Vladimir Putin: Preferable or Provocative?

[Axis Kast]

I ran into an interesting discussion on another board. The political crowd just happened to be discussing the merits of Vladimir Putin in relation to the recent fracas over Iraq. It was eventually articulated that Russia’s current leader is perhaps the most attractive (from the American perspective) in modern history. I disagree. That said, I’m interested to see what you’ve think. I’ve outlined the argument below. It’s yours to read and then chose.

Vladimir Putin’s saving grace is his thirst for personal power and national solubility. As was proven when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Western world tends to prefer rational – or at the very least generally predicable – leaders. Identifiable modus operandi are perennially favorable as compared to anarchic tendencies. A politician whose actions can be put reliably into template (with room for a few minor deviations) is thus eminently more preferable than somebody without an identifiable agenda.

In general, our approval for Putin stems from two results of his pragmatism: a tendency to clamp down heavily on what has since the Russian Federation’s inception been movement toward individuation of formerly state-run organizations (the GRU and one-time Red Army, for instance), and a love – heretofore – of “the fence.”

Now, in basic terms, the first example translates to: “centralization.” A novel notion in post-Soviet Russia, Putin’s desire to gain increased control as a leader in government at least signifies an attention to detail. The man is, for instance, more likely than was Boris Yeltsin to keep a close eye on his nuclear stockpile. For purposes of national security, the United States naturally favors leaders whose efforts focus consistently on themes of non-/proliferation. Putin’s desire to keep Russia strong at least implies that he “counts the beans” where military equipment and strategic assets are in question. It is therefore expected that he will appoint only competent leadership to military positions (despite the poor showing in analysis related to Iraq). None of these people is more likely than otherwise to be lax in their duties of maintenance, security, and most importantly, political accountability (a concept that exists to this day, even if necessarily outside the Communist ideological sphere). It certainly helps matters that Islamofascism has infiltrated Chechnya. As much as he might like to cause problems for the Americans – and blame it, let’s say, on CIS neighbors -, Putin can’t afford to risk a reversal by militants that could put Moscow at risk. To the security-minded among us, the “pro” argument makes sense: Vladimir Putin is an improvement over every Russian leader since Brheznev.

Formerly, Putin was seen as acceptable from a political perspective by dint of his seemingly atypical political calculations. While no vocal ally of the United States, Russia tacitly sympathized with the War on Terror. Rumbles over Afghanistan were considered par for the course. After all, they were coming out of Europe – and even usually silent China – anyway. When one also considers the institutional embarrassment associated with the Soviet-Afghan affair, it seemed merely as if Russia was puffing its chest; posture for the sake of posture, if you will. That analysis had other precursors, besides. The Russians under Putin were economically more conservative than their counterparts by stereotype. The “new old guard” in Moscow – of which Putin was technically the chief example – had stalled investment by the West, insisting that even if Russian progress was to come later rather than sooner, it would at least be predicated on Russian money. All in all, not that eccentric. Costly from the Western perspective but identifiable – and understandable – given the old Soviet love of self-strengthening and the obviously advantageous position that Siberian work would have virtually handed the United States (the chief foreign investor) no matter what. Such perceptions changed only recently.

And here begins the downward spiral. Putin was attractive for two main reasons (and one third, to which I will speak shortly): (1) his being in office meant that Russia nuclear weapons were probably safe and (2) Russian foreign policy had always been characterized with a particular apathy or non-involvement until 11 September 2001. But, in his great zeal for Russian – even if not Soviet – supremacy, will other high-technology items – or even information - fall into the wrong hands? We’ve already heard whispers that Russian missiles and infra-red imaging devices found their way into Saddam’s hands without credible explanation. Word has also begun to circulate that the GRU put great private stake in the War in Iraq; Russian generals are reported to have visited Baghdad shortly after the war for the sake of lending an advisory capability. There are of course more than only nuclear angles from which to approach the security situation. While proliferation is the most important, that by no means suggests Putin is anything close to a roundly desirable leader. Worse, Russia gained an ahistorical credibility after 1991. Putin made a masterstroke of using France as the anti-American mouthpiece this time around. He’s also gained the upper hand merely by being a foreign detractor of the United States. As part of the general peace movement, Putin represents not the Communists of Soviet heydays but a “globalist” voice seemingly more legitimate – in many eyes – than that of President George W. Bush. While Moscow and Beijing are still far easier to discredit for their “Red” and generally more anti-American ties than the French or Germans (and this was a minor third reason why Putin, as a former KGB leader, was also attractive), it doesn’t help matters that the old stigmas are fast dying hard. Perhaps our earlier identification of Putin as “predictable” beyond the point-of-view of an advocate of Russian power and centralization were thus incorrect. Sitting on the fence implies an inherent unpredictability. It’s an obvious benefit to any practitioner of realpolitik: no situation necessarily sets a precedent. Is an enemy – or even ally – any easier to tolerate when quickly labeled? The answer is clearly yes. We expected limited subterfuge from Putin, not outright attempts to cut desperate oil deals with Saddam Hussein or arm Iraqis until the final moments came. It was one thing to question our motives in New York and another to promise absolute veto. If you ask me, he might be leaning on the fence – but his feet are firmly planted in the opposing position. Looking back on matters now, I suppose I kind of appreciated Boris Yeltsin. At least the man who sidelined Gorbachav wasn’t able to consolidate and strategize on the level of his successor. Even if we had to worry a bit more about nuclear dissemination (nobody really knows how much), I’d still venture to say I liked Russia better under his guidance than under Putin’s.

[Sea Skimmer]

Putin might not be ideal for the US, but he's been a good leader for Russia. And really I believe the US is well served by a strong Russia, which can control the rogue elements within it and secure and clean up all its nuclear problems.

[Axis Kast]

The United States will in the future be served well by a strong Russia, but that's primarily because it helps balance out both China and the EU.

While I agree Putin has a positive effect on preventing proliferation, he certainly isn't making things all that hospitable for the United States at this point in time. He's not necessarily integral to the strong Russia of thirty years from now (per se) anyway.

[Edi]

The sooner Putin is out, the better. He's nothing but a jack-booted thug with a fake veneer of civility, and he's done his level best to strangle the possibility of a truly democratic Russia. The damage he has done will take a long time to repair. He's had some good moments, but they are far eclipsed by the bad.

Edi

[Pu-239]

Putin might not be ideal for the US, but he's been a good leader for Russia. And really I believe the US is well served by a strong Russia, which can control the rogue elements within it and secure and clean up all its nuclear problems.

I think it's the other way around. He's good for us, for the reasons mentioned above, but not good for Russia- ie clamping down on rights, etc.

[Admiral Johnason]

Prehaps Bush should take a harder line towards Putin in order to promote human and individual rights.

[Pu-239]

When have we done anything that does not suit our interests? Also, Shrubby probably agreed to look the other way or something as long as Putin gives the ok on the stupid ABM scheme. Of course with the hint of Russian involvement in Iraq...

[Vympel]

When have we done anything that does not suit our interests? Also, Shrubby probably agreed to look the other way or something as long as Putin gives the ok on the stupid ABM scheme. Of course with the hint of Russian involvement in Iraq...

No change in the American attitude right now. Hell, let's be honest, in Crawford Texas Putin whipped out his old KGB mind control kit ...