This would be a very easy claim of mine for you to refute. To my knowledge, no one has reported TOS-1 being active in bombarding the river crossing since that one got blown up by a fucking quadcopter. If you have testimony from mid-November or later, or video evidence, I'd love to see it.Vympel wrote: ↑2023-12-15 10:30pmThis is an incredibly funny way to reason - i.e. an extremely bad one. Like - shockingly - because you saw a single TOS-1 get blown up online and haven't seen a video of one since doesn't mean that they're not in the area.Funny you should mention the flame throwers. One was destroyed in a rather high-profile drone strike just after the Dnipro landings, and they haven't been reported in the area since.
Like Jesus Christ, we are two years into this war and you still think what you personally happen to see on social media isn't a highly selective narrow view of what is going on?
Also, since something like fifty of them have ever been in service with the Russians, it seems weird that you're downplaying how important destroying one of them is. Like, you wouldn't say "oh boo hoo, the US lost one SINGLE amphibious assault ship? Lmao call me when you have news, there's a bunch more." Unless they aren't that important, like a Leopard vs a T-72, in which case it doesn't really matter if they've been active in the Dnipro crossing, anymore than traditional artillery.
Russian reports continue to complain of the efficiency of Ukrainian counterbattery fire. On a broader scale, Russian shell consumption has CONTINUED to fall, and artillery parks are visibly emptying faster since June than in the first half of the war.LOL, sure it has. Cope that Ukraine's boosters* spread as their offensive visibly floundered months ago ("yes our offensive is not moving but that's only because we're 'shaping the battlefield' by destroying Russian artillery!") that people have uncritically repeated ever since, even while article after article on the Ukrainian side complains of shell hunger, an inability to fire more than a few shells a day, and intense Russian artillery superiority.Their tube artillery has been decimated-
*Many Ukrainian commentators themselves seem to have nothing but contempt for these fairy tales, as far as I can see from the prominent accounts on social media.
Cope it may be, but it's a good coping strategy. The offensive pretty quickly shifted in its goals, and if the Russians are vulnerable to counterbattery fire, seems like a pretty good idea to focus on counterbattery fire.
Two things to deal with here. First, and I believe I mentioned this here back in the spring, it doesn't seem like Ukraine NEEDS these NATO-generated units to hold fast. They survived the winter offensive and bled Wagner dry over Bakhmut without them. The attrition these units have suffered has been rough, and they have been useful in defensive actions--see Avdiivka. But the idea that Ukraine is going to lose large amounts of territory now that their assault brigades have been blunted is a bit silly. If Ukraine never recaptures a square inch, this war won't end for years, and I think everyone here is overestimating Russian casualty tolerance.The way people talk about Krynky like its something other than a total waste of time is Exhibit A in why this PR effort even exists in the first place. The Ukrainians just drove multiple 'western trained' brigades into a meat grinder and lost a massive percentage of irreplaceable much hyped western kit for like 6 months, but don't worry - they're sneaking a platoon of cannon fodder at a time over the Dneiper to maintain a bridghead for no clear purpose whatsoever. Of course the troops are asking about the reason why they're doing this - noone could seriously believe that they're capable of actually getting signficant quantities of armor over the river and actually sustaining them for any sort of meaningful offensive action.
Additionally, as I am certain I have said here, I find it unlikely that the bridgehead will ever expand beyond its current status, nor should it. Bringing over large amounts of armor would be difficult, and nowhere near as difficult as the fuel and ammunition they would need for a sustained breakout and offensive drive. To say nothing of additional personnel, artillery, trucks, and everything else less glamorous than T-72s and BMPs. As long as the Russians are willing to site their artillery within range of Ukrainian artillery and attack the bridgehead, the ZSU can cause disproportionate attrition, at a time when Russia is trying to save resources for Avdiivka, possibly now Kupiansk, and the rear area.
In other news, seems there have been armored pushes near Kupiansk. As usual, more information is awaited. Could be interesting.