I do not think you are right, unless you are talking about spring 2024. Unlike the Soviet jets that ex Pact states have been sending, there is a substantial lead time for F-16 or any other Western jet. Huge amounts of training needs to be done--not just pilots, but also ground crew. Tools and parts for repair, maintenance, and sustainment need to be moved into the country. Ukraine has no experience with ANY of it. Estimates are usually that training a significant Ukrainian force for the new equipment would take about 1.5 years.EnterpriseSovereign wrote: ↑2023-05-19 06:35pm It is, they want them for their spring offensive. Denying Russia air superiority is a game changer.
Which doesn't make it a pointless donation. If they had started moving along that path when the war started, they would be ready by fall or winter this year. It gives Russia a time limit, or at least the start of one. Shoigu, Gerasimov, and Putin would have a 1.5 year countdown clock, because they know that the war will never be easier than when Ukraine doesn't have enough planes. And if they fail to meet objectives in time, it might finally convince them to throw in the towel and give up a lost war.
Also, Ukraine is already doing a great job of denying air superiority to Russia. F-16 or other Western platforms would be used to establish local and temporary Ukrainian air superiority. Which Ukraine is ALSO doing on occasion, but they lose planes every time they do and become less capable.
Yeah, this isn't really that big. I guess you could call this an overextension with an associated flanking attack, but the salient really isn't that bad. Currently, in fact, it is still Ukraine that has a salient in the center. There shouldn't be much danger for Wagner being encircled, it isn't like Stalingrad where the line extended for HUNDREDS of miles, unless there is something else going on. Just because it took nine years for Bakhmut to fall doesn't mean withdrawing is going to take long at all--according to Google Maps, just WALKING from Bakhmut all the way back to Soledar is only a two hour trip. Shows how little progress has been made, but also means that a motorized or even footmobile force can easily escape Ukrainian pincers which are currently only advancing a mile or less per day.Lord Revan wrote: ↑2023-05-23 08:39am What's even funnier the "allow enemy to overextend and then crush their flanks" as a tactic is so old that it's probably as old as warfare itself, yet Russia seems to walked straight into it. This one the few tactics that favor a side with fewer numbers too since if done right the force those flanks got crushed will end up with cut supply lines thus their size becomes a liability rather then strength.
EDIT:It wouldn't surprise me at all if the leaders of the Wagner force would be recalled to Moscow just before the Ukrainian noose closes totally and thus don't share the faith of their men.
Unless, of course, Putin forces Prigozhin to fight to the death to hold the city in the name of Russian honor. That or another thunder run like Kharkiv is really the only way you see a major encirclement. So far, the only units I've seen recorded in fighting on the flanks of Bakhmut are the Ukrainian-generated assault units--they seem to be holding their NATO brigades in reserve. Committing them to try and encircle Wagner would probably be a waste--Bakhmut will most likely be back in Ukrainian hands inside a month with just the work of the 3rd Assault and that other formation whose designation escapes me.
I wonder what's happening in Belgorod. I hope it wasn't actually a Ukrainian assault brigade, especially a NATO-trained one. I expect that being seen enabling a direct attack on Russian soil would give reservation to a lot of potential arms suppliers, and it also feeds the Russian propaganda narrative that it is fighting a defensive war against all of NATO and probably boost support on the home front. That said, it does so far legitimately seem to be anti-Putin Russians, though that's the kindest that can be said about their political leanings.
Excellent move, strategically, if it was Russian volunteers. Those guys are probably a liability in the long run, so it's kinda best to let them take the hardest fighting and the heaviest casualties. Like Azov. Russia might have decided it doesn't face risk of invasion and focused its troops in Ukraine while ignoring their own border--the ease of the breakthrough might suggest this. A quick reminder that yes, Ukraine can and will cross that line might get them to draw troops away from wherever the real offensive is coming. It also really damages Russian morale. The men on the front are going to wonder how their commanders missed such a weakness, the civilians back home are going to be reminded that the war isn't just a curiosity, and obviously it should build support for Putin's opposition.
Regarding Biden's dealing with Russia. Russia needs an off ramp or it will become like North Korea. People speaking of Sun Tzu, here is one of his actual lessons, chapter 7:36: "When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard." You can't push but so hard, unless you do it gradually. If you want Russia to be back on the global market, keeping German industry alive, then you don't push them into a corner on day one. You've gotta play a little reserved, or Putin will never be kicked out because he'll be proven right, that NATO is attacking Russians.