Luck or Good Judgement?

[Vympel]

From a Jane's Defense Weekly article (unfortunately, only 543 out of 1,091 words are available to non-subscribers)

One significant risk, several UK and US officers said, is that the relative ease with which coalition forces took control of Basra and Baghdad will sap funding from efforts to grapple with the problems that fighting in cities poses, seeing the new and apparently highly effective urban warfare tactics as the solution to the problem.

The comparatively poor quality of most Iraqi troops and equipment greatly helped coalition forces. A US officer said that the small number of coalition casualties has been largely attributed not to what US forces have done, but rather to what Iraqi soldiers have not done.

An example was an Iraqi armour ambush of a US 3rd Infantry Division (3 ID) unit. After the battle was over, it became clear from the placement of the Iraqi tanks and other armoured vehicles that the Iraqis had set up a well-planned ambush. When US armour moved into the kill zone, the Iraqis opened fire but their first salvo failed to hit a single oncoming vehicle. This, surmised the officer, was probably because of a combination of the Iraqis lacking funds to conduct live fire or simulator training and deteriorating gun barrels that grow increasingly inaccurate with age, due to a lack of spare parts.

As a retired UK officer said: "It does help to fight a totally incompetent enemy." He expressed surprise that the Iraqis did not destroy any of the many bridges on the routes to Baghdad: a standard tactic in defensive warfare, in terrain that seems ideal for such delaying actions. He also noted that the Iraqis were unable to co-ordinate and mass their forces to attack weak points in the coalition lines.

Coalition forces, by contrast, were easily able to co-ordinate their units.

Additionally, the US forces had the benefit of frequent training.

However, UK and US officers said that even with those advantages, US forces clearly underestimated the enemy, as seen by the task organisation. Supply lines were not secured and there were insufficient numbers of infantry to hold ground against the Fedayeen Saddam paramilitaries and other militia loyal to the Ba'ath regime. A lack of troops has already become apparent in the looting of hospitals in Basra and Baghdad. Under the Geneva Conventions, invading forces have an obligation to safeguard hospitals.

Current and retired UK and US officers said that the campaign could have been much more difficult if the general population had strongly opposed the invading forces.

Also the delay in tasking strike aircraft for close air-support could have been a serious mistake had the Iraqi forces put up a more co-ordinated defence. Even so breakthroughs on the road to Baghdad only came after the aircraft started performing close air-support.

"This war has again shown that using air and ground forces in conjunction is an unbeatable combination," the retired UK officer said. "It is a battle-winning card."

The invasion of Iraq also raises questions whether some UK and US acquisition priorities are appropriate to future conflicts. Sources noted that the US drive to recreate its army as a lighter and more agile force is only partly being vindicated. UK and US officers said that when it comes to breaking through heavily defended areas, heavy armour [Vympel: M1A3] and artillery [Crusader] are still the right tools for the job.

[Darth Wong]

I agree that it's grossly premature to say that the "light forces" approach has been vindicated by Iraq. When you go up against an enemy whose troops are untrained, whose equipment has been devastated by a decades of sanctions, whose people won't fight for them, and whose tactics are erratic at best, it's difficult to argue that a victory represents proof of anything.