people they would harm far exceeds their immediate term capacity to do it, and that will remain true in all achievable cases of evacuation.

Okay, but you do understand that that position cannot give rise to your other position without some insanely tortured logic, right?

They should have stayed in just afghanistan and focused on making sure the Taliban were actually crushed (and built a government that wasn't corrupt. A major weakness was that many of their allies were in some ways WORSE than the Taliban).

We shouldn't have invaded in the first place, honestly. It's one of my country's greatest errors, and that's saying something. The issue after that wasn't failing to crush the Taliban - in terms of military force that was pretty much achieved for quite a while - but failing to produce sufficient material changes in society to prevent resurgence, which is always difficult for any occupying force but especially difficult when, as our occupation force did, you deliberately rig the system to be unable to stand independently of the imperial occupation and neuter its ability to interfere with the extractive interests of the metropole.

They should have stayed in just afghanistan and focused on making sure the Taliban were actually crushed (and built a government that wasn't corrupt. A major weakness was that many of their allies were in some ways WORSE than the Taliban).

Problem - that's what they did. After nearly 2 decades, they were still failing miserably.

Well, not entirely - because again, what we did was not set out to build a working government, but one that was a proxy for the interests of the occupation force and the extractive interests of the metropole. The corruption was a feature, not a bug. Add in that most of what we 'built' we transplanted wholesale from Western models without considering the cultural, religious, and practical conditions on the ground and it's no wonder we failed.

There's been a bit of back and forth about Taliban courts, and they're actually an excellent example of how we done fucked up versus the Taliban. Their courts, bluntly, are better than the ones installed by our occupation in every arena except domestic violence and sexual violence. They're less corrupt, faster, more reliable, and merge local customary law, Sharia principles, and a flexible needs-based jurisprudence into a relatively effective legal code. Their ability to create a better functioning dispute resolution system allowed them to rebuild most of their popular support and prove they were a viable indigenous alternative to an imposed, alien, slow, and corrupt system rigged in favour of the occupiers. (The reason I'm down on them elsewhere is that they don't bother with them for alleged espionage, collaboration, etc - so in the current terror, the people most at risk are placed explicitly beyond the reach of law to be dealt with without hearings.)

[loomer]

Looks like it's a moot point anyway. They will not fight to keep Kabul, and will be handing it over to the Taliban peacefully.

[Vendetta]

But I don't see it as an argument to give up on saving as many as we can. We relocated a quarter million Hmong to the US, I'd like to think we could relocate a quarter million Afghans if we wanted to do that. I'd like to see us try. We sure as hell have room for them, whether they want to live in an urban area or set up shop in some of the less populated parts of the US.

But the political will isn't there, people are pre-occupied with an on-going pandemic, climate disasters that are starting to hit everywhere, and years of Republican propaganda has poisoned the well regarding ANY immigrants, with the four years of Trump just icing on the cake.

The time isn't there either. It's not an unreasonable expectation that by the end of today the US/UK will only control the airport in Kabul. The collapse of the Afghan forces has been so swift and so total that the Taliban have recovered control of the whole country in about a week. It's an open question now whether the US could even get all of their own staff out without relying on the Taliban to stick to their word about not attempting to take Kabul by force.

The military destruction of the Taliban was never as complete as the US & UK pretended to themselves that it was, it was as early as 2008 some people were pointing out that military destruction of the Taliban had not only failed but was functionally impossible, and as already noted the corruption in the institutions and army of Afghanistan was considered completely acceptable because their appearance supported the lies the US was telling to itself (that they had Done Nation Building in Afghanistan). These two facts combined to produce sudden and total existence failure in the Afghan forces.

Ultimately, what the US said they were doing in Afghanistan takes generations not decades, and they weren't even really doing it, they were putting on a show that made them feel good and shouting down anyone who tried to point that out at home.

[MKSheppard]

The military destruction of the Taliban was never as complete as the US & UK pretended to themselves that it was, it was as early as 2008 some people were pointing out that military destruction of the Taliban had not only failed but was functionally impossible, and as already noted the corruption in the institutions and army of Afghanistan was considered completely acceptable because their appearance supported the lies the US was telling to itself (that they had Done Nation Building in Afghanistan). These two facts combined to produce sudden and total existence failure in the Afghan forces.

I hate to quote that entire passage by Vendy just to show the highlited part, but it's necessary to set up context.

In a just world, the following people would be arrested/recalled from retirement to be arrested under the Uniform Code of Military Justice:

GEN Austin Miller
GEN John Nicholson, Jr.
GEN Stanley McChrystal
GEN David Petraeus
GEN David McKiernan
GEN John Allen
GEN Joseph Dunford
GEN John Campbell

It's no different than a bridge inspector being arrested after a bridge collapse, revealing he gundecked reports for years.

Unfortunately, we're beyond such petty things as accountability, because that's only for the Chinese Communist Party.

[Vendetta]

The military destruction of the Taliban was never as complete as the US & UK pretended to themselves that it was, it was as early as 2008 some people were pointing out that military destruction of the Taliban had not only failed but was functionally impossible, and as already noted the corruption in the institutions and army of Afghanistan was considered completely acceptable because their appearance supported the lies the US was telling to itself (that they had Done Nation Building in Afghanistan). These two facts combined to produce sudden and total existence failure in the Afghan forces.

I hate to quote that entire passage by Vendy just to show the highlited part, but it's necessary to set up context.

In a just world, the following people would be arrested/recalled from retirement to be arrested under the Uniform Code of Military Justice:

GEN Austin Miller
GEN John Nicholson, Jr.
GEN Stanley McChrystal
GEN David Petraeus
GEN David McKiernan
GEN John Allen
GEN Joseph Dunford
GEN John Campbell

It's no different than a bridge inspector being arrested after a bridge collapse, revealing he gundecked reports for years.

Unfortunately, we're beyond such petty things as accountability, because that's only for the Chinese Communist Party.

Thing is though, it's not just the generals. It was everyone in the entire chain. They weren't "decieving" the civil governments, they and the governments were all working together on the same show, and they were all involved in calling everyone who disagreed or presented things as not going completely swimmingly as "defeatist".

Roughly everyone in the security and military arm of every administration since Bush is a player in the show that was "nation building in Afghanistan".

[MKSheppard]

And the Afghan President has fled. It's all over folks.

[MKSheppard]

#SkyNews reporting UK paratroopers in skirmishes with Taliban at Kabul airport.

[loomer]

Reuters is saying the Taliban is now rejecting the prospect of a transitional government outright.

[MKSheppard]

#BREAKING KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — Taliban official says they will soon declare the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from the presidential palace in Kabul. That was the name of the Taliban government ousted by U.S.-led forces after Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

[Solauren]

Now we have a Taliban back in charge, possible with more people then that had prior to the invasion, but with captured US military hardware and a claim to having driven the United States and it's allies out of the country.

[ray245]

I'm interested to see how the Taliban is actually going to rile Afghanistan now, espeically in the major cities. How would they be able to rein in control of the population with good access to internet and social media?

It's one thing to force people to abide the law via force of arms alone, but that will require a massive state apparatus to do it in this modern era. I doubt the Taliban can afford such a massive state apparatus to succeed.

[Broomstick]

I think you might be missing two important factors, ray245.

First - there are people in Afghanistan who like the Taliban. People who think the type of government/religion/society they promote are a good and desirable thing. (Needless to say I personally don't agree, but then, I'm not those people) This is, no doubt, one reason why the Taliban took over so easily - lots of people who aren't just tolerating them but actively wanting to join their collective.

Second - Afghanistan has been churned by over 25 years of civil war. I suspect a lot of people just want peace, quiet, and some sort of stability even if the government they live under is far from ideal. Many people would choose being alive in a theocracy, even a repressive one, over being dead in the middle of an armed conflict.

I suspect the Taliban are going to party for awhile, then get down to governing.

And I wish for god's sake the US would learn the fucking lesson that we can't "change hearts and minds" or barge in killing and destroying then attempt to impose a foreign system of governance and social contract on another country. It fucking doesn't work. The only time we pulled it off was after years of war with Japan followed by nuking them twice over, and even there the transformation was far from complete or happy for either side. Since no one wants THAT level of conflict to ever happen again (at least no one sane) let's stop this fucking shit once and for all. I want no more blood and treasure spent on these fuck-ups. No more Vietnams. No more Afghanistans.

[Vendetta]

First - there are people in Afghanistan who like the Taliban. People who think the type of government/religion/society they promote are a good and desirable thing. (Needless to say I personally don't agree, but then, I'm not those people) This is, no doubt, one reason why the Taliban took over so easily - lots of people who aren't just tolerating them but actively wanting to join their collective.

The ridiculous levels of corruption in the institutions set up by the US/UK occupiers has been a real help there. The corruption was obvious, money disappeared into all sorts of pockets and everyone knew it was going on.

That gave the Taliban a big old lever to use on public opinion.

[Juubi Karakuchi]

I suspect that the US, and the west in general, has indeed learnt its lesson. That's why this is happening. Certain people are screaming at Biden to go back, but he won't do it; and from what I can see, the bulk of the US public supports him in this. They've had enough, and he's giving them what they want.

As for the Taliban ruling Afghanistan, that depends almost entirely on what kind of government they offer the country. The fact is ,the Taliban are actually quite weak; they only won because most of Afghanistan barely resisted them. They have somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 fighters (the highest and lowest estimates I've heard), trying to hold down a country of many millions; a substantial minority of whom have little reason to trust them. If the local power-brokers offered little resistance, it's because they saw little point; they knew the army and the government would collapse, and they didn't have time to make their own arrangements. Since the Taliban are playing nice for the moment, better to let them roll along; and so doing buy time to get ready, just in case they get nasty. And the Taliban face a hard choice in turn; spread themselves paper-thin to maintain a presence everywhere? Or actually trust their local allies?

Because trust is the big issue; the main factor as to whether Afghans will wearily accept Taliban rule or take up arms against it. Yes, they are tired, grieving, terrified. Yes, they want the violence to stop, and for some measure of order and peace. But is that what the Taliban will give them? Do they dare trust it? Do they dare to assume, to hope, that it will not butcher them as it did before? That it won't massacre them, like the last time they took Mazar-i-Sharif? For the southern Pashtuns this is just about possible; for the northern minorities, this is a big risk to take. The last time the Taliban had power over them, it tried to massacre them. Is mutual trust really possible?

And they might not have to. Because the Taliban rolled merrily along, keeping up their momentum, they left much of what they rolled-over intact.The local power-brokers, and their social networks, and their followers, and whatever weapons they've managed to squirrel away. Unless they do somehow trust the Taliban not to turn on them, they'll be at least covertly trying to organise, plotting with each-other, recreating the Northern Alliance. If the Taliban prove treacherous, it will be their only chance.

On top of that, some are already fighting. Abdul Rashid Dostom may have lost Mazar-i-Sharif, but he's run for the hills with thousands of his followers. He's down, but not out. Yet.

So what do the Taliban have to do? Well, they have to prove that they really have changed, that it'll be different this time. They'll have to give their local allies what they want; which will almost certainly be local autonomy. That means local law-making, and local self-defence; live and let-live. If the Taliban really do want peace this time, really just want overall power, then they will allow this; and there will probably be peace. If they actually try to build trust, and tolerate difference, there will probably be peace.

The only trouble is, I don't think they can. I don't think they can bear the idea, whatever they might say. I fear they can't allow this, because it means throwing away their entire vision. If they allow local autonomy, then substantial chunks of the country - likely in the north and centre - will not be Talibanized. The kites will fly, the music will play, and girls might even go to school. This is an affront to what they sincerely believe, and a denial of their stated conviction; that they are the real Afghans, and their vision is the real Afghanistan. But that's not all, and maybe not even the primary problem.

The primary problem is Pashtun nationalism; of which the Taliban are a particularly warped and nasty manifestation. Their vision isn't just about reactionary Islam, though that plays a key role. It's also about Pashtun domination of Afghanistan; both politically and culturally. What the Taliban want to create is not just a perfect Islamic state, but a perfect Pashtun state, as they see it. This vision has been created for them by the Pakistani secret service, for their own purposes.

What Pakistan wanted, as I see it, was not just strategic depth against India. If that was all they wanted, they could have dumped the used-up Taliban and befriended the new Afghan state, and helped it develop into a powerful ally. The West was hardly likely to object. Even if they couldn't create an Afghan democracy, they might at least have created a semi-effective authoritarian state, maybe a heavily-militarised one like their own.

But that couldn't happen. Because of Pashtun nationalism. The Pashtuns number between 60-70 million, with the bulk living in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have no state of their own, with the sole exception of Afghanistan; and indeed, Pashtuns are sometimes called Afghans. The border between them is the Durand line, drawn there by a British civil servant in 1893; a border which Afghan governments have a curious habit of not recognising. A powerful Afghan state might get funny ideas about the Pakistani Pashtuns, and the roles would be reversed; with Afghan agents stirring up Pashtun separatism, and Afghan money fuelling Pashtun insurgencies in Pakistan. The ultimate goal, and Pakistan's nightmare, would be a recreation of the Durrani empire; which at its height in the 1750s controlled what is now Afghanistan, Pakistan, and chunks of Iran and northern India.

Unless, of course, there are some in Pakistan who want to do that themselves, and on their terms. In which case, the Taliban are an invaluable catspaw.

So, all-in-all, according to this horrid little theory of mine, Pakistan needs a Taliban-led Afghanistan in order to keep Pashtun nationalism in an acceptable and controllable form; because the alternative, in the minds of some, is to risk national truncation.

I might have lost my mind...again. But this makes a worrying amount of sense.

[Juubi Karakuchi]

To better illustrate my point, a convenient map.



As you can see, Pakistan is a complicated place. And Pashtun irredentism has the potential to be inconvenient for it.

And this one, also care of Wikipedia.



As far as I understand, the blue marks the largest area claimed as part of a possible Pashtunistan; as pushed by Daoud Khan. Apparently the Balochis were not best pleased, and neither was Pakistan. They backed the Mujaheddin to get back at him.

[Solauren]

I'm interested to see how the Taliban is actually going to rile Afghanistan now, especially in the major cities. How would they be able to rein in control of the population with good access to internet and social media?

Simple -
#1 - Destroy that infrastructure.
Blow up all the cell phone towers, and other digital communication relays. The Taliban use satelite coms or radio anyway.
No digital communications, no internet and social media.

#2 - Have a cleric pass a religious edict against social media and the internet, and then kill anyone caught using the internet and social media

From their point of view all the Taliban have to do is go 'our way, or the grave', and enforce it, and people will fall into line.

[loomer]

It's not verifiable at the moment, but apparently they're doing door to door searches in Mazar again.

[Elfdart]

To this day, there's debate over how much of ARVN was infiltrated by North Vietnamese officers toward the end of the war. IIRC, at least one ARVN division was commanded by an NVA officer, who handed vast amounts US-supplied equipment over to the NVA as it advanced in the Spring Offensive. The way the Afghan Army folded so quickly can't possibly be the result of just cowardice or ineptitude. I'll bet the rent that they did an Olé! because a good number of them were Taliban all along or jumped on the bandwagon. That said, it was always going to end this way. I thought so even before my cousin's husband was killed over there sixteen years ago.

Anyone looking for satisfaction from this pointless bloodbath should tune in to Morning Joe tomorrow to watch smug imperialists start a weeklong orgy of nonstop blubbering and finger-pointing. It's not much of a consolation prize, but it'll do for now.