Stephen Zunes:"UNMOVIC director Hans Blix and IAEA director Mohamed El-Baradei have expressed concerns that Iraq was not sufficiently forthcoming in some potentially key areas, though they also noted areas where there had been a high level of cooperation in some other areas. This is far short of 'utter contempt.' Similarly, their mission is far from being a scavenger hunt, given the extensive records from the eight years of UN inspections during the 1990s. It is noteworthy that the UNSCOM inspectors did not find any more hidden materials during their last four years of operations despite expanding the scope of their searches. Though these inspectors were withdrawn under pressure from President Bill Clinton in late 1998 before they could complete their job, satellite surveillance and other intelligence gathering since then has given this new round of inspections -- which have an even tougher mandate regarding the timing and extent of their searches -- a good idea of where to look and what to look for. Furthermore, they have equipment that can detect radioactive isotopes and other telltale signs of WMD development at a great distance from their source. It is noteworthy that after insisting that Iraq's four-year refusal to allow UN weapons inspectors to return was cited as grounds for an invasion, the Bush Administration has suddenly challenged the inspectors' effectiveness since they resumed inspections. Furthermore, the United States has yet to put forward any proof that Iraq currently has any banned weapons."It is up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those weapons out for the world to see and destroy them as directed. Nothing like this has happened.
Glen Rangwala , a lecturer in politics at Cambridge University in Britain: "No, they didn't. The UNSCOM January 1999 report states that there is insufficient evidence that Iraq didn't produce this volume of anthrax spores. In short, if Iraq had used its fermentors at maximal capacity from the start of the industrial production of anthrax in September 1990 until the outbreak of war, it could have produced this amount of anthrax. The production log for 1990 at Iraq's bio-weapons factory, al-Hakam, indicates that Iraq did not operate its fermentors at maximal capacity. UNSCOM was not wholly confident of the accuracy of the production log, though it never explained why. However, there is no indication -- either in UNSCOM reports or in UNMOVIC statements -- that they actually believe Iraq produced this volume of anthrax. There is, again, a very large difference between what Iraq had the potential to produce in 1990, and what it is likely that it did actually produce."The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons materials sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax; --
Rangwala: "This is just plain wrong. Anthrax spores produced in 1990 were in liquid slurry form. They would have deteriorated markedly by the mid-1990s. The assessment by Professor Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is as follows: 'Anthrax spores are extremely hardy and can achieve 65 percent to 80 percent lethality against untreated patients for years. Fortunately, Iraq does not seem to have produced dry, storable agents and only seems to have deployed wet Anthrax agents, which have a relatively limited life." ["Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities" (1998), p.13]
Rangwala: "This is plain inaccurate. The only assessment of UNSCOM in this regard was in the January 1999 report, which stated that it could not account for 460kg of casein, the growth media for botulinum toxin. That would be enough to produce 1200 litres of the toxin. The U.S. has independently claimed that Iraq had more casein, but that is not -- and has never been -- the UN's assessment."The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin; enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure. He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.
Zunes: "This figure is far higher than most independent estimates. The former chief weapons inspector for UNSCOM stated that at least 95% of Iraq's chemical weapons had been accounted for and destroyed by 1998. With the embargo preventing the import of new materials, satellites eyeing possible sites for new production, and the return of UN inspectors, it is highly dubious that Iraq could develop an offensive chemical weapons arsenal, particularly since virtually all of their ballistic missiles capable of carrying such weapons have also been accounted for and destroyed.Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He's not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.
Of course, Shrub neglects to mention those 16 munitions did not have chemical agents in them, nor did they ever.U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them, despite Iraq's recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.
Rangwala: "The only defector who has gone public with this claim is Adnan Saeed al-Haideri. It's interesting to note that in his first press conference, he didn't make this claim at all. It was only after he was "debriefed" by an official from the Iraqi National Congress -- the group supported politically and financially by the Pentagon -- that he started making these claims."From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs.
Zunes: "True. What the president failed to mention is that in 1998 the International Atomic Energy Agency also reported that Iraq's nuclear capability had been completely dismantled. More recently, IAEA director El-Baradei, in his January 27 report to the UN Security Council, reported there was no evidence to suggest that Iraq had resumed its nuclear program."The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb.
The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.
Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
Intelligence sources indicate that Saddam Hussein has ordered that scientists who cooperate with UN inspectors in disarming Iraq will be killed, along with their families.
Rangwala: "There is absolutely no evidence for any of this. No evidence has been presented either by UNMOVIC or the U.S. to back up these claims."
Now clearly, the President's claims, the expectations of the military commanders, the repeated accusations, etc all point to the fact that there was no expectation evinced by anyone in the administration that Iraq had vast quantities of WMD, right Kast? After all, like you said, 'logically', it was all split into components- despite the claim that Iraq had authorized the use of chemical weapons to it's field commanders recently (that claim being made in February 2003)- which clearly can mean as far back as 1991 because as well all know you can use such a word in a 'geopolitical' sense, or that no such claim was made by the administration prior to the war, or that the US funneled information to UNMOVIC, which derided the information as useless.
It's crystal clear!
