UKRAINE WAR - 2024 thread

[wautd]

Interesting images and acts of civil disobedience during the first day of the Russian sham elections

https://youtu.be/mdxUi3J5nE0?si=RNtGi_MKYoSI5cS3

[LadyTevar]

Interesting images and acts of civil disobedience during the first day of the Russian sham elections

https://youtu.be/mdxUi3J5nE0?si=RNtGi_MKYoSI5cS3

I heard on the radio one polling station was attacked by "an arsonist" that the guards subdued. Don't have more details, I was driving and it was a headline round-up.

[Vympel]

US Senator Graham says Ukraine aid depends on conditions, domestic issues

KYIV, March 18 (Reuters) - U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham said on Monday, after meeting Ukraine's president, that he was confident an aid package stalled in the U.S. Congress would soon be approved, but called for aid to take the form of a low-interest, waivable loan.

Graham said he fully backed extending the aid, but told Ukrainians they had to take account of U.S. domestic problems that hang over the legislation, including border security.

He and other Republicans have backed the notion of loans rather than grants for U.S. allies to make the expenditure more sustainable and popular, a plan espoused by former President Donald Trump, the likely Republican candidate in the 2024 presidential election.

"If you want aid to Ukraine, you better start talking to the American taxpayer. You better start talking to them about what's going on. Thirty-four trillion (dollars) in debt," Graham told a news conference after talks with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

"Can we provide a loan that's waivable with no interest? Yes. Can Ukraine absorb that? Yes. I think President Zelenskiy would welcome the weapons in any fashion we could get the weapons to him."

President Joe Biden has asked Congress to back a bill that would provide $60 billion more in aid for Ukraine. It has passed the Democratic-led Senate, but it cannot become law unless it is passed by the Republican-led House of Representatives.

The lower chamber’s leaders, who have so far refused to allow a vote, are close Trump allies.

Zelenskiy, in his nightly video address, said he briefed Graham on the situation on the battlefield, where Russian forces have made some recent gains, but front lines have changed little for several months.

Zelenskiy made no reference to the aid package or loan proposal but said the two men discussed "further cooperation and support for Ukraine. All our actions must be farsighted, far-reaching and as effective as possible to allow free nations to continue living in freedom and security."

Graham, a Republican from South Carolina, said he was "more optimistic than ever" that the House will endorse the package.

He said 70% of Republicans in the Senate understand the need to help Ukraine as well as a similar number of Republicans in the House.

"But we have a broken border at home. So when I go to South Carolina, they talk about, 'you want to help Ukraine? Well, what about our own border?'" he said. "We have to, as political leaders, address our own people too."

A non-interest, waivable loan, he said, "makes a lot of sense". Graham said he had spoken about to it House Speaker Mike Johnson before his trip "and I am hoping it will be in the package that will get out of the house in the coming days, not weeks".

And this is probably how the Republicans will thread the needle with Ukraine funding - they'll just call the aid a no interest, 'waivable loan' so Trump can brag that Ukraine owes him money. Ukraine getting no support for months over this exercise in political semantics. Just a farce.

[Broomstick]

Not a farce - it's a plan by the right-wing nutjobs. Especially the branch that loves to extract money out of everyone and everything.

[J]

https://www.ft.com/content/98f15b60-bc4 ... dde122ac0c

US urged Ukraine to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries
Washington told Kyiv that drone attacks risk driving up crude prices and provoking retaliation

The US has urged Ukraine to halt attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, warning that the drone strikes risk driving up global oil prices and provoking retaliation, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The repeated warnings from Washington were delivered to senior officials at Ukraine’s state security service, the SBU, and its military intelligence directorate, known as the GUR, the people told the Financial Times.

Both intelligence units have steadily expanded their own drone programmes to strike Russian targets on land, sea and in the air since the start of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

One person said that the White House had grown increasingly frustrated by brazen Ukrainian drone attacks that have struck oil refineries, terminals, depots and storage facilities across western Russia, hurting its oil production capacity.

Russia remains one of the world’s most important energy exporters despite western sanctions on its oil and gas sector. Oil prices have risen about 15 per cent this year, to $85 a barrel, pushing up fuel costs just as US President Joe Biden begins his campaign for re-election.

Washington is also concerned that if Ukraine keeps hitting Russian facilities, including many that are hundreds of miles from the border, Russia could retaliate by lashing out at energy infrastructure relied on by the west.

This includes the CPC pipeline carrying oil from Kazakhstan through Russia to the global market. Western companies including ExxonMobil and Chevron use the pipeline, which Moscow briefly shut in 2022.

“We do not encourage or enable attacks inside of Russia,” an NSC spokesperson said. The CIA declined to comment. In Kyiv, a spokesperson for the SBU declined to comment. Officials at GUR and Zelenskyy’s office did not respond to requests for comment.

After the Financial Times published news of the US warnings on Friday Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, was asked how Kyiv had responded to the Biden administration’s appeals to stop attacks on Russian refineries.

She said: “The Ukrainian side responded, I think, precisely by achieving its goals and by very successful operations conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation.”

“We understand the appeals of our American partners,” Stefanishyna told an audience at the Kyiv Security Forum. “At the same time, we are fighting with the capabilities, resources and practices that we have today.”

Ukraine has stepped up its air attacks in recent weeks, as its drone programmes expand and the ground war shifts in Moscow’s favour. It also follows growing discontent in Kyiv over what is seen as the west’s ambivalent approach to curbing Moscow’s energy revenues.

There have been at least 12 attacks on major Russian refineries since 2022, and at least nine this year, along with several terminals, depots and storage facilities, according to a military intelligence official in Kyiv.

Helima Croft, a former CIA analyst now at RBC Capital Markets, recently noted that Ukraine had shown it could strike most of the oil export infrastructure in western Russia, putting about 60 per cent of the country’s exports at risk.

The US objections come as Biden faces a tough re-election battle this year with petrol prices on the rise, increasing almost 15 per cent this year to around $3.50 a gallon.

“Nothing terrifies a sitting American president more than a surge in pump prices during an election year,” said Bob McNally, president of consultancy Rapidan Energy and a former White House energy adviser.

Ukraine has steadily increased drone strikes as its technologies have advanced. Ukrainian officials claim to have developed drones with a range in excess of 1,000km and payloads capable of inflicting severe damage.

Kyiv launched two of its largest and most widespread drone attacks last week, with operations by both the GUR and SBU successfully targeting seven Russian energy facilities in consecutive days.

Over the past year, GRU and SBU sea drones have also struck Russian ports, destroyed several Russian warships in the Black Sea and hit Moscow’s prized Crimea bridge connecting Russia to the occupied Ukrainian peninsula.

The aim of the “special operations” is to hamper the supply of fuel to Russia’s troops and cut funding for the Kremlin’s war effort, according to one Ukrainian official involved in planning and conducting the attacks.

Kyiv also wants to deliver a symbolic blow by bringing the war closer to Moscow and showing its air defences — including those around the Kremlin — can be penetrated.

The air campaign is also seen by some officials as a means to spur Washington into approving the $60bn military assistance package held up in Congress that is critical for Ukraine’s defence.

"Please stop doing the only thing that's really working, it's gonna screw up the oil market, drive up prices, and mess up Biden's election campaign!"

So. Nuland out the door, and the US is now urging the Ukraine to stop hitting Russian oil infrastructure with drones. It's early, but it seems like the US may be looking for an off ramp so it can declare victory and memory hole the entire conflict while it focuses on other parts of the world.

[EnterpriseSovereign]

I was going to stay out of this thread but this news is too important not to share:
Dozens dead and wounded in mass shooting at Moscow concert hall

Dozens of people have reportedly been killed and wounded in mass shooting at a concert hall in Moscow after several gunmen stormed the building.

There were no immediate claims of responsibility for the raid, the worst terror attack in Russia in two decades.

Videos from the scene shared on social media show people running from the building which is on fire.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin described the attack as a “huge tragedy.”

Russian news reports said that the assailants threw explosives, triggering a massive blaze at the Crocus City Hall on the western edge of Moscow.

Video of the scene show huge plumes of black smoke rising over the building.

White House National Security Advisor John Kirby said on Friday that he couldn’t yet speak about all the details but that “the images are just horrible. And just hard to watch.”

“Our thoughts are going to be with the victims of this terrible, terrible shooting attack,” Mr Kirby said. “There are some mums and dads and brothers and sisters and sons and daughters who haven’t gotten the news yet. This is going to be a tough day.”

The attack took place as crowds gathered for a concert of Picnic, a famous Russian rock band, at the hall that can accommodate over 6,000 people.

Russian news reports said that visitors were being evacuated, but some said that an unspecified number of people could have been trapped by the blaze.
Russia’s state RIA Novosti news agency reported that at least three people in combat fatigues fired weapons. The state news agency TASS also reported the shooting.

Extended rounds of gunfire could be heard on multiple videos posted by Russian media and Telegram channels.

One showed two men with rifles moving through the mall. Another one showed a man inside the auditorium, saying the assailants set it on fire, as gunshots rang out in the background.

More videos showed up to four attackers, armed with assault rifles and wearing caps, who were shooting screaming people at point-blank range.

Andrei Vorobyov, the governor of the Moscow region, said he was heading to the area and set up a task force to deal with the damage. He didn't immediately offer any further details.

Russian media reports said that riot police units were being sent to the area as people were being evacuated.

The attack followed a statement issued earlier this month by the US Embassy in Moscow that urged the Americans to avoid crowded places in the Russian capital in view of an imminent attack, a warning that was repeated by several other Western embassies.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, who extended his grip on Russia for another six years in the March 15-17 presidential vote after a sweeping crackdown on dissent, earlier this week denounced the Western warnings as an attempt to intimidate Russians.

[madd0c0t0r2]

@J

Well, costing Russia a billion in rebuilding but losing ten billion USA support isn't a great trade, but since the gop is currently blocking the support anyway...

Outside of pure rebuilding costs, and short term disruption of Russian military supplies, I'm not sure that damaging oil supplies and rising prices would actually cut russian income. There was an article I posted in this thread a while back looking at the impact of earlier sanctions and concluding the increase in price made up for the reduced sales volume. Of course, last time houthi's weren't driving up shipping costs and difficulty.

But the sales volume of oil worldwide is dropping thanks to growth of EVs, especially electric bikes. Militarily there may be better soft targets. As a greenie, I support this particular offshoot of Just Stop Oil!

[EnterpriseSovereign]

Yeah, about that...

Ukraine denies US requested to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries

Ukraine did not receive calls from the United States to cease attacks on Russian oil refineries, according to the advisor to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Mykhailo Podolyak. Earlier, the media reported on Washington's alleged request to Kyiv.

He denied the reports that the United States supposedly demanded from the Ukrainian side to refrain from striking Russian oil infrastructure, calling them "fake information."

"No one will dictate terms of conducting this war to Ukraine after two years of full-scale war," Podolyak said.

He adds that Ukraine "can de-oil the tools of waging war" of the aggressor under international law.

"Fuel is a primary tool of waging war. Ukraine will destroy fuel infrastructure," he concluded.

Background

Earlier today, the Financial Times reported that the United States urged Ukraine to stop attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, warning that drone strikes could lead to an increase in global oil prices and gasoline in the United States, harming the re-election of President Joe Biden.

Repeated warnings from Washington were supposedly addressed to senior officials of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Defense Intelligence, according to FT sources.

In turn, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine Olha Stefanishyna stated at the Kyiv Security Forum that oil refineries in Russia were legitimate targets for Ukraine from a military perspective. By striking these targets, the Defense Forces act according to NATO's best practices, the official added.

Attacks on oil refineries in Russia

Since January, Ukraine has intensified attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, striking major oil refineries to disrupt the supply to the Russian army.

For example, Ukrainian drones recently attacked three oil refineries in the Samara region, targeting Rosneft facilities. Recently, a drone also attacked one of the largest oil refineries in Yaroslavl.

As reported by RBC-Ukraine sources, SSU drones hit an oil refinery in Tuapse, resulting in a powerful fire. It was recently announced that Ukrainian drones attacked an oil refinery in the Krasnodar region of Russia.

The Insider calculated that in 2024, there were 15 drone attacks on 13 oil refineries in nine regions of Russia. Significant damage was inflicted on eight facilities.

As Reuters previously reported, Putin can only be stopped by the decline in oil prices.

Recently, Bloomberg wrote that Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries marked a new stage in the war.

On March 20, Russian Minister of Energy Nikolay Shulginov acknowledged the halt in fuel production at several oil refineries due to "incidents" and stated the search for a solution to the problem.

Oleksandr Kharchenko, Director of the Energy Industry Research Center, also explained in a comment to RBC-Ukraine whether there is a connection between the strike on Ukraine and hits on oil refineries in Russia.

[LadyTevar]

Moscow Concert Hall Attack Updates

Summary:

At least 115 people were killed and more than 140 injured when gunmen attacked a packed concert venue on the outskirts of Moscow, Russia says

A large fire engulfed the roof of the complex and dramatic video shows panicked concertgoers taking cover as shots and explosions ring out

Four people directly involved in the Moscow concert hall attack are among 11 detained, Russia's security chief tells President Putin

Muscovites are queuing to give blood for those injured and flower tributes have been placed at the scene of the attack

The US says it's credible that the Islamic State group could be behind the attack, after it said the group did it. Russia has not commented

Russia's security service says the detained suspects were planning to cross the border with Ukraine - Kyiv has described the claim as "absurd"

ISIS is still claiming responsibility for the attack. It's the "why" that confuses me.

[Solauren]

I'm guessing it was so ISIS felt relevant or got in the news again.

Much like a bored 3 year old climbing out of bed at 11pm and making a rucus when his parents have guests over.

[J]

@J

Well, costing Russia a billion in rebuilding but losing ten billion USA support isn't a great trade, but since the gop is currently blocking the support anyway...

No amount of aid from the US will make any real difference in the war, a billion, ten billion, or a trillion, it simply doesn't matter anymore. This is a war of attrition and more importantly, mass industrial production; you can't buy weapons when the factories & trained labour force to run them don't exist and can't be built for years.

Outside of pure rebuilding costs, and short term disruption of Russian military supplies, I'm not sure that damaging oil supplies and rising prices would actually cut russian income. There was an article I posted in this thread a while back looking at the impact of earlier sanctions and concluding the increase in price made up for the reduced sales volume. Of course, last time houthi's weren't driving up shipping costs and difficulty.

It's not about cutting Russian income. Oil refineries & infrastructure aren't something which can be rebuilt overnight, not even by Russia which has a large oil industry which builds everything they have. Energy is the foundation of industry, and industry is what drives this war for the Russians. An oil shortage will have significant impacts on manufacturing & transportation, and on top of that it will rapidly drive up the costs of all food & goods for Russian citizens which will cause pain & discontent. Will it win the war for Ukrainians? No. But it will do them far more good than any amount of aid that NATO can provide them.

[J]

From the Royal United Services Institute.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/p ... ar-ukraine

The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine
Alex Vershinin
18 March 2024

If the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.

Attritional wars require their own ‘Art of War’ and are fought with a ‘force-centric’ approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are ‘terrain-focused’. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.

The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short ‘winner takes all’ clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.

The Economic Dimension

Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win.

High-end weapons have exceptional performance but are difficult to manufacture, especially when needed to arm a rapidly mobilised army subjected to a high rate of attrition. For example, during the Second World War German Panzers were superb tanks, but using approximately the same production resources, the Soviets rolled out eight T-34s for every German Panzer. The difference in performance did not justify the numerical disparity in production. High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train – time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.

It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of cheap weapons and munitions, especially if their subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian goods, ensuring mass quantity without the expansion of production lines. New recruits also absorb simpler weapons faster, allowing rapid generation of new formations or the reconstitution of existing ones.

Achieving mass is difficult for higher-end Western economies. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they shed excess capacity and struggle to rapidly expand, especially since lower-tier industries have been transferred abroad for economic reasons. During war, global supply chains are disrupted and subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added to this conundrum is the lack of a skilled workforce with experience in a particular industry. These skills are acquired over decades, and once an industry is shuttered it takes decades to rebuild. The 2018 US government interagency report on US industrial capacity highlighted these problems. The bottom line is that the West must take a hard look at ensuring peacetime excess capacity in its military industrial complex, or risk losing the next war.

Force Generation

Industrial output exists so it can be channelled into replacing losses and generating new formations. This requires appropriate doctrine and command and control structures. There are two main models; NATO (most Western armies) and the old Soviet model, with most states fielding something in between.

NATO armies are highly professional, backed by a strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) Corps, with extensive peacetime military education and experience. They build upon this professionalism for their military doctrine (fundamentals, tactics and techniques) to stress individual initiative, delegating a great deal of leeway to junior officers and NCOs. NATO formations enjoy tremendous agility and flexibility to exploit opportunities on a dynamic battlefield.

In attritional war, this method has a downside. The officers and NCOs required to execute this doctrine require extensive training and, above all, experience. A US Army NCO takes years to develop. A squad leader generally has at least three years in service and a platoon sergeant has at least seven. In an attritional war characterised by heavy casualties, there simply isn’t time to replace lost NCOs or generate them for new units. The idea that civilians can be given three-month training courses, sergeant’s chevrons and then expected to perform in the same manner as a seven-year veteran is a recipe for disaster. Only time can generate leaders capable of executing NATO doctrine, and time is one thing that the massive demands of attritional war do not give.

The Soviet Union built its army for large-scale conflict with NATO. It was intended to be able to rapidly expand by calling up massed reserves. Every male in the Soviet Union underwent two years of basic training right out of high school. The constant turnover of enlisted personnel precluded creation of a Western-style NCO corps but generated a massive pool of semi-trained reserves available in times of war. The absence of reliable NCOs created an officer-centric command model, less flexible than NATO’s but more adaptable to the large-scale expansion required by attritional warfare.

However, as a war progresses past a one-year mark, front-line units will gain experience and an improved NCO corps is likely to emerge, giving the Soviet model greater flexibility. By 1943, the Red Army had developed a robust NCO corps, which then disappeared after the Second World War as combat formations were demobilised. A key difference between the models is that NATO doctrine cannot function without high-performing NCOs. The Soviet doctrine was enhanced by experienced NCOs but did not require them.

The most effective model is a mixture of the two, in which a state maintains a medium-sized professional army, together with a mass of draftees available for mobilisation. This leads directly to a high/low mixture. Professional pre-war forces form the high end of this army, becoming fire brigades – moving from sector to sector in battle to stabilise the situation and conduct decisive attacks. Low-end formations hold the line and gain experience slowly, increasing their quality until they gain the capability to conduct offensive operations. Victory is attained by creating the highest quality low-end formations possible.

Forging new units into combat-capable soldiers instead of civilian mobs is done through training and combat experience. A new formation should train for at least six months, and only if manned by reservists with previous individual training. Conscripts take longer. These units should also have professional soldiers and NCOs brought in from the pre-war army to add professionalism. Once initial training is complete, they should only be fed into the battle in secondary sectors. No formation should be allowed to fall below 70% strength. Withdrawing formations early allows experience to proliferate among the new replacements as veterans pass on their skills. Otherwise, valuable experience is lost, causing the process to start all over. Another implication is that resources should prioritise replacements over new formations, preserving combat edge in both the pre-war army (high) and newly raised (low) formations. It’s advisable to disband several pre-war (high-end) formations to spread professional soldiers among newly created low-end formations in order to raise initial quality.

The Military Dimension

Military operations in an attritional conflict are very distinct from those in a war of manoeuvre. Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own. In this context, a successful strategy accepts that the war will last at least two years and be broken into two distinct phases. The first phase ranges from initiation of hostilities to the point where sufficient combat power has been mobilised to allow decisive action. It will see little positional shifting on the ground, focusing on favourable exchange of losses and building up combat power in the rear. The dominant form of combat is fires rather than manoeuvre, complemented by extensive fortifications and camouflage. The peacetime army starts the war and conducts holding actions, providing time to mobilise resources and train the new army.

The second phase can commence after one side has met the following conditions.

Newly mobilised forces have completed their training and gained sufficient experience to make them combat-effective formations, capable of rapidly integrating all their assets in a cohesive manner.
The enemy’s strategic reserve is exhausted, leaving it unable to reinforce the threatened sector.
Fires and reconnaissance superiority are achieved, allowing the attacker to effectively mass fires on a key sector while denying the enemy the same.
The enemy’s industrial sector is degraded to the point where it is unable to replace battlefield losses. In the case of fighting against a coalition of countries, their industrial resources must also be exhausted or at least accounted for.

Only after meeting these criteria should offensive operations commence. They should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points with shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside a layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. Concentration of forces on one main effort should be avoided as this gives an indication of the offensive’s location and an opportunity for the enemy to concentrate their reserves against this key point. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916, which resulted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, is a good example of a successful attritional offensive at the tactical and operational level. By attacking along a broad front, the Russian army prevented the Austro-Hungarians from concentrating their reserves, resulting in a collapse all along the front. At the strategic level, however, the Brusilov Offensive is an example of failure. Russian forces failed to set conditions against the whole enemy coalition, focusing only on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and neglecting German capacity. The Russians expended crucial resources which they could not replace, without defeating the strongest coalition member. To reemphasise the key point, an offensive will only succeed once key criteria are met. Attempting to launch an offensive earlier will result in losses without any strategic gains, playing directly into enemy hands.

Modern War

The modern battlefield is an integrated system of systems which includes various types of electronic warfare (EW), three basic types of air defences, four different types of artillery, countless aircraft types, strike and reconnaissance drones, construction and sapper engineers, traditional infantry, armour formations and, above all, logistics. Artillery has become more dangerous thanks to increased ranges and advanced targeting, stretching the depth of the battlefield.

In practice, this means it is easier to mass fires than forces. Deep manoeuvre, which requires the massing of combat power, is no longer possible because any massed force will be destroyed by indirect fires before it can achieve success in depth. Instead, a ground offensive requires a tight protective bubble to ward off enemy strike systems. This bubble is generated through layering friendly counter-fire, air defence and EW assets. Moving numerous interdependent systems is highly complicated and unlikely to be successful. Shallow attacks along the forward line of troops are most likely to be successful at an acceptable cost ratio; attempts at deep penetration will be exposed to massed fires the moment they exit the protection of the defensive bubble.

Integration of these overlapping assets requires centralised planning and exceptionally well-trained staff officers, capable of integrating multiple capabilities on the fly. It takes years to train such officers, and even combat experience does not generate such skills in a short time. Checklists and mandatory procedures can alleviate these deficiencies, but only on a less-complicated, static front. Dynamic offensive operations require fast reaction times, which semi-trained officers are incapable of performing.

An example of this complexity is an attack by a platoon of 30 soldiers. This would require EW systems to jam enemy drones; another EW system to jam enemy communications preventing adjustment of enemy fires; and a third EW system to jam space navigation systems denying use of precision guided munitions. In addition, fires require counterbattery radars to defeat enemy artillery. Further complicating planning is the fact that enemy EW will locate and destroy any friendly radar or EW emitter that is emitting for too long. Engineers will have to clear paths through minefields, while friendly drones provide time-sensitive ISR and fire support if needed. (This task requires a great deal of training with the supporting units to avoid dropping munitions on friendly attacking troops.) Finally, artillery needs to provide support both on the objective and enemy rear, targeting reserves and suppressing artillery. All these systems need to work as an integrated team just to support 30 men in several vehicles attacking another 30 men or less. A lack of coordination between these assets will result in failed attacks and horrific losses without ever seeing the enemy. As the size of formation conducting operations increases, so do the number and complexity of assets that need to be integrated.

Implications for Combat Operations

Deep fires – further than 100–150 km (the average range of tactical rockets) behind the front line – target an enemy’s ability to generate combat power. This includes production facilities, munitions dumps, repair depots, and energy and transportation infrastructure. Of particular importance are targets that require significant production capabilities and that are difficult to replace/repair, as their destruction will inflict long term damage. As with all aspects of attritional war, such strikes will take significant time to have an effect, with timelines running into years. The low global production volumes of long-range precision-guided munitions, effective deception and concealment actions, large stockpiles of anti-aircraft missiles and the sheer repair capacities of strong, determined states all combine to prolong conflicts. Effective layering of air defences must include high-end systems at all altitudes coupled with cheaper systems to counter the enemy’s massed low-end attack platforms. Combined with mass-scale manufacturing and effective EW, this is the only way to defeat enemy deep fires.

Successful attritional war focuses on the preservation of one’s own combat power. This usually translates into a relatively static front interrupted by limited local attacks to improve positions, using artillery for most of the fighting. Fortification and concealment of all forces including logistics is the key to minimising losses. The long time required to construct fortifications prevents significant ground movement. An attacking force which cannot rapidly entrench will suffer significant losses from enemy artillery fires.

Defensive operations buy time to develop low-end combat formations, allowing newly mobilised troops to gain combat experience without suffering heavy losses in large-scale attacks. Building up experienced low-tier combat formations generates the capability for future offensive operations.

The early stages of attritional war range from initiation of hostilities to the point where mobilised resources are available in large numbers and are ready for combat operations. In the case of a surprise attack, a rapid offensive by one side may be possible until the defender can form a solid front. After that, combat solidifies. This period lasts at least a year-and-a-half to two years. During this period, major offensive operations should be avoided. Even if large attacks are successful, they will result in significant casualties, often for meaningless territorial gains. An army should never accept a battle on unfavourable terms. In attritional war, any terrain that does not have a vital industrial centre is irrelevant. It is always better to retreat and preserve forces, regardless of the political consequences. Fighting on disadvantageous terrain burns up units, losing experienced soldiers who are key to victory. The German obsession with Stalingrad in 1942 is a prime example of fighting on unfavourable terrain for political reasons. Germany burned up vital units that it could not afford to lose, simply to capture a city bearing Stalin’s name. It is also wise to push the enemy into fighting on disadvantageous terrain through information operations, exploiting politically sensitive enemy objectives. The goal is to force the enemy to expend vital material and strategic reserves on strategically meaningless operations. A key pitfall to avoid is being dragged into the very same trap that has been set for the enemy. In the First World War, Germans did just that at Verdun, where it planned to use surprise to capture key, politically sensitive terrain, provoking costly French counterattacks. Unfortunately for the Germans, they fell into their own trap. They failed to gain key, defendable terrain early on, and the battle devolved instead into a series of costly infantry assaults by both sides, with artillery fires devastating attacking infantry.

When the second phase begins, the offensive should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points using shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside the layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. There is a cascading effect in which a crisis in one sector forces the defenders to shift reserves from a second sector, only to generate a crisis there in turn. As forces start falling back and leaving prepared fortifications, morale plummets, with the obvious question: ‘If we can’t hold the mega-fortress, how can we hold these new trenches?’ Retreat then turns into rout. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. The Allies’ Offensive in 1918 is an example. The Allies attacked along a broad front, while the Germans lacked sufficient resources to defend the entire line. Once the German Army began to retreat it proved impossible to stop.

The attritional strategy, centred on defence, is counterintuitive to most Western military officers. Western military thought views the offensive as the only means of achieving the decisive strategic goal of forcing the enemy to come to the negotiating table on unfavourable terms. The strategic patience required to set the conditions for an offensive runs against their combat experience acquired in overseas counterinsurgency operations.

Conclusion

The conduct of attritional wars is vastly different from wars of manoeuvre. They last longer and end up testing a country’s industrial capacity. Victory is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime.

Victory is attainable by carefully analysing one’s own and the enemy’s political objectives. The key is recognising the strengths and weaknesses of competing economic models and identifying the economic strategies that are most likely to generate maximum resources. These resources can then be utilised to build a massive army using the high/low force and weapons mixture. The military conduct of war is driven by overall political strategic objectives, military realities and economic limitations. Combat operations are shallow and focus on destroying enemy resources, not on gaining terrain. Propaganda is used to support military operations, not the other way around. With patience and careful planning, a war can be won.

Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict.

If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method.

This is why I don't particularly care about what's happening on the front lines, how much ground is being taken, or whatever the latest "wonder weapon" is. What's going to decide this war is industrial production, logistics, and the ability to replenish manpower while maintaining a decent level of training. Russia has an overwhelming advantage in all the above, even if we add in most of NATO. Russia has centuries of experience in fighting attritional wars, in fact it's part of their doctrine. Thinking that we can beat the Russians at their own game, in their own backyard, when we don't even know how the game is played is the height of arrogance & stupidity.

[Ralin]

ISIS is still claiming responsibility for the attack. It's the "why" that confuses me.

Because they (read: someone somehow associated with ISIS) found someone pissed off or bitter or whatever enough to do it and that happened to be right now. ISIS has no reason not to take credit for a good terror attack against most non-Muslim countries.

It's probably not anything anymore complicated than that.

[wautd]

I'm guessing it was so ISIS felt relevant or got in the news again.

Much like a bored 3 year old climbing out of bed at 11pm and making a rucus when his parents have guests over.

Possibly

Russia fought against ISIS in Syria (at least so they claimed) so there's also that

[aerius]

Apparently they've got 11 terrorists so far including 4 gunmen. Tajikistan passports were found with the terrorists but no word on where they're actually from or if the passports are real. Russians already got medieval on one of them, they sliced off one of his ears and made him eat it. Yes there's a video, no I'm not gonna link it.

[Rogue 9]

ISIS is still claiming responsibility for the attack. It's the "why" that confuses me.

Daesh has been vowing to strike Russia for years because they propped up Assad and thus provided major contribution to the defeat of their Caliphate.

[Zaune]

Under other circumstances I would consider the real-life GLA and a bunch of Call of Duty villains made flesh turning their guns on each other to be cause to break out the popcorn, but I sincerely doubt that even a fraction of the people who died in that concert hall were guilty of anything worse than not realising Putin's tame news outlets are full of crap, if that.

Hawkeye Pierce was right.

[Juubi Karakuchi]

ISIS is still claiming responsibility for the attack. It's the "why" that confuses me.

Daesh has been vowing to strike Russia for years because they propped up Assad and thus provided major contribution to the defeat of their Caliphate.

And now was a good time to do it. Russia's security forces are tied up with the Ukraine occupation and suppression domestic opposition. ISIS probably reckoned this was as good a time as any to give it a go.

[madd0c0t0r2]

Dragonfire laser testing in the UK, now this: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-25/ ... /103631182

50% odds we see a deployment of a laser weapon in Ukraine within the next 24 months

[madd0c0t0r2]

Ghetto edit. Opinion piece by Rand on the same line: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/20 ... ifies.html

[madd0c0t0r2]

The ten year anniversary of the brief attempt to subvert the russian subversion of Donetsk, by encouraging secession pollsters to join that particularly expensive country of Wales.

https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wale ... sk-6867649

[EnterpriseSovereign]

France will soon deliver 78 howitzers to Ukraine to meet Kyiv’s urgent needs, defense minister says

PARIS (AP) — France will soon be able to deliver 78 Caesar howitzers to Ukraine and will boost its supply of shells to meet Kyiv’s urgent needs for ammunition to fight Russia’s full-scale invasion, the defense minister said Tuesday.

Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu said at a news conference that an agreement was reached among France, Ukraine and Denmark to finance the Caesar self-propelled 155 mm howitzers, which will enable France to “quickly deliver” them.

France has also set a goal to deliver 80,000 shells for 155 mm guns to Ukraine this year — up from 30,000 delivered since the beginning of the war on Feb. 24, 2022, he said.

In addition, Lecornu said, France is participating in an effort to identify available stocks of gunpowder and ammunition that could be bought from countries outside the European Union, a plan initiated by the Czech Republic to further support Kyiv.

Under the plan, the Czechs seek to obtain 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine. Czech leaders previously said the first shells should be delivered to Ukraine no later than June. At least 18 countries have joined the initiative, according to officials in Prague.

Earlier this month, Germany, France and Poland vowed to procure more weapons for Kyiv and step up production of military equipment, promising that Ukraine can rely on the trio of European powers as it tries to overcome a shortage of military resources.

Lecornu argued that European countries should reduce their reliance on the U.S. to ensure the continent’s security. He said he expects the issue to be a campaign topic before the European Parliament election in June.

“We know that part of Europe’s security agenda should from now on fall on Europeans,” Lecornu said. “That’s an absolute necessity.”

“To me ... it’s not right that the U.S. taxpayer should have to pay so much for the Europeans’ security,” he said.

Lecornu’s comments come as many in Europe have raised concerns that the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House would weaken the NATO alliance, after his remarks threatening not to come to the defense of allies in the event of an attack by Russia.

Even if U.S. President Joe Biden stays in office, EU leaders worry that the long, slow U.S. pivot to Asia to focus on an ever-more assertive China will pick up speed and increasingly leave Europe to take care of its own security. U.S. efforts to get new funds to arm Ukraine have stalled in Congress.

[EnterpriseSovereign]

Tank shells, drones, and more: Germany sends large aid package to Ukraine

Today, on March 28, Germany updated the list of military aid it has already handed over to Ukraine. Among other things, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will receive new drones, shells for tanks, and artillery, according to the German government.

Ukrainian soldiers received 5 Warthog all-terrain tracked vehicles as a repair and evacuation vehicle. Germany also handed over 9 Warthog all-terrain tracked vehicles as a command vehicle.

Ukrainian Armed Forces also receive:

・Ammunition for Leopard 2 A6;

・18 thousand rounds of 155 mm ammunition;

・14 Vector reconnaissance drones with spare parts;

・30 RQ-35 Heidrun reconnaissance drones;

・5 anti-drone jammers;

・180 RF 360 field kits - drone detection systems;

・6 WISENT 1 demining machines;

・2 BEAVER bridge pavers with spare parts;

・Bergepanzer 2 armored engineering vehicle with spare parts;

・1 DACHS armored engineering vehicle;

・9 mine trawls;

・1 SATCOM surveillance system;

・330 infrared cameras;

・3 vehicles for border protection;

・6 Mercedes-Benz Zetros fuel trucks;

・2 thousand RGW 90 Matador grenade launchers.

The Ukrainian army also received 24,000 40-mm shells, 70 GMG grenade launchers, 3,000 camouflage nets, 2,000 ponchos (rain protection), and 2 emergency power generators.

Germany's plans for next deliveries

The German government has already shared information about what Ukraine will receive in the future. These are:

・20 Marder armored personnel carriers;

・1 Warthog all-terrain tracked vehicle as a command vehicle;

・missiles for the Patriot air defense system;

・70 infrared cameras.

Germany's military assistance

In February, General Carsten Breuer, the Inspector General of the German Armed Forces, promised Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi short-term support for Ukraine of over 100 million euros.

A day later, the German government updated the list of military aid delivered to Ukraine. Berlin handed over dozens of new drones to Kyiv.

And recently, Germany announced a new military aid package for Ukraine. It is worth 500 million euros.

[EnterpriseSovereign]

Putin 'wants Moscow terrorists to stand trial in Belarus so they can get the death penalty

Russia could allow a trial of the Crocus City Hall terrorist suspects to take place in neighbouring Belarus so they can face the death penalty.

Talks are already underway between the ‘competent authorities’ of the two countries, according to Putin-loyalist MP Maria Butina.

Belarus is the only European country where execution remains in active use – and two of the victims in the Crocus City Hall terror attack were Belarusian.

In Belarus, the condemned man – women cannot be executed – is blindfolded and forced to kneel before a shot is administered Stalin-style to the back of the head.

Vladimir Putin’s security council deputy Dmitry Medvedev, a former Russian president, has already said it was ‘necessary’ to ‘kill’ the suspects.

Russia may now abandon its moratorium, which has been in place since 1996, but it would be harder to apply the death penalty retrospectively.

Butina previously praised Belarus dictator Alexander Lukashenko’s support for Russia over the terrorist outrage.

She told Belarusian TV 1: ‘I am quite familiar with your legislation, including the death penalty, which is present. In this case…the murder of two or more persons, you have exactly the same right to try these people as the Russian Federation….

‘The competent authorities are already [working] on this matter [so the suspects could face the death penalty]…’

For reasons currently unknown, the overall number of victims in the Crocus City Hall – both dead and wounded – rose in the past 24 hours from 382 to 695 people, according to the Russian emergencies ministry in the Moscow region.

Medvedev said of the suspects: ‘They were caught. Well done to everyone who caught them… Should they be killed? Necessary. And it will be.

‘But it is much more important to kill everyone involved. Everyone, who paid, who sympathised, who helped. Kill them all.’

A wide range of crimes can be covered by the death sentence in Belarus.

For years there was secrecy over the exact method of executions under Putin-ally Lukashenko, who remains in power due to vote-rigging in the 2020 presidential election.

But former executioner Oleg Alkaev revealed: ‘The special group officers began bringing the convicts one by one through the underground passage. They were dressed in striped robes and wearing felt slippers.

‘Their hands were tied behind them. They were shaking either from cold or from fear, and their crazy eyes radiated such genuine horror that it was impossible to look at them.’

As if Russia actually needs them to receive a death sentence for them to mysteriously suffer cases of lead poisoning.

[Solauren]

I wonder why Putin is against the death penalty in Russia? He's afraid he might have to face it one day?